

September 4, 1998

Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer, Unit 2
c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus, Director
Regulatory Affairs for Millstone Station
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

SUBJECT: RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

Dear Mr. Bowling:

This letter is to inform you of the fifth revision and update to the NRC's Millstone Restart Assessment Plan (RAP) (see Enclosure). The plan has been revised to document the closeout of restart assessment activities for Millstone Unit 3. Final status of the MC-0350, "Restart Approval Checklist"; the Significant Items List (SIL); and Licensing Issues Required for Restart for Unit 3 are attached. The RAP has also been revised to maintain the historical perspective while adding a current status, where applicable, to reflect recent activities by both the NRC and the Millstone organization for Unit 3. In addition, the minutes of the Millstone Restart Panel, which show the basis for panel decisions concerning the restart of Unit 3, are attached. In some of these minutes, issues concerning Units 1 and 2 are also discussed. Based on the enclosed information and other referenced documents, the restart of Unit 3 was authorized on June 29, 1998, by separate correspondence from the NRC's Executive Director for Operations.

In a letter dated July 21, 1998, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company notified the NRC that it has determined to permanently cease operations at Millstone Unit 1. For this reason, Millstone Unit 1 is hereby deleted from the Restart Assessment Plan. The Unit 1 SIL, the MC-0350 Checklist and Unit 1 licensing issues are no longer applicable. However, some issues contained in the SIL and some licensing issues may still require resolution. You will be notified by separate correspondence of open regulatory and licensing issues that must still be resolved. References to Unit 1 will remain in the applicable historical sections of the Restart Assessment Plan to maintain the proper historical perspective for the restart assessment process.

A future revision of the Millstone Restart Assessment Plan, will address and update the plan for Unit 2.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Wayne D. Lanning at 610-337-5126 or Mr. Jacque P. Durr at 610-337-5224.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Wayne D. Lanning
Director of Inspections
Millstone Inspection Directorate

9809160145 980904
CF ADDCK 05000245
CF

1/1
IX50

Enclosure: As stated

Docket Nos. 50-245 and 50-423

cc w/encl:

- B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer - Nuclear Group
- M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Operations
- J. McElwain, Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 2
- J. Streeter, Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight
- P. D. Hinnenkamp, Director - Unit 3
- J. A. Price, Director - Unit 2
- D. Amerine, Vice President - Human Services
- E. Harkness, Director, Unit 1 Operations
- J. Althouse, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group
- F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services
- J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training (CT)
- S. J. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
- L. M. Cuoco, Esquire
- J. R. Egan, Esquire
- V. Juliano, Waterford Library
- J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control
- S. B. Comley, We The People
- State of Connecticut SLO Designee
- D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
- R. Bassilakis, CAN
- J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN
- S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
- Representative T. Concannon
- E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC

DOCUMENT NAME: A:\RAPU3.V5

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE	RI/SPO	RI/SP6	/				
NAME	JPDURR/db	WDLANNING					
DATE	09/2/98	09/4/98	09/ /98	09/ /98	09/ /98	09/ /98	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

**MILLSTONE
RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN**

References:

- (a) **SECY-98-090, Memorandum from L. J. Callan (EDO) for the Commissioners, "Selected Issues Related to Recovery of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3", Dated April 14, 1998.**
- (b) **SECY-98-0119, Memorandum from L.J. Callan (EDO) for the Commissioners, "Remaining Issues Related to Recovery of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3", Dated May 28, 1998.**

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 HISTORICAL

The three Millstone units shut down to formulate responses to a series of 10 CFR 50.54 (f) letters requiring them to affirm their compliance with the conditions of each unit's license and the regulations. During May-June, 1996, the NRC performed a series of inspections at Units 2 and 3 with a 20—person Special Inspection Team (SIT) to ascertain the extent of their compliance. Currently, the results of those inspections are under assessment by the team and NRC management. The licensee initially focussed on Unit 3 as the lead plant for restart. However, as a result of a licensee reorganization which occurred on October 1, 1996, each Millstone unit was assigned a recovery manager who was an executive on temporary loan from another nuclear utility. Resources originally assigned to Unit 3 from the other units were returned to their respective units. Each unit has been tasked with establishing their own restart plan and whichever unit is ready will apply to restart first. Hence this restart assessment plan has been expanded to include Manual Chapter (MC)—0350 evaluations (see paragraph 3.0) for all three units.

On June 28, 1996, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) issued a letter to the licensee that stated the Commission had decided to make the three Millstone units a Category 3 on the Watch List and would vote on the restart of the Millstone units. It is the intent to implement the appropriate aspects of NRC Manual Chapter 0350, "Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval" for the restart of all three units. The NRC will schedule and implement its inspection program after the licensee has indicated that the individual activities necessary for restart are complete and ready for inspection.

The NRC has been dealing with Northeast Utilities on broader performance issues which go beyond the 10 CFR 50.54(f) concerns. These broader concerns are considered contributory causes for the current poor performance, which the 10 CFR 50.54(f) issues are a subset. These issues have been formalized by the licensee in a program titled "Improving Station Performance" (ISP) and are topics that will be

addressed by the licensee and reviewed by the NRC Millstone Restart Assessment Panel. A meeting was conducted on April 30, 1996, and disclosed that the licensee was not adequately managing the program or tracking progress.

The salient concerns embodied in the ISP include leadership, communications (employee concerns), the corrective action program, procedural adherence and procedure upgrades, work planning and control, and operational enhancements. The NRC Restart Assessment Plan will focus on the broader issues of the ISP and licensee self—assessments and management oversight, recognizing the necessity to ensure adequate closure of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) process. The NRC plan for inspection of the Improving Station Performance issues is discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this plan.

On November 3, 1996, the agency established the Special Projects Office (SPO) to consolidate NRC efforts under a single Senior Executive Service (SES) manager, who reports to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The Director, SPO assumed the authority and responsibilities of the Regional Administrator and the Associate Director of Projects.

1.2 CURRENT STATUS

The NRC performed a Corrective Actions "40500" inspection in early February, 1998; and performed an operational safety team inspection (OSTI) in early April, 1998. Based on the results of those inspections, inspections in other areas as will be described below, and completion of the MC-0350 evaluations for Unit 3 the Executive Director for Operations authorized restart of Unit 3 on June 29, 1998. Restart of Unit 3 commenced on June 30, 1998.

2.0 10 CFR 50.54(F) ACTIVITIES

2.1 HISTORICAL

Each Millstone unit was requested to submit information describing actions taken to ensure that future operations will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the Final Safety Analysis Report. In a May 21, 1996, letter, the NRC requested Northeast Utilities (NU) to provide for each unit its plan for completing the licensing bases reviews.

To aid in NRC understanding of how deficiencies were identified and dispositioned, the NRC's May 21, 1996, letter also requested that NU provide for each Millstone unit a comprehensive list of design and configuration deficiencies and information related to how each deficiency was identified and would be dispositioned.

On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP). The independent

effort will verify the adequacy of NU's efforts to establish adequate design bases and design controls, including translation of the design bases into operating procedures and maintenance and testing practices, verification of system performance, and implementation of modifications since issuance of the initial facility operating licenses. The NRC oversight of the ICAVP and activities will be in addition to the activities described in this Restart Assessment Plan. The results from this program will be incorporated into this restart plan and considered a significant part of the decision regarding recommended restart.

2.2 CURRENT STATUS

The NRC has completed its inspections of the licensee's ICAVP process. Certain deficiencies were observed during these inspections. The licensee has taken corrective actions and two ICAVP corrective action inspections have been completed to review licensee actions. SECY 98-0119, issued on May 28, 1998, described the completion of the ICAVP process and concluded that: "...the Unit 3 ICAVP has been satisfactorily performed and the results of the ICAVP and the staff's oversight provide reasonable assurance that Unit 3 is in compliance with its design and licensing basis."

3.0 INSPECTION MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 PROCESS

3.0.1 HISTORICAL

Millstone Unit 1 entered a routine refueling outage on November 3, 1995. On December 13, 1995, the NRC sent a "Demand for Information Letter" (10 CFR 50.54(f)) requiring the licensee to certify compliance with the regulatory requirements before restarting the unit. At the January 1996 Senior Management Meeting, the site was placed on the "Watch List" for various reasons, including a concern for regulatory compliance. Subsequently, Millstone Units 2 and 3 were sent similar letters which required responses before restart.

The NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) -0350, "Staff Guidelines For Restart Approval", provides guidelines and a list of tasks and activities that must be considered before a plant that has been shutdown for cause can restart. Because of NRC concerns relating to the licensee's management effectiveness, the appropriate aspects of MC 0350 will be applied to the restart of Units 1, 2, and 3 to ensure applicable requirements have been met.

The Director, SPO and the Director of NRR, in coordination with the Executive Director for Operations, will make a recommendation regarding restart.

3.0.2 CURRENT STATUS

The recommendation to allow restart of Millstone Unit 3 was made to the Commission through the issuance of SECY 98-0119 and a public briefing of the

Commission on June 2, 1998. The Commission subsequently voted to authorize restart for Millstone Unit 3. A staff requirements memorandum was issued on June 15, 1998, permitting the EDO to authorize restart pending completion of the MC-0350 process. Enclosure (2) documents the Closure of MC-0350 Process for Unit 3. As noted above, restart of Unit 3 was subsequently authorized by the EDO on June 29, 1998.

3.1 SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE

3.1.1 HISTORICAL

The SPO was created on November 3, 1996, to oversee the restart of the Millstone units. The plan was to consolidate the NRC resources devoted to the restart efforts under one SES manager. The office is organized into three primary elements, licensing, inspection, and independent corrective action oversight. The Licensing Branch will administer the typical licensing actions performed in NRR; the Inspection Branch will implement the inspection programs, normally managed from the region, and the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight Branch will oversee the licensee's licensing and design bases review process.

Within the SPO, the Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) will meet to assess the licensee's performance and their progress in completing the designated restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO (chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and Independent Corrective Actions Verification Program Oversight; the Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the Inspection Branch Chief; the Senior Resident Inspectors for the three Millstone units; and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The function of the Millstone RAP is described in MC-0350.

3.1.2 CURRENT STATUS

The Millstone RAP has been meeting on a regular basis since its inception and will remain active until superseded. The minutes of the RAP are attached as Enclosure (4). It is the intent of the Commission as described in the June 15, 1998, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to demobilize the Special Projects Office. The staff has been directed to submit an SPO demobilization plan by September 1, 1998.

3.2 MILLSTONE OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN

3.2.1 HISTORICAL

On July 2, 1996, NU submitted the Unit 3 Operational Readiness Plan, which was discussed at the July 24, 1996, meeting and updated at the August 19, 1996, meeting. However, the licensee has replaced all of the senior managers (President, Vice Presidents, and two of the three unit directors) in the recent past. With these replacements, the submitted plans for Unit 3 and the proposed plans for Units 1 and

2 are being changed substantially. The RAP will review these plans and hold periodic meetings with NU, open to the public, to discuss the schedule for implementation and coordination of NRC restart activities. Since July 2, 1996, NU has periodically updated its Operational Readiness Plan and submitted it to the NRC.

The deficiency lists associated with the restart plans for each unit, which will be updated periodically by the licensee, includes restart and deferred items, and will be audited by the NRC to verify the acceptability of the criteria used to defer items from the restart list.

3.2.2 CURRENT STATUS

The NRC has been holding meetings with the licensee, which are open to the public to discuss restart activities. The NRC also has been holding periodic meetings directly with the public to obtain comments concerning the Millstone Restart Plan and to answer questions.

Prior to restart, the NRC SPO has been holding meetings with the licensee management at least twice a week to discuss readiness for restart and the resolution of emerging technical issues. The EDO was informed by SPO of satisfactory resolution of all technical issues which may impact restart of Unit 3. Based on this notification, the EDO authorized restart of Unit 3.

3.3 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM

3.3.1 HISTORICAL

The NU corrective action program has been weak in ensuring comprehensive and effective corrective actions. There are many instances of narrowly focused corrective actions that failed to embrace all aspects of the underlying problem. Additionally, the licensee has failed to follow up on corrective actions to ensure they were effective. Consequently, the RAP has determined that any restart effort should examine the current state of the licensee's corrective action program. Because of the large number of Condition Reports (CR) [Note: CRs were previously called Adverse Condition Reports] being identified by the licensee's staff, the resident and regional inspection staff will concentrate on issues for each unit identified by the CR process and audit the licensee's corrective actions for completeness. The staff is periodically selecting CRs for review, based on the licensee's assigned level of importance, or their risk significance, as perceived by the resident staff. Additionally, other CR's will be examined to provide a spectrum of safety significant and lessor risk issues. These selected CR's will be added to the SIL for each unit, (The final Millstone 3 SIL is Enclosure (1) to this plan). The intent is to primarily assess the corrective action program while dealing with the safety significant technical issues. Examination of the corrective action program needs to review the Action Requests (AR) from the Action Item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS) program, which is an extension of the CR process, and

commitments regarding violations and inspection items. Further, a significant input to assessing the licensee's corrective action program is derived from the normal inspection program where valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of corrective actions are routinely collected from the technical safety inspections.

Additionally, the NRC Independent Corrective Action Verification Oversight Branch will assess the licensee's corrective actions for degraded and non-conforming conditions. Finally, the Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) will audit portions of the corrective action process during the course of its activities.

Demonstration of improvements in the process will be judged by the completeness of the licensee's corrective actions for each of the inspected CRs. There must be a high ratio of successfully completed CR's to the total population inspected. There should only be minor comments regarding the processing, evaluation, directed corrective actions and closure of an issue.

3.3.2 CURRENT STATUS

The licensee's corrective action processes were significantly reviewed by both the 40500 and OSTI inspections. Based on these and other NRC inspections SECY 98-0199 concluded the following: "...Though the staff's observations indicate that the licensee's corrective action program is adequate to support restart of Unit 3, the effectiveness of the corrective action program can be more completely assessed by evaluating long term performance. In view of this and the licensee's historical problems in maintaining an effective corrective action program after the plant has been in a normal mode of operation for a period of time. This evaluation includes assessing the effectiveness with which the licensee addresses [its] deferred items list, which was discussed in SECY-98-090. Therefore, the staff will assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program in about 1 year by performing another team inspection using IP 40500..."

3.4 WORK PLANNING AND CONTROLS (C.4.)¹

3.4.1 HISTORICAL

Work planning and controls are other areas that the licensee has shown a weakness. The ability to plan, control, and complete work is fundamental to achieving adequate corrective actions. Effective work planning and controls are prerequisites for reducing and managing backlogs. Weak work planning and control were evident during the Unit 2 outage, wherein, tagging boundary violations resulted in an extensive effort by the licensee to correct. Work control and planning were also issues at Unit 1, which resulted in a management meeting.

¹ Reference to applicable MC—0350 section

There will be a complete review of the Automated Work Order (AWO) process by the resident or regional staffs. The automated work order process is an integral part of the work planning and control system and is instrumental in establishing the scope of the work, providing the appropriate procedures, and establishing the tagging boundaries. The OSTI will assess the engineering and maintenance backlogs during its operational readiness inspection and will determine if there are safety significant issues that must be resolved before restart.

3.4.2 CURRENT STATUS

The OSTI performed an in depth review of the Unit 3 work planning and control process. Based on this inspection, SECY 98-0119 stated the following: "...The staff concluded that the work planning and scheduling process is adequate to support plant restart. It was determined that the noted inefficiencies in the work planning and scheduling process were not adversely affecting plant safety and that the root causes for the performance weaknesses had been identified by the licensee and program improvements were being implemented...A recent issue occurred that indicates the need for the licensee to continue to emphasize the importance of work planning and control...The licensee's response to this issue, including a site-wide stand down, [was] an example of senior management's continued emphasis on safe operations."

3.5 PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM (C.3.3.e)

3.5.1 HISTORICAL

The quality and adherence to procedures has been a chronic problem at the Millstone site. The issue was an element in "Improving Station Performance" and was one of the subjects of discussion at the periodic meetings between NU and the NRC. In response to NRC concerns, the licensee developed the Procedure Upgrade Program (PUP) in the early 1990's to improve station procedures.

The resident inspectors will relate procedural inspection findings back to the procedural upgrade program (PUP), identifying whether the procedures reviewed during the course of an inspection have been upgraded and characterize the quality of the document. This will provide an input for assessing the effectiveness of the licensee's PUP. The NRC staff will develop an inspection plan for examining selected portions of each unit's individual efforts.

3.5.2 CURRENT STATUS

As of January, 1998, the licensee had essentially completed the PUP for Unit 3. The NRC performed a series of inspections of the PUP starting in August, 1996, and ending in August, 1997. These inspections determined that the licensee had met most of its commitments made to the NRC in a June 4, 1992, letter, particularly in standardizing the format of station procedures and reducing the number of higher

tiered procedures.

The NRC inspection process for procedure upgrade has been concluded for Unit 3. Based on a series of NRC inspections SECY 98-0119 concludes the following: "...Recent inspections by the NRC have verified that most of the commitments made in the letter of June 4, 1992, were met. As of May 1998, the Unit 3 PUP has been essentially completed except for two procedures [which will be updated by Mode 2, plant startup]. Additional insights regarding procedure quality have been obtained through three NRC ICAVP inspections of the licensee's [Configuration Management Program] (CMP). The three inspections reviewed a combined total of 97 licensee procedures, and only minor problems were identified. In addition, the OSTI reviewed the adequacy and implementation of procedures during operations in Modes 4 and 3 (plant non-critical heat up). The OSTI concluded that the quality of operating procedures was good...Also, recent licensee performance indicators...indicate acceptable performance in both the areas of procedure performance and technical adequacy of procedures...[Based on these NRC inspections and the licensee's own evaluations], [the staff considers the current condition and use of procedures to be adequate to support the restart of Unit 3.]"

3.6 OVERSIGHT (C.1.4)

3.6.1 HISTORICAL

The licensee has identified its oversight function as deficient through self—assessments and external and internal audits and as a contributing factor in the licensee's declining performance. The report of Assessment of Past Ineffectiveness of Independent Oversight by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), examined the failure of Quality Assessment Services, the Independent Safety Evaluation Group, and the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) to identify the deficient FSAR control process and the radioactive waste conditions. They found that management did not support these functions adequately.

In addition, the Joint Utilities Management Association (JUMA) issued its report on July 17, 1996. One conclusion was that the quality assurance (QA) program audits, surveillances, and inspections were not effective in the implementation of their mission and resolution of identified problems. In addition, the JUMA audit found that recommendations for improving QA effectiveness identified in previous QA internal and external assessments have not been addressed.

The NRC assessment of the nuclear oversight function is addressed as part of the RAP's review of the ISP program and through insights gained from the normal inspection program. In addition, the NRC will perform a special inspection of the oversight function using the services of its Human Factors Assessment group. Late in the restart process for each unit, there will be an inspection to evaluate the effectiveness of the oversight groups and management's utilization of the oversight process. There should be positive indications that the oversight function has been

made an integral part of the licensee's management team assessment process. The oversight function should result in meaningful findings, have access to line management, and provide assessments of process and program effectiveness through periodic reports. There should be evidence that the reports are forwarded to the responsible manager and that they have dealt with the contents appropriately. Oversight should be adequately staffed with qualified and experienced personnel. The audit and surveillance programs need to be clearly defined, proceduralized, and implemented with established schedules.

3.6.2 CURRENT STATUS

Both the 40500 and OSTI inspections performed extensive reviews of the current function of the Nuclear Oversight organization. Both inspections determined that Nuclear Oversight is more effective than in the past and was more involved in day to day plant activities. Significant improvement has been made in this area since serious deficiencies were noted in an assessment performed in 1996 by a Joint Utilities Management Assessment. SECY 98-090, states, in part, "...The NRC staff concludes that oversight is adequate to support the restart of Millstone Unit 3 based on (1) the reorganization and replacement of key managers within NNECO and specifically NOS; (2) the promulgation of improved management expectations; (3) the establishment of open communications between the line and NOS and within NOS; (4) the completion of staffing and improved quality and training of the NOS staff; (5) development of a viable inspection and audit program; (6) demonstrated improvements in NOS problem identification and assurance that corrective actions are implemented; (7) improved performance of quality control inspectors; (8) credible performance by the safety committees; and (9) an effective self-assessment program."

3.7 ENFORCEMENT

3.7.1 HISTORICAL

Outstanding enforcement items will be reviewed by the resident inspectors to determine if any issues require closure before plant restart. The Agency is currently accumulating escalated enforcement items concerning design bases issues which may require licensee response before recommending restart of each unit. There are also potential enforcement items that will result from the efforts of the Office of Investigations, the allegation process review group, the Office of the Inspector General, the Special Inspection Team, routine resident and regional inspection efforts, and the 10 CFR 2.026 petition process.

A Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference was held with the licensee on December 5, 1996, to discuss 64 individual apparent violations. The licensee did not contest any of the violations at the conference, and the staff is in the process of finalizing the enforcement package. Once enforcement actions have been taken, the NRC will evaluate the licensee's corrective action to those enforcement actions

which are determined to impact restart of each unit.

3.7.2 CURRENT STATUS

From January 1996 to December 1997, 51 potential escalated enforcement items (EElS) (37 in 1996 and 14 in 1997) were identified at Millstone Unit 3 as a result of NRC inspection activities. As noted above, the Unit 3 EElS identified in 1996 along with EElS identified from January 1995 to December 1996 for Units 1 and 2 also were discussed in the December 1996 enforcement conference. Subsequently, a \$2.1 million civil penalty was issued to NNECO on December 10, 1997, which included violations applicable to all three units.

For those EElS which were not included in the December, 1996 civil penalty some were issued as severity level IV violations; some were determined, upon further review, not to be violations; some were granted enforcement discretion and others were still under evaluation by the NRC. In 1997, for Unit 3, one additional civil penalty was issued; and, in 1998 another severity level 3 violation was issued with no civil penalty. Additional review in 1998, caused the issuance of further notices of enforcement discretion for EElS identified from 1995 through the early part of 1998.

SECY 90-0119 noted the following: "...[For Unit 3], [the corrective actions implemented by the licensee for the majority of the enforcement items issued in 1996-1998 have been evaluated by the staff and have been determined to be adequate. Prior to restart, the corrective actions for those issues that have not yet been assessed by the staff will be reviewed for both adequacy of corrective actions and any potential impact on the licensee's capability to safely conduct plant restart and sustained power operations." The Unit 3 SIL (Enclosure (1)) identifies inspection activities updating and closing EElS identified in 1996 and certain 1997 EElS (no 1995 EElS were identified for Unit 3 during 1995).

3.8 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS

3.8.1 HISTORICAL

The Millstone site has had a chronic problem in dealing effectively with employee concerns. These problems have been documented in several licensee assessments, audits, and internal task group studies. The NRC continues to receive an inordinate quantity of allegations from the staff at the Millstone site. The current series of 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters were initiated due to NRC concerns regarding design basis issues at Millstone, as well as an allegation, and a subsequent Millstone 10 CFR 2.206 petition, dealing with the Unit 1 spent fuel pool. The NRC has issued two enforcement actions for harassment and intimidation to NU in the past three years.

In a September 1996 report, "Millstone Independent Review Group Regarding Millstone Station and NRC Handling of Employee Concerns and Allegations," the

NRC staff determined that, in general, an unhealthy work environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not welcome nor promote a questioning attitude, has existed at the Millstone plants for the past several years. This poor environment resulted in repeated instances of discrimination and ineffective handling of employee concerns.

The NRC initiated two task groups to examine the Northeast Utilities handling of employee concerns, and the recent layoffs that affected several previous allegers. The task group examined NU's handling of employee concerns and identified a number of root causes for the licensee's problems in this area. The task group also concluded that past problems and their root causes still remain. The output from these two task groups and the licensee's response to the order will be reviewed for restart issues.

On October 24, 1996, the director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), issued an Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) requiring specific actions to resolve problems in the process for handling employee safety concerns at the Millstone station. The Order required NNECO to develop, submit for NRC review, and implement a comprehensive plan for (a) reviewing and dispositioning safety issues raised by its employees, and (b) ensuring that employees who raise safety concerns can do so without fear of retaliation. On January 31, 1997, NNECO submitted the plan to the NRC and began implementation of elements of the Plan.

The Order further required NNECO to submit, for NRC approval, a proposed independent, third-party oversight program (ITPOP) organization, to oversee implementation of NNECO's Plan. On December 23, 1996, NNECO submitted the proposed third-party organization, Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), to the NRC. On April 7, 1997, the NRC approved LHC as the third-party organization. The Order specified that once approved, the third-party organization develops and submits for NRC approval an oversight plan for conduct of their activities. On May 2, 1997, LHC submitted the third-party oversight plan to the NRC for approval. On July 15, 1997, the NRC reviewed and approved the ITPOP oversight plan. As specified in the Order, independent, third-party oversight will continue to be implemented until NNECO demonstrates, by its performance, that the conditions which led to the requirements of the oversight have been corrected.

The effectiveness of NNECO programs and program implementation associated with fostering and maintaining a SCWE and for handling employee safety concerns will be assessed by NRC staff relying substantially on the findings of ITPOP's oversight activities. Staff will direct its limited resources to evaluation of a sample of NNECO programs and activities and on review of ITPOP oversight activities. This approach will provide the staff with independent assessment of the effectiveness of NNECO programs as well as establishing confidence in ITPOP's findings.

3.8.2 CURRENT STATUS

The NRC has made an interim evaluation of Millstone's current program of evaluating employee concerns and maintaining a safety conscious work environment (SCWE). SECY 98-090 documents the final NRC conclusions in this area and applies to all three units. Unless emerging issues arise, this area is closed for all three units. SECY 98-090 states, in part, the following: "...Based on review of documentation, monitoring of NNECO activities, NRC team [inspection] evaluations, and consideration of LHC findings, the NRC concludes that the NNECO's ECP and SCWE are established and functioning effectively at Millstone. Employee concerns are prioritized based on safety significance, identities are protected, case resolution is timely and there is appropriate follow-up on corrective action adequacy. Further, significant improvements have been made in the training provided the employees and contractors regarding SCWE and ECP...The staff also considers that NNECO has developed adequate plans, following restart of a unit, for monitoring the sites safety environment...The staff [also] concludes that NNECO's programs for handling safety issues raised by employees, and in ensuring that employees who raise safety concerns are not discriminated against have significantly improved and are sufficient for the licensed operation of Millstone Unit 3. The staff notes that in accordance with the October 24, 1996, Order, the independent third party oversight organization will continue at Millstone until the licensee demonstrates by its performance that the conditions, which led to the requirement of the oversight, have been corrected to the satisfaction of the NRC. The staff anticipates that at least 6 months beyond restart will be required to evaluate the licensee's continuing performance in the ECP/SCWE areas."

3.9 SIGNIFICANT ITEMS LIST

3.9.1 HISTORICAL

The technique to be used for the restart will be to reach agreement with the licensee on its restart issues list, have it impose controls on adding or deferring items from the list, have the resident inspectors review the list to ensure it includes issues of interest to the NRC, and have the residents review the deferred list to ensure appropriate rationales for deferral have been documented (see item B.4.3. of MC 0350). As a result of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) activities, the licensee initially determined that, for all three Millstone units, hundreds of items did not meet criteria for inclusion as a restart item. The resident inspectors, augmented by headquarters staff, are reviewing these lists periodically and confirming that the licensee is performing an adequate assessment of the discrepancies. This process will be used in the restart assessment of each unit. The RAP will determine that licensee's restart issues list includes appropriate restart items from the licensee's programs such as ACR, AR (AITTS), engineering work requests, and commitments.

The enclosed NRC Significant Items Lists for all Millstone units contain some of the items that are being used to audit and evaluate licensee programs (e.g., the corrective action process) and significant safety/regulatory technical issues.

Restart issues on the NRC's Significant Items List will meet at least one of the following criteria:

1. Resolution of the issue is required to ensure safe operation of the facility to include satisfaction of the technical specifications or licensing basis.
2. Inspection of the issue will provide an insight to an identified programmatic deficiency such as the corrective action system.
3. Inspection of the issue will provide assessment of management effectiveness or personnel performance.

3.9.2 CURRENT STATUS

The SIL for Unit 3 (Enclosure 1) has been completed and all significant items have been closed. Applicable inspection reports or other NRC documents both updating and closing each SIL item are listed in the SIL status column.

3.10 POWER ASCENSION INSPECTION

3.10.1 HISTORICAL

Selected portions of NRC MC-93802, "Operational Safety Team Inspection," will provide the framework for a team inspection of each unit during the restart process. The procedure scope will be modified to address the pertinent issues at Millstone. The inspection will cover self-assessments by the licensee, the licensee's implementation of its startup plan, control room observations during the approach to criticality and power ascension, selected systems readiness inspection and observation of management oversight.

The resident inspectors will provide close monitoring of each unit during mode changes to ensure compliance with each unit's technical specifications and FSAR design bases.

3.10.2 CURRENT STATUS

As a final check before the staff could recommend restart of Unit 3, the staff conducted an inspection (the OSTI) to verify that plant operations were being conducted safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The staff verified that the organization that control and support plant operations was functioning effectively to ensure operational safety. Elements of the inspection included operations, maintenance, surveillance, management oversight, technical

support, safety review, quality assurance, and corrective action. Additionally, the staff verified that the licensee properly prepared its staff and the plant for resumption of power operations after an extended shutdown.

Plant heat up for Unit 3 to Mode 3 (normal operating temperature and pressure) was accomplished during April, 1998. The OSTI was on site during hot plant operations to observe licensee performance. Based on the OSTI, licensee performance was found to be acceptable for normal plant operations.

The licensee established a power ascension procedure and a schedule. This procedure defines management controls and overall guidance for the total program. Restart of Unit 3 was authorized by the NRC on June 29, 1998. Plant restart occurred on June 30, 1998. The NRC established a power ascension inspection plan. This plan provides for 24 hour inspection coverage until at least the 30% power level. In addition, during power operations there will be a manager onsite. The NRC will review the licensee's evaluation of their plant status and performance at pre-determined hold points at various power levels.

3.11 PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW

HISTORICAL

The Restart Assessment Panel performed Plant Performances Reviews (PPRs) semi-annually. Two reviews were conducted, on March 19 and November 18, 1997. These PPRs were used to identify issues that need to be inspected at Millstone Station based on licensee performance. These reviews identified several issues that warrant NRC inspection before plant restart of Unit 3. Unit specific issues as well as station wide issues identified by the March 19, 1997, PPR, are contained in the SIL for each Unit as inspection items.

PPRs for Millstone were suspended for all units starting in October, 1997. The reason for this was the continuous NRC management oversight by the Special Projects Office. The SPO, in the context of the Restart Assessment Panel, met at least once a month or, in some cases, more frequently. The SPO frequently briefed NRC senior management and the Commission on Millstone status obviating the need for a redundant PPR.

3.12 LICENSING ISSUES

Each Millstone unit plans to submit or has submitted licensing issues (amendments, unresolved safety questions, relief requests, etc.) which will impact the restart process. The SPO Licensing Branch will disposition each applicable issue prior to restart. Licensing actions required for Unit 3 have been resolved. The status of NRR actions concerning each Millstone 3 issue is documented in Enclosure (3) of this plan.

Enclosures:

- (1) Significant Items List - Millstone Unit 3
- (2) MC-0350 - Restart Approval Checklist - Millstone Unit 3
- (3) Licensing Issues Required for Restart of Millstone Unit 3
- (4) Minutes of Millstone Restart Panel Meetings

ENCLOSURE 1

SIGNIFICANT ITEMS LIST - MILLSTONE UNIT 3

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

Millstone Unit 3 Significant Items List

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
1	ACR: 10773 EEI: 96-06-13 LER: 96-007-01 & 02	RSS AND QSS PIPING TEMPERATURE MAYBE HIGHER THAN ANALYZED (NRR REVIEW ENG. ANALYSIS, DRS INSPECT INSTALLATION)	NRR DRS SPO (O)	UPDATE IR96-06 IR97-202 IR97-203 CLOSED IR98-207
2	EEI: 96-201-01	FSAR UPDATE	SPO(L)	UPDATE IR97-207 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-208
3	ACR: 05715	REACTOR POWER INCREASE WHEN UNBORATED CATION DEMIN PLACED INTO SERVICE 3CHS-DEMIN2	DRP	CLOSED IR96-08
4	ACR: 01895	EDG SEQUENCER CDA SIGNAL OUTPUT "A" TRAIN COMPONENTS STARTED	DRS	CLOSED IR96-09
5	ACR: 01844 VIO: 94-24-01; LER:97-08	FAILURE TO ENTER AN ACTION STATEMENT WHEN MSIVS WERE CLOSED. (TECH SPEC AMEND)	SPO(II)	UPDATE IR 97-02 CLOSED IR 97-207
6	ACR: 04199	RCP SEAL INJECTION FILTER "B" GASKET FAILED RESULTING IN SPILL OF COOLANT TO FLOOR DRAINS	DRP	CLOSED IR96-08
7	ACR: 06092	RCS CHECK VALVE BODY TO BONNET LEAK; 3 RCS*V146	DRP	CLOSED IR96-06
8	ACR: 01535	WHILE DEWATERING SPENT RESIN, THE WASTE TEMPERATURE IN THE LINER RAISED FROM 90 TO 310°F	DRP	CLOSED IR96-06
9	ACR: 10543	NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF RESPONSE TIME TESTING FOR PROCEDURES	SPO(II)	CLOSED IR98-208
10	ACR: 11322	CLOSURE OF PIR WITHOUT ADDRESSING DESIGN FEATURE OF AFFECTED COMPONENTS	DRP	CLOSED IR96-09

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
11	NU LTR (B15397) 11/1/95, ACR: 10774 EEI: 96-201- 04, URI: 96- 201-40	TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER DESIGN CONCERNS. (TECH SPEC AMEND.)	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR 97-202 IR 97-207 CLOSED IR97-208
12	ACR:97-0317 ,6323 URI: 96-04- 13, 96-04- 14, 96-04-15 IFI: 94-11-09 IN: 97-11	CONTAINMENT FOUNDATION EROSION	NRR SPO (L)	UPDATE IR 97-203 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-208
13	ACR: 96-326, 13427,96- 0887 URI: 96-08- 20;IR: 96- 201-22 LER: 96-28 & 96-40	CCP SYSTEM OPERATION ABOVE DESIGN TEMPERATURE; 3 RHS*HCV 606/607 FAILING OPEN; AND OTHER FAILURE MODES	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR96-08, 97-203 IR97-208 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-207
14	ACR: 7745 URI: 96-01- 07	SGCS OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION CONTROL (TECH SPEC AMEND.)	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR 97-02 IR98-207 CLOSED IR98-208
15	ACR: 96- 0159 EEI: 96-06-15	LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER LEAKAGE AND DESIGN DISCREPANCIES	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR96-06, 97-202 CLOSED IR97-203
16	Unit 2 ACR: 01935	DUAL FUNCTION VALVE CONTROL AND TESTING	SPO (I)	UPDATE IR 97-02 CLOSED IR 97-202
17	ACR: 7266	RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKAGE AND BOLT CORROSION	DRS	CLOSED IR97-208

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
18	ACR: 10562, PPR G.2 EEI: 96-201- 15, 96-201- 18, 96-201- 19 URI: 96-201- 17	CONTROL/USE OF VENDOR INFORMATION	DRS SPO(I)	UPDATE IR97-02, IR97-203 IR97-208 IR97-206 IR98-207 CLOSED IR98-208
19	URI: 96-201- 16	RESOLUTION OF AFW VALVES HELB CONCERN	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR97-203
20	VIO: 96-59- 13 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.e & C.2.2.b	LICENSEE HANDLING OF CONCERNS RAISED BY EMPLOYEE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS • SCWE IMPROVEMENTS 	SPO(L)	LHC REPORT 04/22/98 IR97-212 IR98-210 CLOSED SECY 98- 090 04/24/98 IR98-208
21		FATIGUE CYCLE OPEN ITEMS IP 37750 (UNIT 2 ISSUE)	DRS	CLOSED IR96-01
22		PART 70 STORAGE AND INVENTORY IP 84750 (UNIT 1 ISSUE)	DRS	CLOSED IR96-05
23		FORMALITY OF NON-ROUTINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND NEW FUEL SECURITY IP 81064	DRS	CLOSED IR96-05
24	URI: 96-01- 08 LER: 97-17	OVERLAP TESTING OF RPS/ESF	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR97-01 CLOSED IR97-208
25	ACR: 912 URI: 95-07- 10 EEI: 96-201- 43	MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND PARTS LIST (MEPL) PROGRAM	DRS SPO(I)	UPDATE IR96-201, 97-202, 97-203 IR97-208 IR98-207 CLOSED IR98-208

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
26	ACR: 96-277, 0278, 627, 12862 LER: 96- 19,20, 96- 35; URI: 95-17- 09 IFI: 95-01-01, 95-17-01, 02, 03, 04, 05; IN: 97-07	MOTOR OPERATED VALVES (GL 89-10)	DRS	UPDATE IR97-203 IR98-82 CLOSED IR98-208
27	PPR G.1.C, G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.4.e	MISSED SURVEILLANCES/TEST CONTROL VIO 95-38-01	SPO(II)	CLOSED IR96-08
28	PPR G.1.C	DILUTION EVENTS ACR 05715, SIL NO. 3	SPO(II)	CLOSED IR96-08
29	PPR G.1.C	FEEDWATER HAMMER	DRS	CLOSED IR96-01
30	IR: 95-31, NU LTR (B15397) 11/1/95 PPR G.1.C, ACR 96-0855	AFW CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE	SPO(II)	CLOSED IR97-02
31	PPR G.1.C, G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.3.f, C.2.1.e C.3.2.e, C.4.f.& I	WORK-AROUNDS AND ABUSE OF USE-AS-IS DEFICIENCIES	SPO(II)	CLOSED IR97-83
32	NOV: 94-16- 05 PPR G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.e C.4.f,h,i	WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL	OSTI	CLOSED IR97-83

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
33	IR: 96-201, IFI 97-01-07 PPR G.2, LER: 96-003; ACR: 96- 0563; CR: 97-0850	SEISMIC II/I	DRS	UPDATE IR97-202, 97-203 IR97-208 CLOSED IR98-206
34	IP:84750; VIO: 96-09- 18;IFI:96-13- 01 EEI-96-201- 34	EFFLUENT/ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL PROFICIENCY	DRS	UPDATE IR96-09, 96-13 CLOSED IR97-203
35	IP:86750	RADWASTE SYSTEMS/CONTROLS	DRS	UPDATE IR96-08 CLOSED IR 97-207
36	ACR:M3-97- 0216 EEI 96-201- 34	HEAT EXCHANGER PERFORMANCE (GL 89-13)	DRS	UPDATE IR 97-207 CLOSED IR98-207
37	IR: 96-04 EEI: 96-201- 13, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.1, C.1.3, C.1.4.d,e,g, C.2.1, C.2.2.c,e, C.3.1.d, C.4.f	CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS (TECH SPEC AMEND.)	SPO(I) 40500	UPDATE IR97- 02,97-202, 97-203, 97-207 IR97-208 CLOSED IR98-208
38		REVIEW 0737 ACTION ITEMS FOR COMPLETION	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR97-207 IR97-208 IR98-206 IR98-207 CLOSED IR98-208
39	MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.2.a,c	REVIEW ENGINEERING BACKLOGS	DRS OSTI	CLOSED IR97-83

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
40	MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.1, C.1.3, C.1.f,& g, C.4.f,i	REVIEW 50.54F ISSUES FOR RESTART/REVIEW DEFERRED RESTART ITEMS LIST	SPO (L) SPO (I)	UPDATE IR96-06, IR97-202, IR97-207 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-207
41	ACR: 7007 URI: 95-81- 01 VIO: 96-09- 04 MC 0350 C.1.4.i	REVIEW SELF ASSESSMENT ROOT CAUSES AND VERIFY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (IP40500)	SPO(I) 40500	UPDATE IR97-02 IR97-203 CLOSED IR97-82
42	IR: 96-08 IP64704 CR97-3226	FIRE PROTECTION/APPENDIX R PROGRAMS	DRS	UPDATE IR97-202 IR97-207 IR97-84 IR98-01 CLOSED IR98-81
43	ORDER	50.54(f)/ICAVP (PHASE I and II)	SPO(O)	IR97-206 CLOSED IR98-208
44	ACR: 12116, 96-0325 LER: 96-26	CYCLE 6 BORON DILUTION ANALYSIS POTENTIALLY NON- CONSERVATIVE AND PGS FLOW RATE TO CHARGING PUMPS MAY BE IN ERROR	DRS	UPDATE IR97-203 CLOSED IR97-207
45	ACR: 96- 0524,08897 URI 96-06-14 LER 96-29 & 96-39	INITIAL SETTINGS FOR ECCS THROTTLE VALVES INADEQUATE AND POTENTIAL CLOGGING. (TECH SPEC AMEND.)	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR96-06 CLOSED IR97-203
46	ACR: 96- 0183	LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PENETRATIONS	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR 97-207
47	ACR: 96- 0391	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BOLTING SUSCEPTIBLE TO BORIC ACID	DRS	CLOSED IR:97-202
48	ACR: 10397	LLRT "AS FOUND" TOTAL LEAKAGE EXCEEDED MAX ALLOWABLE	SPO (I)	CLOSED IR96-08
49	ACR: 96- 0324	FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS SEAL CONNECTION NOT TESTED	SPO (I)	CLOSED IR96-08

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
50	ACR: 96-0446	DOCUMENTATION OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DISCREPANCIES	DRS	CLOSED IR98-206
51	ACR: 96-0339, 96-0389	WALWORTH VALVE YOKE GENERIC ISSUE	DRS	UPDATE IR98-82 CLOSED IR98-208
52	ACR: 10795 EEI: 96-201-23 LER: 96-005-01	SWP TEMPERATURE SWITCHES DEFEATED BY BYPASS JUMPER FOR SWP*P3A1B (BOOSTER PUMPS)	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR98-206
53	ACR: 96-0449; CR: 97-1007, 97-1729, 97-0727; URI: 96-09-11; LER: 96-25	PIECES OF ARCOR FOUND IN 3RSS*E1A AND 3RCC*E1C	SPO (I) SPO (O)	UPDATE IR:96-09, 97-202 CLOSED IR98-206
54	ACR: 96-0181	NUMEROUS BOLTS ON BACK DOOR ON 4160V SWITCHGEAR MISSING	DRP	CLOSED IR96-06
55	ACR: 96-0467	FAST TRANSFER TEST FAILURES	DRS	CLOSED IR96-09
56	ACR: 12495	SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR ALARM SETPOINT	DRS	CLOSED IR96-05
57	ACR: 96-0080, 96-0081 LER 96-15, 45, 49	POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VIOLATIONS	DRS SPO (I)	UPDATE IR:97-202, 97-203 CLOSED IR 97-207
58	ACR: 96-0557, 96-0685 EEI 96-201-33	THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETPOINTS	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR 97-02, IR 97-207 CLOSED IR98-206
59	ACR: 96-0775, 9124, 0846 LER 96-33	USE OF BORAFLEX IN SFP RACKS (TECH SPEC AMEND.)	SPO(I) NRR	CLOSED IR98-206

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
60	ACR: 96-0718, 0821 EEI:96-09-16	ANALYSIS OF SOV FAILURE MODES DUE TO MOPD	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR96-09, IR 97-207 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-207
61	UNIT 2 ACR: 7923	EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (EEQ) PROGRAM	DRS	CLOSED IR97-203
62	ACR: 13788	TSP BASKET SAFETY EVALUATION POSSIBLY NOT VALID	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR: 97-02
63	ACR:96-0396	3MSS*MOV17D MISSED IST SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DRP	CLOSED IR96-08
64	ACR: 08614	REACTOR PROTECTION LEAD LAG CIRCUITS MAY BE SET NONCONSERVATIVELY	DRS	CLOSED IR96-05
65	ACR: 96-0745, CR:97-742 LER: 96-36	SIL/SIH VALVES POWERED FROM NONSAFETY TRAIN	SPO NRR	CLOSED IR98-206
66	ACR: 96-0483	CCP AND CCE NON-Q COMPONENTS CAUSE Q-COMPONENTS NOT TO FAIL SAFE	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR98-206
67	ACR: 96-0621 TAC No. M96054 URI: 96-201-14; IN 97-21	SBO POSSIBLE OVERLOAD IN EVENT OF AN SIS ACTUATION & DESIGN ISSUES	SPO(I) NRR	UPDATE IR97-01 CLOSED IR98-206
68		REVIEW ALLEGATIONS FOR RESTART ISSUES	SPO (L) SPO (I)	CLOSED IR98-208
69		REVIEW ALL OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BY-PASS JUMPERS BEFORE RESTART	SPO (I)	CLOSED IR97-83
70	URI: 96-08-16 LER: 96-002-01, 96-37, 96-38, 96-42, 96-43, 96-48, 96-51, 97-04, 97-07, 97-18, 97-19 and EEI 96-201-05 ACR 10780	REVIEW TRM FOR TECH. SPEC. INTERPRETATIONS; EVALUATE TS AND OPER. LICENSE ISSUES. REVIEW MODIFICATIONS FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS AND USQ. (REF. SIL 86)	DRS	UPDATE IR97-02, IR97-202, IR97-203, IR97-207 IR97-208 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-207

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
71	MC 0350 C.1.4.i	REVIEW LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS FOR RESTART ISSUES	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR98-208
72		REVIEW ENFORCEMENT AND UNRESOLVED ITEMS FOR ITEMS FOR RESTART ISSUES	SPO(I)	CLOSED IR98-208
73	NOV: 96-05-12; IFI: 96-06-17 MC 0350 C.1.4.a,b,c, C.2.1.c	QUALITY ASSURANCE AND OVERSIGHT PROGRAM	OSTI 40500	UPDATE IR:97-202 IR97-203 CLOSED IR97-82
74	URI: 96-08-18; LER: 96-21; CR 97-901	INSERVICE INSPECTION/INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAMS	DRS	UPDATE IR97-02,97-202, 97-203 CLOSED IR98-207
75	IFI: 96-08-15, 96-09-17	TIA ISSUES (EDG EXHAUST & REQUIRED # OF SW PUMPS)	NRR SPO (L)	UPDATE IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-207
76	IFI: 96-08-17	CRACKING OF FUSE FERRULES	DRS	CLOSED IR:97-202
77	IFI: 95-44-06	POTENTIAL FREEZING OF SW BACKWASH LINES	SPO(I)	UPDATE IR:96-09 CLOSED IR 97-207
78	URI: 93-07-07, EEI: 96-201-02, 06, 07, 08	10 CFR 50.59 PROCESS	SPO(L)	UPDATE IR97-203 IR97-207 IR98-206 CLOSED IR98-208
79	EEI: 96-201-09, 35, 37, 39 MC 0350 C.3.2.f	CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT/DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS (PART OF ICAVP PHASE I)	SPO(I) SPO(O)	UPDATE IR: 97-02, 97-203, 97-206, 97-207 CLOSED IR98-211

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
80	ACR: 97-348 MC 0350 C.2.1.b, C.2.2.d, C.3.1.k, C.3.3.e,f	PROCEDURE ADEQUACY/PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM	SPO(I) OSTI	UPDATE IR97-01, 97-203, 97-206 IR97-207 IR210 IR98-207 IR98-205 IR97-83 CLOSED IR98-208
81	EEl: 96-201- 32, LER: 96- 32	TESTING OF SAFETY SYSTEMS	DRS	UPDATE IR97-02 CLOSED IR98-206
82	EEl: 96-201- 10	QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS	SPO(II)	CLOSED IR98-207
83	NU LETTER (B16195), 2/10/97 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g, h, C.3.1.m, C.3.2.h: IFI: 95-36-01	EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (INCLUDING ORGANIZATION/STAFFING/DOSE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY)	DRS	UPDATE IR96-09 IR97-81 IR97-202 IR98-80 IR98-01 CLOSED IR98-208
84	MC 0350 ITEM C.3.1.J EEl: 96-05- 15, 97-03- 01, 97-03- 02, 97-03- 03; U1 VIO: 96-09-20	SECURITY ISSUES - CORRECTIVE ACTION	DRS	UPDATE IR97-203 CLOSED IR98-206
85	ACR: 96-496, 497, 620, 1078, 97- 039, 128, 409 LER: 97-03, 97-15, 97- 21; CR:97- 1029; EEl 97- 202-09	OTHER RSS AND RELATED DESIGN BASIS CONCERNS	SPO (O) NRR	UPDATE IR97-202 IR97-203 CLOSED IR98-207

	REFERENCE	MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM	RESP	STATUS
86	CAL:1-97-010; CR:97-0927	OPERATOR LICENSING AND TRAINING (REF. SIL 70)	SPO(II) DRS	UPDATE IR97-202 IR97-04 IR97-85 CLOSED IR98-206

ENCLOSURE 2

MC-0350 - RESTART APPROVAL CHECKLIST

MILLSTONE UNIT 3

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

MILLSTONE UNIT 3

RESTART APPROVAL (MC 0350)

RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
4.01	<u>Director, Special Projects Office (SPO)</u> . Notifies the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the Commission, as appropriate, of the NRC actions taken concerning shutdown plants and the proposed followup plan.	X	C	NRR
4.02	<u>Director, Special Projects Office</u>	X	C	DSPO
	a. Discusses with the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, the Office of Enforcement (OE), and NRR, as appropriate, the need for an order or confirmatory action letter (CAL) specifying the actions required of the licensee to receive NRC approval to restart the plant and the proposed followup plan.			
	b. Decides, in consultation with the NRR Associate Director for Projects, whether this manual chapter applies to a specific reactor restart.	X	C	DSPO
	c. In coordination with the NRR Associate Director for Projects, decides whether to establish a Restart Panel.	X	C	DSPO
	d. Develops a written Restart Assessment Plan, including a case-specific checklist, to assign responsibilities and schedules for restart actions and interactions with the licensee and outside organizations.	X	C	RAP
	e. Coordinates and implements those actions prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that have been determined to be the Office of Special Project's responsibility. These include, when appropriate, interactions with State and local agencies and with regional offices of Federal agencies.	X	C	RAP

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	f. In conjunction with NRR, reviews and determines the acceptability of licensee's action program.	X	C	RAP SRI OSTI NRR
	g. Approves restart of the shutdown plant, following consultation with the EDO and the Director of NRR, and approval/vote by the Commission.	NA		
4.03	Director SPO			
	a. Acts as the focal point for discussions within NRR to establish the appropriate followup actions for a plant that has been shut down.	X	C	DSPO
4.04	Deputy Director, Licensing			
	a. Coordinates participation in followup conference calls and management discussions to ensure that the Director SPO is directly involved, when appropriate, in followup action.	X	C	DSPOL
	b. Coordinates and implements actions prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that have been determined to be Licensing's responsibility. These include, where applicable, appropriate NRC Office or NRR Division interaction with other Federal agencies (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Justice (DOJ)) pursuant to any applicable Memoranda of Understanding.	X	C	DSPOL
B.1	INITIAL NRC RESPONSE The facts, the causes, and their apparent impacts should be established early in the process. This information will assist the NRC in characterizing the problems, the safety significance, and the regulatory issues. Early management appraisal of the situation is also important to ensure the proper immediate actions are taken. The following items should have been completed or should be incorporated into the CSC as appropriate. Refer to Section 5.02 of this manual chapter for additional information.	NA		

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	a. Initial notification and NRC management discussion of known facts and issues	NA		
	b. Identify/implement additional inspections (i.e. AIT, IIT, or Special) (Region).	NA		
	c. Determine need for formal regulatory response (i.e. order or CAL).	NA		
	d. Identify other parties involved (i.e., NRC Organizations, other Federal agencies, industry organizations).	NA		
B.2	NOTIFICATIONS Initial notification of the event quickly communicates NRC's understanding of the event and its immediate response to the parties having an interest in the event. Notification to regional and headquarters offices of cognizant Federal agencies may be appropriate. As the review process continues, additional and continuing notifications may be required.	NA		
	a. Issue Daily and Directors Highlight (NRR).	NA		
	b. Issue preliminary notification (Region).	NA		
	c. Conduct Commissioner assistants' briefing.	NA		
	d. Issue Commission paper (NRR).	NA		
	e. Cognizant Federal agencies notified (i.e., FEMA, EPA, DOJ).	NA		
	f. State and local officials notified (Region).	NA		
	g. Congressional notification (NRR)	NA		
B.3	<u>ESTABLISH AND ORGANIZE THE NRC REVIEW PROCESS</u>			
	a. Establish the Restart Panel.	X	C	RAP

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
b.	Assess available information (i.e. inspection results, licensee self-assessments, industry reviews).	X	C	RAP RAP Meeting Minutes
c.	Obtain input from involved parties both within NRC and other Federal agencies such as FEMA, EPA, DOJ.	X	C	RAP DSPOL
d.	Conduct Director SPO briefing.	X	C	RAP
e.	Conduct NRR Executive Team briefing (NRR).	X	C	RAP
f.	Develop the case-specific checklist (CSC).	X	C	RAP
g.	Develop the Restart Assessment Plan.	X	C	RAP
h.	Director SPO approves Restart Assessment Plan.	X	C	DSPO
i.	NRR Director approves Restart Assessment Plan.	X	C	DNRR
j.	Implement Restart Assessment Plan.	X	C	RAP
k.	Modify orders as necessary	NA		
B.4 REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION				
B.4.1 <u>Root Causes and Corrective Actions</u>				
a.	Evaluate findings of the special team inspection.	X	C	OSTI RAP
b.	Licensee performs root cause analysis and develops corrective action plan for root causes.	X	C	NU OSTI 40500
c.	NRC evaluates licensee's root cause determination and corrective action plan.	X	C	RAP OST 405001

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
B.4.2	<p>B.4.2 <u>Assessment of Equipment Damage</u></p> <p>For events where equipment damage occurs, a thorough assessment of the extent of damage is necessary. A root cause determination will be necessary if the damage was the result of an internal event. The need for independent NRC assessment should be considered. The licensee will need to determine corrective actions to repair, test, inspect, and/or analyze affected systems and equipment. These actions are required to restore or verify that the equipment will perform to design requirements. Equipment modifications may also be required to ensure performance to design requirements.</p> <p>Potential offsite emergency response impact for external events such as natural disasters, explosions, or riots should be considered. NRR should obtain information from FEMA headquarters reaffirming the adequacy of State and local offsite emergency plans and preparedness if an event raises reasonable doubts about emergency response capability.</p>	NA		
	a. Licensee assesses damage to systems and components.	NA		
	b. NRC evaluates licensee damage assessment.	NA		
	c. Licensee determines corrective actions.	NA		
	d. NRC evaluates corrective actions.	NA		
B.4.3	<p><u>Determine Restart Issues and Resolution</u></p> <p>The establishment of the restart issues that require resolution before restart demands a clear understanding of the issues and the actions required to address those issues by both the NRC and the licensee. This section outlines steps to determine the restart issues and NRC's evaluation of their resolution.</p>	X	C	RAP
	a. Review/evaluate licensee generated restart issues.	X	C	RAP
	b. Independent NRC identification of restart issues	X	C	RAP

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	c. NRC/licensee agreement on restart issues.	X	C	RAP
	d. Evaluate licensee's restart issues implementation process.	X	C	RAP
	e. Evaluate licensee's implementation verification process.	X	C	SRI-SIL 40500 OSTI
B.4.4	<u>Obtain Comments</u> Since some shutdowns involve a broad number of issues, solicitation of comments from diverse sources may be appropriate. The decision to solicit comments from a group and the level of participation should be made on a case-by-case basis. Input from these groups should be factored into the restart process when they contribute positively to the review. Note: If needed, comments concerning the adequacy of state and local emergency planning and preparedness must be obtained from FEMA headquarters through NRR.			
	a. Obtain public comments.	X	C	RAP
	b. Obtain comments from State and Local Officials (Region).	X	C	Regional SLO/RAP
	c. Obtain comments from applicable Federal agencies.	X	C	RAP
B.4.5	<u>Closeout Actions</u> When the actions to resolve the restart issues and significant concerns are substantially complete, closeout actions are needed to verify that planned inspections and verifications are complete. The licensee should certify that corrective actions required before restart are complete and that the plant is physically ready for restart. This section provides actions associated with completion of significant NRC reviews and preparations for restart.			
	a. Evaluate licensee's restart readiness self-assessment.	X	C	RAP OSTI

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
b.	NRC evaluation of applicable items from Section C "ISSUES" complete.	X	C	RAP
c.	Restart issues closed.	X	C	RAP SRI OSTI
d.	Conduct NRC restart readiness team inspection.	X	C	OSTI
e.	Issue augmented restart coverage inspection plan.	X	C	OSTI RAP
f.	Comments from other parties considered.	X	C	RAP
g.	Determine that all conditions of the Order/CAL are satisfied.	X	C	RAP ICAVP
h.	Re-review of Generic Restart Checklist complete.	X	C	RAP SRI- NU
B.5	<u>RESTART AUTHORIZATION (B.5)</u> When the restart review process has reached the point that the issues have been identified, corrected, and reviewed, a restart authorization process is begun. At this point the Restart Panel should think broadly and ask: "Are all actions substantially complete? Have we overlooked any items?"			
a.	Prepare restart recommendation document and basis for restart.	X	C	RAP
b.	NRC Restart Panel recommends restart	X	C	RAP
c.	No restart objections from other applicable HQ offices.	X	C	DSPOL
d.	No restart objections from applicable Federal agencies.	X	C	RAP
e.	DSPO concurs in restart recommendation	X	C	DSPO
f.	NRR Director concurs in restart recommendation.	X	C	NRR
g.	EDO concurs in restart recommendation when required.	NA		
h.	Conduct ACRS briefing when requested (NRR).	NA		
i.	Conduct Commission briefing when requested.	X	C	DSPO
j.	Commission approves restart.	X	C	COMM

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	k. EDO authorizes restart.	X	C	EDO
B.6	<u>RESTART AUTHORIZATION NOTIFICATION (B.6)</u> Notify the applicable parties of the restart authorization. Notifications should generally be made using a memorandum or other format consistent with the level of formality required. Communication of planned actions is important at this stage to ensure that NRC intentions are clearly understood.			
	a. Commission (if the Commission did not concur in the Restart Authorization or as requested) (NRR).	NA		RAP
	b. EDO (if the EDO did not concur in the restart recommendation or as requested) (NRR).	NA		EDO
	c. Congressional Affairs (RAP).	X	C	OCA
	d. ACRS (a briefing may be substituted for the written notification if the ACRS requests a briefing) (NRR).	X	NA	SPO
	e. Applicable Federal agencies.	X	C	RAP
	f. Public Affairs.	X	C	OPA
	g. State and local officials.	X	C	SLO
	h. Citizens or groups that expressed interest during the restart approval process.	X	C	RAP
	i. Issue staff concerns memorandum.	X	C	RAP
C.1.1	<u>Root Cause Assessment</u>			
	a. Conditions requiring the shutdown are clearly understood.	X	C	RAP ACR 7007
	b. Root causes of the conditions requiring the shutdown are clearly understood.	X	C	RAP
	c. Root causes of other significant problems are clearly understood.	X	C	RAP

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	d. Effectiveness of the root cause analysis program.	X	C	40500 RAP OSTI
C.1.2	<u>Damage Assessment</u>			
	a. Damage assessment was thorough and comprehensive.	NA		
	b. Corrective actions clearly restored systems and equipment or verified they can perform as designed.	NA		
C.1.3	<u>Corrective Actions</u>			
	a. Thoroughness of the corrective action plan	X	C	RAP 40500
	b. Completeness of corrective action programs for specific root causes.	X	C	SRI 40500
	c. Control of corrective action item tracking.	X	C	SRI 40500
	d. Effective corrective actions for the conditions requiring the shutdown have been implemented.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	e. Effective corrective actions for other significant problems have been implemented.	X	C	SRI OSTI ICAVP 40500
	f. Control of long-term corrective actions. (Backlog Management Plan)	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	g. Effectiveness of the corrective action verification process.	X	C	SRI 40500

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
C.1.4	<u>Self-Assessment Capability</u> The occurrence of an event may be indicative of potential weaknesses in the licensee's self-assessment capability. A strong self-assessment capability creates an environment where problems are readily identified, prioritized, and tracked. Effective corrective actions require problem root cause identification, solutions to correct the cause, and verification methods that ensure the issue is resolved. Senior licensee management effectiveness in ensuring effective self-assessment is treated separately.			
	a. Effectiveness of Quality Assurance Program.	X	C	RAP 40500
	b. Effectiveness of Industry Experience Review Program.	X	C	OSTI 40500
	c. Effectiveness of licensee's Independent Review Groups.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	d. Effectiveness of deficiency reporting system.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	e. Staff willingness to raise concerns.	X	C	SPO(L) RAP
	f. Effectiveness of PRA usage.	X	C	40500 OSTI
	g. Effectiveness of commitment tracking program.	X	C	SRI 40500 RAP
	h. Review applicable external audits	X	C	40500 OSTI
	i. Quality of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 reports.	X	C	SRI
C.2.1	<u>Management Oversight and Effectiveness</u>			
	a. Goals/expectations communicated to the staff.	X	C	OSTI 40500
	b. Demonstrated expectation of adherence to procedures.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	c. Management involvement in self-assessment and independent self-assessment capability	X	C	RAP 40500

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	d. Effectiveness of management review committees.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	e. Management's demonstrated awareness of day-to-day operational concerns.	X	C	SRI OSTI
	f. Management's ability to identify and prioritize significant issues.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	g. Management's ability to coordinate resolution of significant issues.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
	h. Management's ability to implement effective corrective actions.	X	C	SRI OSTI 40500
C.2.2	<u>Management Support</u>			
	a. Impact of any management reorganization.	X	C	RAP 40500
	b. Effective and timely resolution of employee concerns.	X	C	RAP SPO(L) SCWE
	c. Adequate engineering support as demonstrated by timely resolution of issues.	X	C	DRS OSTI ICAVP
	d. Adequate plant administrative procedures.	X	C	SRI 40500 OSTI
	e. Effective information exchange with other utilities.	X	C	SRI 40500 OSTI
	f. Participation in industry groups.	NA		
	g. Effectiveness of Emergency Response Organization.	X	C	DRS
	h. Coordination with offsite emergency planning officials.	X	C	DRS
C.3.1	<u>Assessment of Staff</u>			
	a. Demonstrated commitment to achieving improved performance.	X	C	RAP SRI OSTI
	b. Demonstrated safety consciousness.	X	C	OSTI SRI SPO(L) SWCE

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
c.	Understanding of management's expectations and goals.	X	C	OSTI 40500
d.	Understanding of plant issues and corrective actions.	X	C	OSTI SRI 40500
e.	Qualifications and training of the staff.	X	C	OSTI
f.	Staff's fitness for duty.	NA		
g.	Attentiveness to duty.	X	C	OSTI
h.	Level of attention to detail.	X	C	OSTI
i.	Off-hour plant staffing.	X	C	SRI
j.	Staff overtime usage.	X	C	SRI 40500
k.	Procedure usage/adherence.	X	C	SRI 40500 OSTI
l.	Awareness of plant security.	X	C	DRS
m.	Understanding of offsite emergency planning issues.	X	C	DRS
C.3.2	<u>Assessment of Corporate Support and Site Engineering Support</u>			
		X	C	OSTI
a.	Corporate staff understanding of plant issues.	X	C	OSTI
b.	Corporate staff site specific knowledge.	X	C	OSTI
c.	Effectiveness of the corporate/plant interface meetings.	X	C	OSTI
d.	Corporate involvement with plant activities.	X	C	OSTI
e.	Effectiveness of site engineering support.	X	C	DRS ICAVP OSTI
f.	Effectiveness of the site design modification process.	X	C	ICAVP OSTI
g.	Effectiveness of licensing support.	X	C	RAP
h.	Coordination with offsite emergency planning officials.	X	C	DRS

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
C.3.3	<u>Operator Issues</u>			
	a. Licensed operator staffing meets requirements and licensee goals.	X	C	DRS IR 98-206
	b. Level of formality in the control room.	X	C	OSTI SRI IR 98-206
	c. Effectiveness of control room simulator training.	X	C	DRS IR 98-206
	d. Control room/plant operator awareness of equipment status.	X	C	OSTI SRI
	e. Adequacy of plant operating procedures.	X	C	OSTI ICAVP OSTI 40500 PE
	f. Procedure usage/adherence.	X	C	SRI OSTI
	g. Log keeping practices.	X	C	OSTI
C.4	<u>ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLANT</u>			
	a. Operability of technical specification systems.	X	C	OSTI MODE 2
	b. Operability of required secondary and support systems.	X	C	OSTI
	c. Results of pre-startup testing.	X	C	SPO OSTI
	d. Adequacy of system lineups.	X	C	OSTI
	e. Adequacy of surveillance tests/test program.	X	C	OSTI
	f. Significant hardware issues resolved (i.e. damaged equipment, equipment ageing, modifications).	X	C	OSTI
	g. Adequacy of the power ascension testing program.	X	C	OSTI SRI
	h. Effectiveness of the plant maintenance program.	X	C	OSTI DRS
	i. Maintenance backlog managed and impact on operation assessed.	X	C	OSTI

		NEED	STATUS	RESP
	j. Adequacy of plant housekeeping and equipment storage.	X	C	OSTI
C.5	<u>ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS</u>			
	a. Applicable license amendments have been issued.	X	C	RAP
	b. Applicable exemptions have been granted.	X	C	RAP
	c. Applicable reliefs have been granted.	X	C	RAP
	d. Imposed Orders have been modified or rescinded.	X	C	RAP
	e. Significant enforcement issues have been resolved.	X	C	RAP OE
	f. Allegations have been appropriately addressed.	X	C	RAP SRI PE
	g. 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions have been appropriately addressed.	X	C	NRR
	h. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings have been completed.	NA		No ASLB hearing required before restart
C.6	<u>COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES</u>			
	a. Federal Emergency Management Agency	X	C	DRS DSPO (L)
	b. Environmental Protection Agency	NA		
	c. Department of Justice	X	C	OE OI DSPO
	d. Department of Labor	X	C	OE
	e. Appropriate State and local officials	X	C	SLO
	f. Appropriate public interest groups	X	C	RAP
	g. Local news media	X	C	OPA

ENCLOSURE 3

**LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR
RESTART OF MILLSTONE UNIT 3**

**LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART
MILLSTONE UNIT 3**

No.	TAC No.	Issue	Status
1	M9279 8	Modified MSIV surveillance and action statements (TS).	Amendment No. 136 Issued 4/10/97
2	M9546 9	Modified the description of the time constants associated with the OT and OP Delta T calculations (TS).	Amendment No. 134 Issued 3/10/97
3	M9605 4	SBO possible overload in event of an SIS actuation and design issues (SIL #67).	Closed out by memo dated 3/20/98.
4	M9640 2	TIA issue involving the containment foundation erosion (SIL #12).	Closed out by memo dated 06/10/98.
5	M9677 3	TIA issue involving the number of required SW pumps (SIL #75).	Closed out by memo dated 3/13/98.
6	M9750 8	TIA issue involving the EDG exhaust stack (SIL #75).	Closed out by memo dated 4/27/98.
7	M9828 8	Changed AFW motor- and turbine-driven pump surveillances (TS).	Amendment No. 139 Issued 5/29/97
8	M9828 9	Separated the required testing of MOV thermal overload protection into 2 new surveillances (TS).	Amendment No. 140 Issued 5/29/97
9	M9841 5	Changed the RHR suction relief valve setpoint (TS).	Amendment No. 143 Issued 7/10/97
10	M9845 5	Clarified the actions to be taken when an area temperature exceeds the limit (TS).	Amendment No. 141 Issued 6/24/97
11	M9845 6	Changed the surveillance requirements for the hydrogen monitors (TS).	Amendment No. 142 Issued 6/24/97
12	M9852 5	Requested changes to the charging and SI pump surveillances (TS).	Withdrawn by licensee - 10/15/97
13	M9863 0	Added valves that must be closed to provide flood protection (TS).	Amendment No. 144 Issued 7/28/97

14	M9867 8	Overcurrent protection devices. Relocated the 300% and 150% circuit breaker test currents to the Bases (TS).	Amendment No. 153 Issued 11/14/97
15	M9867 9	Issue clarified the number of battery banks required in Modes 5 & 6 (TS).	Amendment No. 146 Issued 8/21/97
16	M9868 0	Issue addressed seismic qualification of the spent fuel racks (TS).	Withdrawn by licensee - 11/11/97
17	M9868 1	Issue corrected the wording associated with venting the charging pumps (TS).	Amendment No. 147 Issued 8/28/97
18	M9869 9	Will allow the SMM to be operable at a lower count rate (TS).	Under staff review. Not required for restart.
19	M9872 4	Revised the battery changer test requirements to equal to or greater than 132V (TS).	Amendment No. 149 Issued 9/5/97
20	M9886 0	SIL/SIH valves powered from nonsafety train (SIL #65).	Closed out by memo dated 3/19/98.
21	M9886 6	Issue addressed the testing of the RSS pumps (TS).	Withdrawn by licensee - 10/15/97
22	M9901 6	Created a surveillance for the situation when the reactor trip breakers are closed (TS).	Amendment No. 145 Issued 8/5/97
23	M9904 1	Table 2.2-1 Notes. Defined the terms (TS).	Amendment No. 152 Issued 10/22/97
24	M9904 2	Revised the required volume in the DWST and CST (TS).	Amendment No. 150 Issued 9/11/97
25	M9913 1	Issue involved the partial- and full-stroking of MSIVs (TS).	Amendment No. 148 Issued 9/3/97
26	M9913 2	Issue involved manual CIVs that require intermittent operation in Modes 1-4 (TS).	Withdrawn by licensee - 10/3/97
27	M9926 1	Issue involved adding a new TS and Bases for the SGARVVs (TS).	Amendment No. 151 Issued 10/2/97
28	M9950 2	Proposes new pressure/temperature curves (TS).	Amendment No. 157 Issued 2/12/98
29	M9974 7	Issue involves manual CIVs that require intermittent operation in Modes 1-4 (TS).	Amendment No. 154 Issued 12/18/97

30	M9979 6	Change will affect nominal trip setpoints and allowable values for RTS and ESFAS Instrumentation Trip Setpoints (TS).	Amendment No. 159 Issued 5/26/98
31	M9979 7	Changes the TS and bases description for pressurizer level (TS).	Withdrawn by licensee - 4/27/98.
32	M9979 8	Changes ECCS pump surveillances to reference the IST program (TS).	Amendment No. 155 Issued 12/24/97
33	MA007 0	Issue addresses seismic qualification of the spent fuel racks (TS).	Amendment No. 158 Issued 4/9/98
34	MA010 4	Issue addresses the RHR interlock at 390 psia (TS).	Amendment No. 156 Issued 1/23/98
35	MA027 3	TIA issue involving RSS and related design basis concerns (SIL #1 & 85).	Closed out by memo dated 5/19/98.
36	MA051 3	Relief Request	Closed out by letter dated 2/17/98.
37	MA084 3	EP Rev. 24 Review	Closed out by letter dated 6/1/98.
38	MA108 4	Relief Request	Closed out by letter dated 3/13/98.
39	MA142 1	Changes the TS and bases description for pressurizer level (TS).	Amendment No. 160 Issued 5/27/98
40	MA152 7	Change the TS and bases description for PORV operability.	Amendment No. 161 issued 06/05/98.
41	MA179 9	Alternative to Code Requirements	Resolved by letter to licensee dated 06/10/98.

Total Issues: 41

Total Issues Closed: 41 (24 amendments issued, 5 amendments withdrawn, 1 amendment not needed prior to restart, 8 SIL items closed)

Total Issues Open: None.

Note: The licensee has submitted 4 amendments involving USQs. The licensee has indicated that it plans to submit 3 additional license amendments involving USQs. The USQ issues are not required to be completed prior to restart (licensee will have operability determinations in place).

ENCLOSURE 4

RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

MEETING MINUTES

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JULY 13, 1998

ATTENDEES: W. Lanning W. Travers W. Dean
 E. Imbro A. Cerne J. Durr

The licensee discussed the Millstone Unit 3 plant status with the Restart Assessment Panel during a conference call conducted 7/13/98 at 9:00 p.m.. The plant is currently at 90% power. The licensee discussed the following topics:

- The plant is at 90% power and 3000 MWt. They are presently in a chemistry action statement due to high oxygen in the condensate system resulting from condenser work to repair a leaking tube. Containment leakage is presently running .2 g.p.m.
- Valve FWA 35D leakage is about the same as the earlier report made today of 125 ml/min.
- Of the earlier 4 LCO's reported, the containment hatch LLRT and the "B" instrument air compressor have been exited, no changes to the others.
- There is one new Operability Determination regarding ASCO solenoid valves that was discussed earlier in the startup on July 10, 1998. In a population of 211 valves, 87 are only energized intermittently. Of the remaining 124, 80 are within their qualified life. Of the remaining 44, 40 have had the coils replaced. The remaining four are in the auxiliary building, and have been determined acceptable for use as-is.
- The licensee discussed the Technical Requirements Manual issue where the operators did not log into an action statement. They have completed a review of the tables in sections 7.4 and 7.6 and verified they are either logged into the statement or the equipment is operable.
- Nuclear Oversight made a presentation of their findings of ongoing activities. They have been making independent assessments of the loose parts monitor issue, maintenance and other activities. They had no remaining open issues that would prevent the plant from going to 100% power.
- Once granted concurrence by the NRC, they will proceed to 100% power most likely on the day shift. They will then test the No. 4 turbine control valve, a further two days of testing and plant walkdowns. They project that they will be ready for the 100% power discussions with the NRC to be complete by Thursday.

At the completion of the licensee's presentation, the Restart Assessment Panel caucused and discussed any remaining outstanding issues that needed resolution before concurring

with the licensee's request to ascend to 100% power. The panel expressed concern for the continuing loose parts monitor events and the licensee's plans to address the issue. The decision was made to allow the licensee to complete their evaluations of the data. The panel agreed that it was appropriate to concur with the licensee's request to proceed to 100% power.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JULY 13, 1998

ATTENDEES: W. Lanning W. Travers W. Dean
 E. Imbro A. Cerne E. Korona
 J. Durr N. Blumberg

The licensee discussed the Millstone Unit 3 plant status with the Restart Assessment Panel during a conference call conducted 7/13/98 at 11:00 am. The plant is currently at 75% power. The licensee discussed the following topics:

- Plant status to include a containment entry necessitated by the EEQ data logger. The plan to observe valve V132 was abandoned due to the risk of high radiation exposures.
- Feedwater valve FWA35D is currently leaking at the rate of 125 ml/min.
- There have been no significant operational events to evaluate except for the operators failing to log into a Technical Requirements Manual action statement.
- Recent Condition Reports on the previous TRM logging incident and loose parts monitor alarms.
- Limiting Conditions for Operations:
 - * An issue associated with the leak rate testing of the containment hatch after the earlier containment entry.
 - * Need to complete the review of the special report dealing with the loose parts monitor.
 - * TRM issues with the 'B' instrument air compressor; the 'C' RPCCW; and the motor operated valve MSS 17D.

If these are not corrected, they will result in a 30 day JCO.

- There are no new operability determinations.
- There are currently 23 control panel deficiencies. A plan is being developed to correct these deficiencies.
- The status of the loose parts monitoring issue:

There is currently a summary report before the Plant Operations Review Committee for review. There was an unconfirmed hit in steam generator 'D' on July 6. On July 8, there was a confirmed hit by Westinghouse in steam generator 'B' on both the primary and secondary sides estimated at < 1

pound mass. On Saturday at 4:30 there was a hit in steam generator 'A' on the primary and secondary channels. Later, at 8:41 there was another hit in steam generator 'A' on the secondary only. On Sunday, there were other hits, but this occurred during cable checking.

- Nuclear Oversight discussed their assessment results. The operating crews are doing a good job. Engineering has not made any new temporary modifications or operability determinations.
- The schedule for power ascension, assuming NRC concurrence, would have the plant ascend in power this afternoon to 90%. They would then do differential temperature tests and several other retests. No flux mapping is required at the 90% plateau, only at 100% power. Possibly ready for 100% power tomorrow.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JULY 10, 1998

ATTENDEES: W. Lanning A. Cerne N. Blumberg
 J. Durr W. Travers R. Urban

1. The licensee discussed the Millstone Unit 3 plant status with the Restart Assessment Panel during a conference call conducted 7/10/98 at 10 am. The plant is currently at 48% power. The licensee discussed the following topics:
 - Plant status to include a containment entry necessitated by the EEQ data logger. Also, during the entry, they would attempt to inspect V132 valve for leakage, recognizing that radiation levels may preclude this.
 - The loose parts monitor received another hit located between the core and steam generator. Suspect it may be a split pin. Similar hit before the outage in the "C" steam generator, when they went in to look for it, they found nothing.
 - PRA review on the auxiliary feedwater pump outage for risk.
 - FWA 35D valve is currently leaking about 6.5 ml/ min.
 - MSS 17D is isolated, using AOV 31 as the containment boundary.
 - LCO'S: 7 new, 3 existing, 1 on the equipment failure of the steam flow monitor.
 - Operability Determinations: One on inverter #3 for 2 meters and one on ASCO solenoid valves that have exceeded the end-of-life on 32 coils.
 - Control panel deficiencies: 75-80% are cleared per week, currently 16 new items
 - The motor driven feed pump has been returned to service. It will not be used for low flow conditions
 - Nuclear Oversight made a presentation of their assessment of line management and operations performance.
 - At greater than 50% power, the licensee will put the turbine heater drains and moisture separator reheater into service.

The licensee noted that there were no technical issues that would preclude them from going above 50% power and proceeding to the 75% hold point.

2. Following the phone call with the licensee, the RAP discussed plant status and determined that there no issues that would preclude increasing power to 75%. The SRI was requested to notify the licensee that there were no NRC objections for Millstone 3 to increase its power level.

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL

MEETING MINUTES

JULY 7, 1998

ATTENDEES:

W. Travers	W. Lanning	P. McKee	E. Imbro
J. Durr	A. Cerne	T. Easlick	P. Koltay
S. Dembek	J. Andersen	B. Korona	

- A meeting was held to discuss the licensee's assessment of the 30% power ascension hold point for Unit 3 as discussed in the licensee's letter, dated June 16, 1998. Unit 3 officers and management met with the Restart Assessment Panel and presented their assessment in the following areas:
 - * Plant status
 - * Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations to include the North fire water storage tank, inoperability of valve MSS 17D; the loose parts monitor; auxiliary feedwater pump "A"; and control valve No. 4 for the turbine.
 - * No new operability determinations have been issued.
 - * Control room deficiencies and associated emerging issues that warrant additional management review. The licensee committed to complete these reviews before ascending to a higher power level.
 - * The licensee discussed the assessments made by them and the outstanding work that needs to be accomplished. Subjects discussed included: flux mapping and incore/ excore cross calibration; 12 automated work order retests; plant equipment walkdowns; operator performance during power ascension; maintenance performance for emerging technical issues; and radiation protection.
 - * Nuclear Oversight presented the results of the formal, independent assessments made by them. No major adverse findings were identified.

Based on the foregoing information, the licensee requested NRC concurrence to proceed to the 50% power plateau.

- In consideration of the around-the-clock coverage by the NRC staff, the favorable findings from these observations, and the positive consensus of the Restart Assessment Panel, W. Travers verbally concurred with the licensee's request.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 29, 1998

ATTENDEES: W. Travers W.Lanning S. Reynolds
 J. Durr A. Cerne B. Korona
 T. Easlick P. Mc kee N. Blumberg
 E. Imbro J. Andersen L. Scholl
 C. Cahill

- The Restart Assessment Panel met with NNECO telephonically to discuss the following items: Plant status, fire barriers, recent Unit 2 health physics ERT report findings and any applicability to Unit 3, the RSS sump pump dedication program, the JUMA audit results and any application to the restart of Unit 3, and the status of AITTS open items.
- A. Cerne reported the preliminary results of the JUMA audit of the licensee's Nuclear Oversight Group. The JUMA audit made several negative observations regarding the morale and effectiveness of the NOS. The panel discussed any impact the JUMA audit might have on the NRC's restart decision. It was decided that the panel should be aware of the JUMA audit results, but the restart decision should be based on NRC inspection findings. The SRI will verify the JUMA did not make any statement regarding the suitability of the oversight program for restart.
- L. Scholl briefed the panel on the status of his inspection activities of the RSS sump pump qualifications. He personally felt that the licensee had performed the proper engineering evaluations and testing to support operability of the system for restart. The licensee will transmit the final closure package to the region for review and verification of the statements made in the conference call.
- W. Lanning discussed a concern that the contamination event at Millstone Unit 2 did not affect radiation safety at Unit 3. It was pointed out by the utility that the procedures employed during the Unit 2 event are specific to that unit. Units 1 and 3 use more detailed procedures for contamination events.
- The panel discussed the sequence of events leading to restart authorization. Once the letter is received from NNECO requesting restart, the EDO and commission will be notified. The EDO will sign the restart letter and notify the utility telephonically and by facsimile. Once the initial notification is complete, OCA will be notified and the notification list will be executed.
- A poll of the panel was taken for any additional issues that might require resolution before the plant restart recommendation is made by the director, SPO to the EDO. No additional issues were noted. The consensus of the panel was the plant staff, processes and equipment are satisfactory for restart. SPO managers will meet with the EDO and Director, NRR at 1:00 p.m. to answer any questions they might have and to recommend plant restart.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 26, 1998

ATTENDEES:

W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
T. Easlick	P. Mc kee	N. Blumberg
E. Imbro	J. Andersen	P. Cataldo
D. Beaulieu	B. Korona	J. Andersen
G. Hammer		

- The Restart Assessment Panel met telephonically with NNECO to discuss the plant status, the recirculation spray system sump pump issue, the charging system gas accumulation issue, the OSTI inspection findings on operator performance and configuration management, fire barrire inspections, post accident sampling outstanding issue on total dissolved gas, and AITTS open issues.
- The panel discussed the current information available on the recirculation spray system sump pump commercial grade dedication. Nuclear Oversight is questioning the dedication process used for nonmetallic parts. Parts in question are the nonmetallic impeller (Hylum), the shaft seal and O-rings. The licensee is mounting an engineering effort to qualify the parts to support an operability determination. L. Scholl is onsite performing inspections of the licensee's work.

E. Imbro's staff reviewed the licensee's assessment of engineering modifications for similar vulnerabilities and was satisfied with the scope of their efforts.
- The panel reviewed the status of the MC 0350 checklists to ensure proper closeout of line items. Items B.4.g; B.5.e,f,g; B.6.c,f,g,h; remain open and items C.5.d and C.4.d are closed.
- Status update on ICAVP Deficiency Reports noted that all DR's are closed and no need for scope expansion was identified.
- A discussion was held concerning the fire barrier allegation and the licensee's inspection efforts. Based on the licensee's scope of inspection and findings todate, the panel determined that the allegation is not credible and should not impact restart. However, the panel determined that an NRC inspection of the licensee's work would be made to verify their findings. The inspection will take place on or about June 29, 1998.
- The panel discussed the potential for the RSS sump pump issue to result in escalated enforcement.
- A. Cerne discussed the post accident sampling issue relating to total dissloved gas tolerances on measurement. The panel acknowledged that the measurement tolerance was a licensee commitment and could be changed by them in documentation to the NRC.

- T. Easlick briefed the panel on the status of the OSTI inspection findings relating to operator performance and configuration control. The licensee was providing the last of the documentation for their corrective actions and Mr. Easlick would reivew it. He was satisfied with the results of their corrective actions and did not perceive this as a continuing restart issue.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 25, 1998

ATTENDEES:

W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
T. Easlick	P. Mc kee	N. Blumberg
E. Imbro	J. Andersen	P. Cataldo
D. Beaulieu	B. Korona	

- The Restart Assessment Panel met with the licensee through a scheduled telephone conference to discuss the following items: Plant status, recirculation sump pump modification status, gas accumulation in the gravity boron line, OSTI inspection findings on configuration management, fire barrier concerns, post accident monitoring program, AITTS open items.
- L. Scholl presented the status and latest inspection findings regarding the recirculation spray sump pump modifications. The licensee has remaining work to be accomplished and finalization of test reports for NRC review. Until these items are complete, the NRC can not close the SIL item regarding RSS.
- E. Imbro provided a preliminary status on the NRC's review of the licensee's engineering modification evaluations associated with potential vulnerabilities identified with the RSS sump pump modifications.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 23, 1998

ATTENDEES:

W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
T. Easlick	P. Mc kee	N. Blumberg
E. Imbro	J. Andersen	P. Cataldo
D. Beaulieu	B. Korona	

- The panel discussed the current status of the post accident sampling system for Unit 3. It was reported that all of the open issues were addressed except for the licensee's inability to draw total dissolved gas samples within the committed tolerance of +/- 10 cc/kg. This does not appear to be a major deficiency and the licensee plans on changing the commitment to be -10, + 30 cc/kg.
- T. Easlick discussed the status of the licensee's efforts to resolve the OSTI operator performance and configuration control issues. The salient corrective actions have been verified by NRC inspection.
- During an earlier telephone conference with the licensee, they discussed the fire barrier investigations they have initiated to establish the credibility of the allegation the NRC referred to them. Once the investigation and engineering evaluations are complete, the licensee will assemble a package for NRC review. The Division of Reactor Safety will provide technical assistance to review the licensee's actions.
- L. Scholl has been dispatched to the site to review the Operability Determination the licensee is composing to justify the recirculation spray supplemental sump pumps. L. Scholl will coordinate any licensing issues through J. Andersen and the Technical Branches
- The resolution of outstanding technical issues such as the fire barriers and the RSS sump pumps will be closed by documenting them in the RAP meeting minutes.
- The Significant Items List for Unit 3 is essentially complete except for the PASS issue (which is closeable) and the RSS sump issue.
- The panel reviewed MC 0350 open items to ensure timely closure of outstanding issues.
- The need to move the public meeting from June 30 to a later date was discussed. Consensus was to move the meeting to July 7 based on the staff's inability to support the earlier date.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 19, 1998

ATTENDEES:

W. Lanning	G. Imbro	J. Nakoski
A. Cerne	P. Narbut	J. Andersen
T. Easlick	B. Korona	S. Jones
L. Scholl	N. Blumberg	R. Perch
W. Dean		

1. Letter on possible fire barrier deficiencies for fire barrier material installed in the 1980's. To be paneled.
2. RSS sump pump issue discussed:
 - Ground water not considered in RSS operation. Only water from RSS line break.
 - Awaiting final licensee corrective actions.
 - Containment vulnerability due flooding may be an issue.
3. Open licensee technical issues to be resolved:
 - PASS problems
 - RSS sump pump
 - Body to bonnet leak on MDAFW pump discharge valve 3FWA*MOV35A. Leak is small and manageable. May not be safety or operational issue. Will go away when main feed pumps can be put on line. SLCRS boundary affected. Cannot conveniently pump out water.
4. Results of RSS ERT review:
 - Generic applicability to other mods being reviewed.
 - Bill Dean asked for inspection next week to assure EDO on Millstone 3 engineering before he can issue restart letter. Inspection should review licensee mod review screening process and determine if RSS sump problem was an isolated case.
5. SIL discussed. Cerne will send in final SIL to Region today. RAP agreed that SECY paper 98-119 can be judiciously used to close out some SIL items where appropriate such as corrective actions and ECP, but, in general the inspection report should be the main method of closure.
6. MC0350, checklist item B.6.i, "Issue Staff Concerns Memorandum" was closed. This was not required by MC0350 chapter but was added by the RAP. Region I has

sent an E-mail looking for staff concerns. NRR does not plan to issue a staff concerns memorandum.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 17, 1998

ATTENDEES:

W. Travers	W. Lanning	G. Imbro
P. Mckee	B. Perch	A. Cerne
T. Easlick	B. Korona	S. Jones
D. Bealieu	L. Scholl	N. Blumberg
P. Koltay	P. Narbut	W. Dean

I. General Discussion of Licensee Readiness Issues:

(1) RSS Sump Pump Qualification

- NRR will not perform a pre-startup review of licensee's 50.59 safety evaluation of the RSS sump pumps qualification
- SPO will review licensee actions

(2) Timeliness of CR closeouts

- Per licensee M&TE issues to be closed by July 28
- Resolution not to be a restart issue

(3) May/June 1998 Valve Positioning Events

- OSTI issue follow-up inspections ongoing to determine if licensee corrective actions are adequate
- Licensee monitoring of valve status performance is not yet in place
- Until a new program is established containment boundary valves will be treated and controlled as containment isolation valves
- Licensee does not have good system for tracking valves that are "NA'd" in valve lineups because they will be operated later
- Issue of unlabeled valves on skid mounted equipment is closed. These valves are operated by maintenance.
- TS monthly surveillance of valve portions not independently verified. Question as to whether or not it is required. Consensus is that there is no regulatory requirement for an independent verification.

(4) Quality of Engineering Based on Resolution of Emerging Issues

- Engineering is OK in general based on inspection effort over the last year and one half

- Engineering is better than before, adequate but needs improvement
- Wait for licensee assessment of their handling of recent engineering issues
- Will look at engineering during future inspection program. Consider additional inspection of their performance on emerging issues.
- Current engineering problems do not affect restart recommendation previously made to the Commission.

II. Status of Significant Items List

- All SIL items closed except PASS and LER issues.
- Remaining items to be closed in Inspection Reports 98-208 (Resident) and 98-211 (ICAVP Corrective Actions)
- IR 98-208 will not close until the end of June. SIL will have to be closed before these reports are issued but will reference the reports anyway.

III. Status of MC 0350 Checklist

- More items closed. All technical issues in Section C have been closed.
- Checklist closure awaiting final approvals by NRR and the EDO and final coordination with other federal agencies.

IV. Open Inspection Effort Still in Progress

- Boric acid transfer pump air binding issues
- RSS sump pump qualification
- Charging pump hydrogen binding
- Post Accident Sampling System issues

Configuration management issues from OSTI

V. ICAVP issues

- Trending
- Installation component data
- Drawings

Additional ICAVP information added to 6/17 minutes on 6/23/98 based on two E-mail

messages from S. Reynolds on 6/22/98:

ICAVP staff has reviewed 21 of the 22 level 3 DRs for unit 3. (DR 328 is the one DR with corrective actions outstanding at this time.) Based on the reviews of the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions for these DRs, the ICAVP inspection team determined that expansion of the ICAVP scope was not warranted. The following is a list of the level 3 DRs that the ICAVP staff has completed their review:

0001/
 0006/
 0029/
 0035/
 0051/
 0331/
 0355/
 0434/
 0588/
 0624/
 0639/
 0667/
 0669/
 0670/
 0686/
 0687/
 0762/
 0795/
 1011/
 1016/
 1026

As part of the ICAVP review, the ICAVP staff reviewed level 4 DRs looking for the possibility for any trends that could adversely affect the licensing and design bases of the plant. The staff identified two areas that contained a number of DRS, which could possibly be indicative of trend. The areas were: 1) drawings and component information, and 2) installation implementation. After reviewing these DRs the staff was able to conclude that a trend that could adversely affect the licensing and design bases of the plant did not exist.

We have not completed our review of DRs 670 and 686; however, our preliminary review of these 2 DRs indicates that the ICAVP scope does not warrant expansion since the licensee's corrective actions appear effective. After we have completed the review of the final correctove actions, we will inform the RAP of the results.

Additionally, the ICAVP staff has completed a review of corrective actions for all ICAVP inspection findings (e.g., NOVs) . The licensee's corrective actions have been effective and consequently, it was not necessary to expand the scope of the ICAVP.

VI. To-Do's

Q. Blumberg to check MC 0350 to determine if response is required to C.1.3.i "Issue staff concerns memorandum." This was done by E-mail in Region I and responses were received by E-mail. Are acknowledgments required.

A. Acknowledgements not required. This item not required by MC0350. Was added to the checklist by the RAP.

Q. Gene Imbro to provide more detail concerning ICAVP issues discussed in Section V above.

A. Provided. See additions in Section V.

Q. SRI to provide final status of the SIL ASAP

A. Provide to RAP by separate correspondence

Q. Region I to perform additional review to determine if independent verification is required for monthly valve position surveillance. See item I.(3).

A. Independent verification not required per ANSI 18.7-1976, para. 5.3.10.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

JUNE 4, 1998

ATTENDEES:	W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
	J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
	T. Easlick	P. Mc kee	N. Blumberg
	E. Imbro	J. Andersen	P. Eselgroth
	P. Cataldo	D. Beaulieu	B. Korona

● ICAVP STATUS :

There are 4 DR's remaining that require corrective actions, 588,670,686, and 689. The staff is Continuing to inspect completed corrective actions for identified inspection findings such as NOV's, URI's and IFI's. There are 2 unresolved DR's that are under review by the technical staff. For those that are outstanding, NNECO will make GL 91-18 operability determinations. We are awaiting the final Sargent and Lundy report; NNECO needs to respond to the report. We are trying to determine if this response needs to take place before they enter Mode 2, most likely the answer is "no." However, we will issue a letter signed by the director of NRR to NNECO stating that the order has been satisfied for Unit 3.

The staff has inspected the implementation of corrective actions for 16 of 20 DR's and based on the acceptability of the licensee's corrective actions, determined there is no need for expansion of scope. The SPO staff has reviewed the calculation-related Level 4 DRs to determine if the errors identified represented a trend that could result in the Unit being in nonconformance with its design and licensing bases. The approximately 160 identified calculational errors occurred in more than fifty different types of calculations, e.g., NPSH, pressure drop, pipe stress, etc. The errors were largely a result of calculational control issues identified by the NRC staff and S&L in that NNECo had overlapping calculations. The errors were insignificant errors that resulted during data transposition or were minor mathematical errors that did not affect the results or conclusions of the calculations. The staff attributed the errors to inattention to detail and found no trends such as repeated misapplication of a design equation or physical principle that in other circumstances would likely result in a nonconformance with the design and licensing bases. The SPO staff is also evaluating Level 4 DRs for potential scope expansion in the areas of component data, installation, and drawings to determine if there are any trends which could suggest that a broader review of these areas would likely identify possible nonconformances with the design and licensing bases

The Following Level 3 DRs have been reviewed, corrective actions are acceptable and have been implemented. DR-MP3-0001, 0006, 0035, 0051, 0331, 0355, 0434, 0624, 0639, 0667, 0669, 0762, 0795, 1011, 1016, and 1026.

The following Level 3 DRs have been reviewed but corrective actions/implementation is not complete. DR-MP3-0588, 0670, 0686 and 0687.

DR-MP3-725 was originally a Level 3 but downgraded to a Level 4.

The licensee has one Level 3 DR but has not given it to us for review.

There are several more unresolved DRs that could potentially be Level 3s.

Still looking at the impact of the Parsons finding regarding M&TE. The corrective action team will follow this for Unit 3 with T. Easlick providing assistance for the work he has already done.

- **LICENSING STATUS:**

The employees concern project is complete for Unit 3 restart. The Little Harbor periodic assessments are ongoing.

There is one licensing action in process, the inadvertent safety injection, which is needed for modes 2/3. It is under review by the technical staff and OGC. The technical staff has some remaining questions. The licensee is still doing training on this amendment, we need at least 8 of the 10 crews to demonstrate feasibility of the time constraints.

Basemat erosion TIA, technical staff input is in process. The licensee also needs the ASME Code relief for the relief valve flow area and common header discharge.

NRC currently has 4 USQ's in house; they are not required for NNECO to go to mode 2. There may be 3 more being processed by NNECO, the resident staff will review the Operability Determinations.

Revision 24 to the Emergency Plan has been approved by NRR.

- T. Easlick and P. Narbut provided a status on the OSTI restart issues they are inspecting, configuration management and operator performance corrective actions. It does not appear that the level of effort meets our expectations. This will be discussed with M. Brothers today by W. Travers and T. Cerne to ensure the proper corrective actions are implemented before we recommend restart.
- The panel reviewed the open MC 0350 items and updated the table(See attachment)
- A. Cerne provided a SIL status: Inspection Report 50-423/98-207 will bring the total closed SIL's to 72. There are still a few items in NRR such as the basemat and motor operated valves. Items the inspection staff are still addressing include the MEPL (this is closeable), PASS and NUREG 0737. NNECO will provide a letter addressing any residual issues pertaining to NUREG 0737.

- There will be a Confirmatory Action Letter issued separately from the restart letter formalizing the power ascension hold points and NRC concurrence to proceed with the ascension to full power.

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

MAY 22, 1998

ATTENDEES: W. Travers W.Lanning S. Reynolds
 J. Durr A. Cerne W. Dean
 T. Easlick P. Mc kee N. Blumberg
 E. Imbro

- The Restart Assessment Panel approved the meeting minutes from the May 8, 1998 meeting, as amended, pending verification that S. Reynolds comments have been incorporated.
- The panel discussed the unreviewed safety questions from the preceding NRC/ NU conference call and the need to have them submitted prior to restart. The panel determined that Generic Letter 91-18 permits the licensee to evaluate the condition and document acceptability in an operability determination. The OSTI reviewed all current operability determinations during the inspection. The staff will review any recently issued OD's for acceptability.
- The panel discussed the acceptability of having open items that would not be completed before the commission meeting on June 2. The panel recognized that certain outstanding items will be open before the commission meeting and will be tracked to ensure closure before restart.
- The panel discussed the need to inspect OSTI restart issues before the inspection report is issued and the licensee has had the opportunity to respond with their corrective actions. The licensee will be asked to develop closure packages and the staff will assess the scope of the corrective actions and the NRC resources needed to audit the licensee's corrective actions. Currently, the SRI for Unit 1 is tasked with the initial assessment and possibly auditing the NNECO corrective actions. The corrective action inspection will most likely not be completed before the 6/2/98 commission meeting.
- E. Imbro made a presentation to the panel recommending closure of the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program. Currently, there are approximately 40 Deficiency Reports open that are Level 4's; there are 16 confirmed Level 3's with 2 pending determination. Based on a review of the NRC inspection findings (Notices of Violation) and the identified 12 issues, no expansion of the sampling plan is warranted. Further, based on the completion of NRC inspections and the verification of the adequacy of the Sargent and Lundy overview of the NNECO configuration management program, the NRC staff believes the NNECO configuration management program was effective.
- W. Travers made a presentation to the panel recommending closure of the Corrective Action Program portion of the Restart Assessment Plan. The NRC performed inspections of the program during the OSTI IP 40500 team inspections, the ICAVP corrective action inspections, and routine closure of the Significant Items List. NNECO implemented the revised program plan, RP-4 and improved management involvement. With the heightened NNECO management oversight,

UNIT 3 ALLEGATION STATUS WRT MC 0350

- There are currently no unresolved hardware/technical issues that impact restart.
 - One caveat may be the final discussion with the last QC inspector (who apparently worked [REDACTED] lately) and [REDACTED]
- We don't know the outcome of the operator licensing stuff or the MOV contractor retaliation stuff.

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

MAY 22, 1998

NEW BUSINESS:

- Approve the meeting minutes from the May 8, 1998 meeting.
- Discuss any issues arising from licensee/NRC update conference call.
- RAP expectations for inspections of restart issues for pending enforcement from OSTI and 40500 inspections, level of effort. Staff outside of normal process without formal response from licensee. Is it sufficient to request existing documentation from licensee?
- Approval of ICAVP, corrective action program, work planning and control, and procedure upgrades for commission meeting.
- Determine what aspects of PASS are truly restart issues and those that can be deferred to post restart for validation and verification.

OLD BUSINESS:

- Status of the MC 0350 process (Residents/ Durr)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

MAY 8, 1998

ATTENDEES:	W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
	J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
	T. Easlick	E. Imbro	L. Scholl
	S. Jones	N. Blumberg	J. Trapp
	H. Pastis	J. Andersen	D. Beaulieu

- Panel meeting was held as a telephone conference.
- W. Travers announced that the next commission meeting will be held on June 3, 1998.
- Panel members will provide J. Durr with inputs to the meeting minutes for the April 22, 1998 Restart Assessment Panel meeting. Need to document closure of the SCWE, backlog management and oversight.
- The panel discussed the power ascension plan and the need for a more detailed plan from NU that will clearly define the NRC/NU interface and interactions.
- J. Andersen discussed the basis for closure of SIL No. 2 dealing with FSAR updates. He outlined the various NRC inspections and reviews that concluded that, in general, the process was adequate, the threshold is proper and the review of prior evaluations was complete. It was noted that Sargent and Lundy was also doing a review of FSAR changes and would submit a report on the docket. J. Andersen will provide a feeder report to the resident report closing this issue. The panel agreed this item is closed.
- J. Andersen also discussed the NRC reviews of the 10 CFR 50.59 process, SIL 78, which arose from the team inspections in early 1996. The inspection issues from 1996 have been closed as well as observations by the ICAVP Tier 2 and 3 and Project Manager inspections. The inspections had findings in this area, which can be closed in the next corrective action report. The panel agreed the inspection record is sufficient to close this issue.
- N. Blumberg made a presentation on the status of the procedure quality and adherence. NU has essentially completed the Procedure Upgrade Program committed to the NRC in 1992. There are 2 procedures that require rewrite and these will be accomplished for mode 2 operations. There have been 2 inspections by the regional staff and inspections during the ICAVP and OSTI addressing procedure quality and adherence. Additionally, the licensee's performance indicators by the line and Nuclear Oversight show improved performance. The OSTI had findings regarding the licensee's practice of "N/A'ing" steps that could not be performed. Also, ICAVP has some residual findings in this area that will be

closed during next weeks inspections. The panel agreed that procedure quality and adherence were adequate to support operation of Unit 3.

- W. Travers noted that the topics that warranted attachments to the commission paper were: OSTI results, ICAVP and the corrective action program. The other topics would only be discussed in the body of the report accompanied by the executive summaries for the attachments. It was agreed that all sections should have detailed writeups that would be incorporated into the supporting MC 0350 closure documentation. Inputs for the commission paper are due to R. Perch by 5/15 for the minor areas and 5/19 for those requiring attachments.
- N. Blumberg will coordinate with R. Perch on the submittal of the senior management meeting documents.
- J. Trapp provided a status on the OSTI report and exit interview. Based on the advanced stage of the OSTI draft report, there will be no "quick look" report.
- The licensee will be ready for inspection of the interim corrective actions for the operator performance issues identified during the OSTI on May 18. Blumberg will update the power ascension plan to include inspection of the operator performance issues.
- The licensee is prepared to address the configuration control issues associated with valve lineups at 1:30 on May 11 with the SPO staff.
- A. Cerne, SRI for Unit 3, presented the SIL status (see attached).
- A discussion was held on including a writeup on the several design control issues in the commission paper. This would address any questions on the boric acid pumps, residual heat removal miniflow and recirculation spray systems before they are asked.
- **ICAVP:** Corrective action inspections are completed next week. NU will not have completed all of unresolved issues by the time of the inspection. The NRC will have to referee ½ dozen contested DR issues between NU/SL. There are 30 level 3 DR's need dispositioned for corrective actions.

S/L report is due today, final report is due the end of May.

Tier 2 inspection at Unit 2 ends next week, looks good so far.

Unit 3 is going for code relief on the VCT relief valves.

The licensee is being sent a choice letter and will provide a written response. On receipt of the response, it will need to be repanelled.
- The configuration control meeting with NU will be internal so that there is enough time to gather the information necessary to properly plan our actions.

- A discussion was held on the licensee's tracking of commitments. We found situations in TMI action items and GL 89-13 where the licensee committed to one corrective action and when we inspected found something different. The different corrective action was not necessarily less effective, just different than what was provided on the docket, such as SIL 13. The licensee wrote a CR this week documenting this finding. NRR has a program that is looking at commitments. J. Andersen will pursue the applicability of them doing an audit of Millstone. The panel decided this is not a restart issue.
- H. Pastis discussed the safety evaluation that has been attached to the commission paper, future plans for Little Harbor Consultant oversight and the termination criteria for LHC. The IP41001 report and the Secy Paper closes SIL No. 20.
- J. Andersen provided a project manager report on the status of licensing issues. There are 3 technical specification change requests outstanding: 1) RPS setpoint-complete in about 2 weeks; 2)pressurizer level- TS is complete; and 3) inadvertent safety injection- staff issued questions, response due tomorrow.

Currently 3 unreviewed safety questions in-house: 1)RWST back leakage; 2)SLCRS; and steam generator tube rupture overflow. NU may have 3 more.

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

MAY 7, 1998

NEW BUSINESS:

- Status of the meeting minutes from the April 8, 1998 meeting.
- Basis for closure of the procedure upgrade program.(Blumberg)
- Staffing and implementation of the power ascension plan.
- Timing of the inputs for the next commission meeting and the senior management meeting.

OLD BUSINESS:

- Status of the OSTI report and findings. (Trapp/Durr)
- Status of the MC 0350 process(Residents/ Durr)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)
- Need for additional operator evaluations. (Durr)
-

UNIT 3 SIL STATUS

(as of 5/7/98)

TOTAL SIL ITEMS = 86
 CLOSED (thru IR 98-206 + 40500) = 52

CLOSED (OSTI) = 4

"CLOSEABLE" (IR 98-207) = 11

"PLACEHOLDERS" (no info req'd) = 4

SIL Items under Review = 15

(as follows)

NRR Issues: }
 2 - FSAR UPDATE
 12 - CONT. BASEMAT
 78 - SO.S9 PROCESS
 on track

PROGRAM ISSUES: }
 18 - VETP
 25 - MEPL
 38 - TMI
 36 - GL89-13
 5/11 Review

TECH. ISSUES: }
 9 - Time Resp. Test
 14 - SGCs
 79 - Design Control
 5/11 Review

DRS REVIEW: }
 26 + 51 - MOVs
 83 - EP/PASS
 5/11 Review

TM FOLLOW UP: }
 37 - Corr. Act.
 80 - PUP
 5/11 Review

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

APRIL 8, 1998

ATTENDEES:	W. Travers	W.Lanning	S. Reynolds
	J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
	T. Easlick	E. Korona	D. Mc Donald*
	S. Jones	S. Dembek	P. Mc kee
	H. Pastis	P. Koltay	P. Eselgroth
	J. Nagoski	N. Blumberg	P. Cataldo
	E. Imbro	J. Trapp	R. Urban
	L. Scholl		

- The Restart Assessment Panel approved the meeting minutes from the March 4, 1998 meeting, as amended.
- J. Higgins, BNL, made a presentation which discussed the status of the programmatic areas to include vendor information, Generic Letter 89-13 and MEPL. The discussion revealed that there are some aspects of these programmatic areas that have long term corrective actions associates with them that will not be closed before plant restart. For example, the vendor information manual updates for the NSSS and key safety related components are essentially complete and will be ready for plant restart. However, for the remainder of the safety related equipment, completion of the updates will not occur until January of 1999. Additionally, the MEPL program has four augmented quality assurance requirement areas (SBO, ATWS, fire protection, and radwaste) that will not be completed before December, 1998. The panel acknowledged these long term projects, and determined that the intent of the SIL was to verify that the licensee had established an acceptable program and controls were in place to ensure proper materials were used.
 - * J. Higgins will check for any possible connections between the GL 89-13 program and the Locbaum letter.
 - * Where nonsafety related parts are installed in ASME components, we will sample the operability determinations for appropriateness.
 - * The panel determined that the MEPL issue for Unit 3 did not represent a programmatic breakdown. OSTI will sample the MEPL parts during the inspection.
 - * The resident staff will sample some of the parts procured as nonsafety related and compare them to the original specification.
- R.Urban provided the panel with an oversight of the recent Office of Investigation reports and the intended resolution.
- The panel discussed the mechanism for documenting the recent issues with the recirculation system and the residual heat removal. The resident inspector will confirm the existence of an LER on the residual heat removal valve oscillations.

The Sargent and Lundy portion of the RSS will be documented in a "quick look" report; while the stress calculations will be documented in a routine resident report.

- With regard to the closure of enforcement items identified during ICAVP inspections, Level 3 Discrepancy Reports will be inspected during the corrective action inspection for S&L. Findings that rise to the level of an LER will be inspected during the closeout and dispositioned accordingly. All Level 3 DR's that affect design and/or licensing basis will be closed before restart. The DR population will be treated the same as the condition report findings, only those that the NRC selects through the LER process will be processed for enforcement.
- J.Trapp gave an overview of the OSTI staffing. Currently there is a vacancy in the leader of the maintenance group. W. Travers and W. Lanning will pursue acquiring a replacement.
- The resident inspectors presented the status of the SIL:

Unit 3: 51 of 86 SIL items are closed to include the current report; 4 are place holders; 9 are in the process of being closed; 1 is outstanding with NU (NUREG 0737 items). Of the 216 individual packages, 194 are closed; 22 are working of which 16 are with the NRC and 6 are awaiting answers from the licensee.

Discussed the status of place-holder items such as allegations review, LER review, completion of the ICAVP, open items to include enforcement and IFI's, closure of the 50.54 (f) letter, and closure of the team inspection results for MOV's and EP. The MOV team inspection findings will not be ready for closure until 4/26/98 by the licensee.

DRS has provided SPO with a memorandum stating they have concluded there is no need for further operator training prior to restart of Unit 3, which should allow closure of SIL 86.

Unit 2

Unit 2 currently has 53 SIL items. The staff recently added SIL item 53, LER 98-002 dealing with the ECCS design not providing hot leg injection for boron precipitation control following a LOCA coincident with a loss of either DC bus or AC bus. A pending LER involving the potential for containment bypass caused by pipe whip from a HELB (LOCA) rupturing a closed system inside containment is planned to be added to the SIL as item 54.

Unit 2 has had 2 events resulting in spills in the recent past. Unit 2 is currently scheduled for core reload on 5/10/98. There is a meeting scheduled in headquarters on 4/21/98 to discuss recent reanalysis of 12 Chapter 14 accident scenarios.

- **ICAVP STATUS:**

The Unit 3 tier 1,2, and 3 inspection reports have been issued; the corrective action inspection is scheduled to begin on April 13, 1998 to close out ICAVP inspection findings and corrective actions to S&L level III DR'S. There are currently 150 DR's open between S&L and NU. It was determined that all confirmed DR's will be closed and the final S&L report must be issued before the order can be closed. There must be no remaining programmatic issues. NU agrees that the Level 4 DR's will be completed by the next refueling outage.

Unit 2 RBCCW out of scope inspection is complete; Tier 3 will start next week and Tier 2 in July

- The panel discussed the backlog management issue and a possible need for a Confirmatory Action Letter. No decision was made at this time. It is recognized that an integrated plan for post restart needs to be developed.

- **ECP:**

NRC-ECP onsite activities are mostly complete. the licensee owes us the long term plan on the focus areas and how it will be implemented.

The report on safety conscious work environment and assessment of LHC is complete and ready to be issued. We are now getting the quarterly reports from LHC.

The staff is preparing a safety evaluation on the SCWE and LHC aspects of the project.

- **LICENSING:**

The NRC has 3 Unit 3 technical specifications in house for processing, pressurizer level, Boraflex, and inadvertent safety injection. There are also 3 USQ's being evaluated, containment basemat concrete leaching, EDG exhaust stack, and recirculation spray system.

There are a total of 33 licensing action requests for Unit 2, of which 20 have been received by the NRC. Of the 20, 11 are complete.

Unit 2

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

APRIL 8, 1998

NEW BUSINESS:


- Approve the meeting minutes from the March 4, 1998 meeting.
- Status of programmatic issues for Unit 3 restart(Higgins)
- Staff efforts to close pending enforcement issues. Recent OI investigation results.(Urban)

OLD BUSINESS:

- *RSS documentation*
- Is there a need for closure of the enforcement items opened by the ICAVP inspections prior to restart, who will do and when. ICAVP Tier 2 and 3, Level 3 inspection findings and potential violations, how to treat these in enforcement space. (Travers)
- Status of the OSTI, update of staffing, scheduling and planning. (Trapp/Durr)
- Status of the MC 0350 process(Residents/ Durr)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
 - *NU corrective actions for level 1,2,3 DR'S, backend of process.
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)
- Need for additional operator evaluations. (Durr)

OSTI Assignments

Milestone OSTI Staffing



APR-03-1999 4:03 PM

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

MARCH 4 , 1998

NEW BUSINESS:

- Approve the meeting minutes from the February 10, 1998 meeting.
- Staff efforts to close pending enforcement issues.
- Is there a need for closure of the enforcement items opened by the ICAVP inspections prior to restart, who will do and when.
- Level 3 findings from the ICAVP Tier 2/3 inspections

OLD BUSINESS:

- Status of the OSTI, update of staffing, scheduling and planning. (Trapp)
- Status of the MC 0350 process(Residents/ Durr)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

MARCH 4, 1998

ATTENDEES:	W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
	J. Durr	A. Cerne	W. Dean
	D. Beaulieu	T. Easlick	E. Korona
	J. Andersen	D. Mc Donald	S. Jones
	L. Scholl	S. Dembek	P. Mc Kee
	H. Pastis	R. Archazel	P. Koltay
	P. Eselgroth	J. Luehman	D. Dorman

- The panel approved the meeting minutes, as amended, from the February 10, 1998 meeting.
- The panel determined that the November 1997 Plant Performance Review performed in preparation for the Senior Management Meeting would serve as the RAP meeting minutes for that month. The entire meeting was confined to the evaluation of the station performance.
- The Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) discussed the ICAVP Tier 2 and 3, Level 3 inspection findings and potential violations arising from the inspections. W. Travers will pursue how these items will be treated in the enforcement realm.
- The ICAVP staff made the following presentation to the RAP: The ICAVP staff has performed a preliminary evaluation of the ICAVP Significance Level 3 inspection findings from following three Unit 3 inspections:

1. Out-of-scope, Tier 1
2. Tier 2/3
3. In scope Tier 1

We have preliminarily concluded that these findings and the ICAVP staff's understanding of the scope of the licensee's planned corrective actions do not suggest the need to expand the scope of the ICAVP at this time. A final determination regarding the need to expand the ICAVP will be based on the ICAVP staff's review of the licensee's corrective actions. As specified in the January 30, 1998, letter from NRC (W. Travers) to NU, NEAC, Sargent & Lundy and Parsons Power, an expansion of the ICAVP scope for Significance Level 3 DRs and inspection findings would be considered by NRC, if the licensee's corrective actions did not adequately address the identified issue.

- The panel discussed the outstanding enforcement items that remained after the \$2.1 Million enforcement letter. A panel is planned for March 17, 1998 to resolve the contents of a proposed letter to the utility outlining the status and dispositioning of the remaining issues.
- The panel discussed the SIL item closure process when isolated enforcement issues are discovered during the closure inspection. The panel decided that closure of the

SIL is appropriate if the enforcement item is isolated in nature and not representative of a programmatic issue. Issues rising a significance level that would put restart into question will be brought to the RAP.

- A discussion of the NU corrective actions for Level 1,2,3 Discrepancy Reports was held. E. Imbro will brief the panel at the next meeting on the back end of the process.
- A brief discussion was held on the status of the OSTI inspection. The licensee has advertised the week of March 9 as the transition to mode 4 date. OSTI is tied to mode 4 to allow observation of plant operations.
- The panel was briefed by the resident inspection staff on the status of the SIL closures:

Unit 3: 38 of 86 SIL items have been closed; 10-14 more will be closed at the end of this report period; 4 of the SIL items are place keepers such as ICAVP and corrective actions; 4 are OSTI items; 6 are in NRR; 7 deal with BTP 9.5, training, security, emergency response and motor operated valves; 5 are open technical issues.

The 86 SIL items represent 216 individual packages; 182 are complete; 29 are in-process; roughly 89% complete.

Unit 2: 12 of 52 SIL items are closed; these represent 74 individual packages total with 17 closed.

Unit 1: The licensee has down sized the work force to about 190 people and one director.

- ICAVP Status:
 - Unit 2: Started the RBCCW, tier 1, out-of- scope inspection on 3/2/98
 - Unit 3: All inspection are complete except the corrective action inspections. This inspection will sample items from the CMP; review 11 LER's; closeout ICAVP findings. Sargent and Lundy is beginning to write their report.
- Employee Concerns Status:
 - * Evaluation report is complete.
 - * Staff is reviewing event results such as the vice president of Nuclear Oversight resignation and 10 CFR 2.206 closure.
 - * Little Harbor Consultant and NU are making final determinations on the long term plan; NRC will review this plan when it is complete.

- **Licensing Issues:**

- Unit 3:

There are three outstanding licensing action requests dealing with Boraflex, RPS-ESFAS, and pressurizer level. There are two unreviewed safety questions under consideration: service water Arcor delamination and the recirculation spray system.

Licensee needs relief under 10 CFR 50.55a before entering mode 4 for the accumulator check valves.

There are outstanding questions on the containment base mat; it is a matter of focusing the safety evaluation. This is a mode 2 issue.

There are outstanding TIA's on: 1) the spent fuel pool and the number of service water pumps (1 vs2); 2) the emergency diesel generator exhaust stack.

There is an open issue on the air operated valve/ solenoid operated valves non-safety power.

- Unit 2:

There are currently 3 amendments needed for mode 4 (control room ventilation, pressure/ temperature curves, and ventilation); 3 more are expected.

- Region I wants to take confirmatory chemical samples after restart.
- The panel discussed the need to perform operator evaluations considering the amount of training program and operator simulator observation already completed. W. Lanning will discuss with J. Wiggins, Director of Reactor Systems, any perceived need for more inspection to close the SIL.

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

FEBRUARY , 1998

NEW BUSINESS:

- Approve the meeting minutes from the January 15, 1998 meeting.
- Preparation for the next SMM. Region I is proposing doing theirs the week of March 23. The senior management meeting is currently scheduled for 6/2-4/98. Should the Millstone Units continue to issue PPR's considering the periodicity of updates to the commission? Would update of the restart matrix suffice?
- Discuss the format and content of the weekly commission briefing package.
- Staff efforts to close pending enforcement issues.
- Is there a need for closure of the enforcement items opened by the ICAVP inspections prior to restart, who will do and when.

OLD BUSINESS:

- Discuss the status of MC 40500/OSTI, update of staffing, scheduling and planning. (Trapp, Shedlosky)
- Status of the MC 0350 process (Residents/ Durr)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)

RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL MEETING

FEBRUARY 10, 1998

ATTENDEES:	W. Travers	W. Lanning	S. Reynolds
	J. Durr	A. Cerne	E. Imbro
	D. Beaulieu	T. Easlick	E. Korona
	J. Andersen	D. Mc Donald	S. Jones
	L. Scholl	J. Nagoski	P. Mc Kee
	H. Pastis	R. Archazel	P. Koltay

- There is a potential that Commissioners Dicus and Diaz may want to visit the site. The staff has requested that it occur earlier rather than later. Most likely will not occur before late March.
- A discussion was held regarding the licensee's backlogs that will be carried over at restart. The panel believes that the licensee should clearly characterize the backlog and justify the need for the carry over. L. Scholl and J. Andersen need to state their characterization of the backlog content in the next inspection report.
- The panel discussed the preparations for the next senior management meeting to be held 6/2-4/98. It was proposed that the staff only develop the "Get off the watch list" matrix and the PIM. In addition, the senior managers would be provided the commission briefing papers that will be developed on a weekly basis. W. Travers will confirm the acceptability of the approach.
- The panel discussed the format and content of the weekly commission briefing package. The decision was to not include NU activities. Inputs will be given to R. Perch every Wednesday and should contain current activities, forecasts for the next week and new key issues.
- The panel discussed the pending enforcement under the constraints of the Office of Investigation. There are now no prohibitions from the Department of Justice on any cases released to the staff by OI. HQ will provide R. Urban information that will close any linked allegations. A discussion ensued regarding the need to go to the commission on enforcement that was identified by the NRC versus the licensee. Current thought is that we may not need to go to the commission for NRC identified issues if the licensee's process would have identified the issue. J. Durr will contact OE to verify this as a fact.
- A discussion was held on the status of the draft enforcement letter that collects the remaining undispositioned NRC enforcement issues. The letter is currently in the review process and will likely be ready for signature next week. The letter will be drafted for W. Travers signature. Travers to verify that upper management does not want to sign it. J. Durr will coordinate with OE for their concurrence.
- Closure of ICAVP enforcement issues: We need to notify the licensee that we expect enforcement associated with the ICAVP to be addressed in a timely manner, before restart as appropriate. The licensee issues a CR for NRC enforcement items

and should process it through the system. Corrective actions that are restart issues should be processed in accordance with the system we have been auditing for deferred items. Short term corrective actions should be taken as appropriate and long term issues that transcend the restart will be evaluated with the established criteria.

- ICAVP enforcement items will be processed outside of the SIL list. The corrective actions inspections will address the closure, as appropriate, of ICAVP enforcement items. W. Travers will develop a memorandum for NRC management and the commission to describe the restart status of enforcement that may not be closed before restart.
- The IP 40500 inspection exit is planned for February 26, 1998. Needs to be noticed
- The OSTI will do a preparation week on February 17, 1998. This is necessary for contractor availability. The first week of inspection will be 3/2/98.
- MC 0350 status:
 - Unit 3: 38 SIL items were closed as of the last report; 7-14 should be closed in the next inspection report. The MOV and 40500 team will close 4 more; 5 are place holders; of the 25 remaining, approximately 50% are inspected for an estimated 86% complete. The critical issues remaining are the RSS, ECP, Appendix R, VETIP, and operator licensing and training. The SIL should be completed by the end of March. NU owes us 9 packages.
 - Unit 2: 12 of 52 SIL items are closed; 1-2 will be closed in the next report; approximately 23% complete. Critical items are the programmatic issues such as VETIP, ISI, HELB, MOV. Of 71 packages, 32 have been delivered.
 - Unit 1: Unit 1 management has completed the reorganization to accommodate the reduction in staff size. There is a plan for 190 people and a \$34 million budget to maintain corrective maintenance and shut down risk. No new SIL packages have been received.
- NU resources for Unit 2 are increasing because of the transfer from Unit 3.
- There was a discussion of the treatment of LER's for closure. The concern was that all LER's should be addressed in detail versus an audit. The decision was that SPO-I would review the inspection procedure for the policy on review and closure of LER's and treat them in accordance with the procedure. SPO-I will report to the panel the results of the review.
- SPO considers the SIL to be a living document and new issues will be added as approach to restart progresses.

- The panel discussed the extension of the Brookhaven contract that will expire in May. There will be a need to support the Unit 2 restart effort. J. Durr will contact R. Perch for contract support and funding.
- The ICAVP has completed tier 1 at S&L; overall performance of S&L was good based on the implementation of the audit plan. Although there were NRC findings of significance, these were outside the scope of the ICAVP charter. Also, tier 2 and 3 are complete with acceptable S&L performance.
- DR's are still being reviewed by NU; NU projects completion of their DR response by 2/23.
- There is 1 confirmed Level III DR and 2 pending for Unit 3. There is 1 Level III DR for Unit 2 pending. The confirmed Level III for Unit 3 is DR MP3 0051 regarding embed plates which was corrected by adjusting the calculation. NU agreed that it was not previously identified.
- SPO is charged with evaluating DR's every 2 weeks
- The NRC ECP has completed the site evaluation and is doing a quick look report. It looked at the ECP and LHC activities. ECP is functioning well; LHC oversight is thorough; our findings were also identified by LHC. We found the safety conscious work environments to be less formal and lacked LHC oversight. LHC is finding confidence in the licensee's compliance with the order. Critical issues are NU development of long term plans and emerging event implications.
- We issued the vice president of Nuclear Oversight chilling effects letter today.
- Licensing issues: Unit 3; needed for mode 4: 1) Appendix G amendment to be issued today; 2) relief request for RSS pump testing which is in OGC; 3) 2 letters that acknowledge ability to go to mode 2 for the RPS/ESFAS set point calibration and pressurizer level TS. Need amendment before mode 2 which will take 45 days; and the RSS potential USQ. There is a meeting set for 2/19 for the staff and the licensee to discuss RSS. A discussion ensued on the need for the NRC to send the licensee a letter for mode 2.
- Licensing issues: Unit 2: There are 22 licensing actions; 14 are complete; 4 are in review and 4 need to be submitted; 1 is on hold (control room habitability) for dose calculations.
- Allegation status was presented for the region. See attached.
- SPO has received another 10 CFR 2.206 petition.
- Next RAP/ NU meeting is planned for 3/4/98; also will include a RAP meeting and a public meeting. A meeting is planned for 2/26/98 with the NEAC.

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

JANUARY , 1998

NEW BUSINESS:

- Approve the meeting minutes from the December 17, 1997 meeting.
- Preparation for the next SMM. Region I is proposing doing theirs the week of March 23.
- Structure of the authorization to restart process; i.e. what are the elements of the letter from the EDO to NU, who will write it? What is the commission voting on? Notification process to interested parties?
- Discuss the questions/answers for the chairmans Millstone visit.
- Discuss the process for dealing with the outstanding Millstone Unit 3 enforcement that is associated with [REDACTED]

OLD BUSINESS:

- Discuss the status of MC 40500/OSTI, update of staffing, scheduling and planning. (Trapp, Shedlosky) Do do the 40500 and OSTI in parallel if the licensee request it?
- Status of the MC 0350 process(Residents)
- Assessment of licensee performance (All)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)

o Unit not layout

MILLSTONE
RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL
MEETING MINUTES

January 15, 1998

Attendees:	T. Easlick	S. Reynolds	W. Lanning
	J. Trapp	D. Beaulieu	P. Mc Kee
	E. Imbro	W. Travers	D. Mc Donald
	J. Shedlosky	A. Cerne	E. Korona
	J. Nagoski	H. Eichenholz	J. Durr

- The panel approved the meeting minutes, as amended, from the December 17, 1997 RAP meeting.
- The panel agreed that the next Plant Performance review for the senior management meeting would be held the week of March 23, 1998.
- The panel discussed the elements of the restart authorization process for Millstone Unit 3. R. Perch was designated to develop a draft plan based on the precedent set by other plants that have restarted from extended NRC imposed outages.
- The panel discussed the process for dispositioning the outstanding Millstone 3 potential enforcement items that are associated with the Office of Enforcement and Department of Justice investigations. These items will be discussed with the commission by senior NRC management. The list of issues involved in this process will be compared to the current letter being drafted to disposition the outstanding non-OI enforcement items that were not included in the major enforcement package recently issued to the licensee.
- The licensee has tentatively proposed the date of February 9, 1998 as the onsite start date for the MC 40500 team inspection. The licensee stated they will send a letter requesting the inspection on this date. The panel discussed the appropriateness of this date base on the NRC perception of the licensee's progress. The MC 40500 team leader presented his observations that supported the inspection starting on the proposed date. The panel agreed to starting the inspection on February 9, 1998.
- The OSTI team leader briefed the panel on the scope and content of the proposed inspection plan. A discussion ensued concerning any nexus between the OSTI and the ICAVP corrective action inspection relative to the configuration management program. It was decided that the OSTI would be independent of the ICAVP and that the ICAVP inspection program would provide inspection coverage of the configuration management program and its implementation.

- The resident inspection staff provided an update of the Significant Items List status.
 - Unit 2: Twelve of the 52 SIL packages have been closed; 30 items are in the licensees process. All NRC backlog packages are being inspected.
 - Unit 3: Thirty eight of the 86 SIL packages are closed as of December. Five of the SIL's will not have packages because they are programmatic issues such as review the Hannon Report or review the enforcement issues. NNECO owes us 13 SIL packages. Of the remaining 30 packages, 9 require inputs from NRR; 14 will be inspected by special inspection teams and 7 are within SPO control.
- E. Imbro provided a status report on the progress of the ICAVP effort. The NRC has completed tier 2 and 3 for Unit 3. There will be a public exit on 1/28/98. Tier 1 will be onsite for 2 weeks and exit on 2/6/98. The corrective action inspection is scheduled to begin the week of 2/1/98 and end on 3/27/98. It will be 2 weeks onsite, a week off site, and 2 more weeks onsite. It will examine NNECO's corrective actions for deficiency reports. A. Cerne will provide the ICAVP team with selected open items for inspection.
- P. Mckee discussed the inspection processes that will examine the interface for issues that need to be included in the FSAR. It was decided that the MC 40500 inspection team would examine the FSAR change process.
- Director, SPO requested that the panel develop a list of challenge items to the restart of Unit 3. The panel recommended that the Unit 3 HELB issue, fire protection program and the RSS/QSS task interface agreement be placed on the list. For Unit 2, the SRI proposed the MEPL issue be placed on the list.
- The panel discussed the operator training issues and what was needed before restart. The panel felt that the licensee needed to do simulator training for the modifications associated with the recirculation spray system. Additionally, the panel felt that DRS should perform inspections of the "just in time" training that the licensee is doing for other modifications. It was suggested that license examiners do JPM's with selected operators for some modifications.
- P. McKee provided a status report on the NRC activities associated with the employees concern program. The NRC inspection team completed the Safety Conscious Work Environment and employees concern program inspection and exited on 1/22/98 with the licensee and Little Harbor Consultants. He reported that the ECP is doing well under the current manager; most of the activities associated with the SWCE have only occurred recently and the action plans for post LHC are not complete. He also observed that LHC has been embroiled in several reactive events to the distraction of their routine audit plan activities, and the documentation is not meeting our expectations.
- The project managers provided a status report on license amendment requests for

Units 2 and 3. For Unit 3, there are 6 open LAR's, 4 for mode 4 and 2 are near completion. The instrument inaccuracies needs more information and may challenge the mode change dates. The LAR dealing with the pressurizer level setpoint may need to be revised, there is currently a request for information. Two LAR's are needed for mode 2, the issue on the spent fuel pool boraflex and the shutdown margin monitor.

We are awaiting the submittal on the Arcor potential USQ. The licensee may deal with this under GL 91-18 while awaiting the license amendment.

The licensee just submitted a relief request that they will need prior to mode 4 on base line for the RSS pump.

For Unit 2, there are 22 LAR's, 11 are complete. Major LAR's are HELB inside containment; control room technical specifications; Appendix R / Thermolag exemptions.

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL

MEETING MINUTES

December 17, 1997

Attendees:	W. Travers	W. Lanning	E. Imbro
	S. Reynolds	T. Easlick	D. Beaulieu
	A. Cerne	P. Cataldo	S. Jones
	B. Korona	J. Durr	L. Scholl
	N. Blumberg	J. Andersen*	

* Telephonically

- Discussed the lack of meeting minutes from the November RAP meeting. Reynolds and Blumberg have notes that can be assembled to capture the essence of the meeting.
- Panel members need to develop a late, pacing items list that will enumerate the end of project major issues that need to be focused on such as VETIP and S&L DDR's. List listing will be added to the commission briefing paper.
- Unit 1 has one SIL item complete. The licensee is not providing any packages completed packages at this time. The residents are only performing the core inspections, all other effort will be directed to Unit 3.
- Unit 2 has 11 of 51 SIL items completed. The programmatic areas are being inspected but not closed.
- Unit 3 has 29 SIL items closed; 6 more will be closed in inspection report 207. There are approximately 20 packages in the backlog and another 5-10 will be closed in inspection report 208.
- Need to complete the updating of the Restart Assessment Plan. Mc Kee will provide updated input on LAR's and ECP.
- Held a discussion on the technical concerns associated with the "piggy-back" mode of the recirculation spray system, the fact that it is unique in this configuration, and that it was probably never reviewed by the staff. The system was altered using 10 CFR 50.59, thus not receiving staff review. SPO-L will coordinate with the various groups within the NRC that are performing reviews on this system (i.e. ICAVP, NRR tech staff, and S&L) in conjunction with the TIA.
- P. Mc Kee held a discussion on the meaning of "FSAR verification" in the SIL. Needs assistance of the inspection groups (resident staff, ICAVP tier 1,2,3) to put statements in the inspection reports that describes the degree to which they verified the content of the updated FSAR and the area being inspected. This will support the closure of the FSAR SIL item.

- Similarly, SPO staff needs to develop a listing of the inputs that will be used to close programmatic areas. (Residents) The RAP decided to review and approve the closure of all programmatic areas of the SIL.
- E. Imbro noted that the "message" is not being driven down in the NU organization. Discussed an anecdote noted by S&L contractor which reflected an unchanged culture in pockets of NU. A. Cerne noted that there are other examples that indicate a positive change has occurred in the organization. The group discussed the implications and consensus was reached that, although pockets of resistance to change may exist, the overall trend is positive.
- S. Reynolds will keep the master schedule for SPO meetings.
- E. Imbro will develop a proposal by the next RAP meeting to identify the inputs that we would propose to use to reach a conclusion regarding the ability of NU to maintain the configuration management of the facilities in accordance with their licensing and design bases.
- Next RAP meeting is scheduled for 1/15/98 and the next public meeting is slated for 1/27/98.
- S&L needs to bring the DR trends to the table soon and not wait for the final report.
- Report on the Employees Concern Program inspection status: Observation is that the ECP is maturing and the SCWE has just been implemented.
- Unit 3 license amendment requests: 8 are still open, all have been submitted. The Arcor seismic issue may need to be submitted as an unresolved safety question, also the auxiliary feedwater throttle valves.
- Need to draft a "straw man" power authorization paper.
- Discussed the recent counter proposal of NU for providing responses connected to milestones versus periodic updates for the 10 CFR 50.54 letter. P. Mc Kee to draft NRC position.

RAP AGENDA ITEMS

SEPTEMBER , 1997

NEW BUSINESS:

- Approve the meeting minutes from the August 13, 1997 meeting.
- Discuss the status of MC 40500/OSTI, update of staffing, scheduling and planning. (Trapp, Shedlosky) Do we still do the 40500 as scheduled, do we delay the OSTI?
- Status of the MC 0350 process(Residents)
- Assessment of licensee performance (All)
- Status of the ICAVP process (Imbro/ Reynolds)
- Status of the employees concern program (Mc Kee)
- Status and potential problems of licensing actions (Project Managers)

OLD BUSINESS:

- Brief discussion of the content of the licensee's power ascension plan. Discussion at the next RAP meeting of the SPO power ascension coverage plan. (Blumberg)
- Determine the extent of application of instrument uncertainty for Millstone Station. (Scholl)
- Preparation for the next SMM, should there be a formal preparation of the PIM and PPR?
-

9/24/97

Millstone Unit 2 SIL Status (Includes IR 97-203 items if Inspection Completed)

Package Status	9/5	9/12	9/19	9/26	10/3	Remarks
# of SIL Items	51	51	51			
# of SIL Items with No Package(s) Required	8	8	8			SIL 2,3,4,11,13,15,17,50
# of SIL Items with All Packages Received	14	14	14			SIL 1,5,6,22,26,29,33,34,35,36,38,41,43,45
# of SIL Sub-tasks Requiring Individual Package	70	69	69			<u>1.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.5/25.1, 8.6, 9.1, 9.2/23.3, 9.3, 9.4/34.1, 9.5/46.1, 10.1, 12.1, 14.1, 14.2, 16.1, 18.1, 18.2, 19.3, 19.4, 19.5, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.6, 21.1, 21.2, 22.1, 22.2, 23.1, 23.2, 23.4, 23.5, 23.6, 24.1, 26.1, 27.1, 28.1, 28.2, 29.1, 30.1, 31.1, 32.1, 33.1, 35.1, 36.1, 37.1, 38.1, 39.1, 39.2, 40.1, 41.1, 42.1, 43.1, 43.2, 44.1, 45.1, 47.1, 47.2, 48.1, 49.1, 49.2, 49.3, 51.1</u>
# of SIL Individual Packages Received	27	26	26			
Inspection Status						
# SIL Items Closed (all SIL sub-tasks completed)	2	3	3	4		SIL 38, 43 and 45
# SIL Items Updated in which Corrective Actions were Satisfactory but Pending Escalated Enforcement Prevents Closure	4	6	6	6		SIL 22, 26, 33, 34, 35 and 36 <i>10 sub closed</i>
# SIL Items Updated in which Corrective Actions were Not Satisfactory and Further Inspection is Required	5	10	10			
# Individual SIL Sub-tasks (Packages) Closed	6	8	8			
# Individual SIL Sub-Tasks (Packages) Updated in which Corrective Actions were Satisfactory but Pending Escalated Enforcement Prevents Closure	4	8	8			
# Individual SIL Sub-Tasks (Packages) Updated in which Corrective Actions were Not Satisfactory and Further Inspection is Required	6	12	12			
NRC Backlog - # Open Individual Sub-tasks with Pkg Received or Pkg not Required	23	23	23			10 are working, 7 are specifically scheduled, 6 are unscheduled
NRC Backlog - # of Open, Non-SIL Packages Received	2	2	3			

SIL Item Closure Plan

SIL #2 - FSAR Adequacy for Restart

- 1) PM to review FSAR updates and select sample of 50.59 reviews supporting the FSAR changes
- 2) PM to review licensee guidance on FSAR updates (review process)
- 3) Residents review FSAR as part of normal inspection activity
- 4) ICAVP (contractor and NRC) review FSAR as part of normal inspection activities
- 5) 40500 Inspection Team to review FSAR as part of normal inspection activities
- 6) OSTI to review FSAR as part of normal inspection activities

SIL #78 - 10 CFR 50.59 Process

- 1) PM to review 7 URI/EEIs listed in SIL for 50.59 adequacy (obtain NRR assistance if needed for technical review)
- 2) PM to select sample of 50.59s and review
- 3) PM to review the licensee's process for 50.59 evaluations
- 4) Residents review 50.59s as part of normal inspection activity
- 5) ICAVP (contractor and NRC) review 50.59s as part of normal inspection activities
- 6) 40500 Inspection Team to review 50.59s as part of normal inspection activities
- 7) OSTI to review 50.59s as part of normal inspection activities

Significant Items List

ID	SIL #	Reference	Description	Package Status	Inspection Status	Pkg Due	Pkg Recd	Inspect	Responsibility	Remarks	
1	1	MC 0350 SECTION C.1.3. C.	MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND EFFECTIVENESS; LICENSEE STAFF SA	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED			8/30/97	10/1/97	SPO(O)		
2	1.1-	MC 0350	MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND EFFECTIVENESS	RECEIVED	SCHEDULED			10/1/97	40500		
3	2	MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1. C.	10 CFR 50.54(i)	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED				8/23/97	SPO(O)	8/23/97 - ICAPV START	
4	2.1	MC 0350; CONF ACTION LE	50.54(i); 50.59 PROCESS	NOT REQUIRED	WORKING			8/23/97	SPO(O)		
5	3	MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1. AN	DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS CHANGES TO ADDRESS UNIT 1 ACR 7007	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED				8/23/97	SPO(O)		
6	3.1	ACR 7007 & 8781; MC 035	DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS; ACR 7007 & 8781	NOT REQUIRED	WORKING			10/27/97	SPO(L)		
7	4	MC 0350 ITEM C.1.4. a, C.2	EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED				10/27/97	SPO(L)	10/27/97 IS APPROXIMATE	
8	4.1	CONFIRMATORY ORDER; M	EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM	NOT REQUIRED	SCHEDULED			10/1/97	SPO (O)		
9	5	MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1. C.	CORRECTIVE ACTION; SELF-ASSESSMENTS; COMMITMENT TRACKING	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED			5/9/97	10/1/97	40500		
10	5.1	MC 0350	CORR ACT; SELF-ASSESS; COMMIT TRACKING	RECEIVED	SCHEDULED	8/20/97	8/18/97	10/1/97	40500		
11	5.2	EEL 98-201-30	FAIL PROMPTLY CORR SIGNIFICANT COND ADVERSE QUALITY	RECEIVED	SCHEDULED				DRS(OL-HP)		
12	6	MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.d, C.4	WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL: PLANT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM E	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED			7/25/97		DRS(OL-HP)		
13	8.1	MC 0350	WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL	RECEIVED	UNSCHEDULED			1/5/98	SPO (O), OSTI		
14	7	MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.3.f; C.2	BYPASS JUMPERS, OPERATOR WORK AROUNDS & CONTROL BOARD	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED				1/5/98	SPO (O), OSTI	1/5/98 - TENTATIVE OSTI	
15	7.1	MC 0350	BJS, WORK AROUNDS & CONTROL BOARD DEF	NOT RECEIVED		4/23/97	4/23/97		SPO(O), SPO(O), O		
16	8	MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.b, C.2	PROCEDURE ADEQUACY/PUP; PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION; TS 8.8.1;	SIL - SOME PKG(s) RECEIVED		8/28/97	8/1/97		BLUMBERG		
17	8.1	MC 0350	PROCEDURE ADEQUACY/PUP PROGRAM	NOT REQUIRED	WORKING: IR 97-203		8/13/97	7/21/97	BEAULIEU		
18	8.2	IFI 95-201-03	WEAKNESSES IN PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM	RECEIVED					SPO(O)		
19	8.3	URI 98-001-04	LOSS OF DC BUS EVENT	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203			8/11/97	WILLIAMS		
20	8.4	TS 8.8.1 PROCEDURES	TS 8.8.1 PROCEDURES	NOT RECEIVED			4/23/97	7/7/97	CARASCO		
21	8.5	NU B18257/ URI 98-008-08	OPS PROCEDURES PRECLUDE WATER HAMMER	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(O)	ADD EEL TO SIL	
22	9	EEL 97-002-12	NUMEROUS INAD SURV PROCEDURES	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(O)		
23	9.1	MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.g, C.2	OPERATING PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH FSAR DESCRIPTION OF	SIL - SOME PKG(s) RECEIVED				8/23/97	SPO(O)	8/23/97 - ICAPV START	
24	9.2	MC 0350	OP: CONSISTENT W/FSAR; PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(O)		
25	9.3	EEL 98-008-13	FSAR UPDATE FOR HYDROGEN MONITOR SYSTEM	NOT RECEIVED		8/18/97	8/13/97		SPO(O)	FIX SIL - SPO(O)	
26	9.4	EEL 98-008-05	BORIC ACID SAMPLING	NOT RECEIVED			3/28/97	5/19/97	BLUMBERG		
27	9.5	EEL 98-008-08	REFUELING DRAIN LINE	RECEIVED					SPO(O)		
28	10	LER 97-002-00	DAMPER CANNOT BE MAN OPERATED W/ 10 MIN AS REQ IN ACC ANA	NOT RECEIVED				8/11/97	DRS(OL-HP)		
29	10.1	MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.g, C.3	EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE UPGRADES; ACCEPTABILITY OF	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED			5/18/97	7/25/97	8/11/97	WILLIAMS	INSPECTED W/OUT PKG
30	10.2	EOP & ADP UPGRADES	EOP & ADP UPGRADES	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203		7/1/97	7/1/97	10/1/97	SPO (O), NRR	
31	11	MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.a,b,c	QUALITY ASSURANCE AND OVERSIGHT	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED				10/1/97	40500		
32	11.1	MC 0350	QA AND OVERSIGHT	NOT REQUIRED	SCHEDULED			8/29/97	SPO (O)		
33	12	MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1. C.	LICENSEE RESTART PUNCH LIST - REVIEW OF ITEMS DEFERRED UNTIL	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED				8/29/97	SCHOLL	8/29/97 IS APPROXIMATE	
34	12.1	MC 0350	DEFERRED ITEM REVIEW	NOT RECEIVED			5/28/97	5/18/97	1/5/98	SPO (O), OSTI	
35	13	MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.a,b,i,j	LICENSED OPERATOR STAFFING; CONTROL ROOM FORMALITY; SIMUL	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED			5/28/97	8/1/97	1/5/98	OSTI, SPO(O)	1/5/98 - TENTATIVE OSTI
36	13.1	MC 0350	OPERATIONS - STAFFING, FORMALITY, LOGKEEPING...	NOT REQUIRED	SCHEDULED				DRS(OL-HP)	FIX SIL - DUPLICATE DESC	
37	14	MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.e, C.3	LICENSEE STAFF QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING; ATTENTIVENESS T	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED			8/20/97	8/18/97	DRS(OL-HP)	NOT DIANTONIO	
38	14.1	MC 0350; CONF ACTION LT	CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER/ INACCURATE FORM 398s	NOT RECEIVED				10/8/97	DIANTONIO		
39	14.2	URI 97-001-03	OPERATOR TRAINING	NOT RECEIVED				3/9/98	SPO (O), OSTI		
40	15	MC 0350 ITEMS C.4.a,b,c,d	AUGMENTED INSPECTION COVERAGE DURING RESTART INSPECTION;	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED			8/15/97	7/30/97	3/9/98	SPO(O)	3/9/98 VERY TENTATIVE
41	15.1	MC 0350	AUGMENTED RESTART COVERAGE	NOT REQUIRED	SCHEDULED			8/18/97	DRS(EPI)		
42	16	MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g,h, C	EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION; COORDIN	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED				8/18/97	LUSHER		
43	18.1	MC 0350	EP & ON-SHIFT DOSE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY	RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203				NRR, SPO(L)		
44	17	MC 0350 SECTION C.5 AND	DISPOSITION OF REGULATORY ISSUES: LICENSE AMENDMENTS; EXE	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED					NRR, SPO(L)		
45	17.1	MC 0350 SECTION C.5 AND	DISPOSITION OF REGULATORY ISSUES	NOT REQUIRED	WORKING				NRR, DRS(SEB)		
46	18	ACR: 02821, M2-98-0239, E	MEPL PROGRAM	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED			5/18/97		HIGGINS		
47	18.1	EEL 98-201-42	INADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROLS FOR MEPL	NOT RECEIVED							

Significant Items List

ID	SIL #	Reference	Description	Package Status	Inspection Status	Pkg Due	Pkg Recd	Inspect	Responsibility	Remarks
48	18.2	EEl 98-201-43	INADEQ CONTROL NON-CONFORMING MATERIAL	NOT RECEIVED			8/1/97		HIGGINS	
49	18	ACR# M2-98-0515 & 07958;	EEQ & HELB	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED					DRS(EEB)	
50	18.1	EEQ PROGRAM	EEQ PROGRAM	NOT REQUIRED	UNSCHEDULED				DRS(EEB)	
51	18.2	HELB PROGRAM	HELB PROGRAM	NOT REQUIRED	UNSCHEDULED				DRS(EEB)	WAIT FOR EEQ PROGRAM
52	18.3	EEl 98-201-20	FAILURE TO MAINTAIN MCC ENVIRONMENTAL ENCLOSURES	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203			7/22/97	CHUNG	WAIT FOR EEQ PROGRAM
54	20	EEl 98-008-12	EEQ OF SOLENOID VALVE ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS	NOT RECEIVED					DRS(SEB)	
55	20.1	IFI 338/98-01-01, EEl 338/98	GENERIC LETTER 88-10 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM; DYNAM	SIL - SOME PKG(S) RECEIVED				11/1/97	PRIVDY	NOVEMBER TENTATIVE
56	20.2	IFI 95-001-01	NUMEROUS GL 88-10 MOV ITEMS	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203			11/1/97	PRIVDY	NOVEMBER TENTATIVE
57	20.3	EEl 98-005-11	INACCURATE INFO TO NRC FOR GL 88-10	NOT RECEIVED				11/1/97	PRIVDY	NOVEMBER TENTATIVE
58	20.4	EEl 98-005-09	DYNAMIC TESTING OF TERRY TURBINE MOV	NOT RECEIVED			4/4/97	11/1/97	PRIVDY	NOVEMBER TENTATIVE
59	20.5	EEl 95-008-01	SEAT LEAKAGE OF SUMP RECIRC CHECK VALVES - E 95-031 02013	RECEIVED			4/4/97	11/1/97	PRIVDY	NOVEMBER TENTATIVE
60	20.6	EEl 95-008-03	PRESSURE LOCKING OF SUMP RECIRC MOV'S - E 95-031 01013	RECEIVED			4/18/97	11/1/97	PRIVDY	NOVEMBER TENTATIVE
61	21	EEl 95-008-04	REVIEW OF ENG SERVICES; MOV PRESS LOCKING - E 95-031 01023	RECEIVED				11/1/97	DRS(EEB)	
62	21.1	MC ITEM C.3.3.e; IR 338/98	FIRE PROTECTION/APP R PROGRAMS; APP R AOPS; THERMOLAG	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED					DRS(EEB)	
63	21.2	APP R AOP#	APP R AOP#	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
64	21	THERMOLAG	THERMOLAG	NOT RECEIVED					DRS(EEB)	
65	21.1	SELF-ASSESS/QA AUDITS; A	SELF-ASSESS/QA AUDITS; ACR M2-98-0460	NOT REQUIRED				7/14/97	DRS(SEB)	FIX SIL - URI 98-08-10
66	22	ACR 98-0513, EEl 338/98-08	CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN MESH SIZE & ECCS PUMP THROTTLE V	SIL - ALL PKG(S) RECEIVED	SIL - EEl "CLOSURE": IR 97-203		6/30/97	7/14/97	KENNY	
67	22.1	URI 98-008-10	CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN MESH SIZE	RECEIVED			6/30/97	7/14/97	KENNY	
68	22.2	EEl 98-008-11	FAILURE TO IDENTIFY CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN MESH SIZE	RECEIVED					SPO (J)	
69	23	ACR# 01991, M2-98-0448, 0	HYDROGEN MONITORS AND POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INO	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
70	23.1	EEl 98-008-11	INOPERABLE HYDROGEN MONITOR	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
71	23.2	EEl 98-008-12	INAD DESIGN CONTROL OF MOD - H2 MON ISOL VALVES	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
72	23.3	EEl 98-008-13	FSAR UPDATE FOR HYDROGEN MONITOR SYSTEM	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	WAIT FOR EEl 98-201-41
73	23.4	EEl 98-201-03	INAD 50.59 FOR H2 MONITOR CONTAINMENT ISOL	RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
74	24	EEl 98-201-41	FAIL TO MEET SINGLE FAIL CRIT FOR HYDROGEN MONITOR	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
75	24.1	URI 98-001-05	INOPERABLE HYDROGEN MONITOR	NOT RECEIVED					SPO (J)	
76	24.2	ACR# 08174, 04047, 06372	EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RA	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
77	24.3	URI 95-042-03	PRESSURIZER HEATUP RATE LIMIT EXCEEDED	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
78	25	NUMEROUS ACR#; URI 338/	ECCS PUMPS SUCTION LINE FROM RWST HAS NUMEROUS DEGRADED	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED		5/18/97	5/18/97	7/7/97	DRS(CMME)	NEED UPDATED PKG
79	25.1	URI 98-008-08	SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM WATER HAMMER	NOT RECEIVED		5/17/97	4/23/97	7/7/97	CARASCO	
80	26	ACR 11252 EEl 338/98-08-1	B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE - INADEQUATE CORRECTI	SIL - ALL PKG(S) RECEIVED	SIL - EEl "CLOSURE": IR 97-02	4/18/97	4/4/97	5/18/97	SPO (J)(LS)	
81	26.1	EEl 98-008-10	EDG BEARING FAILURES	RECEIVED		4/18/97	4/18/97	5/18/97	SCHOLL	
82	27	EEl 338/98-201-08	INACCURATE DESIGN BASES DOCUMENT PACKAGES	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED		4/18/97	4/18/97		SPO(J)	
83	27.1	EEl 98-201-08	DESIGN CONTROL MEASURES DBDP#	NOT RECEIVED		6/20/97	6/13/97		SPO(J)	
84	28	EEl 338/98-201-11 & 31	RBCCW TEMP. MOD TO SURGE TANK	SIL - ALL PKG(S) RECEIVED		6/13/97	6/13/97	5/20/97	SPO(J)	
85	28.1	EEl 98-201-11	INADQ CONTROL BJ RBCCW SURGE TANK	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203			5/20/97	BESLER	
86	28.2	EEl 98-201-31	INAD DES VER RBCCW SURGE TK SEISMIC RESTRAINT	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-203			5/20/97	BESLER	
87	29	EEl 338/98-201-12	WIDE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT, SEPARATION & SINGLE FAILUR	SIL - ALL PKG(S) RECEIVED			6/13/97	6/30/97	MING	
88	29.1	EEl 98-201-12	FAILURE TO MAINTAIN NUC INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL INDEPEND	RECEIVED		6/30/97	6/30/97	5/18/97	SPO(J)	UPDATED PKG NEEDED
89	30	EEl 338/98-201-25	CA FOR DUAL FUNCTION VALVES	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED		6/30/97	5/18/97	5/18/97	SCHOLL	
90	30.1	EEl 98-201-25	FAIL PROMPTLY CORR DISCREPANCY W/DUAL FUNC ISOL VALVES	NOT RECEIVED		6/30/97	5/18/97	7/22/97	SPO(J)	
91	31	EEl 338/98-201-28	STATION BLACKOUT DIESEL ISSUES	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED		3/28/97	3/28/97	7/22/97	MING	
92	31.1	EEl 98-201-28	CORR ACTIONS SBO AUDIT DEFICIENCIES	NOT RECEIVED		6/3/97	7/1/97	7/22/97	MING	
93	32	EEl 338/98-201-29	CORR ACTIONS FOR AUDIT ISSUES REGARDING NCR#	SIL - NO PKG(S) RECEIVED		4/4/97	4/4/97		SPO(J)	
94	32.1	EEl 98-201-29	FAIL PROMPTLY CORR IDENTIFIED NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS	NOT RECEIVED	UPDATED, NOT CLOSED: IR 97-02				SPO(J)	
95	33	EEl 338/98-201-38	VITAL SWGR ROOM COOL SEISMIC DESIGN	SIL - ALL PKG(S) RECEIVED	SIL - EEl "CLOSURE": IR 97-202			7/7/97	DRS(CMME)	

Significant Items List

ID	SIL #	Reference	Description	Package Status	Inspection Status	Pkg Due	Pkg Recd	Inspect	Responsibility	Remarks
96	33.1	EEL 98-201-38	INAD CORR ACT SW SEISMIC DEFICIENCY	RECEIVED			8/13/97	7/7/97	CARASCO	
97	34	EEL 338/98-08-08	REFUELING POOL DRAIN VALVE CONFIGURATION CONTROL	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	SIL - EEI "CLOSURE": IR 97-02	4/4/97	4/4/97	5/19/97	SPO(J)	
98	34.1	EEL 98-008-08	REFUELING DRAIN LINE	RECEIVED		8/15/97	3/28/97	5/19/97	BLUMBERG	
99	35	EEL 338/98-08-08	CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR LER 338/98-24	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	SIL - EEI "CLOSURE": IR 97-203		5/30/97	5/24/97	SPO(J)	
100	35.1	EEL 98-008-08	FAILURE REVIEW TS VLU ₂	RECEIVED		8/15/97	8/30/97	5/19/97	SPO(J)	
101	36	EEL 338/98-08-10	UNIT 1 HEAVY LOAD OVER UNIT 2	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	SIL - EEI "CLOSURE": IR 97-02		8/18/97	4/4/97	5/19/97	BLUMBERG
102	36.1	EEL 98-008-10	HEAVY LOAD CONCERN AND CORRECTIVE ACTION	RECEIVED		5/19/97	5/9/97		SPO(J)	
103	37	EEL 338/98-44-05	ICE BLOCKAGE OF SERVICE WATER STRAINER BACKWASH LINE	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED		8/30/97	8/13/97		SPO(J)	
104	37.1	EEL 95-044-05	FAILURE TO ENTER TS 3.0.3 AFTER SW BACKWASH LINE FREEZING	NOT RECEIVED		8/22/97	8/22/97	5/19/97	SPO(J)	
105	38	EEL 338/98-05-11; ENFORCE	SPENT FUEL POOL FSAR UPDATES	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	SIL - CLOSED: IR 97-02	8/15/97	4/18/97	5/19/97	BLUMBERG	
106	38.1	URI 98-005-11 (17)	SPENT FUEL POOL FSAR UPDATES	RECEIVED		8/15/97	7/30/97		DRS(SEB)	
107	39	EEL 338/98-04-10 URI 338/98-04-10	RBCCW FLOWS ASSUMED IN CONTAINMENT ANAL; POST-ACCIDENT F	SIL - SOME PKG(s) RECEIVED		8/30/97	8/30/97		DRS(SEB)	WAIT FOR URI 98-04-11
108	39.1	EEL 98-004-10	USE OF INCORRECT FLOW RATE IN CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT ANALYS	RECEIVED		1/1/97	1/1/97		DRS(SEB)	
109	39.2	URI 98-201-38	FAIL TO CONSIDER POST ACCIDENT FLUID TEMPS IN ANALYSES	NOT RECEIVED		1/1/97	1/1/97		DRS(SEB)	
110	40	LER 338/98-31	POT NON-CONS ASSUMP FOR SING MSIV CLOSURE EVENT	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED		7/15/97	5/23/97		DRS(SEB)	
111	40.1	LER 98-031-00	POT NON-CONS ASSUMP FOR SING MSIV CLOSURE EVENT	NOT RECEIVED		5/8/97	5/8/97		NRR	PKG WITH NRR - HOW TO
112	41	ACR M2-97-0023	SEIMANS MODEL OF LARGE AND SMALL BREAK LOCA ₂	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	WORKING	8/1/97	8/13/97	8/1/97	NRR	
113	41.1	ACR M2-97-0023	SEIMANS MODEL OF LARGE AND SMALL BREAK LOCA ₂	RECEIVED		7/25/97	7/25/97		SPO(J)	
114	42	IR 338/94-201 (IFS # - IFI 9	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL DAY TANK DOES NOT SATISFY	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED					MCDONALD	
115	42.1	IFI 94-201-90	EDG FUEL OIL SUPPLY LESS THAN 7 DAY REQUIREMENT	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
116	43	URI 338/98-08-14; LER 338/98-08-14	INAPPROPRIATE REMOVAL OF STARTUP RATE TRIP	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	SIL - CLOSED: IR 98-08, 97-203	8/30/97	8/30/97	7/7/97	MOY	
117	43.1	URI 98-008-14	REMOVAL OF STARTUP RATE TRIP	RECEIVED	CLOSED: IR 97-77	1/1/97	1/1/97		BEAULIEU	
118	43.2	LER 338/98-29	REMOVAL OF STARTUP RATE TRIP	RECEIVED	CLOSED: IR 98-08				SPO(J)	
119	44	ACR 02797, ACR 09583, ACR 02797	POTENTIAL EXCEED CONTAINMENT DESIGN FOLLOWING MSLB	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED				7/15/97	SPO(J)	
120	44.1	LER 338/97-08; ACR 02797	POTENTIAL EXCEED CONTAINMENT DESIGN FOLLOWING MSLB	NOT RECEIVED				7/15/97	SPO(J)	
121	45	ACR M2-98-0298	MS CHECK VALVE AFFECT ON MSLB	SIL - ALL PKG(s) RECEIVED	SIL - CLOSED: IR 97-202		7/11/97	7/15/97	HIGGINS	
122	45.1	ACR M2-98-0298	MS CHECK VALVE AFFECT ON MSLB	RECEIVED	CLOSED: IR 97-202				SPO(J)	
123	48	LER 338/97-02	CONTROL ROOM AC COMMON INLET DAMPER	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
124	48.1	LER 97-002-00	DAMPER CANNOT BE MAN OPERATED W/ 10 MIN AS REQ IN ACC ANA	NOT RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
125	47	URI 338/98-08-09, LER 338/98-08-09	REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE	SIL - SOME PKG(s) RECEIVED				1/1/97	SPO(J)	
126	47.1	URI 98-008-09	RESPONSE TIME TESTING OF COMPONENTS	NOT RECEIVED					BEAULIEU	
127	47.2	LER 338/98-24	RESPONSE TIME TESTING DID NOT INCLUDE SPEC 200	RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
128	48	ACR M2-98-0542	TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS FOR INOPERABLE MAIN STEAM IS	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED					SPO(J)	
129	48.1	ACR M2-98-0542	TS FOR INOP MS SAFETY VALVES NON-CONSERVATIVE	NOT RECEIVED					DRS(SEB)	
130	49	LER 338/98-30, LER 338/97-07	INSERVICE INSPECTION/INSERVICE TESTING	SIL - SOME PKG(s) RECEIVED				1/1/97	BEAULIEU	
131	49.1	LER 338/98-30	FAIL PERFORM SECTION XI TESTING HPSI CHECK VALVES	RECEIVED					DRS(SEB)	
132	49.2	LER 97-005-00	FAIL PERFORM SECTION XI TESTING HPSI CHECK VALVES	NOT RECEIVED					DRS(SEB)	PKG NEEDED FOR CR ₂ ONL
133	49.3	CR M2-97-0491 & 1229	INSER TEST INSTRU NOT MEET ANSI/ASME CHPT XI REQ	NOT RECEIVED				7/22/97	SPO(J)	
134	50	SIL 50 (NO REFERENCES)	CR M2-97-0491 & 1229 - IST/ISI PROGRAM	NOT RECEIVED				7/22/97	HIGGINS	
135	50.1	SIL 50	CONTROL/USE VENDOR INFORMATION	SIL - NO PKG(s) REQUIRED	WORKING: IR 97-203				DRS(SEB)	
136	51	IR 338/95-29	CONTROL/USE VENDOR INFORMATION	NOT REQUIRED					DRS(SEB)	
137	51.1	IR 338/95-29	SWSOPI FOLLOWUP	SIL - NO PKG(s) RECEIVED					DRS(SEB)	
			SWSOPI FOLLOWUP	NOT RECEIVED						