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Annual Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) 1999

January 1, Through December 31, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Annual Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) 1999

January 1, Through December 31, 1999

This document was prepared in response to inquiries concerning the nature of safeguards-related events involving NRC and licensed material.

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Operations Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ABSTRACT

The Annual Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), 1999, provides brief summaries of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1999, through December 31, 1999. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, Byproduct Material, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting. Also included is a section on foreign SSEL incidents for purposes of comparison and to broaden the database of potential threat events. It is derived primarily from press reports.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Annual Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), 1999, provides brief summaries of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1 through December 31, 1999. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Besides the new title, there are four major changes to this year's report:

- Starting this year, the SSEL is being issued as a stand-alone annual report, vice its previous serial format, in order to make it more useful to readers.

- A new Byproduct Category has been added, containing events which involve either byproduct material or source material (e.g. natural uranium). Recent changes to Section 831 of Chapter 39 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code regarding criminal activity includes a significant expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's jurisdiction to initiate criminal investigation for the malicious use of nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material. Byproduct incidents which were formerly reported in the Miscellaneous category will be moved to the new category, and will utilize the formerly discontinued Category IX code. NRC also will retroactively add byproduct incidents to the historical database maintained by NRC.

- Category VI, Arson, has been reinstated.

- A new section has been added which reviews significant foreign safeguards and security incidents, broken down in the same categories. NRC hopes that by including foreign events, the database of possible threat-related activities will be broadened and provide a comparison to U.S.-based incidents.

The first section (involving NRC-licensed activities) is divided into two parts: a chronological listing of events by category, and a short statistical analysis. The information contained in the event descriptions is reported primarily by the licensees, NRC resident inspectors or NRC Regional Information Assessment Team (IAT) personnel to the NRC Operations Center or the IAT in the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. As NRC adds incidents to the foreign event database, NRC will also include a statistical analysis of that information.

NRC-licensed SSEL Events

The overall number of Safeguards Event increased this year to 21, nearly double last year's total and the first increase after four straight years of decline (Figure 1). The highest number of

incidents last year were in the Bomb-related (6) and Miscellaneous (4) categories (Figure 2), representing almost entirely hoax or non-credible threats, so NRC assesses that the increased number of reports does not represent an increased threat to NRC-licensed facilities. There were no actual Bomb-related (Section A), Transportation, or Radiological Sabotage events. Reactor Events greatly exceeded Non-reactor events (Figures 3 & 4). Over the past ten years, Firearms-related (419), Bomb-related (235), and Miscellaneous events (264) have dominated the overall number of safeguards incidents, with the other four categories combined accounting for the 29 remaining incidents (Figure 5). The number of operating power reactors (104) remained steady in 1999.

- The most notable domestic incident during the past year occurred in the Non-radiological sabotage category (VIIIB-99-01), when an individual was arrested in Florida in December for plotting to attack, among other things, power lines leading to the Crystal River Plant. There are no indications that the plot developed beyond the discussion stage. There was no plan to attack the plant directly.

- In addition, a researcher was convicted of misdemeanor assault and felony unlawful disposal of radioactive material and was sentenced to 120 days in jail and three years probation as a result of his contaminating a co-worker's chair with phosphorus-32 (By-Product category, IX-99-02) at the University of California-Irvine. There have been several similar low-level malicious contamination cases since 1995 involving research or academic facilities. In January 2000, a student at Brown University received 10 years probation and will likely be deported for maliciously exposing a former girlfriend in 1998 to iodine-125 (see the 1998 SSEL, X-98-03).

Foreign SSEL Events

The first foreign SSEL events, culled from foreign and international press reports, appear in this report. More events will be added in future years, and older incidents from the past three decades will also eventually be added in order to build a statistically valid database. Please note that NRC has not been able to independently verify the information in the foreign incident reports and thus they could contain inaccuracies.

- The most notable foreign event was the attempted ramming of a gate at the South Ukraine nuclear power plant in December. Guards shot and wounded the intruder, who was described as mentally ill. There were also three incidents of attempted theft of parts from nuclear reactors, two at Kola, Russia, and one at South Ukraine. Metal is a high value commodity in the former Soviet Union, and metal thefts from nuclear facilities are becoming more common as a means to make hard currency.

PREFACE

The Annual Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of numerous safeguards-related events involving nuclear materials or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A larger electronic database, containing over 2,100 incidents dating back to 1969, is maintained at NRC headquarters and is available in previous print editions of the SSEL. As the list is intended to provide a broad perspective on the nature of safeguards incidents in the licensed nuclear industry, both unusual and routine events are described. Events have been placed in the several categories described below. Each listing is included in a single category unless it is transportation-related, in which case it is cross-referenced in the Transportation category.

I. Bomb-Related: Events concerned with explosives, incendiary devices or arson.

Section A: Events in which a bomb or explosive material was located or an explosion occurred at a licensed facility.

Section B: All other bomb-related events (e.g., hoax bomb threats).

II. Intrusion: Incidents of attempted or actual penetration of a facility's barriers or safeguards systems.

III. Missing or Allegedly Stolen: Events in which safeguarded special nuclear material was stolen, alleged to be stolen, discovered missing, or found.

IV. Transportation-Related: Events typically include incidents where safeguarded material was mis-routed or involved in an accident. Material reported missing or stolen during transport, for example, would be included in Category III and cross-referenced in the Transportation category.

V. Tampering/Vandalism: Incidents of destruction or attempted destruction of property, parts, and equipment which do not directly cause a radioactive release.

VI. Arson: Intentional acts involving incendiary materials resulting in damage to property, equipment, or other assets.

VII. Firearms-Related: Events typically describe the discharge, discovery, or loss of firearms at a licensed facility.

VIIIA. Radiological Sabotage: Deliberate act directed against a safeguarded activity which could endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

VIIIB. Nonradiological Sabotage: Events characterized by the FBI as sabotage but which could not endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

IX. Byproduct Materials Events: Events involving either byproduct material or source material (e.g. natural uranium).

X. Miscellaneous: Events which hold some interest to safeguards and the public but which do not fit into any of the previously described categories.

Each event listed in the body of the report is identified by an alphanumeric code composed of the appropriate category Roman numeral, the last two digits of the year in which the event occurred, and a sequential number for that specific year and category. Each incident listing includes the appropriate date and location and a brief description of the event. Descriptions vary in detail according to the amount of data available through NRC reporting channels, or in the case of foreign incidents, press and other open source reports. Please note that NRC has not been able to independently verify the information in the foreign incident reports and thus they could contain inaccuracies.

ABBREVIATIONS

DOE Department of Energy

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

IAT Information Assessment Team (NRC)

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

PNO Preliminary Notification of an Event or Unusual Occurrence

RSO Radiation Safety Officer

SSEL Safeguards Summary Events List

I. BOMB-RELATED EVENTS
SECTION A

There were no reported Section A events during 1999.

I. BOMB-RELATED EVENTS
SECTION B

IB-99-01	**Date: 03/05/99**	**Site: San Onofre** **Southern California Edison Company** **San Diego Gas & Electric Company** **San Diego County, CA**

Plant Status: Units 2 & 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A plant security officer discovered suspicious device on the 70' elevation of control building consisting of a 1.5 inch diameter copper pipe, capped on both ends. The device was in a remote location, outside of vital areas and away from plant equipment.

Action: The building was evacuated, and the local Marine Corps bomb squad and FBI responded.

Resolution: Bomb squad determined that the pipe was not an explosive device.

Source: Licensee; PNO-IV-99-018, Event #35443, IAT

IB-99-02	**Date: 04/14/99**	**Site: Turkey Point & St. Lucie** **Florida Power and Light Company** **Dade County & St. Lucie County, FL**

Plant Status: St Lucie - Units 1 & 2 Operational
Turkey Point - Units 3 & 4 Operational
Fuel present on both sites.

Event: At 08:45 in the morning, the FP&L customer service office in Miami received a bomb threat from a white male stating "I'm going to blow up a building or a power plant."

Action: FP&L notified both Turkey Point and St. Lucie plants.

Resolution: Call was assessed as noncredible; local police were unable to identify the caller.

Source: Licensee; IAT

IB-99-03	Date: 07/26/99	Site: Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company Appling County, GA

Plant Status: Units 1&2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: The plant received 3 calls within a few minutes on a direct line to a Security Alarm Station. There was no direct threat in the calls, only the somewhat garbled words "Do y'all know when the plant's gonna blow up?" After listening several times to a recording of the 3 conversations, it was evaluated to be a probable prank call. There was never a direct threat or a suggestion that a device had been placed; only a question.

Action: Plant notified local law enforcement authorities, FBI, and NRC.

Resolution: Subsequent investigation by corporate security confirmed the calls were an "innocent" prank by an adolescent child from a nearby community. The child's parent took corrective action to prevent a recurrence.

Source: Region II

IB-99-04	Date: 08/24/99	Site: Brown's Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority Limestone County, AL

Plant Status: Units 2 & 3, Operational
Unit 1, Refueling outage
Fuel present at site.

Event: An off duty security officer reported that his wife had a friend who said that she (the friend) had heard a man say that if he didn't get the drug charges against him dropped, he was going to blow up Brown's Ferry. The man had made the statement two weeks previous.

Action: The licensee heightened security and interviewed the woman reporting the threat. A subsequent interview was conducted with the alleged suspect, who was a former plant contract employee from 1992-95.

Resolution: Interviews determined the threat to be non-credible. Subject was inebriated at the time the threats were made.

Source: Licensee; IAT

IB-99-05	Date: 09/10/99	Site:	San Onofre Southern California Edison Company San Diego Gas & Electric Company San Diego County, CA

Plant Status: Units 2 & 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Orange County Police received information that an employee of a local business had been overheard to say that he could blow up San Onofre.

Action: The suspect is known to the police and had previous minor brushes with the law.

Resolution: After an interview with the suspect, the threat was assessed as noncredible.

Source: Orange County Police Department; IAT

IB-99-06	Date: 09/28/99	Site:	Limerick Philadelphia Electric Company Montgomery County, PA

Plant Status: Units 1 & 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Montgomery County, PA police notified the licensee that at 02:40 am a male called in to its 911 number and made what was described by the police as a "credible bomb threat." The call allegedly stated that a device had been placed at Limerick and $5 million ransom was being asked.

Action: The licensee declared an "unusual event," heightened security, and began to search

for a device with the assistance of local law enforcement. FBI also responded. The call was traced by police to a phone booth in Pottstown, PA, approximately 3 miles from the site.

Resolution: A subsequent review of the call by the NRC IAT and FBI determined that it was not credible. No device was found and the search was terminated.

Source: Licensee; Event #36358; IAT

II. INTRUSION EVENTS

II-99-01	Date: 01/14/99	Site: Dresden Commonwealth Edison Company Grundy County, IL

Plant Status: Units 2 & 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A delivery person arrived late at the plant warehouse and knocked on the door. When no one answered the person tried the door and it was unlocked. When she opened the doors she triggered alarms and security responded. The person was in the warehouse when security arrived.

Action: Compensatory measures were taken upon discovery. Doors on the warehouse outer wall are supposed to be locked during after-duty hours.

Resolution: The delivery person is known to the licensee, and was making a legitimate delivery. The person posed no threat to the facility.

Source: Licensee; Event #35266

II-99-02	Date: 03/28/99	Site: State Univ of New York at Buffalo Erie County, NY

Plant Status: NA

Event: An unknown person(s) was suspected of entering the underground steam pipe conduit which leads to the university research reactor building.

Action: Investigation by the university found a steam pipe entrance which was unlocked and unalarmed (all entrances are supposed to be secured). The entrance was secured.

Resolution: Investigation did not reveal the identity of the intruder(s). It is presumed they were curious students.

Source: Licensee; Event #35520

II-99-03	Date: 04/13/99	Site: Waterford Entergy Operation, Inc. St. Charles Parish, LA

Plant Status: Unit 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: An individual carrying an empty bag was apprehended outside of a warehouse about 150 yards outside the Waterford protected area. Security was worried that he may have possessed an explosive device in the bag when they first spotted him.

Action: Security apprehended the individual. Local law enforcement and the FBI responded to the site. Individual's bag was empty. The man claimed to be on site "to protect the plant from Yugoslavian terrorists" (paraphrase).

Resolution: FBI determined the individual was mentally unstable. The local sheriff arrested the suspect and charged him with criminal trespass.

Source: Licensee; IAT

III. MISSING AND/OR ALLEGEDLY STOLEN EVENTS

III-99-01	Date: 08/24/99	Site: Augustana University Minnehaha County, SD

Plant Status: NA

Event: During a change of Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) inventory, the new RSO discovered that 1 of 12 Pu-238/239 calibration sources was missing. It is an electro-plated disk about the size of a quarter, activity level of 0.023 microcuries.

Action: The licensee searched for the missing disc and talked with appropriate individuals.

Resolution: The new RSO thinks it has been lost for a long time, and it does not appear at this time that any malevolent act was involved.

Source: Licensee; Event # 36039, IAT

IV. TRANSPORTATION-RELATED EVENTS

There were no reported Transportation-related events during 1999.

V. TAMPERING/VANDALISM EVENTS

V-99-01	Date: 04/21/99	Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District Washington County, NE

Plant Status: Unit 1 Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: An contract employee reportedly overheard a contractor electrician say that he (the electrician) could sabotage the wiring he was working on and that it would be very difficult to detect, but that he wouldn't do something like that. This comment was reportedly made at least two months previous during an outage, but did not surface until later.

Action: The licensee completed extensive testing and checks of the switchyard. No significant problems were identified. The individual in question never had access to the protected area.

Resolution: The individual in question, along with another contract employee, had been fired on 2/24/99 for poor work performance.

Source: Licensee; IAT

V-99-02	Date: 11/29/99 & 12/16/99	Site: Turkey Point Florida Power and Light Company Dade County, FL

Plant Status: Units 3 & 4 Operational
Fuel present on site.

Event: Plant maintenance discovered that doors installed in early November in the protected area (not vital area) had been tampered with, i.e. screws missing from locks, locks and strike plates missing parts, etc. Two weeks later, workers discovered a cut line to a pump on the screen wash system (not safety-related).

Action: Corporate and licensee security reviewed situation. None of the activities affected the safety of the plant.

Resolution: Incident may have been associated with labor unrest.

Source: Licensee; IAT

VI. ARSON EVENTS

VI-99-01	Date: 01/12-13/99	Site: Calvert Cliffs Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert County, MD

Plant Status: Units 1 & 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: On January 13, the licensee notified the Maryland State Fire Marshall and Department of Natural Resources regarding a fire within the owner controlled area. A fire of approximately 30' x 15' was discovered in the Camp Canoi recreation area at a location adjacent to the site of a 40' x 40' fire on 01/12/99. The fire was extinguished as a result of efforts by both onsite and offsite fire fighters. This was the fourth fire that had occurred in the owner controlled area since December 1998.

Action: An eyewitness recorded the license number of a vehicle seen leaving the area, and the Maryland State Police was able to identify the suspect.

Resolution: The suspect is a former cafeteria employee for the licensee who was fired and became disgruntled. She was charged with five counts of malicious fire-setting and two counts of trespassing.

Source: Licensee; Events #35257, #35224

VII. FIREARMS-RELATED EVENTS

VII-99-01	Date: 09/22/99	Site: Fermi Detroit Edison Company Monroe County, MI

Plant Status: Unit 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A truck belonging to a contractor entered the protected area after being searched. During the course of work, the contractor removed some large flexible tubing from the back of the truck. Located under the tubing was a loaded Glock 9mm pistol.

Action: The contractor immediately reported the pistol to security. Contractor and employees were interviewed. No gun was seen during work by the same contractor the previous day. The contractor had spent the night at a nearby motel. The local sheriff and the FBI were contacted.

Resolution: Extensive efforts were made to trace the owner of the weapon. No owner was identified, and it is unknown how or why the weapon the weapon was placed in the truck.

Source: Licensee; IAT

VIIIA. RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE

There were no reported events of radiological sabotage criteria during 1999.

VIIIB. NON-RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE

VIIIb-99-01	**Date: 12/08/99**	**Site: Crystal River Florida Power Corporation Citrus County, FL**

Plant Status: Unit 3, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: An individual was arrested and charged with a terrorist conspiracy to, among other things, steal explosives from National Guard armories, and blow up electrical power transmission lines in Florida, reportedly including those serving the Crystal River nuclear power plant.

Action: The licensee elevated its site security to Level 2 and contacted the FBI. The FBI indicated that there was no direct threat against Crystal River, so plant security was downgraded to normal levels.

Resolution: Suspect pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to degrade property of the United States, to destroy energy facilities, and to provide material support for terrorists. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in federal prison and a $250,000 fine. His sentencing is July 28, 2000. Although the power lines involved were not subject to NRC security requirements due to their location, this event was included because of its general interest.

Source: Licensee; Press; IAT

IX. BYPRODUCT MATERIALS EVENTS

IX-99-01	Date: 03/17/99	Site: NDT & Inspections Broward County, FL

Plant Status: NA

Event: An AEA Technology Model 66B radiography camera containing 88.3 curies of iridium-192 was stolen from a locked equipment trailer at the radiographer's house in Pembroke Pines. The thief who stole the device also took the keys for the camera.

Action: Due to the large activity level of the stolen source, the NRC entered the monitoring phase of normal response mode, and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control responded to the event. Broward County offered a reward. Local law enforcement and the FBI were notified of the theft and conducted an investigation.

Resolution: The camera was not located. On 03/22/99, the NRC secured from the monitoring phase of normal response mode.

Source: Licensee; Event #35477, PNO-II-99-009, IAT

IX-99-02	Date: 07/02/99	Site: University of California Irvine, CA

Plant Status: NA

Event: On August 5, 1999, the State of California, Department of Health Services (CDHS) notified NRC Region IV of an incident involving the alleged misuse of 0.555-1.110 megabecquerels (15-30 microcuries) of phosphorus-32 (P-32) by a University of California-Irvine (UC-I) researcher. CDHS reported that the licensee determined that the researcher had placed P-32 on a fellow researcher's chair with the intention of exposing the individual to radiation. On July 2, 1999 during a rountine survey of the laboratory and an adjacent office area, the contaminated chair was identified.

Action: The UC-I police submitted this case to the Orange County District Attorney's Office, Environmental Protection Unit, for review. The FBI was also notified. The suspect was eventually arrested and charged with assault.

Resolution: Suspect plead guilty to misdemeanor assault and felony unlawful disposal of radioactive material and was sentenced to 120 days in jail and three years probation.

Source: Licensee; Event #36000, PNO-IV-99-033, IAT

X. MISCELLANEOUS

X-99-01	Date: 01/26/99	Site: Susquehanna Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Luzerne County, PA

Plant Status: Units 1 & 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: The licensee had a conversation with an individual who stated that he was an explosives expert and that someone could use a van pop-up camper with propane tanks to sneak a bomb onto the site. It was unclear whether he was actually making a threat to the facility.

Action: The call was traced and the State and Local police located the individual who placed the call.

Resolution: Based on the police interview, the individual was trying to get a person in trouble who had an alleged affair with the individual's wife. The police arrested the individual and charged him with "harassment by communications."

Source: Licensee; IAT

X-99-02	Date: 03/28/99	Site: Three Mile Island GPU Nuclear Corporation Dauphin County, PA

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: Five individuals, who were part of a group of approximately 125 people demonstrating outside the North Gate, crossed a police line.

Action: The Pennsylvania State Police arrested the five individuals for criminal trespass.

Resolution: The licensee reported that the demonstration was peaceful.

Source: Licensee; Event #35519

X-99-03	Date: 05/21/99	Site: Comanche Peak Three Mile Island 12 unnamed nuclear power plants

Plant Status: NA

Event: A U.S. military base received a threat letter to the U.S. President stating that 100 Russian commandos from Mexico were going to attack Comanche Peak, Three Mile Island and 12 other nuclear power plants which were not identified. The letter complained about ongoing U.S. military action in Kosovo.

Action: FBI and U.S. Secret Service notified. The NRC IAT, FBI and DOE conducted a credibility assessment of the threat.

Resolution: The threat was determined to be a hoax.

Source: U.S. military; IAT

X-99-04	Date: 08/09/99	Site: Cooper Nebraska Public Power District Nemaha County, NE

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: The FBI reported that they had received information that a Middle East terrorist would "do something at Cooper."

Action: Investigation revealed that the information was from a local sheriff in Casper, WY, who received the information from a "local psychic" who had a premonition of this threat.

Resolution: FBI interviewed the psychic, and assessed the threat as non-credible. Her original threat premonition was for August 1, which had already passed.

Source: Licensee; IAT

X-99-05	Date: 12/09/99	Site: Beaver Valley Duquesne Light Company Beaver County, PA

Plant Status: Units 1 & 2, Operational
Fuel present at site.

Event: A law enforcement source stated that his neighbor had stated that he knew of a group of Iraqis with weapons living in a state park who were conspiring with ex-military personnel to attack Beaver Valley.

Action: Beaver Valley heightened security awareness. A search warrant was executed at the residence of the "neighbor" who had originally claimed to know of a threat to Beaver Valley.

Resolution: The neighbor was found to be mentally ill, in possession of a loaded shotgun and several hundred rounds of ammo, which were confiscated. The threat was assessed as non-credible, and the subject was committed for mental observation.

Source: Licensee; IAT

I. FOREIGN BOMB-RELATED EVENTS
SECTION A

IA-99-01	Date: 05/20/99	Site: Ignalina NPP Lithuania Ministry of Energy Visaginas, Lithuania

Plant Status: Unit 1, Operational
Unit 2, Repair outage

Event: A grenade-like device was found in a lavatory. One unconfirmed report stated that the "F-1" style grenade was mainly filled with bitumen and a small quantity of poor quality explosive, making it unusable as an explosive device.

Action: The device was removed.

Resolution: There was no specific threat associated with the discovery, and it is possible the grenade entered the plant during construction, when it was guarded by the miltary.

Source: Press

II. FOREIGN INTRUSION EVENTS

II-99-01	Date: 03/21/99	Site: Barseback NPP Barseback Kraft AB Malmohus, Sweden

Plant Status: 2 Units, status unknown

Event: 25 Danish Greenpeace activists forced their way onto the grounds of the Barseback power station, triggering an alarm. The activists entered the site near Barseback's production area in the morning and proceeded to climb onto building roofs to protest against continuing nuclear power production at the plant.

Action: The disturbance tripped the alarm and Barseback security guards contacted the police, who had arrested several of the activists during the afternoon.

Resolution: Barseback said the alarm is designed to block intruders from gaining access to crucial areas of the production plant. Electricity production at the plant reportedly was undisturbed.

Source: Press

II-99-02	Date: 12/01/99	Site: South Ukraine NPP Energoatom Kiev, Ukraine

Plant Status: 3 Units, Status unknown.

Event: An individual tried to ram the plant gate with his car.

Action: Plant guards shot and wounded the individual during the attempt.

Resolution: Intruder was described as mentally ill. His motivation for attempting to ram the gate is unknown.

Source: Press

V. FOREIGN TAMPERING/VANDALISM EVENTS

V-99-01	Date: 4/09/99	Site:	Kola NPP Rosenergoatom Murmansk, Russia

Plant Status: 4 Units, Status unknown

Event: An unidentified Kola employee tried to steal oil pressure monitors from the lubrication system of the turbogenerator in order to sell the electronic parts. The attempted theft reportedly set off an alarm.

Action: The alarm automatically shut down the Number 1 reactor.

Resolution: The individual was apprehended. The theft reportedly would not have affected the plants nuclear operations.

Source: Press

V-99-02	Date: 5/27/99	Site:	Kola NPP Rosenergoatom Murmansk, Russia

Plant Status: 4 Units, Status unknown

Event: In mid-May, unidentified thieve(s) removed two items of equipment, which were a part of the automatic radiation monitoring system at the plant's fourth reactor unit. The plant reportedly was unable to read the radiation levels in the fourth reactor hall for 24 hours, but managed to regain them.

Action: The incident was not reported to the police until May 27th . According to press reports, the plant's security manager said they tried to commission an internal investigation, but failed to identify the thieve(s).

Resolution: It is believed that the thieves were not plant employees, but someone from one of the plant's subcontractors, who perform periodic, but non-nuclear, work on site.

Source: Press

V-99-03	Date: 12/27/99	Site: Temelin NPP Czech Power Board Jihocesky, Czech Republic

Plant Status: 2 Units, under construction

Event: Unidentified individuals stole an electronic entrance control unit from the construction site.

Action: Since December 1, 1998, security at all entrances to the construction site has been tightened.

Resolution: The security unit has not been recovered. Insiders are suspected in the theft.

Source: Press

V-99-04	Date: 12/27/99	Site: South Ukraine NPP Energoatom Kiev, Ukraine

Plant Status: 3 Units, Status unknown

Event: A thief tried to steal the power cable to the Number 1 reactor. The cable broke in the attempt, resulting in the reactor's shutdown.

Action: The thief was apprehended.

Resolution: The cable was replaced and the reactor restarted. Plant officials claim the safety of the reactor was not affected. The thief was apparently trying to steal the cable to sell as scrap.

Source: Press

IX. FOREIGN BYPRODUCT MATERIALS EVENTS

IX-99-01	Date: 09/15?/99	Site: Grozny Chemical Combine Grozny, Chechnya

Plant Status: NA

Event: Three men were killed and three were injured after opening a container of cobalt-60 rods they were attempting to steal from the plant.

Action: NA

Resolution: It was not reported who the men were or why they were trying to steal the container. In the past Chechen rebels have used radioactive byproduct materials to threaten the Russian government concerning its Chechnya policy.

Source: Press

Safeguards Events

NRC-Licensed Activities
1989-1999



Figure 1

Note: Reporting requirements changed in 1995

Safeguards Events by Category (21)

NRC-Licensed Activities
1999



Figure 2

Reactor Safeguards Events



Figure 3

Nonreactor Safeguards Events



Figure 4

Safeguards Events by Category (984)

NRC-Licensed Activities 1989-1999



Figure 5

U.S. Commercial Power Reactors Licensed to Operate

1989-1999



Note: Regions IV and V were merged in 1993.

Figure 6

NRC FORM 335
(2-89)
NRCM 1102,
3201, 3202

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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(See instructions on the reverse)

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10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

11. ABSTRACT *(200 words or less)*

The Annual Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), 1999, provides brief summaries of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1999, through December 31, 1999. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, By-product Materials, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting. Also included is a section on foreign SSEL incidents for purposes of comparison and to broaden the database of potential threat events. It is derived primarily from press reports.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS *(List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.)*

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

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