

June 2, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations

FROM: J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator /s/James L. Caldwell

SUBJECT: COMMISSION STAFF REQUIREMENTS MEMORANDA (SRM)
M000110B - D. C. COOK SIGNIFICANT EMERGENT SAFETY
ISSUES

The attachment to this memorandum provides an update to the significant emergent safety issues at D. C. Cook. In the subject SRM, the Commission requested to be informed of these issues. The issue involving large-bore piping supports has been resolved and will no longer be reported in future memoranda. Progress is being made toward resolving the remaining issue. Changes to existing issues are provided in ***bold italics***.

Attachment: As stated

cc w/att: F. Miraglia, OEDO
S. Collins, NRR
M. Satorius, OEDO
M. Case, OEDO
J. Zwolinski, NRR
S. Bajwa, NRR
C. Craig, NRR
J. Stang, NRR
A. Vogel, RIII
G. Shear, RIII
B. Bartlett, SRI D. C. Cook
M. Holmberg, RIII

CONTACT: D. Passehl, DRP
(630) 829-9872

Not for Public Disclosure

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DATE	06/ /00		06/ /00		06/ /00		06/ /00	

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Issue Is Resolved and Will No Longer Be Included in this Report Attachment

Current Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	The licensee identified multiple examples where large-bore piping supports were not installed according to the design and licensing basis. Systems affected include Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal, Containment Spray, and Safety Injection, along with multiple nonsafety-systems.
Licensee Action	The licensee has issued a design change package to repair, replace, or install approximately seventy piping supports in the affected safety-related systems. Also, the licensee has identified the need to repair, replace, or install several hundred additional supports in other systems.
NRC Action	<i>Pipe support modifications needed for restart have been completed.</i>
Safety Significance	The affected piping systems may not have been adequately designed to sustain a seismic event.
Impact on Schedule	None.

Issue Is Resolved and Will No Longer Be Included in this Report

Current Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	On November 22, 1999, the licensee identified a concrete wall in containment where segments of concrete and several reinforcing bars had been removed from the upper portion of the wall during initial construction. This wall forms part of the boundary between upper and lower containment which is designed to force the steam blowdown during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steam line break (MSLB) through the ice condenser to reduce containment pressure buildup. The missing concrete and reinforcing bars may affect the ability of containment to perform its function.
Licensee Action	The licensee evaluated the condition of the wall and determined that the wall does not meet specified design margins. The licensee determined that replacement of the missing concrete with grout would restore the wall to an operable but degraded condition. The licensee initiated a design change package to add grout to the wall and completed calculations on April 14, 2000, concluding that the wall would not fail under the worst case postulated loading. The licensee has prepared an operability evaluation of this condition. The licensee was pursuing additional NRC questions resulting from a May 4, 2000, public technical meeting regarding the as-built configuration of this wall and the adequacy of their calculations. Following the May 4, 2000, public meeting, the licensee hired a contractor to map the reinforcing bars in the wall. Based on the preliminary mapping results, the licensee concluded that there were fewer reinforcing bars in the wall than were assumed in the calculations completed on April 14, 2000. <i>On May 30, 2000, the licensee provided to the NRC staff a more sophisticated analysis to evaluate operability of the wall. A public meeting with the licensee was conducted on June 1, 2000, to discuss the NRC staff's review of the analysis.</i>
NRC Action	NRR and Region III staff continue to review the supporting calculations and will review the licensee's basis for determining the operability of this wall.
Safety Significance	Failure of this wall during a LOCA or MSLB would create a steam bypass of the ice condenser resulting in over-pressurization of the containment and potential containment failure.
Impact on Schedule	Unknown at this time.