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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

Nuclear Business Unit

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT NO. 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 00-006-00

Dear Sir:

This Licensee Event Report entitled, "Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification due to Suppression Pool High Level Alarm Inoperability," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Sincerely,

Mark Bezilla
Vice President – Operations

Attachment

RAR

C Distribution
LER File

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Hope Creek Generating Station	05000354	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification due to Suppression Pool High Level Alarm Inoperability.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
05	11	00	00	-- 006 --	00	06	12	00	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)					
		20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Robin Ritzman, Licensing Engineer	(856)339-1445

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 1608 on May 11, 2000, Hope Creek entered into a condition prohibited by technical specifications when inverters AD481 and AD482 were de-energized as part of the "A" vital bus outage. The de-energization of these inverters resulted in the loss of the suppression pool high level alarm. Under the existing plant alignment Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operations require that SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY be established with FRVS operating within one hour. FRVS is not required if the following conditions are met: a) reactor water level is maintained at least 22 feet 2 inches over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, b) the suppression pool is maintained at greater than or equal to 5 inches indicated level, c) at least one channel of the suppression pool high level alarm is operable, and d) the spent fuel pool gates are removed. This condition (loss of high level alarm) was recognized approximately one and one half hours after the event, during shift turnover, and FRVS was placed in service. An alternate suppression pool level alarm, powered from a different bus, has been provided and bus outage procedures are under review for possible changes. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System {VA/--}*
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 instrumentation {--/LIT}

* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 (REFUELING) for Hope Creek's ninth refueling outage (RF09).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On May 11, 2000, at 0913, the "A" vital bus was removed from service for planned maintenance. At this point, Hope Creek was also in the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification 3.3.2 due to the inoperability of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 instrumentation. The required action for this LCO is to establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System (FRVS) operating within one hour. FRVS is not required if the following conditions are met: a) reactor water level is maintained at least 22 feet 2 inches over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, b) the suppression pool is maintained at greater than or equal to 5 inches indicated level, c) at least one channel of the suppression pool high level alarm is operable, and d) the spent fuel pool gates are removed. Although FRVS was not placed into operation at this time, compliance with the Technical Specification was maintained because the other four conditions were met.

At 1608, inverters {INVT} AD481 and AD482 were de-energized as part of the "A" vital bus outage. The de-energization of these inverters resulted in the loss of the suppression pool high level alarm. Control Room personnel had previously discussed the need to place FRVS into service if these four conditions were not met; however, at the time that the inverters were de-energized the operators did not recognize the need to place FRVS in service. As a result, the Technical Specification definition of SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY was not met. Because Control Room personnel did not realize that SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY was not met at this time, fuel movements continued. At 1745, during turnover, Control Room personnel identified the need to place FRVS in service to comply with Technical Specifications.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence is personnel error. Control Room personnel (NRC Licensed Operators) had previously discussed the need to place FRVS into service if these four conditions were not met; however, at the time that the inverters were de-energized the operators did not recognize the need to place FRVS in service.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS

The four required conditions assure that the likelihood of an accident that would require FRVS is minimized. The suppression pool level alarm provides notice to the operators of changing conditions that could be precursors to an event. Although this alarm is not the only available indication that would be utilized, it is one layer of a multi-layered approach to safety. There was no safety significance associated with this event.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review has been conducted of Licensee Event Reports for 1998, 1999 and 2000. The Technical Specification prohibited conditions that occurred during that timeframe were related to Technical Specification surveillances; either missed surveillances, inadequate surveillance procedures, inadequately performed surveillances, or failed surveillances. Therefore, the corrective actions associated with those events would not have prevented this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. FRVS was placed in service in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications.

2. An alternate suppression pool high level indicator powered from the "C" bus, was re-configured to provide an alarm in the control room.

3. The Bus Outage Procedure is being reviewed in order to determine if additional cautions should be included regarding the torus level alarms.

COMMITMENTS

The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.