PSEG

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Nuclear Business Unit

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Attn: Document Control Desk

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT
SALEM UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-311

Gentlemen:

In compliance with Section 6.9.1.6, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Technical Specifications, the original Monthly Operating report for May 2000 is attached.

Sincerely,

M. B. Bezilla
Vice President - Operations

/rbk
Enclosures

C Mr. H. J. Miller
Regional Administrator USNRC, Region 1
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19046

DOCKET NO.: 50-311
UNIT: Salem 2
DATE: 6/15/00
COMPLETED BY: R. Knieriem
TELEPHONE: (856) 339-1782

Reporting Period: **May 2000**

OPERATING DATA REPORT

Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net)	**1115**		
Maximum Dependable Capacity (MWe-Net)	**1106**		
	Month	**Year-to-date**	**Cumulative**
No. of hours reactor was critical	**744**	**3647**	**99752**
No. of hours generator was on line (service hours)	**744**	**3647**	**96429**
Unit reserve shutdown hours	**0**	**0**	**0**
Net Electrical Energy (MWH)	**812425**	**3966150**	**96888368**

UNIT SHUTDOWNS

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT

(1) Reason

A - Equipment Failure (Explain)
B - Maintenance or Test
C - Refueling
D - Regulatory Restriction
E - Operator Training/License Examination
F - Administrative
G - Operational Error (Explain)
H - Other

(2) Method

1 - Manual
2 - Manual Trip/Scram
3 - Automatic Trip/Scram
4 - Continuation
5 - Other (Explain)

Summary:

Salem Unit 2 began the month of May 2000 operating at full power. On May 12, power was reduced to 98% to perform maintenance on the 26B Feedwater Heater. Salem Unit 2 returned to full power on May 14, and operated at full power for the remainder of the month.

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS FOR THE SALEM UNIT 2 GENERATING STATION

MONTH: May 2000

The following items completed during **May 2000** have been evaluated to determine:

1. If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or
3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant; nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.

Design Changes - Summary of Safety Evaluations

2EC-3571, Package 1, Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) 21E and 21W Low Pressure Tube Bundle Replacement

This design change involved the replacement of the low-pressure tube bundles for the 21E and 21W MSRs. The MSRs provide moisture separation and two-stage reheat of steam exhaust from the high pressure turbines to the low pressure turbine.

Review of this design change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the change constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The replacement of the low-pressure tube bundles did not alter MSR function, interface systems, or operational procedures. The MSRs are non-safety related components. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Temporary Modifications - Summary of Safety Evaluations

There were no changes in this category implemented during May 2000.

Procedures - Summary of Safety Evaluations

T-S1.CH-AD.RC-1135(Q) – Revision 0, Boration of the Safety Injection Accumulators Via the Sample Line

This procedure was developed to provide a method to inject borated water into the Safety Injection Accumulators via an existing sample line to ensure that boron concentration in the accumulators remains at required levels. This procedure will allow boration to occur while the unit is on line to address dilution caused by check valve leakage.

Review of this procedure under 10CFR50.59 was required because boration of the Safety Injection Accumulators via the sample line constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. Boration of the Safety Injection Accumulators via this procedure will insure that the boron concentration remains at levels required to support their safety function. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

UFSAR Change Notices - Summary of Safety Evaluations

UFSAR Change Notice SCN 99-072, Removal of Positive Displacement Charging Pump From Service For Normal Operation

This Safety Evaluation considered the use of one of two Centrifugal Charging Pumps to provide Reactor Coolant System makeup and Reactor Coolant Pump seal injection flow vice the use of the Positive Displacement Charging Pump as the normal source for these functions. This action will allow the Positive Displacement Charging Pump to be to be isolated and placed under administrative controls in order to limit potential leakage outside of containment. The Emergency Core Cooling safety function of the Centrifugal Charging Pumps to provide high head safety injection will remain unchanged.

Review of the isolation of the Positive Displacement Charging Pumps under 10CFR50.59 was required because this action constituted a change to the facility as described in the SAR. Removing the Positive Displacement Charging Pump from service leaves both Centrifugal Charging Pumps that are capable of providing adequate Reactor Coolant System makeup and Reactor Coolant Pump seal injection flow. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or

consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

UFSAR Change Notice SCN 00-017 – Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Removal Efficiency

This evaluation analyzed input parameters associated with the analysis of the radiological consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident. Specifically to change the credited Auxiliary Building Ventilation System charcoal filter efficiency from 90% (elemental) to 70%, to change the fraction of airborne ECCS leakage release that is filtered after two hours from 0.5 to 0.65, and to identify an equivalent overall iodine removal efficiency of 45% as a dose assumption. These revised parameters were incorporated as a change to the UFSAR.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because revision of the input parameters associated with the analysis of radiological consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident constituted a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The revised input parameters will result in an overall iodine removal efficiency that is consistent with the dose analysis previously performed to evaluate radiological dose consequence at the site boundary and the control room during a loss of coolant accident, and will not change the results of that analysis. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Deficiency Reports - Summary of Safety Evaluations

There were no changes in this category implemented during May 2000.

Other - Summary of Safety Evaluations

There were no changes in this category implemented during May 2000.