

2000-0212

1



RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY
ACT (PA) REQUEST

RESPONSE TYPE FINAL PARTIAL

REQUESTER

Aldo Capristo

DATE

JUN 12 2000

PART I. -- INFORMATION RELEASED

- No additional agency records subject to the request have been located.
- Requested records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section.
- APPENDICES Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the listed appendices are already available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.
- APPENDICES **A, B** Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the listed appendices are being made available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.
- Enclosed is information on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records located at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC.
- APPENDICES **A, B** Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.
- Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.
- We are continuing to process your request.
- See Comments.

PART I.A -- FEES

AMOUNT *

\$ 37.80

* See comments for details

- You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. None. Minimum fee threshold not met.
- You will receive a refund for the amount listed. Fees waived.

PART I.B -- INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE

- No agency records subject to the request have been located.
- Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described in and for the reasons stated in Part II.
- This determination may be appealed within 30 days by writing to the FOIA/PA Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal."

PART I.C COMMENTS (Use attached Comments continuation page if required)

The actual fees for processing your request are as follows:

Search (2 hours, 15 minutes): \$ 87.75
 Review (3 hours, 15 minutes): 126.75
 Duplication (14 pages @ \$.20 per page): 2.80
 TOTAL: \$217.30

You have already paid advance fees in the amount of \$179.50; therefore, you will be billed in the amount of \$37.80 for the additional fees. In a telephone conversation with Natalie Brown on June 2, 2000, you agreed to pay the additional amount.

SIGNATURE - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY ACT OFFICER

Carol Ann Reed

Natalie Brown

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST

2000-0212

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PART II.A -- APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS

APPENDICES
B

Records subject to the request that are described in the enclosed Appendices are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the Exemption No.(s) of the PA and/or the FOIA as indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552a and/or 5 U.S.C. 552(b)).

- Exemption 1: The withheld information is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958.
- Exemption 2: The withheld information relates solely to the internal personnel rules and procedures of NRC.
- Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by statute indicated.
 - Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165).
 - Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167).
 - 41 U.S.C., Section 253(b), subsection (m)(1), prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals in the possession and control of an executive agency to any person under section 552 of Title 5, U.S.C. (the FOIA), except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal.
- Exemption 4: The withheld information is a trade secret or commercial or financial information that is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.
 - The information is considered to be confidential business (proprietary) information.
 - The information is considered to be proprietary because it concerns a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1).
 - The information was submitted by a foreign source and received in confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d)(2).
- Exemption 5: The withheld information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are not available through discovery during litigation. Applicable privileges:
 - Deliberative process: Disclosure of predecisional information would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas essential to the deliberative process. Where records are withheld in their entirety, the facts are inextricably intertwined with the predecisional information. There also are no reasonably segregable factual portions because the release of the facts would permit an indirect inquiry into the predecisional process of the agency.
 - Attorney work-product privilege. (Documents prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation)
 - Attorney-client privilege. (Confidential communications between an attorney and his/her client)
- Exemption 6: The withheld information is exempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
- Exemption 7: The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.
 - (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an enforcement proceeding (e.g., it would reveal the scope, direction, and focus of enforcement efforts, and thus could possibly allow recipients to take action to shield potential wrongdoing or a violation of NRC requirements from investigators).
 - (C) Disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 - (D) The information consists of names of individuals and other information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal identities of confidential sources.
 - (E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.
 - (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.
- OTHER (Specify)

PART II.B -- DENYING OFFICIALS

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.25(g), 9.25(h), and/or 9.65(b) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The person responsible for the denial are those officials identified below as denying officials and the FOIA/PA Officer for any denials that may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO).

DENYING OFFICIAL	TITLE/OFFICE	RECORDS DENIED	APPELLATE OFFICIAL		
			EDO	SECY	IG
James E. Dyer	Regional Administrator, Region III	Appendix B	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appeal must be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of this response. Appeals should be mailed to the FOIA/Privacy Act Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, for action by the appropriate appellate official(s). You should clearly state on the envelope and letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal."

**APPENDIX A
RECORD BEING RELEASED IN ITS ENTIRETY**

<u>NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION/(PAGE COUNT)</u>
1.	04/26/00	NRR Allegation Summary Sheet. (1 page)

**APPENDIX B
RECORDS BEING WITHHELD IN PART**

<u>NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION/(PAGE COUNT)/EXEMPTIONS</u>
1.	5/12/2000	Printout of Pt. Beach Closed Allegations Received since 12/31/97. (10 pages) EX. 7C
2.	05/16/2000	Printout of Pt. Beach Open Allegations Received since 12/31/97. (3 pages) EX. 7A, EX. 7C

ALLEGATION SUMMARY SHEET

Action Text

26-Apr-00

NRR-1998-A-0060

1 Date Received 07/20/199 Date Closed 08/19/1998 Substantiated N/A

WELDS ON VSC-24s LOCATED AT ANO, PT BEACH AND PALISADES ARE EXPERIENCING DEGRADATION AFTER ONLY A COUPLE OF YEARS. (Actions apply to all concerns until closed.)

Transferred to NMSS

2 Date Received 07/20/199 Date Closed 08/19/1998 Substantiated N/A

THERE IS NO DEMONSTRATED APPROACH FOR REMOVAL OF FUEL FROM THESE FACILITIES. THIS COULD BE A GENERIC PROBLEM INVOLVING SPENT FUEL CASKS AT OTHER FACILITIES.

Transferred to NMSS

3 Date Received 07/20/199 Date Closed 08/19/1998 Substantiated N/A

THE SPENT FUEL CASKS AT PALISADES, POINT BEACH AND ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ARE CRACKED.

Transferred to NMSS

A/1

Pt Beach Closed Allegations Received > 12/31/97

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?	
EX 7C RIII-1998-A-0	01/1998	04/1998	<p>Examples of a lack of control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M/TE) program at Point Beach:</p> <p>(a) No procedures in place for use of M/TE controlled by the Engineering department.</p> <p>(b) The procedure used by the Operations and Instrument and Control (I&C) departments does not meet minimum requirements.</p> <p>(c) During routine calibration of I&C department M/TE, if a piece of M/TE was found out of calibration, the I&C department does not check, in a timely fashion, if plant equipment that the M/TE was used previously on is out of tolerance. The I&C department will wait up to 60 - 90 days before checking plant equipment.</p> <p>(d) Does the licensee have separate procedures for control of M/TE assigned to engineering?</p>	Y	Alleg # and data - Ex through
EX 7C RIII-1998-A-0	01/1998	04/1998	<p>Examples of Lack of Procedural Compliance for Control of M/TE:</p> <p>(a) I&C technicians not signing out M/TE as required by procedure.</p> <p>(b) Two pieces of M/TE were sent for calibration while the equipment was still signed out for a job. After the equipment was calibrated, it was used on other jobs (Work Orders xxxx & -xxxx) prior to being signed back in. This is contrary to procedure NP 8.7.1.</p> <p>(c) While the two pieces of M/TE were still logged out, initiated a Condition Report (CR) to determine why the equipment had been signed out since 9/17/97. was informed that the equipment had been turned over to the Engineering department and that the Engineering department had removed the two pieces of equipment from service. There was no "as-left" calibration data for the equipment removed from service, as required by procedure NP 8.7.1.</p> <p>(d) A total of six pieces of M/TE (including the two mentioned above) were removed from the M/TE program and are still being used in the plant. The M/TE identification numbers are</p>	N	EX 7C
EX 7C RIII-1998-A-0	01/1998	04/1998	<p>Falsification of Work Order (WO) Records. has seen incorrect M/TE identification numbers on Work Orders. Some of the M/TE numbers did not exist and were not even close to the actual number. The example provided was WO 97-10450, which was closed 8/29/97. stated that M/TE was documented on the WO. However, the M/TE sign out log indicated that was not signed out until 9/16/97. believed the WO was for a motor operated valve, but was unsure which one.)</p>	N	EX 7C

B/1

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	01/1998	04/1998	_____ was told by the I&C maintenance supervisor, xxx, and the mechanical maintenance supervisor, xxx, that s/he was writing too many Condition Reports (CR) and to stop writing CRs. The supervisors stated that the CRs reflected poorly on the maintenance departments.	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	01/1998	04/1998	Inadequate Corrective Actions _____ the licensee is currently conducting a QA root cause evolution based on the number of CRs written _____ since 2/97. _____ that the specific examples _____ occurred after the QA root cause evaluation was started and after some of the corrective actions were in place.	EX7C Y
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	_____ were harassed, intimidated, and retaliated against for raising safety concerns. _____ were being held "virtual captives by having armed guards outside the door."	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	A named licensee system engineer demonstrated aberrant behavior during a meeting on February 20, 1998.	Y
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	Licensee management did not recognize that the named system engineer's actions as potential aberrant behavior.	Y
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	The security guards' response to the alleged aberrant behavior was inappropriate because the guards never attempted to assess the situation in the room and only guarded the door. The guards simply took the named system engineer's word that initially there was a problem and later that "everything was under control."	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	You were concerned that the licensee was trying to "sweep" the incident of the verbal abuse by the named system engineer under the table.	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	A named licensee system engineer was not following the Condition Reporting (CR) procedure for writing CRs. You stated that contractors were required to present issues to a system engineering group for review before a CR was written.	Y
EX7C RIII-1998-A-Q	02/1998	12/1998	You were not satisfied with the licensee's operability evaluation which responded to Condition Report (CR) _____ and _____	EX7C N

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	02/1998	12/1998	[redacted] another example of how the CR process was not being followed: During the week of February 23 - 27, 1998, a named contractor for Nuclear Energy Consultants (NEC), identified about 20 issues related to his review of Chapter 14, "Accident Analysis," of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The named contractor reported the issues to a licensee engineer, XXXX. Mr/Ms. XXXX told the named contractor that he/she (the named contractor) would no longer be working on the review of Chapter 14 of the USAR. Mr/Ms. XXXX stated that he/she (XXXX) would write the Condition Reports (CRs). The named contractor did not write any CRs for the 20 issues.	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	02/1998	12/1998	[redacted] that a named individual told a named contractor not to write any more CRs thereby creating a potential chilling effect.	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	The Condition Report (CR) process was not being followed from the beginning of the Generic Letter (GL) 96-01 review project in February 1996. Examples of how the CR process was not followed included: (a) most of the problems were not incorporated into the CR program, (b) there was a pattern of suppressing findings and not reporting significant findings, (c) problems that were identified during the project were added to a separate engineering work list for resolution, and (d) the operability evaluations for problems that were entered into the CR system were not formal, rigorous engineering evaluations. [redacted] Conversation Record)	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	Licensee management was aware that some of the problems being identified were not being added to the CR program, that the problems were being added to a separate engineering work list, that the problems were not being elevated to upper management, and that the problems were not being resolved. Because the licensee did not adequately address the problems related to the GL 96-01 project, a chilling effect was created in which employees that pursue resolution of safety concerns faced covert and overt hostility. (From [redacted] Conversation Record and from Page 24 of [redacted])	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	[redacted] concerned that the licensee has not fully addressed all of the operability issues identified during the GL 96-01 project. [redacted] Conversation Record)	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	Employment Discrimination - You were discriminated against for identifying safety concerns to management related to the problems identified during the GL 96-01 project. The concerns were the CR program was not being followed; a separate engineering work list was being used to track problems; and the lack of a formal, rigorous engineering operability evaluation for the issues identified during the GL 96-01. [redacted] Conversation Record)	EX7C N

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	In October 1997, a named contractor, identified that there were no GL 96-01 configuration management controls in place to capture changes to procedures and drawings. There were changes being made to the plant that were not being reflected in the review process. (From Page 10 of [redacted]) EX7C	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	In November 1997, a contractor who had previously been involved with a modification to install a switch in the permissive logic circuits, informed a named licensee system engineer, that the addition of the switch appeared to be a Unreviewed Safety Question, and that several engineers in Milwaukee concurred. (From Page 20 of [redacted]) EX7C	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	Potentially Inaccurate Information was provided to the NRC - In November 1997, the licensee wrote a report to the NRC stating that during a review of Generic Letter 96-01 responses, it was determined that potential discrepancies exist in the testing of the reactor protection logic permissives. Technical Specification 15.4.0.3 was entered on unit 2 for the missed surveillance, which allows 24 hours to perform the surveillance. A concurrent, conservative 4 hour report is being made for this same condition on Unit 1. [redacted] that although the discrepancy was known for 18 months, it was reported to NRC that it had just been discovered. (From Page 20 of [redacted]) EX7C	Y
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	[redacted] concerned that the licensee's investigation of the issue of system engineers not allowing contractors to write CRs may be abusing the Employee Concerns Program in an attempt to find out what documentation [redacted] to support [redacted] concerns. (From Pages 22 & 23 of [redacted]) EX7C	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	About the same time as the explosion in a spent fuel dry cask, the Mechanical Evaluations team leader and the Senior Engineer - Mechanical Evaluations [redacted] were being pressured by the Manager of Design Engineering to "come up with the right answer" on the number of service water pumps required to support accident mitigation. (From Page 8 of [redacted]) EX7C	N

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	<p>Original concern: During a GL 96-01 meeting held on February 29, 1996, a comment was made that the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) definition of engineered safety systems was inconsistent with the revised plant accident analysis. [] that the licensee's engineering organization apparently didn't know exactly which systems were considered engineered safety systems, and that it was considered a matter open to individual interpretation.</p> <p>Revised during [] conversation: EX7C During a GL 96-01 meeting held on February 29, 1996, a comment was made that the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) definition of engineered safety systems was inconsistent with the revised plant accident analysis. You were surprised that some of the licensee's system engineers seemed to demonstrate a lack of understanding of what parts of the RPS permissive circuits had safety functions and what parts did not. It was considered a matter open to individual interpretation.</p>	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	<p>The licensee's (reactor protection system) technical specification (TS) circuit testing program did not validate the performance of circuit elements. (From Page 10 of [] EX7C</p>	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	<p>[] unsure if the issues related to the lack of separation of electrical cables in the main control board and the lack of separation of quality assurance (QA) and non-QA components in the main control board were adequately resolved. (From Pages 11 & 12 of [] EX7C</p>	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	<p>The latest revision of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading accident analysis did not have the correct assumption for the containment accident fan power input values. (From Pages 12 & 13 of [] EX7C</p>	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	03/1998	10/1998	<p>[] unsure that the procedural controls for adjusting the fan blade pitch on the containment accident fans in mid-1997 were adequate. [] adjusting the pitch would change the power consumption of the fan motors, which in turn would change the EDG loading during accident conditions. EX7C</p>	N

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	05/ 1998	12/ 1998	<p>The licensee did not follow proper procedures when conducting for-cause fitness-for-duty (FFD) testing on May 13, 1998. The following examples were provided:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Named licensee personnel informed the individuals being FFD tested, that everyone in the North Office Complex would be tested, and that trailer number 5 would be tested first. Only the contractors in trailer number 5 were tested (urinalysis) and had their site access temporarily removed. None of the licensee employees who routinely worked in the trailer were tested and no other personnel on site were tested. * The individuals' subject to the for-cause test were not individually informed of the test. The licensee informed the group at the same time. * The licensee had not given a "specific" reason for the test. The licensee only stated that there was an allegation of drug use on company property, outside of the protected area. 	Y
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	05/ 1998	12/ 1998	Because the licensee did not follow its FFD testing procedures, the licensee's actions amounted to an illegal search and seizure.	N/A
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	05/ 1998	12/ 1998	Chilled environment - Some of the individuals subject to the FFD test believe that the testing was an attempt by the licensee to prevent one unnamed individual in the work group from writing Condition Reports (CRs). Because of the licensee's action (i.e. the FFD testing), some of the members were reconsidering if they want to submit signed CRs.	N
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	06/ 1998	06/ 1998	[redacted] that the licensee's policy does not explicitly prohibit firearms on company owned property. EX7C	N/A
EX7C RIII-1998-A-0	06/ 1998	06/ 1998	[redacted] threatened by a named individual when [redacted] are working outside of the protected area. EX7C	N/A

<u>Allegation No.</u>	<u>Received</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Substantiated?</u>
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	01/1999	08/1999	<p>Examples of Poor Procedural Adherence:</p> <p>Maintenance management (first line supervisors and up) is not promoting and enforcing procedure adherence and usage for procedures, work orders, etc. Instead, due to outage schedule pressure they are bending the rules and turning their backs when craft are not obeying the rules.</p> <p>Maintenance contractors being supervised by WEPCO employees are not working in accordance with station rules for procedure adherence and usage. Not intentionally but because they do not know any better and the WEPCO people supervising them are not forcing the issue to point out to them since the work is getting done.</p> <p>Supervisors are not allowing employees time to follow requirements, only if it is convenient.</p>	Y
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	01/1999	08/1999	Maintenance Supervisors will suggest and allow improper work practices if employee will go along.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	01/1999	08/1999	Plant management (supervisors and up) are not responsive to safety issues raised by employees.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	01/1999	08/1999	<p>(Concern # 4 Revised at 1/28/99 ARB.)</p> <p>Examples of Deficiencies in Corrective Action Program:</p> <p>* Issues concerning the freeze protection have been identified for 8 years and have not been properly resolved.</p> <p>* Due to the work load, personnel do not have time to write condition reports.</p>	Y
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	01/1999	08/1999	<p>(Concern # 5 Developed at 1/28/99 ARB. Do not include in letters to CI.)</p> <p>At a recent All Hands Meeting on January 7, 1999, in response to an operator who said he had raised issues about freeze protection for 8 years for the same problems over and over, the Plant Manager said if you see a problem, he needs to be told 20 times. [redacted] said "I don't have the time to tell somebody 20 times."</p>	N/A

EX7C

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	02/1999	04/2000	You stated that you believe you have been discriminated against, through a low performance appraisal, for raising safety concerns to licensee management through the Condition Reporting (CR) system and through discussions with your previous supervisor and another individual. on may 27, 1999, the ALJ ruled in favor of the employee. licensee had filed an appeal. EA 99-196 issued a CEL on July 30, 1999.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	02/1999	04/2000	You stated that you believe you have been discriminated against, through a low performance appraisal, for raising safety concerns to licensee management through the Condition Reporting (CR) system and through discussions with your previous supervisor and another individual. on may 27, 1999, the ALJ ruled in favor of the employee. licensee had filed an appeal. EA 99-196 issued a CEL on July 30, 1999.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	02/1999	04/2000	You stated that you believe you have been discriminated against, through a low performance appraisal, for raising safety concerns to licensee management through the Condition Reporting (CR) system and through discussions with your previous supervisor and another individual. on may 27, 1999, the ALJ ruled in favor of the employee. licensee had filed an appeal. EA 99-196 issued a CEL on July 30, 1999.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	02/1999	04/2000	A lack of good technical reviews following rapid and massive procedure changes in the Operations department of the last few years appeared to have caused a degradation of the quality of the procedures in the Operations department and appears to have led to several near miss events.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	02/1999	04/2000	A lack of good technical reviews following rapid and massive procedure changes in the Operations department of the last few years appeared to have caused a degradation of the quality of the procedures in the Operations department and appears to have led to several near miss events.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	02/1999	04/2000	A lack of good technical reviews following rapid and massive procedure changes in the Operations department of the last few years appeared to have caused a degradation of the quality of the procedures in the Operations department and appears to have led to several near miss events.	N

Duplicate Entries

Duplicate Entries

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	02/ 1999	04/ /2000	The root cause evaluations, as required by Criterion XVI for significant conditions adverse to quality, fall under the Quality Assurance definition.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	02/ 1999	04/ /2000	The root cause evaluations, as required by Criterion XVI for significant conditions adverse to quality, fall under the Quality Assurance definition.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	02/ /1999	04/ 2000	The root cause evaluations, as required by Criterion XVI for significant conditions adverse to quality, fall under the Quality Assurance definition.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	02/ 1999	03/ 1999	Licensee radiation protection (RP) technicians that were contaminated to less than 100 counts on articles of clothing or shoes, but were unable to pass through the personnel contamination monitor (PCM) without an alarm, were not making the appropriate log entries as required by procedures.	N/A
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	03/ 1999	04/ 1999	Contamination in a pond area on the site during the late 1970's through mid-1980's time frame was never acknowledged or cleaned up by the licensee.	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	03/ 1999	04/ 1999		EX7C N/A
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	10/ 1999	03/ 2000	stated the training was inadequate to qualify the electricians as specified by the procedure [NP 1.9.15, Rev 10, dated Sept 22, 1999, "DANGER TAG PROCEDURE"].	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	10/ 1999	03/ 2000	stated the training was inadequate to qualify the electricians as specified by the procedure [NP 1.9.15, Rev 10, dated Sept 22, 1999, "DANGER TAG PROCEDURE"].	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	10/ 1999	03/ 2000	In the past several months, management regressed to the pre-1996 lax attitude toward procedure use and adherence. indicated that this change might be related to a recent strong emphasis on completing the upcoming refueling outage in the scheduled 40 days.	EX7C N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	10/ 1999	03/ /2000	In the past several months, management regressed to the pre-1996 lax attitude toward procedure use and adherence. indicated that this change might be related to a recent strong emphasis on completing the upcoming refueling outage in the scheduled 40 days.	N EX7C
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	10/ 1999	10/ 1999	The Point Beach Maintenance Manager informed the NRC resident inspector that a facilities supervisor (non licensed) was discharge on October 6, 1999, due to falsification of a visitor access record	Y

Duplicate Entries

EX7C Duplicate Entry

Duplicate Entry

Allegation No.	Received	Closed	Concern Description	Substantiated?
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	12/1999	01/2000		N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-C	12/1999	01/2000		N - Duplicate Entry
EX7C RIII-1999-A-Q	12/1999	01/2000	wanted the NRC to follow up on this concern because s/he did not feel comfortable pursuing it with the current "safety conscious work environment" issues.	N
EX7C RIII-1999-A-Q	12/1999	01/2000	wanted the NRC to follow up on this concern because s/he did not feel comfortable pursuing it with the current "safety conscious work environment" issues.	N - Duplicate Entry EX7C Entry

Pt Beach Open Allegations Received > 12/31/97

Allegation No.	Concern Description
EX7C RIII-1999-A-0	A named individual may have deliberately failed to report arrests while working at Point Beach, TVA/Watts Bar and Salem/Hope Creek nuclear facilities.
EX7C RIII-2000-A-0	
EX7C RIII-2000-A-Q	<p>PBNP Component Instruction Manual Program has not adequately implemented NRC Generic Letter 83-28 and 90-03 for vendor information on safety-related components. This failure may jeopardize the health and safety of the public since procedures may be based on outdated Component Instruction Manuals. A number of vendors have revised documentation since the equipment was initially installed. Examples include:</p> <p>1(a): (a) Personnel utilize documentation obtained directly from manufacturers that has not undergone a qualified Engineering Design review. (See CR 99-2358), (b)The Component Instruction Program procedures and forms do not address periodic contact with vendors of safety-related components to insure adequacy of vendor information, (c)The review of new and revised vendor documentation is allegedly being performed by Group Heads rather than by qualified Design Engineering personnel. This violates FSAR Section 1.4.3, Design Control which states in part "Changes to designs are subjected to commensurate design control measures. When a contemplated change is considered by appropriate management to be of sufficient scope as to be beyond the expertise of in-house personnel, these changes are reviewed by the organization that performed the original design, or other design organizations determined to be equally qualified."</p> <p>1(b): (d) Procedure NP 1.3.3 Rev.1 "Component Instruction Manual" does not incorporate current industry guideline TG-181994 for vendor information programs but is based on industry guideline NIRMA TG-06-1984</p>
EX7C RIII-2000-A-Q	<p>1(a)Condition Reports are being prematurely closed to reduce management expectations for the number of Condition Reports remaining open. The issues identified within the Condition Reports are still pending and are being tracked on department Action Items. 1(b) No administrative controls appear to be in place for implementing these action lists and updating any closed CRs or QCRs. This practice appears to be a nefarious maneuver to disguise the actual conditions of the Point Beach facility from regulatory agencies. Most of the issues addressed within the Procedure Common Cause Assessment (see QCR 97-0136) fall into this practice as do more than 500 other procedure-related issues.</p>

EX7C Ex 7.a

B/D

Allegation No.**Concern Description**

EX7C RIII-2000-A-0

Continuing programmatic breakdown of both Procedure Controls and the Configuration Management Programs. Examples (Concern 3A): (1) Procedures CMG 1.0, CMG 1.1, and CMG 1.2 (all Revision 0) appear to have been issued without a multi-disciplinary review. (2) The current qualifications established for Group Heads to review/approve procedures appear to be less than adequate. (3) Programmatic measures do not appear to be in place to limit the continued number of procedure administrative errors and reduce Writers Guide infractions (See CR 99-2357)

(Concern 3B) (4) Procedure AM 3-16, rev 0 conflicts with CR 92-519 and MSSm 92-17, issue 6,
(5) CMP Procedures do not conform with Writers Guide

6). P

EX7C RIII-2000-A-0

Multiple dry cask containers (VCC) fabricated in 1999 by Selmer Company are questionable.

1. Procedure deficiencies identified to Maintenance Quality Control Group Supervisor prior to starting assembly of the first series of assembly activities but work activities continued without making procedure revisions or obtaining Temporary Changes.

A). DSP 20.0 paragraph 5.13 references procedure NP 8.2.1 "Control of Weld Rod." However, NP 8.2.1 is NOT listed within REFERENCES Section 6.0.

B). Section 6.17 identifies procedure, DSP 20.17 "Control of Welding Electrodes" which has not been issued.

EX7C RIII-2000-A-0

Multiple Procedure adherence deficiencies identified.

A). Incomplete performance of DSP 20.0 Step 4.5. Proper review of DSP 20.17 should have stopped continued performance of procedure.

B). QC Group Supervisor acknowledged deficiencies and allowed work activities to continue without implementing corrective actions.

C). Numerous errors within these procedures cast doubt on the overall procedure review and approval processes. Although Screening and Safety Evaluation SCR #99-0601 for procedure DSP 20.0 and other supporting DSP 20.x series procedures were signed by two different individuals within the same work group, the problems identified point toward the lack of Independent Review.

EX7C RIII-2000-A-0

Documentation that validates the review and approval phases of new and revised procedures is not being maintained as QA records contrary to FSAR 1.4.3. For example, (1) various checklists and other forms have been implemented to document the procedure review and approval process. NP 1.1.3 Rev. 9 paragraph 4.2.5 specifies "Reviewer checklists, guidelines, or written materials when used to insure test procedures are technically correct and reflect the current plant configuration, are considered to be aids, and checklists or other aids are not considered to be QA records and are not required to be retained following completion of the reviews." (2) NP 1.1.3 Rev. 10 issued 11-8-99 adds a Procedure Validation form for new or revised procedures. Failure to maintain the checklists and other aids as QA records for procedures issued prior to 11-8-99 makes any investigations into the root cause of technical or administrative issues within procedures remarkably nebulous and virtually impossible to confirm. (3) The PBF-0026 series of forms does not address any attributes for design control.

Allegation No.	Concern Description
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d Temporary changes or revisions to the Station Writer's Guide were not processed. Condition report 99-1901 was written.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d The licensee provided an acknowledgment letter an individuals who anonymously submitted a CR. If the licensee is identifying authors of anonymously submitting CRs, then the licensee may be creating a chilling environment.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d An update to condition report 99-9901 was made four days after the condition report was closed. The update involved referncing CR 97-3843 for tracking the development adn implementation of a MAster PROcedure Index. Since CR 99-1901 has nothing to do with a Master PROcedures Index, the reference was inapporpriate.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d QA records are being updated with NUTRAK after the record is closed. Condition 99-2380 was generated.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d PBF-0026a forms are not being generated for procedure indices. Condition report 99-1908 was generated. PBF -0026a documentation does not exist for any indices issued to date.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d Procedure IMG 6.9. rev. 4 deos not address performing a safety evaluation when procedure indices are issued. Safety evaluations have not been performed on controlled reference documents. Procedures do not exclude safety evaluation requirements.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d The response to CR 99-1908 disputes the conclusions of 98-3962.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d Condition report 99-1908 was dispositioned and closed without addressing all the issues. Condition report 99-1993 was generated to address this issue.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d Condition report 99-1908 was assigned a lower priotity [than it should have received], which "endangered the health and safety of the public".
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d Condition report 99-1908 did not receive an independent review, contrary to NP 5.4.1, Rev 7.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d There appears to be a weakness in the background and experience of the procedures program manager.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d The statments in CR 99-2380 Action #1 are inappropriate.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d EX7A EX7a
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-d EX7A (a) [redacted] supervisor discouraged him from writing CRs that could force a plant shutdown.. (b) [redacted] icoworkers no longer write condition reports.
EX7C	RIII-2000-A-C An operability evaluation written in response to a CR (#00-0718), involving containment fan cooler tubes that were found to be larger than assumed in the service water flow model, was not accurate in that the referenced analysis was not correctly characterized. Specifically, the sensitivity analysis of the tube diameter was misrepresented.