

Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.

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June 28, 2000


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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE FACILITY
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.**

Reference: 1. Private Fuel Storage, "Aircraft Crash Impact Hazard at the Private Fuel Storage Facility," Rev. 3, dated June 17, 2000.

We are enclosing as an errata to Tab H of Revision 3 of the "Aircraft Crash Impact Hazard at the Private Fuel Storage Facility," June 17, 2000, a new page 14 to Tab H. The revised page is identified in the header as being revised June 28, 2000 and should replace the current page 14 in Tab H to the Report. We are filing this errata to correct an error, identified in our subsequent review of the Report, and to conform the data and information in the identified paragraphs with that described in the remainder of Tab H and set forth in the data tables attached thereto. The data, analysis and conclusions of Tab H remain unchanged.

Sincerely,



John L. Donnell
Project Director
Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.

Enclosure

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June 28, 2000

Jay Silberg
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ground during dark night low-level flight without visual references (lights) available on the ground.¹²

Gen. Cole, Gen. Jefferson, and Col. Fly assessed 16 accidents that occurred during the Takeoff and Landing phases of flight as being not relevant because their initiating causes were not random events that could occur during any phase of flight, but rather were specific to the Takeoff and Landing regime of flight. These 16 include such accidents as landing with the gear up, crashing immediately after takeoff because of a control problem, collision with trees 3.5 miles from the runway, midair collisions in the traffic pattern with landing aircraft, etc., which clearly are not relevant to Skull Valley transit flight

There were 6 accidents that occurred in the Normal Inflight phase of flight which were assessed as not relevant to Skull Valley transit. In three of the six, the pilots remained in control and were thus "Able to Avoid." These three accidents were assessed as not relevant to Skull Valley transit for the reasons noted in footnote 15. In the other three accidents, the pilot did not retain control. These three were assessed as not relevant to Skull Valley transit for reasons that are fully discussed in Section D.1. below.

Finally, there were 2 other accidents occurring in the Normal Inflight phase in which the pilot was not able to control the aircraft. These 2 accidents were conservatively assessed as being potentially relevant to Skull Valley flight, and therefore included in the category of "Skull Valley-Type Events." (These two accidents, on 25 May 90 and 4 April 91, are discussed in detail at the end of this Section and the reasons for this conclusion are set forth there).

Since the objective of this analysis is to understand and calculate the likelihood that a pilot in an accident relevant to Skull Valley transit would be left in control and with time

¹² The PFSF will be a large facility illuminated by lighting around its perimeter and within the storage area; this will provide a clear visual reference for pilots transiting Skull Valley. See Report, Section III.A.5.b. Thus, such accidents would not occur in the vicinity of the PFSF.