

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.3.1.1.13 -----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Neutron detectors are excluded.</li> <li>2. For Functions 1.a and 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.</li> <li>3. For Function 2.e, the CHANNEL CALIBRATION only requires a verification of OPRM-Upscale setpoints in the APRM by the review of the "Show Parameters" display.</li> </ol> <p>-----</p> <p>Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.</p>	<p>24 months</p>
<p>SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.</p>	<p>24 months</p>
<p>SR 3.3.1.1.15 Verify Turbine Stop Valve—Closure, and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure—Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is <math>\geq</math> 30% RTP.</p>	<p>24 months</p>
<p>SR 3.3.1.1.16 Verify APRM OPRM-Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is <math>\geq</math> 30% RTP and recirculation drive flow is <math>&lt;</math> 60% of rated recirculation drive flow.</p>	<p>24 months</p>

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES,  
LCO, and  
APPLICABILITY

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10. Reactor Mode Switch—Shutdown Position (continued)

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on reactor mode switch position.

Four channels of Reactor Mode Switch—Shutdown Position Function, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Mode Switch—Shutdown Position Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn.

11. Manual Scram

The Manual Scram switch and push button channels provide signals, via the manual scram logic channels, to each of the four RPS logic channels that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provide manual reactor trip capability. This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is one Manual Scram switch and push button (with two channels) for each of the four RPS logic channels. In order to cause a scram it is necessary that at least one switch and push button in each trip system be actuated.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the switch and push buttons.

Eight channels of Manual Scram with two switch and push buttons (two channels per switch and push button) in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic (i.e., both channels of a switch and push button must be actuated), are available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn.

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