

July 6, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Beckner, Chief  
Technical Specifications Branch  
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Guy S. Vissing, Senior Project Manager, Section 1 */RAI/*  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF FITZPATRICK ITS BEYOND SCOPE ISSUES 10, 25,  
AND 26 RELATED TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
(RAI) IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (ITS) 3.6.1.2 (TAC NO.  
MA8129), RAI ITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) 3.5.3.5 & SR  
3.5.3.6 (TAC NO. MA8144) and RAI ITS SR 3.5.3.3 (TAC NO. MA8145)

By letter dated December 10, 1999, the NRC identified issues in RAI ITS 3.6.1.2 (TAC NO. MA8129), RAI ITS SR 3.5.3.5 & SR 3.5.3.6 (TAC NO. MA8144) and RAI ITS SR 3.5.3.3 (TAC NO. MA8145) that were beyond the scope of the Current Technical Specification (CTS) conversion to the ITS. The attached memorandum from Ralph Caruso, SRXB, dated June 27, 2000, Assession No. ML003726984, provides the safety evaluations (SEs) for these issues. Thus, as this provides the necessary SEs for these issues, we can close TAC Nos. MA8129, MA8144, and MA8145.

Docket No. 50-333

Attachment: As stated

July 6, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Beckner, Chief  
Technical Specifications Branch  
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Guy S. Vissing, Senior Project Manager, Section 1 */RA/*  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF FITZPATRICK ITS BEYOND SCOPE ISSUES 10, 25,  
AND 26 RELATED TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
(RAI) IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (ITS) 3.6.1.2 (TAC NO.  
MA8129), RAI ITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) 3.5.3.5 & SR  
3.5.3.6 (TAC NO. MA8144) and RAI ITS SR 3.5.3.3 (TAC NO. MA8145)

By letter dated December 10, 1999, the NRC identified issues in RAI ITS 3.6.1.2 (TAC NO. MA8129), RAI ITS SR 3.5.3.5 & SR 3.5.3.6 (TAC NO. MA8144) and RAI ITS SR 3.5.3.3 (TAC NO. MA8145) that were beyond the scope of the Current Technical Specification (CTS) conversion to the ITS. The attached memorandum from Ralph Caruso, SRXB, dated June 27, 2000, Assession No. ML003726984, provides the safety evaluations (SEs) for these issues. Thus, as this provides the necessary SEs for these issues, we can close TAC Nos. MA8129, MA8144, and MA8145.

Docket No. 50-333

Attachment: As stated

DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC  
PDI-1 R/F  
RidsNrrPMGVissing  
R.Caruso (e-mail)  
NLe (e-mail)

Accession Number: ML003727881

OFC	PM:PDI-1	LA:PDI-1	SC:PDI-1	SC:SRXB
NAME	GVissing	SLittle	JClifford for MGamberoni	RCaruso
DATE	7/5/00	7/6/00	7/6/00	7/5/00

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

June 27, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: G. Vissing, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing and Project Management

FROM: Ralph Caruso, Section Chief */RA/*  
BWR Systems & Performance Section  
Reactor Systems Branch  
Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

SUBJECT: FITZPATRICK IMPROVED STANDARD TECHNICAL  
SPECIFICATION CONVERSION (TAC#s MA8129,8144,8145)

Enclosed is a SRXB Safety Evaluation input approving the FitzPatrick conversion to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications. Please contact George Thomas at 415-1814 if you have any questions.

Enclosure  
As stated

DISTRIBUTION:

File Center  
SRXB R/F  
GHolahan  
JWermiel  
EAdensam  
RCaruso  
G.Thomas  
N.Le

SRXB:DSSA	SRXB:DSSA
GThomas	RCARUSO
06/21/00	06/27/00

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\JAF8144.WPD

ATTACHMENT

ENCLOSURE

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

NEWYORK POWER AUTHORITY

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 INTRODUCTION

As part of the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) program the New York Power Authority (NPA), the licensee for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP) submitted changes or revisions to their Custom Technical Specifications (CTS) on June 1, 1999. Licensees may change their CTS to the ISTS using the NRC approved, generic methodology. They may also use a combination of the previously approved CTS and the new ISTS as long as the CTS are more restrictive than the ISTS. However, if a licensee proposes changes to their CTS that are less restrictive than the ISTS they must have NRC review and approval. The CTS evaluated below are less restrictive than the ISTS requirements.

The licensee also proposed changes to the CTS that are more restrictive than the ISTS, and they are also included in this evaluation.

2.0 EVALUATION

3.5.3 RCIC SYSTEM

(a) SR 3.5.3.3 (MA8145)

The current TS requires that the RCIC testable check valves be tested for operability following any period of reactor cold shutdown exceeding 48 hours if not performed during the preceding 92 days. This requirement is proposed to be replaced by SR 3.5.3.3 which requires the test to be performed once each startup prior to exceeding 25 percent power. This requirement is not in the STS and the licensee wants to maintain the current check valve test requirement. The check valves need not be tested during cold shutdown. The valves need to be tested only during power operation. This is more restrictive than the current generic recommendation, and therefore is acceptable.

(b) SR 3.5.3.5 (MA8144)

The licensee proposed to change the pressure range for the periodic pump flow test (every 92 days) from 1195 psig -150 psig to 1040psig -970 psig. The recommended pressure range given is within the normal operating reactor pressure range. This is acceptable.

(c) SR 3.5.3.6 (MA8144)

The licensee proposed to separate the pump test at low reactor pressure from the test at high reactor pressure. The frequency of the test at low reactor pressure is changed from every 92 days to once in 24 months. Also, the test pressure is changed from 150 psig to 165 psig. These changes will ensure that the RCIC system is tested at both the high and low pressures at the proposed frequencies and is considered more restrictive on plant operation than the CTS but necessary to ensure RCIC remains operable over its full range. This is acceptable.

RHR system (MA8129)

3.4.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown

The proposed TS requires operation of two RHR shutdown cooling loops in Mode-3 with reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. This is more restrictive than the STS where operation of only one loop is required during special circumstances. The proposed SR 3.4.9.1 will require monitoring of RCS temperature every 30 minutes during RCS heatup and cooldown operations. The temperature can be monitored when either any RHR shutdown cooling system is in operation or any recirculation pump is in operation.

The licensee also proposed to delete the note in the STS which allows the removal of both shutdown cooling systems for up to 2 hours per 8 hour period. This is more restrictive than the STS and therefore is acceptable.

3.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.