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June 22, 2000

SVP-00-090

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D C 20555

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Subject:

Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report

Please find enclosed the "Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report" for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This report contains summary information from June 1, 1999, through June 1, 2000. Revisions to docketed correspondence were processed using the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) 99-04, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes", dated July 1999.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. C.C. Peterson at (309) 654-2241, extension 3609.

Respectfully,

acouse P. Barnes. for

Joel P. Dimmette, Jr. Site Vice President Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

Attachment

CC:

Regional Administrator – NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

Attachment Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Revised Commitment Summary for June 1, 1999 through June 1, 2000 Page 1 of 2

Commitment	Date of	Original	Original	Revised	Basis For
Revision	Commitment	Document	Commitment	Commitment	Revision
Tracking No.	Revision 08/13/99	IED	"Two Prodefine Work Dominants for	Madified minting and fine ha	
		1-97-016	QCOS 6600-08 were implemented, one	changing the title to include both units	increased system challenges that would
			each for Units 1 and 2."	and changed the unit designator to $1/2$.	occur by the creation of separate
					Predefines. This surveillance has been
					since the original incident.
99-009	07/28/99	Letter to the	Attachment 2 (Page 9 of 11) "Response to	Changed to "Annual" Fire Attack,	During the past two years we have been
		Intro 1 1997	Questions 5-8 of R. M. Pulsiter Letter to I Johnson dated May 22 1997" the	Live Burn, from "Quarterly" Fire	able to reduce our fire vulnerabilities
		ESK-97-127	following statement was made: "2)		Calculations, lower Fire Risk Analysis and
			Quarterly Fire Attack, Live Burn"		plant improvements. This change meets
					the requirements of Branch Technical
					Appendix R.
99-010	12/09/99	LER	QCOP 1200-11 was revised to require	Delete requirement from QCOP 1200-	Remove unnecessary steps and save dose.
		1-99-002, Rev 01	RWCU system fill/vent before restarting RWCU numps anytime the system was	11 to fill/vent RWCU system if	The intent of fill/vent is to ensure pressure
		1.01.01	shutdown. These actions were to reduce	and system is still pressurized.	drained system when the system is started.
			the likelihood of introducing a water		If the system was off for a relatively short
			hammer event.		time and the system is still pressurized,
				- 	transients should not occur:
00-002	01/10/00	D. L. Farrar	The "annual" training provided to	Participants in the "annual" NGG hot	Revised commitment satisfies NFPA 51B,
		letter to H.	activities for hot work is cutting and	class may be exempt from	"Fire Prevention in use of Cutting and Welding Processes " and applicable
		R. Denton	welding) would include practice	extinguishing a small fire provided	OSHA educational and training
		(NRR),	extinguishing a small Class B test fire.	they have previously participated in a	requirements.
		uated June 14, 1984		nands-on practice session that	
				a portable extinguisher.	

Attachment Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Revised Commitment Summary for June 1, 1999 through June 1, 2000 Page 2 of 2

Commitment	Date of	Original	Original	Revised	Basis For
Tracking No.	Revision	Document	Commitment	Commitment	Revision
00-003	02/14/00	Verbal statement during an NRC meeting conducted on 3/12/98	"Replace Unit 1 Drywell Cooling Fan Discharge (backdraft) dampers during Q1R16.	Backdraft dampers will not be replaced. All Unit 1 backdraft dampers will be permanently locked open (1A, 1C, 1E, 1F, 1G), or replaced with a manual damper (1B and 1D), which will be locked open. (Note: the 1F and 1G dampers have been completed during Q1R15. The 1E damper was completed during Q1P02. 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D are scheduled for Q1R16.)	Experience gained during Q1R15 revealed that gravity type backdraft dampers do not work well in this system. All Unit 1 dampers will be mechanically held open instead.
00-004	02/14/00	Verbal statement during an NRC meeting conducted on 3/12/98	"Replace Unit 2 Drywell Cooling Fan Discharge (backdraft) dampers during Q2R15.	Backdraft dampers will not be replaced. All Unit 2 backdraft dampers have been permanently locked open (2A, 2C, 2E, 2F, 2G), or replaced with a manual damper. Dampers (2B and 2D) have been replaced with a manual damper and locked open.	Experience gained during Q1R15 revealed that gravity type backdraft dampers do not work well in this system. All Unit 2 dampers have been mechanically held open instead. This work was performed during Q2R15.
00-005	04/07/00	LER 75-019; AO 75-30; IR 75-13, LER 76-012; LER 84-10; LER 86-017	Commitments have been made over the years to apply locking devices (a.k.a. S- locks lead seals, security seals, wire seals) to various plant valves. Many have been on safety related instrument isolation valves as an additional step to maintain configuration control. It has not always been clear in these commitments, exactly which valves will be controlled by the locks.	ComEd Nuclear Generating Group (NGG) has developed standard procedures for Operational Configuration Control and the Locked Equipment Program. These procedures define a method by which Station Operations will determine which valves will require a locking device. They also require the stations to maintain a list of all locked valves. Station Operations currently maintain two lists of locked valves. 1) S-Lock List; 2) QOM's List.	Locked and lock-wired components are one method that plant configuration is controlled. Locks do not guarantee that a valve will not be mispositioned. Rather, they are a way of pointing out the safety significance of the valve to anyone planning on operating the valve. They also prompt the worker to think about the valve's position a second time before placing the lock on the valve. Detail in procedures on safety significance, required second verifier signatures and scheduled valve position verifications are other methods of plant configuration control. Operations owns plant configuration and will determine which components to lock or lock-wire.

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