



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 12, 2000

Mr. Mike Reandeau
Director - Licensing
Clinton Power Station
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727

SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT
ALLOWING A ONE-TIME EXTENSION OF CERTAIN SURVEILLANCE
INTERVALS (TAC NO. MA MA8714)

Dear Mr. Reandeau:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 129 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 for the Clinton Power Station, Unit 1. The amendment is in response to your application dated April 24, 2000.

The amendment extends some Technical Specification surveillance intervals until November 30, 2000, due to elimination of a planned mid-cycle outage.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Jon B. Hopkins, Senior Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-461

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 129 to NPF-62
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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June 12, 2000

Mike Reandeau
Director - Licensing
Clinton Power Station
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727

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*See previous concurrence

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-461

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 129
License No. NPF-62

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (the licensee), dated April 24, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 129 are hereby incorporated into this license. AmerGen Energy Company, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Anthony J. Mendiola, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 12, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 129

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62

DOCKET NO. 50-461

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

3.0-8
3.0-9
3.0-10

Insert Pages

3.0-8
3.0-9
3.0-10

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.d	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Main Steam Line Isolation, Condenser Vacuum - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.a	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.d	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High (ECCS Divisions 1 and 2) LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.e	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (HPCS NSPS Divisions 3 and 4) LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.f	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High (HPCS NSPS Divisions 3 and 4) LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.g	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Containment Building Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.h	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Containment Building Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.i	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Containment Building Continuous Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation - High
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.j	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.b	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RCIC System Isolation, RCIC Steam Line Flow - High Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.d	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RHR System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.f	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RHR System Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5, Table 3.3.6.2-1, Item 3	Secondary Containment Isolation, Containment Building Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5, Table 3.3.6.2-1, Item 4	Secondary Containment Isolation, Containment Building Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5, Table 3.3.6.2-1, Item 5	Secondary Containment Isolation, Containment Building Continuous Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5, Table 3.3.6.2-1, Item 6	Secondary Containment Isolation, Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.4, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 4	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System A and System B CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.6.3.4, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 5	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System B Only CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.6.3.5, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 1	RHR Containment Spray System, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 2	RHR Containment Spray System, Containment Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 3	RHR Containment Spray System, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 4	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System A and System B LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

(continued)

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.3.6.3.5, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 5	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System B Only LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5, Table 3.3.6.3-1, Item 6	RHR Containment Spray System, Manual Initiation LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.4.7, Table 3.3.6.4-1, Item 1	Suppression Pool Makeup System, Drywell Pressure - High, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.4.7, Table 3.3.6.4-1, Item 2	Suppression Pool Makeup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.4.7, Table 3.3.6.4-1, Item 3	Suppression Pool Makeup System, Suppression Pool Water Level- Low Low, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.4.7, Table 3.3.6.4-1, Item 4	Suppression Pool Makeup System, Timer, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.4.7, Table 3.3.6.4-1, Item 5	Suppression Pool Makeup System, Manual Initiation, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.a	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.b	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.c	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage Reset - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.d	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage Drop-out - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.e	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage - Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.a	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.b	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.a	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.b	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.c	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage Reset - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.d	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage Drop-out - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 1.e	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.a	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.b	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Loss of Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4, Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.c	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage Reset - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

(continued)

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.d	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage Drop-out - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1, Item 2.e	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage, Degraded Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.5.1.5	ECCS - Operating injection/spray subsystem actuation
3.5.1.8	ECCS - Operating injection/spray subsystem RESPONSE TIME TEST
3.5.2.6	ECCS - Shutdown injection/spray subsystem actuation
3.6.1.3.7	Automatic PCIV actuation
3.6.1.3.11	Excess flow check valve PCIV actuation
3.6.1.7.3	Automatic RHR Containment Spray valve actuation
3.6.4.2.3	Automatic SCID actuation
3.6.4.3.3	SGT subsystem actuation
3.6.5.3.5	Automatic drywell isolation valve actuation
3.7.2.2	Division 3 Shutdown Service Water subsystem actuation
3.7.3.5	Inleakage verification of the negative pressure portions of the Control Room Ventilation System
3.8.1.8	AC Sources - Alternate Offsite Circuit
3.8.1.9	AC Sources - Load Reject (single largest load)
3.8.1.10	AC Sources - Full Load Reject
3.8.1.11	AC Sources - LOP
3.8.1.12	AC Sources - Auto Start
3.8.1.13	AC Sources - Non-essential Trip Bypass
3.8.1.16	AC Sources - Manual Sync and Load Transfer
3.8.1.17	AC Sources - Test Mode Override on ECCS Initiation Signal
3.8.1.18	AC Sources - Load Sequence Time
3.8.1.19	AC Sources -LOP / ECCS Initiation Signal Auto Start
3.8.4.6	Battery Charger Functional Test
3.8.4.7	Battery Charger Capacity
3.8.11.2	Static VAR Compensator Protection System Functional Test



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 129 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62

AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-461

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 24, 2000, AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, (the licensee) proposed a one-time extension of some Technical Specification (TS) surveillance intervals due to elimination of a planned mid-cycle outage for the Clinton Power Station (CPS). The request is similar to a previous request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff approved by license Amendment No. 125 dated March 17, 2000.

Normally, CPS can operate a full operating cycle without needing a mid-cycle shutdown to perform TS surveillances. However, CPS had a lengthy shutdown (over 2 ½ years) that ended in May 1999. TS surveillances were performed during that shutdown for an earlier restart date than occurred. As a result, some of the surveillances are now coming due before the end of the current operating cycle.

2.0 BACKGROUND

On December 16, 1999, the licensee requested a one-time extension of various CPS TS surveillance intervals due to elimination of a planned Spring 2000 mid-cycle outage. The NRC staff approved that request by license Amendment No. 125. Subsequent to the issuance of Amendment No. 125, the licensee discovered that additional one-time TS surveillance test extensions were necessary. Specifically, the extensions are related to logic system functional testing of the Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation and the Suppression Pool Makeup System Instrumentation.

3.0 EVALUATION

CPS is on a nominal 18-month operating cycle. There are TS surveillances that can only be performed during shutdown conditions. The allowed interval for performance of those TSs is 18 months plus a 25 percent allowance that provides some scheduling flexibility. Due to the lengthy shutdown, some of the CPS TS surveillances will come due for performance before the next refueling outage (RF-7) even after utilization of the 25 percent allowance. Due, in part, to the good operational performance since plant startup in May 1999, the licensee proposes a

one-time extension to these surveillance intervals to negate the need for a mid-cycle outage prior to RF-7.

The longest requested extension is for 5 1/2 months beyond the 25 percent allowance for a total surveillance interval of approximately 29 months. This is less than the interval allowed for those plants which have been approved for 24 month TS surveillances considering the 25 percent allowance for a total of 30 months.

The licensee evaluated the surveillance extensions, in part, using the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 91-04, "Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle," dated April 2, 1991. A review of each surveillance was performed considering surveillance history and other testing that would continue to be performed on the affected equipment or components.

The TS surveillances of concern here involve a check of logic system circuitry. The licensee points out in their submittal that logic systems are inherently more reliable than other plant components. The NRC staff acknowledged that in a Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1993, relating to extension of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, surveillance intervals from 18 to 24 months, which stated the following:

Industry reliability studies for boiling water reactors (BWRs), prepared by the BWR Owners' Group (NEDC-30936P) show that the overall safety systems' reliabilities are not dominated by the reliabilities of the logic system, but by that of the mechanical components (e.g., pumps and valves), which are consequently tested on a more frequent basis. Since the probability of a relay or contact failure is small relative to the probability of mechanical component failure, increasing the logic system functional test interval represents no significant change in the overall safety system unavailability.

The above is still the NRC's position regarding the reliability of logic system circuits.

For the surveillance extension involving the Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation, the licensee reviewed the surveillance history for the last two operating cycles. The licensee states that "There were no failures to meet the surveillance test acceptance criteria identified in this review."

Additional justification for this surveillance extension is that other surveillances such as Channel Checks, Channel Calibrations, and Channel Functional Tests will continue to be performed during the operating cycle, which helps ensure that the circuitry is operating properly.

The NRC staff reviewed the justification provided for the one-time extension of a Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation surveillance test and based on the good surveillance history, logic system reliability, and performance of other surveillances during the operating cycle, the staff finds the extension acceptable.

In addition to the reliability of logic systems, justification for the surveillance extensions involving the Suppression Pool Makeup System is that other surveillances such as Channel Checks,

Channel Calibrations, and Channel Functional Tests will continue to be performed during the operating cycle, which help ensure that the circuitry is operating properly.

The licensee reviewed the surveillance history for the Suppression Pool Makeup System Instrumentation for the last operating cycle and found no failures to meet the surveillance test acceptance criteria. The licensee only looked at the last operating cycle for surveillance history because not all of the logic circuitry was tested previously as described in CPS Licensee Event Report 1997-031.

The NRC staff reviewed the justification provided for the one-time extension of certain Suppression Pool Makeup System Instrumentation surveillance tests, and based on the logic system reliability and performance of other surveillances during the operating cycle, the staff finds the extension acceptable.

In summary, the NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's request for a one-time extension of surveillance tests until the planned end of RF-7 (November 30, 2000) and finds, based on the above, that the request is acceptable. The staff also notes that, even if these surveillances were performed during a mid-cycle outage, the surveillances would have to be performed again during RF-7 to reach the end of the next operating cycle. Therefore, some additional personnel radiation exposure would occur if the surveillance intervals were not extended to eliminate the mid-cycle outage.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 26642). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by

operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Hopkins

Date: June 12, 2000