

June 13, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations

FROM: J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT: COMMISSION STAFF REQUIREMENTS MEMORANDA (SRM)  
M000110B - D. C. COOK SIGNIFICANT EMERGENT SAFETY  
ISSUES

Attachment 1 to this memorandum provides the final update to the significant emergent safety issues at D. C. Cook. In the subject SRM, the Commission requested to be informed of these issues. The final issue involving the concrete wall in containment has been resolved.

During final staff review of the containment wall issue, a member of my staff involved in that review raised a differing view to my attention. I forwarded the technical issues raised in the differing view to the Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 Restart Panel for their consideration in their restart deliberations. The Panel has concluded that there are no new technical issues that affect resolution of the containment wall issue for restart. The differing view will be handled separately in accordance with agency procedures on Differing Professional Views.

In addition, all the issues being tracked by the Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 Panel have been adequately addressed by the licensee and are considered closed. Also attached to this memorandum is the letter to the licensee documenting completion of NRC actions necessary prior to restart of D. C. Cook, Unit 2, including NRC review of specific corrective actions that the licensee committed to complete prior to restarting Unit 2.

This update on significant emergent issues affecting restart of D. C. Cook Unit 2 completes all required actions pursuant to SRM M000110B.

Attachments: 1. Current Emergent Safety Issue Status  
2. NRC Cook Restart Ltr to R. Powers dtd 06/13/00

See Attached Distribution

CONTACT: D. Passehl, DRP  
(630) 829-9872

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W. Travers

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## Issue Is Resolved and Will No Longer Be Included in this Report

Attachment 1

### Current Emerging Safety Issues

<b>Issue</b>	On November 22, 1999, the licensee identified a concrete wall in containment where segments of concrete and several reinforcing bars had been removed from the upper portion of the wall during initial construction. This wall forms part of the boundary between upper and lower containment which is designed to force the steam blowdown during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steam line break (MSLB) through the ice condenser to reduce containment pressure buildup. The missing concrete and reinforcing bars may affect the ability of containment to perform its function.
<b>Licensee Action</b>	The licensee evaluated the condition of the wall and determined that the wall does not meet specified design margins. The licensee determined that replacement of the missing concrete with grout would restore the wall to an operable but degraded condition. The licensee initiated a design change package to add grout to the wall and completed calculations on April 14, 2000, concluding that the wall would not fail under the worst case postulated loading. The licensee has prepared an operability evaluation of this condition. The licensee was pursuing additional NRC questions resulting from a May 4, 2000, public technical meeting regarding the as-built configuration of this wall and the adequacy of their calculations. Following the May 4, 2000, public meeting, the licensee hired a contractor to map the reinforcing bars in the wall. Based on the preliminary mapping results, the licensee concluded that there were fewer reinforcing bars in the wall than were assumed in the calculations completed on April 14, 2000. On May 30, 2000, the licensee provided to the NRC staff a more sophisticated analysis to evaluate operability of the wall. A public meeting with the licensee was conducted on June 1, 2000, to discuss the NRC staff's review of the analysis.
<b>NRC Action</b>	<b><i>NRR and Region III staff reviewed the supporting calculations and the licensee's basis for determining the operability of this wall and concluded that the wall was operable but degraded.</i></b>
<b>Safety Significance</b>	Failure of this wall during a LOCA or MSLB would create a steam bypass of the ice condenser resulting in over-pressurization of the containment and potential containment failure.
<b>Impact on Schedule</b>	None.

**Issue Is Resolved and Will No Longer Be Included in this Report**