PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

Nuclear Business Unit

JUN 05 2000

LRN-00-0211

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 354/00-004-00
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO NPF-57
DOCKET NO. 50-354

This Licensee Event Report entitled "Reactor Scram with Reactor Defueled Due to Scram Discharge Volume High Level" is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as "an event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS),... ."

Sincerely,

Mark Bezilla
Vice President - Operations

Attachment

/JCN
c: Distribution:
LER File 3.7

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Hope Creek Generating Station	05000354	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Reactor Scram with Reactor Defueled Due to Scram Discharge Volume High Level

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	06	00	00	- 004 -	00	06	05	00		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	--
POWER LEVEL (10)	0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
John Nagle, Licensing Engineer	856-339-3171

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On May 6, 2000, a SCRAM signal was generated as a result of high level in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV). At the time of the event, the reactor was in a refueling outage with the core completely offloaded to the fuel pool, all control rods were inserted and the control rod drive hydraulic system was isolated. Work was being performed that required isolating air to the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves, resulting in these valves being closed. With the plant in this configuration Control Rod Drive leakage is directed to the scram discharge volume. Water level continued to rise in the discharge volume until the high scram discharge volume level scram setpoint was reached. This event resulted from an inadequate partial release of a tagout and untimely action to drain the SDV. Corrective action is to perform a review of tagouts in order to identify enhancements that will prevent recurrence of this type of event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an "event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS),…."

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Control Rod Drive System - EIIS Identifier {AA/ISV}*
Reactor Protection System - EIIS Identifier {JC/LS}
* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was in the Undefined Operational Condition with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel. The control rods were fully inserted and the control rod drive system was removed from service. No other structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the time of the occurrence that contributed to the event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On May 6, 2000, at 2324, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) SCRAM occurred due to high level in the scram discharge volume (SDV). Prior to the SCRAM, Operators had performed a standard tagout which completely de-energizes the SCRAM related components in their fail safe positions to support activities on the alternate rod insertion valves thus eliminating the potential for a SCRAM. On May 5, in order to support the performance of a surveillance, operators performed a partial release on a standard tagout associated with the scram discharge volume. The partial release re-energized the SCRAM logic. Later on May 5, Operators filled the CRD system and placed a CRD pump in service to support re-coupling of a control rod and other items. After the CRD pump was placed in service, minor water in-leakage was observed into the SDV. This is not unexpected. Rising level resulted in a Rod Block alarm and operations drained the SDV early on May 6. Late on May 6, the SDV high level once again occurred and operators were taking actions to manually open the SDV valves in order to drain the water out of the SDV when the SCRAM occurred.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The partial release prepared by the Licensed Operators did not adequately evaluate and address the effects of the revised configuration. This led to the conditions which permitted the SCRAM to occur.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this condition. The reactor was shut down with all fuel off loaded to the fuel pool. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review has been conducted of Licensee Event Reports and Inspection reports for 1998, 1999 and 2000 in order to identify similar events. No similar ESF actuations resulting from tagging/releases were identified.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The tagouts which were used are being reviewed and tagout revisions for this tagging evolution are being considered in order to provide additional guidance to minimize challenges to plant operations.

COMMITMENTS

The corrective action cited in this LER is a voluntary enhancement and does not constitute a commitment.

LER PROCESS AND PERFORMANCE MONITORING

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PROCESS



PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Process Indicators and Measurement	Targets	Checking		
		Criteria	Frequency	Resp.
Q1 Adequate Input received	75%	Sufficient info to draft LER.	Quarterly	Regional Lead
T1 Input timely	75%	Day 14	Quarterly	Regional Lead
T2 - % of time draft to internal reviewers on time	70%	Copy to reviewer by day 16.	Quarterly	Regional Lead
Q2 - % of time with no valid comments from reviewers.	80%	Other than phrasing	Quarterly	Regional lead
T3 % of time Traveler signed on time.	80%	Prior to SORC meeting.	Quarterly	Regional Lead
T4 - % of time draft to SORC Secy before meeting	80%	Electronic copy by the week Prior	Quarterly	Regional Lead
Q3 % of Time LER SORC Approved	90%	Multiple SORC mtg reqd	Quarterly	Regional Lead
Q4 - % of initial requiring no supplement.	95%	Form 366 Box checked	Quarterly	Regional Lead
T5 LERs submitted to VP on time.	100%	1 day prior To Due date	Quarterly	Regional Lead