

TSTF STATUS as of June 13, 2000

<u>TSTF #</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Status</u>
016 R.3	RA added for LCO 3.0.3 Entry on LOF	NRC reviewing
207 R.5	CT to Restore Excess Leak Rate	Approved
231 R.0	RPS Instrumentation Bases, B3.3.1.1	Bases correction
306 R.1	3.3.6.1 added Action	Modify; Bases lacking
330 R.0	UHS TS Changes	OG reviewing
332 R.0	ECCS RTT	NRC Tech Branch reviewing; note on Cascading not in topical
334 R.0	Excess Flow Check Valve SR Freq	Approved
339 R.2	<u>W</u> parameters to COLR	Approved
342 R.1	SR 3.3.1.5 on PR Cals	OG to provide justification
343 R.0	Containment Tendon SR & Program	Modify; Working Group to resolve
349 R.1	Note for deenergizing SDC pumps	Approved
355 R.0	RPS Instrumentation Bases, B3.3.3.1	Insert 9 correction
360 R.0	Consolidated 3.8 Changes	Under NRC review (critical path item)
361 R.0	Note on TS Suspension during SR Perf	SRXB proposed Mod; discuss
364 R.0	Bases Control Program update, 50.59	NRC reviewing, discuss
365 R.0 (TSB-22)	LOP DG Instrumentation, SR 3.3.5.3	WOG to submit revision
TSB-16	RCP Related P/T Limits	NRC considering
TSB-17	Pzr Level & S/G Level Limits	OG considering

Integrated Industry / NRC Priority List for Travelers to be Incorporated into Revision 2

(Includes all Active Travelers that are not Approved, Withdrawn, or Rejected with Rejection Accepted)

Traveler #	Short Title	Traveler Status	Responsibility for Next Action/ Target Date		NRC Contact/ Date Sent to NRC	Industry Contact
TSTF-16, Rev. 3	Add Action to LCO 3.8.9 to require entry into LCO 3.0.3 when there is a loss of function	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Tomlinson, Ed 5/9/00	Pontious, Harry
TSTF-207, Rev. 5	Completion Time for Restoration of Various Excessive Leakage Rates	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Giardina, Bob 5/5/00	Pontious, Harry
TSTF-306, Rev. 1	Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to give option to isolate the penetration	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Schulten, Carl 3/13/00	Pontious, Harry
TSTF-332, Rev. 0	ECCS Response Time Testing	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Schulten, Carl 4/30/99	Pontious, Harry
TSTF-334, Rev. 1	Relaxed Surveillance Frequency for Excess Flow Check Valve Testing	Under TSTF Consideration	TSTF	Unassigned	Giardina, Bob With TSTF	Pontious, Harry
TSTF-339, Rev. 2	Relocate TS Parameters to COLR	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Tjader, Bob 5/26/00	Wideman, Steve
TSTF-342, Rev. 1	Revise SR 3.3.1.5, Calibration, and associated requirements for power range channels	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Schulten, Carl 3/13/00	Clarkson, Noel
TSTF-349, Rev. 1	Add Note to LCO 3.9.5 Allowing Shutdown Cooling Loops Removal from Operation	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Tjader, Bob 5/26/00	Weber, Tom
TSTF-360, Rev. 0	DC Electrical Rewrite	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Tomlinson, Ed 2/25/00	Clarkson, Noel
TSTF-361, Rev. 1	Allow standby SDC/RHR/DHR loop to inoperable to support testing	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Tjader, Bob 5/5/00	Weber, Tom
TSTF-365, Rev. 0	Add upper limits to the voltage and time delay setpoints of the loss of voltage relays	NRC Action Pending	NRC	Unassigned	Schulten, Carl 5/26/00	Wideman, Steve

Number: 11

Technical Specification Snubber Issue

Introduction

During the past several years numerous plants have converted from their current or custom technical specifications (TS) to the improved standard technical specification (STS). Part of this conversion included the relocation of TS requirements (LCOs, SRs, and Bases) for snubbers to a 10CRF50.59 controlled document such as the TRM. After several of these relocations, the industry noted that the 72 hour AOT that was available when the snubber LCO was in the TS may be interpreted as not being available due to operability issues.

Problem Statement: Industry has indicated that it does not have clear guidance on how to deal with the relocated snubber TS. Without the LCO requirement in the TS, the industry feels that there are different and sometimes conflicting views on when (or if) the determination of operability is conducted. This issue should also be discussed in reference to the two train supported systems LCOs.

Solutions/Options:

Option 1. Suggest that the Owners group propose a change to the "motherhood" LCOs contained in section 3.0. This change would include a note explaining the supported systems operability as it pertains to the 72 hour AOT. This change could outline specifics such that the licensee would know that they should do an evaluation (which according to GL 91-18 they should do anyway) determination prior to taking the snubber out of service.

Pros

Cons

Solutions/Options:

Option 2. TSB to develop a RIS to provide detailed information pertaining to the change in the TS relative to the requirements for snubbers.

Pros

Cons

Solutions/Options:

Option 3. Risk Informed track - TSB and TSTF to develop strategy for risk informed methodology that takes into account factors such as location of the snubber, mean time between failures, and likelihood of qualifying seismic event in a particular geographical area.

Pros

REFUELING QUESTIONS

- 1) What percentage of time during a refueling outage is a plant in Special Operations/Refueling Technical Specification 3.10.6? (Comment: Reading the Refueling and Special Operations LCOs, it would appear that the natural refueling situation of preference would be for the plant to be in 3.10.6 most of the time.)
- 2) What is the purpose of the TSTF-225 change request? Why is it important?
- 3) Do plants foresee being in TS 3.9.1 and TS 3.10.6 simultaneously; is this considered acceptable?
- 4) Operationally, what is the significance of requiring that a Spiral Loading Sequence be used (not the safety significance, but the operational constraints it places on the plant)? What administrative controls/precautions do plants have that do not have the Spiral Reload requirement when they shuffle fuel?
- 5) Some plants that have a custom TS version of 3.10.6 have the allowance that the "one-rod-out interlock may be bypassed," rather than the ITS allowance that "the full in position indicators may be bypassed." It appears that these custom plants cannot refuel with any control rods withdrawn; is this so?
- 6) When the TS require, "Verify all control rods are fully inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies," how is this done?
- 7) Can the refueling crane operator visually see if a control rod is in the assembly in which he intends to place fuel?
- 8) What administrative checks do the plants have to ensure that: a) a control rod is in the assembly to be refueled; and b) that there is no fuel in the assembly from which a control rod is to be withdrawn?
- 9) Have Grand Gulf or River Bend been in a Refueling Outage since adopting TSTF-225? If so, have they entered into TS 3.9.1; why; how often?

TABLE OF CONTENTS / REVISION SUMMARY

Revision - Date

B 2.0	SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)		
B 2.1.1	Reactor Core SLs	2	DraftRev
B 2.1.2	Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL	2	DraftRev
B 3.0.1	LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY	2	DraftRev
B 3.0.2	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY	2	DraftRev
B 3.1	REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS		
B 3.1.1	SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)	1	04/07/95
B 3.1.2	Reactivity Balance	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.3	Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)	1	04/07/95
B 3.1.4	CONTROL ROD Group Alignment Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.5	Safety Rod Insertion Limit	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.6	AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD (APSR) Alignment Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.7	Position Indicator Channels	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.8	PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions Systems - MODE 1	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.9	PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2	2	DraftRev
B 3.2	POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS		
B 3.2.1	Regulating Rod Insertion Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.2	AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD (APSR) Insertion Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.3	AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Operating Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.4	QUADRANT POWER TILT (QPT)	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.5	Power Peaking Factors	2	DraftRev
B 3.3	INSTRUMENTATION		
B 3.3.1	Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.2	Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Reactor Trip	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.3	Reactor Protection System (RPS) - Reactor Trip Module (RTM) ..	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.4	CONTROL ROD Drive (CRD) Trip Devices	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.5	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.6	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Manual Initiation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.7	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Automatic Actuation Logic	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.8	Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Loss of Power Start (LOPS)	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.9	Source Range Neutron Flux	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.10	Intermediate Range Neutron Flux	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.11	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Instrumentation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.12	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Manual Initiation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.13	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Logic	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.14	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) - Emergency Feedwater (EFW) - Vector Valve Logic	2	DraftRev

CURRENT T.O.C

TABLE OF CONTENTS / REVISION SUMMARY

Revision - Date

B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) AND SL VIOLATIONS

B 2.1 SLs

B 2.1.1	Reactor Core SLs	2	DraftRev
B 2.1.2	Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL	2	DraftRev

B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

B 3.0.1	<u>LCO Applicability</u>	2	DraftRev
B 3.0.2	<u>SR Applicability</u>	2	DraftRev

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.1	SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)	1	04/07/95
B 3.1.2	Reactivity Balance	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.3	Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)	1	04/07/95
B 3.1.4	CONTROL ROD Group Alignment Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.5	Safety Rod Insertion Limit	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.6	AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD (APSR) Alignment Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.7	Position Indicator Channels	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.8	PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions Systems - MODE 1	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.9	PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2	2	DraftRev

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.1	Regulating Rod Insertion Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.2	AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD (APSR) Insertion Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.3	AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Operating Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.4	QUADRANT POWER TILT (QPT)	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.5	Power Peaking Factors	2	DraftRev

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1	Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.2	Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Reactor Trip	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.3	Reactor Protection System (RPS) - Reactor Trip Module (RTM) ..	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.4	CONTROL ROD Drive (CRD) Trip Devices	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.5	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.6	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Manual Initiation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.7	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Automatic Actuation Logic	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.8	Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Loss of Power Start (LOPS)	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.9	Source Range Neutron Flux	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.10	Intermediate Range Neutron Flux	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.11	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Instrumentation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.12	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Manual Initiation	2	DraftRev

1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 30
 31
 32
 33
 34
 35
 36
 37
 38
 39
 40
 41
 42
 43
 44
 45
 46
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51
 52
 53
 54
 55
 56
 57
 58
 59
 60
 61
 62
 63
 64
 65
 66
 67
 68
 69
 70
 71
 72
 73
 74
 75
 76
 77
 78
 79
 80
 81
 82
 83
 84
 85
 86
 87
 88
 89
 90
 91
 92
 93
 94
 95
 96
 97
 98
 99
 100
 101
 102
 103
 104
 105
 106
 107
 108
 109
 110
 111
 112
 113
 114
 115
 116
 117
 118
 119
 120
 121
 122
 123
 124
 125
 126
 127
 128
 129
 130
 131
 132
 133
 134
 135
 136
 137
 138
 139
 140
 141
 142
 143
 144
 145
 146
 147
 148
 149
 150
 151
 152
 153
 154
 155
 156
 157
 158
 159
 160
 161
 162
 163
 164
 165
 166
 167
 168
 169
 170
 171
 172
 173
 174
 175
 176
 177
 178
 179
 180
 181
 182
 183
 184
 185
 186
 187
 188
 189
 190
 191
 192
 193
 194
 195
 196
 197
 198
 199
 200
 201
 202
 203
 204
 205
 206
 207
 208
 209
 210
 211
 212
 213
 214
 215
 216
 217
 218
 219
 220
 221
 222
 223
 224
 225
 226
 227
 228
 229
 230
 231
 232
 233
 234
 235
 236
 237
 238
 239
 240
 241
 242
 243
 244
 245
 246
 247
 248
 249
 250
 251
 252
 253
 254
 255
 256
 257
 258
 259
 260
 261
 262
 263
 264
 265
 266
 267
 268
 269
 270
 271
 272
 273
 274
 275
 276
 277
 278
 279
 280
 281
 282
 283
 284
 285
 286
 287
 288
 289
 290
 291
 292
 293
 294
 295
 296
 297
 298
 299
 300
 301
 302
 303
 304
 305
 306
 307
 308
 309
 310
 311
 312
 313
 314
 315
 316
 317
 318
 319
 320
 321
 322
 323
 324
 325
 326
 327
 328
 329
 330
 331
 332
 333
 334
 335
 336
 337
 338
 339
 340
 341
 342
 343
 344
 345
 346
 347
 348
 349
 350
 351
 352
 353
 354
 355
 356
 357
 358
 359
 360
 361
 362
 363
 364
 365
 366
 367
 368
 369
 370
 371
 372
 373
 374
 375
 376
 377
 378
 379
 380
 381
 382
 383
 384
 385
 386
 387
 388
 389
 390
 391
 392
 393
 394
 395
 396
 397
 398
 399
 400
 401
 402
 403
 404
 405
 406
 407
 408
 409
 410
 411
 412
 413
 414
 415
 416
 417
 418
 419
 420
 421
 422
 423
 424
 425
 426
 427
 428
 429
 430
 431
 432
 433
 434
 435
 436
 437
 438
 439
 440
 441
 442
 443
 444
 445
 446
 447
 448
 449
 450
 451
 452
 453
 454
 455
 456
 457
 458
 459
 460
 461
 462
 463
 464
 465
 466
 467
 468
 469
 470
 471
 472
 473
 474
 475
 476
 477
 478
 479
 480
 481
 482
 483
 484
 485
 486
 487
 488
 489
 490
 491
 492
 493
 494
 495
 496
 497
 498
 499
 500
 501
 502
 503
 504
 505
 506
 507
 508
 509
 510
 511
 512
 513
 514
 515
 516
 517
 518
 519
 520
 521
 522
 523
 524
 525
 526
 527
 528
 529
 530
 531
 532
 533
 534
 535
 536
 537
 538
 539
 540
 541
 542
 543
 544
 545
 546
 547
 548
 549
 550
 551
 552
 553
 554
 555
 556
 557
 558
 559
 560
 561
 562
 563
 564
 565
 566
 567
 568
 569
 570
 571
 572
 573
 574
 575
 576
 577
 578
 579
 580
 581
 582
 583
 584
 585
 586
 587
 588
 589
 590
 591
 592
 593
 594
 595
 596
 597
 598
 599
 600
 601
 602
 603
 604
 605
 606
 607
 608
 609
 610
 611
 612
 613
 614
 615
 616
 617
 618
 619
 620
 621
 622
 623
 624
 625
 626
 627
 628
 629
 630
 631
 632
 633
 634
 635
 636
 637
 638
 639
 640
 641
 642
 643
 644
 645
 646
 647
 648
 649
 650
 651
 652
 653
 654
 655
 656
 657
 658
 659
 660
 661
 662
 663
 664
 665
 666
 667
 668
 669
 670
 671
 672
 673
 674
 675
 676
 677
 678
 679
 680
 681
 682
 683
 684
 685
 686
 687
 688
 689
 690
 691
 692
 693
 694
 695
 696
 697
 698
 699
 700
 701
 702
 703
 704
 705
 706
 707
 708
 709
 710
 711
 712
 713
 714
 715
 716
 717
 718
 719
 720
 721
 722
 723
 724
 725
 726
 727
 728
 729
 730
 731
 732
 733
 734
 735
 736
 737
 738
 739
 740
 741
 742
 743
 744
 745
 746
 747
 748
 749
 750
 751
 752
 753
 754
 755
 756
 757
 758
 759
 760
 761
 762
 763
 764
 765
 766
 767
 768
 769
 770
 771
 772
 773
 774
 775
 776
 777
 778
 779
 780
 781
 782
 783
 784
 785
 786
 787
 788
 789
 790
 791
 792
 793
 794
 795
 796
 797
 798
 799
 800
 801
 802
 803
 804
 805
 806
 807
 808
 809
 810
 811
 812
 813
 814
 815
 816
 817
 818
 819
 820
 821
 822
 823
 824
 825
 826
 827
 828
 829
 830
 831
 832
 833
 834
 835
 836
 837
 838
 839
 840
 841
 842
 843
 844
 845
 846
 847
 848
 849
 850
 851
 852
 853
 854
 855
 856
 857
 858
 859
 860
 861
 862
 863
 864
 865
 866
 867
 868
 869
 870
 871
 872
 873
 874
 875
 876
 877
 878
 879
 880
 881
 882
 883
 884
 885
 886
 887
 888
 889
 890
 891
 892
 893
 894
 895
 896
 897
 898
 899
 900
 901
 902
 903
 904
 905
 906
 907
 908
 909
 910
 911
 912
 913
 914
 915
 916
 917
 918
 919
 920
 921
 922
 923
 924
 925
 926
 927
 928
 929
 930
 931
 932
 933
 934
 935
 936
 937
 938
 939
 940
 941
 942
 943
 944
 945
 946
 947
 948
 949
 950
 951
 952
 953
 954
 955
 956
 957
 958
 959
 960
 961
 962
 963
 964
 965
 966
 967
 968
 969
 970
 971
 972
 973
 974
 975
 976
 977
 978
 979
 980
 981
 982
 983
 984
 985
 986
 987
 988
 989
 990
 991
 992
 993
 994
 995
 996
 997
 998
 999
 1000
 1001
 1002
 1003
 1004
 1005
 1006
 1007
 1008
 1009
 1010
 1011
 1012
 1013
 1014
 1015
 1016
 1017
 1018
 1019
 1020
 1021
 1022
 1023
 1024
 1025
 1026
 1027
 1028
 1029
 1030
 1031
 1032
 1033
 1034
 1035
 1036
 1037
 1038
 1039
 1040
 1041
 1042
 1043
 1044
 1045
 1046
 1047
 1048
 1049
 1050
 1051
 1052
 1053
 1054
 1055
 1056
 1057
 1058
 1059
 1060
 1061
 1062
 1063
 1064
 1065
 1066
 1067
 1068
 1069
 1070
 1071
 1072
 1073
 1074
 1075
 1076
 1077
 1078
 1079
 1080
 1081
 1082
 1083
 1084
 1085
 1086
 1087
 1088
 1089
 1090
 1091
 1092
 1093
 1094
 1095
 1096
 1097
 1098
 1099
 1100
 1101
 1102
 1103
 1104
 1105
 1106
 1107
 1108
 1109
 1110
 1111
 1112
 1113
 1114
 1115
 1116
 1117
 1118
 1119
 1120
 1121
 1122
 1123
 1124
 1125
 1126
 1127
 1128
 1129
 1130
 1131
 1132
 1133
 1134
 1135
 1136
 1137
 1138
 1139
 1140
 1141
 1142
 1143
 1144
 1145
 1146
 1147
 1148
 1149
 1150
 1151
 1152
 1153
 1154
 1155
 1156
 1157
 1158
 1159
 1160
 1161
 1162
 1163
 1164
 1165
 1166
 1167
 1168
 1169
 1170
 1171
 1172
 1173
 1174
 1175
 1176
 1177
 1178
 1179
 1180
 1181
 1182
 1183
 1184
 1185
 1186
 1187
 1188
 1189
 1190
 1191
 1192
 1193
 1194
 1195
 1196
 1197
 1198
 1199
 1200
 1201
 1202
 1203
 1204
 1205
 1206
 1207
 1208
 1209
 1210
 1211
 1212
 1213
 1214
 1215
 1216
 1217
 1218
 1219
 1220
 1221
 1222
 1223
 1224
 1225
 1226
 1227
 1228
 1229
 1230
 1231
 1232
 1233
 1234
 1235
 1236
 1237

TABLE OF CONTENTS / REVISION SUMMARY

Revision - Date

B 2.1	SLs		
B 2.1.1	Reactor Core SLs	2	DraftRev
B 2.1.2	Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL	2	DraftRev
B 3.0	LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY		
B 3.0.1	LCO Applicability	2	DraftRev
B 3.0.2	SR Applicability	2	DraftRev
B 3.1	REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS		
B 3.1.1	SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)	1	04/07/95
B 3.1.2	Reactivity Balance	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.3	Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)	1	04/07/95
B 3.1.4	CONTROL ROD Group Alignment Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.5	Safety Rod Insertion Limit	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.6	AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD (APSR) Alignment Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.7	Position Indicator Channels	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.8	PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions Systems - MODE 1	2	DraftRev
B 3.1.9	PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2	2	DraftRev
B 3.2	POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS		
B 3.2.1	Regulating Rod Insertion Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.2	AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD (APSR) Insertion Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.3	AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Operating Limits	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.4	QUADRANT POWER TILT (QPT)	2	DraftRev
B 3.2.5	Power Peaking Factors	2	DraftRev
B 3.3	INSTRUMENTATION		
B 3.3.1	Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.2	Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Reactor Trip	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.3	Reactor Protection System (RPS) - Reactor Trip Module (RTM)	1	04/07/95
B 3.3.4	CONTROL ROD Drive (CRD) Trip Devices	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.5	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.6	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Manual Initiation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.7	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Automatic Actuation Logic	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.8	Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Loss of Power Start (LOPS)	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.9	Source Range Neutron Flux	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.10	Intermediate Range Neutron Flux	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.11	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Instrumentation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.12	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Manual Initiation	2	DraftRev
B 3.3.13	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Logic	1	04/07/95

OPT 1 w/
Ns 2.0

OPT 2

087-1
B 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs

BASES

BACKGROUND

GDC 10 (Ref. 1) requires that reactor core SLs ensure specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during steady state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). This is accomplished by having a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) design basis, which corresponds to a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level (95/95 DNB criterion) that DNB will not occur and by requiring that the fuel centerline temperature stays below the melting temperature.

The restrictions of this SL prevent overheating of the fuel and cladding and possible cladding perforation that would result in the release of fission products to the reactor coolant. Overheating of the fuel is prevented by maintaining the steady state peak linear heat rate (LHR) below the level at which fuel centerline melting occurs. Overheating of the fuel cladding is prevented by restricting fuel operation to within the nucleate boiling regime, where the heat transfer coefficient is large and the cladding surface temperature is slightly above the coolant saturation temperature.

Fuel centerline melting occurs when the local LHR, or power peaking, in a region of the fuel is high enough to cause the fuel centerline temperature to reach the melting point of the fuel. Expansion of the pellet upon centerline melting may cause the pellet to stress the cladding to the point of failure, allowing an uncontrolled release of activity to the reactor coolant.

Operation above the boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperature because of the onset of DNB and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer coefficient. Inside the steam film, high cladding temperatures are reached, and a cladding water (zirconium water) reaction may take place. This chemical reaction results in oxidation of the fuel cladding to a structurally weaker form. This weaker form may lose its integrity, resulting in an uncontrolled release of activity to the reactor coolant.

The proper functioning of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and main steam safety valves (MSSVs) prevents violation of the reactor core SLs.

CURRENT → LCO Applicability 3.0.1

3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

3.0.1 LCO Applicability

LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2 and 3.0.7.

LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated.

LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour to place the unit, as applicable, in:

- a. MODE 3 within 7 hours,
- b. MODE 4 within 13 hours, and
- c. MODE 5 within 37 hours.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

PREPARED

BASIS IS SIMILAR

W/ B PREFIX

i.e. B 3.0

B 3.0.1

CONSISTENT

PROPOSED

CURRENT →

SR Applicability
3.0.2

3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) AND SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

↑
CONSISTENT

3.0.2 SR Applicability

SR 3.0.1

SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

SR 3.0.2

The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per . . ." basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

SR 3.0.3

If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

SR 3.0.4

Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry

BASIS IS
SIMILAR

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The reactivity control systems must be redundant and capable of holding the reactor core subcritical when shut down under cold conditions GDC 26 (Ref. 1). SDM requirements provide sufficient reactivity margin to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for normal shutdown and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the SDM defines the degree of subcriticality that would be obtained immediately following the insertion of all safety and regulating rods, assuming the single CONTROL ROD assembly of highest reactivity worth is fully withdrawn.

The system design requires that two independent reactivity control systems be provided, and that one of these systems be capable of maintaining the core subcritical under cold conditions. These requirements are provided by the use of movable control assemblies and soluble boric acid in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The CONTROL RODS can compensate for the reactivity effects of the fuel and water temperature changes accompanying power level changes over the range from full load to no load. In addition, the CONTROL RODS, together with the Chemical Addition and Makeup System, provide SDM during power operation and are capable of making the core subcritical rapidly enough to prevent exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits, assuming that the rod of highest reactivity worth remains fully withdrawn.

The Chemical Addition and Makeup System can compensate for fuel depletion, during operation and all xenon burnout reactivity changes, and maintain the reactor subcritical under cold conditions.

During power operation, SDM control is ensured by operating with the safety rods fully withdrawn (LCO 3.1.5, "Safety Rod Insertion Limits") and the regulating rods within the limits of LCO 3.2.1, "Regulating Rod Insertion Limits." When the unit is in the shutdown and refueling modes, the SDM requirements are met by means of adjustments to the RCS boron concentration. Adjusted SDM limits defined in the COLR preclude recriticality in the event of a main steam line break (MSLB) in MODE 3, 4, or 5 when high steam generator levels exist.

CURRENT
BASES

DRAFT

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk.
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Docket No.50-

Dear Sirs:

Enclosed is an application for amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. [] pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. This license amendment request (LAR) requests the incorporation of TSTF No. xxxx, "Elimination of Requirements for Post Accident Sampling (PASS)," into the technical specifications for [plant]. This availability of this technical specification improvement was announced in the Federal Register on [date] as part of the consolidated line item improvement process.

A description of the proposed TS change, and the requested confirmation of applicability and plant-specific verifications and commitments are provided in Enclosure A. The proposed TS change is noted on the marked-up copy of the current TS page provided in Enclosure B and the revised TS page provided in Enclosure C.

I am authorized to make this request on behalf [licensee], I am familiar with the content of this application, and that the facts stated herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Sincerely

Enclosure A

Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation

We have reviewed the safety evaluation published as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). This verification included a review of the NRC staff's evaluation as well as the supporting information provided to support the TSTF (i.e., Combustion Engineering Owner's Group (CEOG) topical report CE NPSD-1157, Revision 1, "Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post-Accident Sampling System From the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for CEOG Utilities" submitted May 5, 1999 (as supplemented by letter dated April 14, 2000, OR Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) topical report WCAP-14986, "Post Accident Sampling System Requirements: A Technical Basis," submitted October 26, 1998 (as supplemented by letters dated April 28, 1999, April 10, 2000, and May 22, 2000)). We have concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [] and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the technical specifications for [plant].

Verifications and Commitments

As recommended in the notice of availability for this technical specification improvement, we offer the following plant-specific verifications and commitments.

1. We have verified that we have and make a regulatory commitment to maintain contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere. The plan is contained in our severe accident management guidelines. We have implemented the regulatory commitment.
- 4.2 We make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold (typically this is 300 $\mu\text{Ci/ml}$ dose equivalent iodine). This capability will be described in our emergency plan implementing procedures. We will implement the regulatory commitment on or before January 1, 2001.
- 4.3 We have verified that we have and make a regulatory commitment to maintain the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. This capability is described in our emergency plan implementing procedures. We have implemented the regulatory commitment.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

We have reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination published as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). We have concluded that the proposed determination presented in the notice is applicable to [plant] and we hereby incorporate, by reference, that determination to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

Enclosure B

Redline/Strikeout version of TS Pages

Enclosure C

"Camera Ready" version of tech spec pages