



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

Nuclear Business Unit

JUN 14 2000

LRN-00-0233

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

**HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT NO. 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 00-008-00**

Dear Sir:

This Licensee Event Report entitled, "Unplanned High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation During System Warm-up," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark Bezilla".

Mark Bezilla
Vice President –
Operations

Attachment

JPP

C Distribution
LER File

The power is in your hands.

Handwritten initials "IE22" in black ink, located in the bottom right corner of the page.

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)	

FACILITY NAME (1) Hope Creek Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000354	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
---	--------------------------------------	---------------------------

TITLE (4)
 Unplanned High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation During System Warm-up

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	22	00	00	008	00	06	14	00	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	2	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)		
POWER LEVEL (10)	4%	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71		
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER		
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A		
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Jim Priest, Licensing Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 856-339-5434
---	---

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On May 22, 2000, Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 2, Startup, following its ninth refueling outage (RFO9). With reactor power at approximately 4 percent and reactor coolant system pressure at about 200 psig, operators had initiated warming of the High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) steam line to place it in a standby alignment. At 2338 hours, when the bypass valve was throttled open, an isolation signal was unexpectedly received from the HPCI high steam flow logic channel and the bypass valve appropriately closed. The apparent cause of the HPCI isolation was spurious steam line pressure perturbations resulting from a steam/condensate interface in the HPCI steam line during the warm-up due to personnel error. In accordance with procedures, operators determined that an actual steam line break had not occurred and reset the HPCI system isolation signal. Operators then successfully completed the warm-up of the HPCI steam lines. The Corrective Action Program will continue to be used to evaluate personnel performance related to the event to determine appropriate corrective actions.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Hope Creek Generating Station	05000354	00	-- 008 --	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI), Isolation Valve - EIIS Identifier {BJ/ISV}*

* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Event Date: May 22, 2000
Discovery Date: May 22, 2000

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 (STARTUP). No structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the time of the occurrence that contributed to the event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On May 22, 2000, Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 2, Startup, following its ninth refueling outage (RFO9). With reactor power at approximately 4 percent and reactor coolant system pressure at about 200 psig, licensed operators had initiated warming of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line to place it in a standby alignment. Prior to this evolution, the HPCI steam line was isolated from the reactor by three containment isolation valves (an inboard valve, an outboard valve, and a bypass valve in a line around the inboard isolation valve used during steam line warm-ups). As part of the steam line warm-up procedure, the outboard isolation valve was fully opened and the inboard bypass valve was throttled to slowly heat up and pressurize the HPCI steam line (once the steam line is pressurized, the inboard isolation valve is then opened). At 2338 hours, when the bypass valve was throttled open, an isolation signal was unexpectedly received from the HPCI high steam flow logic channel and the bypass valve appropriately closed.

In accordance with procedures, licensed operators determined that an actual steam line break had not occurred and reset the HPCI system isolation signal. Licensed operators then successfully completed the warm-up of the HPCI steam lines. The HPCI steam line isolation due to the sensed high HPCI steam line flow conditions is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation, which was reported to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Hope Creek Generating Station	05000354	00	-- 008 --	00	3 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of the HPCI isolation was spurious steam line pressure perturbations resulting from a steam/condensate interface in the HPCI steam line during the warm-up due to personnel error. Verifications of HPCI steam line valve positions prior to the event identified that a manual maintenance isolation valve in the bypass line, which would normally be open prior to HPCI steam line warming, was closed. This valve configuration may have caused excessive condensation to remain in the bypass line, resulting in the aforementioned pressure perturbations. The perturbations sensed by the inboard isolation logic were sufficient to cause a HPCI isolation signal.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS

The HPCI Isolation Actuation Instrumentation is required to be operable during Operational Conditions 1 through 3 (Power Operation through Hot Shutdown). The components actuated by the HPCI inboard isolation signal responded as designed. There was no impact to the public health and safety. There were no actual safety consequences associated with this condition.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

LERs 96-010-00, 96-025-00, 97-031-00 and 99-010-00 documented occurrences in which the RCIC system received an isolation signal when a RCIC steam line warm-up was in progress due to sensed low steam line pressures. During this period, the HPCI system did not experience any isolations during steam line warm-ups.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. On May 23, 2000, after receipt of the HPCI isolation signal, licensed operators determined that an actual steam line break had not occurred. The isolation signal was then re-set and the warm-up of the HPCI steam lines was successfully completed.
2. The Corrective Action Program will continue to be used to evaluate personnel performance issues related to the event to determine appropriate corrective actions.

COMMITMENTS

The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.