



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

March 31, 2000

Randal K. Edington, Vice President - Operations
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - RIVER BEND STATION

Dear Mr. Edington:

The purpose of this letter is to communicate our assessment of your performance and to inform you of our planned inspections at your facility. On March 8, 2000, we completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of River Bend Station. We conduct these reviews to develop an integrated overview of the safety performance of each operating nuclear power plant. We use the results of the PPR in planning and allocating inspection resources and as inputs to our senior management meeting (SMM) process. This PPR evaluated inspection results and safety performance information for the one-year period from through February 11, 2000, but emphasized the last 6 months to ensure that our assessment reflected your current performance. Our most recent summary of plant performance at River Bend Station was provided to you in a letter dated March 19, 1999, and was discussed with you in a public meeting on April 20, 1999.

The NRC has been developing a revised reactor oversight process that will replace our existing inspection and assessment processes, including the PPR, the SMM, and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP). We recently completed a pilot program for the revised reactor oversight process at nine participating sites and are making necessary adjustments based on feedback and lessons learned. We are beginning initial implementation of the revised reactor oversight process industry-wide, including your facility, on April 2, 2000.

This PPR reflects continued process improvements as we make the transition into the revised reactor oversight process. You will notice that the following summary of plant performance is organized differently from our previous performance summaries. Instead of characterizing our assessment results by SALP functional area, we are organizing the results into the strategic performance arenas embodied in the revised reactor oversight process. Additionally, in assessing your performance, we have considered the historical performance indicator data that you submitted in January 2000 in conjunction with the inspection results. The results of this PPR were used to establish the inspection plan in accordance with the new risk-informed inspection program (consisting of baseline and supplemental inspections). Although this letter incorporates some terms and concepts associated with the new oversight process, it does not reflect the much broader changes in inspection and assessment that will be evident after we have fully implemented our revised reactor oversight process.

During the last 6 months, with the exception of one reactor trip and two power reductions for suppression testing, River Bend Station typically operated at or near full power. Although the NRC identified some performance issues during this assessment period, we note that River Bend Station continues to operate in a safe manner.

In the reactor safety strategic arena, performance resulted in safe operation. However, we noted an increase in instances of failure to implement or follow procedures, and problems continued with control and implementation of surveillance testing. Some engineering products lacked rigor and engineering personnel were inconsistent in the timely identification of problems and implementation of corrective actions. The baseline inspection will be adequate to monitor your corrective actions.

We did not identify any significant performance issues in the radiation safety or safeguards strategic arenas. As a result, only baseline inspections are planned. However, we plan to conduct an Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) inspection based upon the amount of time since the last OSRE and the changes that have been made in your security program. We will continue with OSRE inspections until the industry proposed Self-Assessment Program is approved by the NRC staff as an acceptable substitute for the OSRE inspections.

Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were used during this PPR process to arrive at our integrated view of your performance trends. The PIM for this assessment is grouped by the prior SALP functional areas of operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support, although the future PIM will be organized along the cornerstones of safety as described in the revised reactor oversight process. The enclosed PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence regarding River Bend Station. We did not document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, we only documented issues that we believe warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance. In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since our last inspection report was issued but had not yet received full review and consideration. We will make this material publically available as part of the normal issuance of our inspection reports and other correspondence.

Enclosure 2 lists our planned inspections for the period April 2000 through March 2001 at River Bend Station to allow you to resolve scheduling conflicts and personnel availability in advance of our inspector arrival onsite. The inspection schedule for the latter half of the period is more tentative and may be adjusted in the future due to emerging performance issues at River Bend Station or other Region IV facilities. We also included some NRC noninspection activities in Enclosure 2 for your information. Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at 817-860-8148.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-458
License No.: NPF-47

Enclosures:

1. Plant Issues Matrix
2. Inspection Plan

cc w/enclosures:

Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

General Manager
Plant Operations
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Director - Nuclear Safety
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway
P.O. Box 651
Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
Winston & Strawn
1401 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Manager - Licensing
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

The Honorable Richard P. Ieyoub
Attorney General
Department of Justice
State of Louisiana
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005

H. Anne Plettinger
3456 Villa Rose Drive
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806

President
West Feliciana Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 1921
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Ronald Wascom, Administrator
and State Liaison Officer
Department of Environmental Quality
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135

President
Pointe Coupe Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 290
New Roads, Louisiana 70760

President
East Feliciana Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 427
Clinton, Louisiana 70722

Parish President
West Baton Rouge Parish Counsel
P.O. Box 757
Port Allen, Louisiana 70767

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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President
West Feliciana Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 1921
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Mayor-President
Office of the Mayor-President
P.O. Box 1471
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821

Federal Emergency Management
R. L. "Buddy" Young, Regional Director
Region VI, Federal Center
800 North Loop 288
Denton, Texas 76201-3698

bcc to DCD (IE40)

bcc electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:

Regional Administrator **(EWM)**

DRP Director **(KEB)**

DRS Director **(ATH)**

Senior Resident Inspector **(TWP)**

Branch Chief, DRP/B **(WDJ)**

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B **(RAK1)**

Branch Chief, DRP/TSS **(LAY)**

RITS Coordinator **(NBH)**

B. Henderson, PAO **(BWH)**

C. A. Hackney, RSLO **(CAH)**

C. J. Gordon **(CJG)**

DRS Branch Chiefs **(GMG, DAP, JLP)**

W. D. Travers, EDO **(WDT)**

W. M. Dean, Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB **(WMD)**

R. K. Frahm, PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB **(RKF)**

B. A. Boger, Associate Dir. for Inspection and Programs **(BAB2)**

B. W. Sheron, Associate Dir. for Project Licensing and Technical Analysis **(BWS)**

G. M. Tracy, Chief, Regional Operations Staff, OEDO **(GMT)**

S. Richards, NRR Project Director **(SAR)**

R. Gramm, Chief, Section 1, NRR/DLPM **(RAG)**

D. Jaffe, NRR Project Manager **(DHJ)**

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region IV
 RIVER BEND STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
12/25/1999	1999014	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Knowledge weakness of heat trace panel operation The inspectors identified a general knowledge weakness of the operation of heat trace panels. Specifically, operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel could not determine the position of the HAND-OFF-AUTO switch on heat trace panels. Additionally, the licensee could not explain the operation of heat trace panels with the switch in the HAND position.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
12/25/1999	1999014-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter: 3A	Failure to implement cold weather actions The inspectors identified that operations personnel did not adequately verify that the facility was prepared for freezing weather during the first week of November as required by Procedure OSP-0043, "Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance." Specifically, five cold weather related maintenance action items associated with heat tracing were not corrected and one temporary structure installed for cold weather protection was not suitable. This Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-1979.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Operations personnel not aware of panel indications The inspectors identified two examples where operations personnel were not aware of suspect indications in the main control room. Specifically, control room operators were not aware of a pegged high amperage indication on the high pressure core spray switchgear and an abnormally low suppression pool temperature indication. These instances did not meet management expectations for operator awareness of control room indications.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter: 3A	Good operator response to turbine trip and reactor scram The licensee determined that a generator trip and automatic reactor scram were caused by activities in the Fancy Point switchyard when testing of communication circuits actuated the primary and backup pilot wire relays and opened the main generator output breakers. Operations personnel responded well to the reactor scram and performed well during the subsequent plant startup. Additionally, the investigation for identifying and confirming the initiating event was thorough and the immediate and planned corrective actions were appropriate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
11/13/1999	1999013-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter: 3A	Four examples of failure to follow procedures in the operations functional area involving locked valves, oper The inspectors identified four examples where operations personnel did not follow plant procedures. First, approximately 20 manually operated valves in the main flow path of the control building instrument air system were not locked as required by Procedure EDP-AA-77, "Control of Locked Valves List." Following the inspectors' initial review of locked valves, the licensee identified 18 valves in emergency diesel generator systems which were locked but did not have locking requirements specified on piping and instrument drawings and 45 valves in the standby service water system which were not locked and needed additional review. Second, more than 25 permanently attached instructional and warning labels in the main control room and elsewhere in the plant were not controlled as required by Procedures ADM-0022, "Conduct of Operations," and OSP-0001, "Control of Operator Aids." Third, main control room operators did not refrain from potentially distracting activities while in the "at the controls" area as required by Procedure ADM-0022 in that, on October 16, 1999, an operator was observed reading electronic mail during reactivity manipulations and on October 18, 1999, an operator was observed accessing an internet web page for an automobile manufacturer. Fourth, the radwaste ventilation system was not operated as required by Procedure SOP-0108, "Liquid Radwaste Collection and Processing," Procedure SOP-0063, "Radwaste Building Ventilation," and the Updated Safety Analysis Report in that all three radwaste ventilation exhaust fans were secured even though procedures required two of the three radwaste ventilation exhaust fans to remain in service during normal plant operations. This Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-1557, -1646, -1672, and- 1667.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: 3A Ter: 4B	Two examples of failure to follow or have adequate procedures for operability determinations and sampling The inspectors identified two examples of failure to follow or have adequate procedures. Specifically, operations personnel did not perform an operability determination which assessed plant operations with the radwaste building ventilation system exhaust fans secured as required by Procedure RBNP-078, "Operability Determinations." Additionally, Updated Safety Analysis Report requirements for sampling service water from the residual heat removal heat exchangers when radiation monitors were removed from service were not prescribed in plant procedures. This Severity Level IV violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-1667 and 1999-1583 (Sections O2.1 and R2.1).
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013-03	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Failure to perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for suppression pool temperature and The licensee determined that the failure to use all of the functional suppression pool temperature indications and drywell temperature channels during the derivation of average temperature was a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.6.2.1.1 and 3.6.5.5.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The circumstances addressed in Licensee Event Report 50-458/9901 are addressed in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-0056.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
10/02/1999	1999012	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Conduct of Operations was Good Operations personnel demonstrated good use of three-way communications, peer checks, and annunciator response. Nuclear equipment operators demonstrated a good understanding of plant equipment.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
10/02/1999	1999012-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Failure of operating personnel to be aware of plant indications The inspectors identified four examples where main control room operators were not aware of temperature and pressure indications associated with the suppression pool, containment, and drywell parameters. Specifically, operations personnel were not aware of deviations associated with computer points for suppression pool temperature and drywell temperature and strip chart recorder deviations for containment temperature and pressure. These instances of a lack of plant status awareness represented a failure to meet the requirements of Procedure ADM-0022, "Conduct of Operations." This was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-1448.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
09/03/1999	1999010	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Licensee remediated examination weaknesses aggressively The licensee had implemented a formal and effective remedial training program. Observed weaknesses, as well as, examination failures were aggressively remediated and there were no repeated failures.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
09/03/1999	1999010	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	Operators performed at a high level on operating test The licensed operators performed at a high level during the annual operating test. Communications and teamwork were strengths. During the dynamic scenarios, the operators advocated appropriate responses to changing plant conditions and as plant conditions deteriorated the shift management team conducted frequent briefings covering plant status and strategy for responding to events. The crews were sensitive to the impact of degrading plant equipment availability on core damage risk and implemented appropriate administrative controls to minimize increased risk
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
09/03/1999	1999010	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Licensee's evaluators demonstrated high competence level The licensee's evaluators demonstrated high performance expectations for operators and sustained high levels of competence in examination administration and operator performance assessment. Their threshold for generating constructive comments was low. Operations' management participation in the evaluations was a strength.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
07/29/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Three Human Performance Errors in Tagging/ Valves Three human performance errors were identified. One involved an out-of-position valve in the main steam isolation valve system and two errors were observed while operators were implementing a clearance order. The tagging errors were not recognized as human performance deficiencies by the licensee until the issues were discussed with the inspectors.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/29/1999	1999007	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Plant Startup was Well Controlled The plant startup was well controlled. Postmodification and surveillance tests were properly conducted and well coordinated. The control room supervisor provided good direction to the crew during the reactor startup and poststartup testing.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
06/09/1999	1999007	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A	Control room supervisor good command and control in response to onsite fire alarm The control room supervisor maintained good command and control in response to an onsite fire alarm caused by an overheated battery charger connected to a forklift in the main warehouse. The fire brigade responded in a timely manner.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A	Failure by operators to properly determine status of RHR valves A control room supervisor and a reactor operator did not understand why a manual residual heat removal valve's position indication lights were out. The condition of the valve was not properly determined during control room board walkdowns.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/29/1999	1999005-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A	Failure to meet Technical Specification for Control Room Fresh Air The licensee identified a Technical Specification 3.7.2 violation in that the Division II control room fresh air system was not operated in the emergency mode while fuel movement was in progress and the Division I unit was inoperable. Operators had mistakenly declared the Division I unit operable prior to completion of an electrical bus outage. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0686.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/23/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec:	Self	NEG	Pri: 1A	Inadequate communications between operators and security personnel resulted in loss of fuel building vacuum Inadequate verbal communications between operators and security personnel resulted in the inadvertent loss of fuel building vacuum while fuel movement was in progress. A senior reactor operator permitted personnel to enter the annulus through an inappropriate pathway, which opened a large leakage path to the fuel building. Operator response to the event was appropriate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/23/1999	1999005-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Self	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3C Ter:	Failure to follow operating procedure resulting in damage to fuel handling platform mast Fuel handlers failed to follow procedures and started moving the refueling bridge without first checking the position of the refueling mast. This was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. As a result, the extended mast was damaged when it ran into the wall below the transfer canal. This was the third significant fuel handling problem observed during the outage. Management response to the previous events was not sufficient to preclude this problem. More recently, however, the licensee invoked a work stoppage on the refueling floor, retrained the fuel handling crews, retested the fuel handlers, and provided increased management oversight of activities. Performance improved following the licensee's corrective measures. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0702.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A	Good operator performance during plant shutdown The plant shutdown was well controlled. The control room supervisor provided good direction to the crew and properly anticipated entry into the emergency operating procedures.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
04/17/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operator actions in addressing fuel transfer system interlock problems were conservative and well controlled. The approach of operators toward resolving inclined fuel transfer system interlock problems was conservative and well controlled. Administrative controls were established to permit bypassing nonsafety-related valve interlocks. The interlocks helped to protect against a partial draindown of the reactor cavity. Operator training was thorough and engineering support was effective.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Loss of Division III standby service water pump for more than 30 days The licensee identified a Technical Specification 3.7.1 violation, in that the Division III standby service water pump was inoperable for more than 30 days. Inadequate refurbishment caused the breaker failure. During the investigation, the licensee also identified that operators had failed to implement procedural requirements to check the pump breaker weekly
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 1B Ter:	Two examples of failure to follow procedures during refueling activities The inspector and the licensee identified two Technical Specification 5.4.1.a violation examples, failure to follow procedures. First, the licensee identified that refueling operators failed to follow procedures and inadvertently overextended the refueling bridge mast and drove a new fuel bundle into the top core guide plate, bending the fuel bundle handle. Second, the inspector identified that refueling operators failed to follow procedures, when they did not have adequate indication of fuel bundle height, and continued to move a spent fuel bundle until it contacted the top of the portable radiation shield. The licensee's initial problem assessment of the second issue was not thorough or self critical and failed to identify the procedural violation. The inspector determined that the violation examples met the criteria for a noncited violation. In addition, the inspector identified that emergency actions specified by one refueling procedure were overly restrictive, in that the document did not permit operators to return a fuel bundle to the core once it was withdrawn
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003-04	Pri: OPS Sec:	Self	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Improper implementation of a tagging procedure The inspector identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, in that a tagging official did not properly implement procedures when initiating a clearance order. The official inappropriately copied from an older, uncontrolled clearance order, which resulted in the inclusion of certain inappropriate fuses in the tagout. Two containment isolation valves closed when a bus de-energized, an engineered safety features actuation. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
03/06/1999	1999002	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 4B Ter:	Lack of attention to detail noted in operator response to failed containment isolation valve When a containment isolation valve associated with the post accident sampling system failed, operators appropriately isolated the penetration using other valves. Although operators and engineers initiated compensatory actions to allow plant staff to open the valves for sampling under accident conditions, they did not consider the effects of those plant conditions on the workers until questioned by the inspectors.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
03/03/1999	1999301	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	All applicants passed and exhibited good oversight, peer checking and communications All 14 applicants passed the examinations. No broad knowledge or training weaknesses were identified as a result of evaluation of the graded written examinations. The applicants exhibited good oversight, peer checking and communications.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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12/25/1999	1999014	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Repetitive tasks not developed for heat trace panels The inspectors identified that repetitive tasks (preventive maintenance activities) were not developed for 5 of the 7 cold weather related heat trace panels at the facility. Specifically, only 2 repetitive tasks at 6 year intervals were utilized by the licensee for heat trace panels in the circulating water and fire protection areas.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:	Good work practices during breaker maintenance Electrical maintenance personnel demonstrated a good understanding of circuit breaker operations and use of procedures during maintenance on a control room chiller breaker. Even though not required, the use of quality control personnel to observe activities was considered a good maintenance practice.
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11/13/1999	1999013-04	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4A Sec: 4B Ter:	Three example of failure to adequately transfer design requirements into specifications for the control buildi The inspectors identified two examples of a failure to translate design requirements into calculations involving the control building instrument air accumulators and test procedures for the turbine control valve system. First, acceptance criteria for control building instrument air Accumulators TK5A and -B specified a 12-hour duration instead of 24 hours and control building air accumulator calculations were not revised to reflect a modification which replaced air operated valves with manually operated valves. Second, procedures for testing of the turbine control valves were not revised following a modification during Refueling Outage 8. The licensee also identified that the instantaneous trip current for the annulus mixing fans had not used the correct value for the locked rotor current specified in vendor documents. The circumstances addressed in Licensee Event Report 50-458/9802 are addressed in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1998-0482. This Severity Level IV violation of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-1657, 1999-1653, and 1999-1810. (A second example was discussed in IR99-14).
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013-05	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 4B Ter:	Two examples of failure to follow procedures in the maintenance functional area involving testing of air accu The inspectors identified two examples where maintenance personnel did not follow plant procedures. First, inservice testing personnel did not adjust control building instrument air accumulator Regulator IAS-PCV6B and initiate a tracking condition report as required by Procedure TSP-0029, "Control Building Accumulator Test." Second, instrument and control personnel did not stop work, notify supervision, and resolve a turbine control valve testing issue in Procedure STP-508-4523, "Reactor Protection System/End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip - Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Valve Trip System Oil Pressure-Low, Channel Functional Test and Logic System Functional Test (C71-N005A, B, C, and D)," on July 6, 1999, and September 4, 1999, as required by Procedure ADM-0023, "Conduct of Maintenance." This Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-1657 and 1999-1653.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
10/05/1999	01013-99158	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	VIO III	Pri: Sec: Ter:	(IR9907) TS 3.8.1.b requires three diesel generators be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3
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Region IV
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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
08/03/1999	1999008-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure for Valve Maintenance One violation was identified which involved the licensee's discovery that the staking of the stem nut locknut on the reactor core isolation cooling minimum flow valve to the suppression pool, Valve E51-MOV-FO19, was inadequate to prevent movement of the stem nut locknut. This is the second example within 6 months of poor staking technique which could have resulted in safety-related equipment failure. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-1265 .
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
07/10/1999	1999007	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Plant material condition generally good Plant material condition was generally good. Material condition concerns included an out-of-service control building chiller. Material improvements included the replacement of failed fuel assemblies and the repair and modification of the main steam isolation valve poppet valves.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: 4B Ter:	Poor coordination between test activities resulted in failure of RHR injection valves to open During the Division II emergency core cooling system test, the Residual Heat Removal A and C low pressure coolant injection valves failed to open. The licensee determined that poor coordination between two test activities caused the problem. The retest was acceptable.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Plant material condition was generally good Plant material condition was generally good. Significant material improvements included the replacement of the recirculation pump seals.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/29/1999	1999005-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Undocumented items in suppression pool The licensee identified a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, violation in that workers failed to initiate tracking documents as required when items were dropped into the suppression pool. The licensee determined that emergency core cooling system pump operability was not affected. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0895.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/28/1999	1999009	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	Failure to Identify Operator Workaround The licensee failed to identify an operator workaround and train operators concerning a temperature-actuated isolation of the residual heat removal system that was designed to isolate a leak in the system but which had a temperature setpoint below the design no-leak post-accident temperature. There was a possibility that a spurious isolation of the residual heat removal system could have occurred during a loss-of-coolant accident, which would have complicated accident recovery since operators would have had to diagnose the condition and take manual actions to initiate or restore shutdown cooling.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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05/28/1999	1999009	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	WK	Pri: 2A Sec: 4B Ter: 4C	Implementation Weaknesses to GL 89-13 Recommendations Weaknesses were identified in the licensee's program developed to implement the recommendations of Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." The decision to clean marginal auxiliary building unit coolers in lieu of testing was not appropriately justified, the sequence of cleaning with respect to past testing was contrary to NRC guidance, a baseline test program was not established, and actions following test failures were not consistent with the recommendations of the generic letter.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/28/1999	1999009-04	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4C Sec: Ter:	Handling of Auxiliary Building Unit Cooler Test Failures within the Maintenance Rule Program An unresolved item was identified concerning the licensee's handling of the auxiliary building unit coolers within the Maintenance Rule Program. The existing performance measures were observed to not address the maintenance implications of unit coolers that had failed to meet their design capacities.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Plant material condition is acceptable except for fuel leaks and degraded second stage seals for RCP "A" Plant material condition was acceptable, with some notable problems. Significant material condition concerns included seven fuel leaks, degraded first and second stage Recirculation Pump A seals, an inoperable diesel generator, and a degraded electrohydraulic controls pump.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	WK	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Poor coordination and control of outage activities In several instances, the licensee demonstrated poor coordination and control during outage preparation and implementation activities. Problems were manifested as: (1) three unplanned engineered safety features actuations; (2) damage to a secondary containment boundary, which resulted in an unplanned entry into a 4-hour Technical Specification Action Statement; and (3) two instances where the same scaffold was not properly erected in a safety-related area.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003-05	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Self	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Use of inadequate procedure resulted in standby service water pump actuation The inspector identified a violation of TS 5.4.1.a, in that an inadequate procedure instructed operators to perform steps that depressurized safety-related portions of the reactor plant component cooling water system, which auto started the standby service water pumps, an engineered safety features actuation. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003-06	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to follow procedures while installing seismic scaffolds The inspector identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, in that maintenance workers failed to follow plant procedures, on two occasions, when installing the same seismic scaffold. In the first instance, the scaffold was secured to an instrument air line. In the second instance, maintenance craftsmen had removed the inappropriately installed support piece, leaving the scaffold in a nonseismic configuration. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
03/24/1999	1999007-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	VIO III	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:	Emergency Diesel Generator inoperability due to licensee failure to provide adequate work instructions The following violations were cited as a single Severity Level III Violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.b and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, with two examples. No Civil Penalty was imposed. These two violations had previously been tracked as two separate 'apparent violations' (EA 99-158). 1. Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.1.b, from February 24 to March 25, 1999, River Bend Station operated in Mode I without three operable emergency diesel generators. Specifically, the Division I emergency diesel generator was inoperable during this period due to an improperly staked fuel booster pump coupling pin. The coupling pin came loose 55 minutes into a 1-hour surveillance run of the diesel on March 24, 1999. It was subsequently determined that the diesel had been incapable of performing its intended safety function since the fuel booster pump coupling pin was reassembled during maintenance on February 24, 1999. 2. Contrary to the requirements of Creterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50, Maintenance Action Item 319116, which provided work instructions for the February 23-24, 1999, Division I emergency diesel generator fuel booster pump disassembly and repair, was not appropriate to the circumstances, in that it failed to reference all procedures, vendor procedures, and design documents required to perform the work instruction and to return the system to operational status. Specifically, the work planner did not specify the use of Loctite 680, an adhesive, when assembling the fuel booster pump coupling and did not reference the associated vendor instructions. The "Vendor Manual" contained Cooper-Enterprise Service Information Memo (SIM 363), Revision 1, dated 12/2/93 which states, in part . . . "Reports have been received from the field that the. . . fuel booster pump drive couplings have worked loose under certain operation conditions. Failure of this coupling will result in a loss of fuel oil pressure . . . The coupling should be installed on the over speed governor drive assembly using Loctite 680."
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
03/06/1999	1999002	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Self	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 4B Ter:	Plant material condition was acceptable, with some notable exceptions (e.g fuel leaks, RCP seal leaks etc.) Plant material condition was acceptable, with some notable problems. Significant material condition concerns included seven potential fuel leaks, degraded first and second stage 'A' recirculation pump seals, a degraded electro-hydraulic controls pump and a degraded post accident sampling system.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
12/25/1999	1999014	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 4A Sec: 4B Ter: 4C	Failure to translate design requirements into specifications and procedures The inspectors identified two examples of a failure to translate design requirements into calculations, procedures, and drawings involving a containment fuel pool level transmitter and spent fuel pool heat loading. Specifically, design requirements were not translated into maintenance procedures following a modification which installed suppression pool cleanup suction Valve RHS-AOV62. Additionally, Procedure AOP-0051, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," was not revised following changes in the heat loading of the spent fuel pool. These issues were treated as additional examples of a violation of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 which was described in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/99-013. These items were entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-1542 and -1958.
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10/02/1999	1999012-02	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4A	Failure to translate information into specificaitons and procedures The inspectors identified six examples where the licensee had not correctly translated design information into standby service water documents involving the time retention feature of the vacuum release solenoid valves, a modification which changed normal service water from an open to a closed system, reduced standby service water flow to the residual heat removal heat exchangers, isolation of the normal service water system within 20 minutes of a failure of a division of standby service water, and Updated Safety Analysis Report sampling requirements for the suppression pool and residual heat removal system not performed or specified in chemistry sampling procedures. In addition, the licensee identified that filters had not been removed from containment fan coolers as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The circumstances addressed in Licensee Event Report 50-458/99-02 are addressed in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-0137. This Severity Level IV violation of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These items were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-0137, -1488, -1489, -1493, -1500, and -1510.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
10/02/1999	1999012-03	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B	Failure to test service water retention relays The inspectors found that the licensee had not tested the time retention feature of the standby service water vacuum release solenoid valves. Subsequent testing by the licensee determined that there had not been any degradation of the retention relay setting since installation. This Severity Level IV violation of Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-1510.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
10/02/1999	1999012-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B	Failure to perform adequate technical evaluations The inspectors found that the licensee performed an inadequate technical evaluation for isolating Division I standby service water supply motor-operated Valve SSW MOV-077A to the Division III jacket water cooler. Specifically, the evaluation did not include an assessment of the impact on Division III emergency diesel generator operability, the motor-operated valve operating characteristics, and operator actions to reopen Valve SSW MOV-077A. This Severity Level IV violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-1475.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
07/10/1999	1999007	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5B	Multiple factors for failure of seven fuel elements during Fuel Cycle 8 The licensee, although unable to determine a single root cause, identified multiple contributing factors for the failure of seven fuel elements during Fuel Cycle 8. The investigation and analyses performed as a result of the fuel failures was extensive and comprehensive.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
07/10/1999	1999007-03	Pri: ENG Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: 2B	Inadequate Surveillance of Division 3 Battery Due to Calculation Error In July 1997, the licensee identified, and reported in Licensee Event Report 50-458/97-004, that proper design information for the Division III battery had not been used to determine the surveillance acceptance criteria. This was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is addressed in the licensee corrective action program as Condition Reports 97-1079 and 97-1111 (Section E8.3)
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05/28/1999	1999009-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Inadequate Operability Evaluation of Degraded Auxiliary Building Unit Coolers The licensee failed to assess adequately the operability of four auxiliary building unit coolers that were found by test or calculation to have degraded capacity. As a result of these degraded conditions, the predicted post loss-of-coolant accident temperatures in the effected rooms were increased from 122 to 132 degrees F. The operability evaluations were inadequate because they failed to consider several effects of the higher predicted temperatures, such as decreases in motor-operated valve motor efficiency, decreases in cable ampacity, and changes in the operating margins of temperature-actuated isolations. In response to this finding, the licensee performed a complete analysis and determined that equipment operability was not affected. This issue was identified as a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/28/1999	1999009-02	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Failure to Perform a 10CFR 50.59 Evaluation The licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to determine if an unreviewed safety question existed as a result of its calculations showing that the maximum post-accident temperature in some auxiliary building rooms, housing safe shutdown equipment, could exceed design limits specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This issue was identified as a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 (EA 99-150). The licensee's unreviewed safety question determination was pending, but the determination of operability indicated that the consequences of this condition were minor.
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05/28/1999	1999009-03	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	Failure to Initiate Condition Reports in a Timely Manner 1. During a period from October 1996 to January 1997, the licensee failed to initiate condition reports in a timely manner (or not at all) for four auxiliary building unit cooler test failures. The test results revealed that the unit coolers had inadequate capacity to maintain the supplied rooms at the design temperatures. Moreover, the licensee failed to address in an adequate manner three auxiliary building unit coolers that were in a degraded state for a period of 4 years. As a result, the plant would have been unable to meet the design basis limiting temperatures for several auxiliary building rooms housing emergency core cooling system pumps and other safety-related components. This issue was identified as an additional example of a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. 2. The licensee failed to initiate a condition report and restore over a 3-year period missing insulation on piping located in the high pressure core spray pump room in a timely manner after the discovery of this deficiency even though this situation exacerbated an already deficient condition of the unit cooler that serviced this room. The insulation was discovered missing in late 1995 and not restored until September 1998. This issue was identified as an additional example of a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
05/20/1999	1999005-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Inadequate diesel generator surveillance procedure A diesel generator system engineer demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude and identified a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12 in that testing of the nonessential trip bypass function and current differential trips was not adequate. Successful testing was subsequently performed. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0903.
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04/17/1999	1999003-07	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Inadequate engineering evaluation on fouling rate for RHR heat exchangers The inspector identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design Control), in that an engineering evaluation, intended to determine the design fouling rate for the Division I residual heat removal heat exchangers, was inadequate. The evaluation: (1) utilized an inappropriate method to predict the fouling rate; (2) relied on unvalidated and erroneous assumptions; and (3) failed to properly consider significant operational changes and instances where test data may have been affected by previous high temperature operations. Furthermore, sound recommendations made by an industry heat exchanger expert were not implemented. Although there was substantial management oversight of the engineering evaluation, the oversight was ineffective in ensuring a quality engineering product. In response to the NRC concerns, the licensee performed testing in Refueling Outage 8 and found that the degradation rate was three times greater than the engineering evaluation predicted. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
03/06/1999	1999002-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 4A Sec: Ter:	Inadequate relay substitution evaluation The licensee identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, in that a procurement engineer failed to follow plant procedures when evaluating relays for use in the DG starting air circuit. As a result, the Division I DG failed to start during postmaintenance testing. Inspectors considered the corrective measures acceptable and determined that the violation met the criteria for a non-cited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
02/01/1999	01013-98478	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO III	Pri: Sec: Ter:	(IR9813) Violation of Criterion III of Appendix B, design control measures provide for verifying or checking Since November 1985, design control measures did not adequately provide for verifying or checking, through the performance of design reviews, use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or performance of testing, that the safety-related diesel generator control air instrument and controls system remained functional during accident conditions. Specifically, design control measures did not ensure that the system was provided with a long-term supply of safety-related pressurized air, which was necessary for the continued operation of the diesel generators in response to an extended loss of offsite power (i.e., the air compressors were nonsafety-related and were not powered by a safety-related bus). At less than 120 psig, the non-essential diesel generator trips would no longer be bypassed and at less than 45 psig the diesel generators would automatically shutdown. As a result, the Division I and II diesel generators were not operable while in Modes 1, 2, and 3 during this time period because the control air instrument and controls, a subsystem, were not operable. This is contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.1b and of Section 7.1.2.4.2 of the licensee's Updated Safety Analysis Report, and as a result, a Severity Level III violation was cited against Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (not assessed a civil penalty). (01013)
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02/01/1999	02013-98478	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO III	Pri: Sec: Ter:	(IR 9813) Violation of XVI of Appendix B From 1985 until about June 1998, a significant condition adverse to quality existed related to the Division I and II diesel generator control air instrument and controls systems, and the cause of the condition was not determined, and adequate corrective action was not taken throughout this time. Since 1990, licensee staff knew that diesel generator control air instrument and controls systems were not provided with a long-term source of safety-related pressurized air to ensure that the nonessential diesel generator trips would remain bypassed during a loss of offsite power. Although procedures were changed in 1990 to require operators to install nonsafety-related air bottles as an alternate air source, the acceptability of relying on this operator action, in lieu of automatic action, was not properly evaluated against the licensee's design-basis description in the safety analysis report and the ability to accomplish the manual actions was not fully demonstrated until 1998. Further, the failure to identify the significant condition adverse to quality continued until 1998 and the cause of the condition and the corrective action taken was not documented and reported to appropriate levels of management. This failure to document, report, and promptly correct a significant condition adverse to quality was cited as a Severity Level III Violation of Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and a \$55,000 Civil Penalty was imposed. (02013)
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
02/04/2000	2000005-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Inadequate Access Control Equipment A violation of the physical security plan was identified for inadequate access control equipment when one of two metal detectors failed to detect a test weapon. Maintenance personnel corrected the problem prior to the end of the inspection. Subsequent tests indicated that the corrective action was effective and that the affected metal detector met physical security plan requirements. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2000-200.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
12/09/1999	1999016	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Implementation of a good solid radioactive waste management program The licensee implemented a good solid radioactive waste management program. Radioactive material was correctly stored and controlled. Radioactive waste was correctly sampled, classified, and stabilized for burial. Waste manifests were prepared in accordance with regulatory requirements.
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12/09/1999	1999016	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Implementation of a good radioactive materials transportation program Based on radioactive waste shipments on December 7 and 8, 1999, the licensee demonstrated a good program for packaging and shipping radioactive materials and radioactive waste. Shipments were correctly categorized, packaged, and surveyed. Associated hazards were correctly communicated through shipping documentation, driver briefings, package marking, labeling, and vehicle placarding.
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12/09/1999	1999016-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to verify transferee's authorization, in violation of 10 CFR 30.41(c) A violation associated with the transferral of radioactive material was identified. On five occasions since September 1997, the licensee failed to verify that a transferee's byproduct material license authorized receipt of the type, form, and quantity of byproduct material to be transferred, in accordance with 10 CFR 30.41(c). This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a. of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-1948.
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11/13/1999	1999013	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	Poor communications and radiological controls during emergency drill The licensee identified recurring communications deficiencies in the operations support center during the October 12, 1999, emergency drill. The deficiencies identified by the licensee involved unnecessarily delaying two priority field teams, not announcing that a General Emergency had been declared, and poor updating of facility status boards. Additional deficiencies identified by the inspectors involved briefs that did not include a status on habitability, core damage, or radiological conditions; the operations support center manager informing the technical support center that two teams had been dispatched when they remained in the operations support center; and additional requests for qualified operators not being made when resources were depleted. In addition, operations support center personnel demonstrated a poor regard for radiological conditions during the October 12, 1999, emergency drill. Specifically, personnel did not question radiological survey data or take precautionary measures as a result of the radiological survey data. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-1623.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
11/13/1999	1999013	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Comprehensive radiological worker practices training The licensee developed and implemented comprehensive mockup training to improve radiological work practices. The training included several challenging scenarios in a variety of radiological conditions. Worker performance was appropriately critiqued at the conclusion of each scenario by observers.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
10/02/1999	1999012	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Off-year emergency exercise deficiencies The licensee identified several deficiencies during the September 21, 1999, emergency exercise. These included an incorrect event declaration, poor emergency response organization communications, slow dispatch of field teams, poor site evacuation of personnel, and slow activation of the technical support center. Additional issues identified by inspectors included not using the off-site fire department to combat the fire and the technical support center not considering the use of standby service water as an alternate injection source.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
10/02/1999	1999012	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Good off-year emergency exercise critiques The licensee conducted effective postexercise critiques which identified several performance issues and adequate overall performance during the September 21, 1999, emergency exercise.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
07/23/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 1C Sec: 3A Ter:	Security Program implemented in an excellent manner Overall the licensee's security program continues to be implemented in an excellent manner. Senior management support for the security organization was very good. Overall, the access authorization program was excellent. The staff was highly trained and extremely knowledgeable of all areas of the program. An effective program for searching personnel and packages was maintained. Equipment operators were efficient and properly trained. The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements. Security personnel observed in the performance of their duties and those interviewed demonstrated that they were knowledgeable of program requirements. Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the time requirements stated in 10 CFR 50.54(p). An effective training program that included conducting shift contingency drills had been implemented. Documentation of training activities was very good. The licensee's on-shift security staffing was properly maintained. The annual audit of the security program was intrusive and evaluated performance of individuals (Sections S1.1, S1.2, S1.3, S2.1, S3.1, S5.1, S6.1, S6.2 and S7.1).
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07/15/1999	1999008	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:	Licensee Unsuccessful in Decontaminating Containment Building Following Airborn Contamination Event The licensee was unable to successfully decontaminate the containment building following an airborne contamination event during vessel reassembly. Postings for individual contamination areas within the containment building were not removed prior to posting the entire containment building as a contamination area. Leaving posted contamination areas inside a contamination area without posting special instructions was a poor practice.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/02/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Implementation of the internal exposure control program was adequate Overall, the implementation of the internal exposure control program was adequate. Whole-body counters were calibrated correctly using sources traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Internal dose assessments were appropriately performed.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/02/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	WK	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Weak performance was noted in the implementation of exposure control program during refueling outage On the basis of the inspection sample, the overall implementation of the external exposure control program during the refueling outage was weak as evidenced by the number of violations identified for the failure of radiation workers to follow radiation work permit requirements, an inadequate radiation protection prejob briefing, inadequate instructions to radiation workers, and poor radiation work supervisory oversight.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/02/1999	1999004-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to perform adequate prejob briefing A violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to perform a documented, prejob briefing in accordance with Radiation Section Procedure RSP-0200, Revision 16. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-0557. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/02/1999	1999004-02	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	Failure to comply with 10CFR 19.12 Two examples of 10 CFR 19.12 violations were identified: one involved the failure to adequately inform workers in the storage, transfer, or use of radiation and/or radioactive material, and one involved the failure to adequately instruct individuals in precautions to minimize exposure. These violations are in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-0723 and 1999-0551. These Severity Level IV violations are being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/02/1999	1999004-03	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to adhere to RWP requirements Five examples of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a violations were identified for the failure of personnel to adhere to radiation work permit requirements. These violations are in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-0195, 1999-0427, 1999-0551, 1999-0564, and 1999-0723. These Severity Level IV violations are being treated as a noncited violations consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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06/02/1999	1999004-04	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	Failure to properly control a locked high radiation area A violation of Technical Specification 5.7.3 was identified for the failure to lock or continuously guard a locked high radiation area. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1999-0598. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
06/02/1999	1999004-05	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to maintain the appropriate personnel qualified to wear respiratory protection A violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to maintain the appropriate personnel qualified to wear respirators. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 1999-0561 and 1999-0562. This Severity Level IV Violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
04/17/1999	1999003-08	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Inattentive guard in violation of security procedures The inspector identified a Facility Operating License violation, in that a security procedure was not properly implemented. The inspector observed a security officer at his post, leaning back in his chair with his eyes closed, mouth open, and right arm dangling freely at his side. The procedure required that the officer remain alert. The inspector determined that the violation met the criteria for a noncited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
03/06/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	No problems found in security for past year The resident inspectors have found no problems in the security area for the past year.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
02/26/1999	1998010	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	RWP Program Weaknesses not Recognized The licensee did not identify multiple, long-standing radiation work permit program weaknesses until questions were raised by NRC. Once initiated, the licensee's assessment was generally good. Corrective actions were not complete, but addressed the program deficiencies adequately.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						
02/26/1999	1998010	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	WK	Pri: 1C Sec: 3C Ter:	Radition Work Permit Program Implemented Poorly The radiation work permit program was implemented poorly until July 1998, because the program implementing procedures provided inadequate guidance. As a result, radiation work permits contained little radiological information, work areas were not specifically addressed, revisions were not communicated to workers, locked high radiation area work permits did not specify work area dose rates or maximum allowable stay times, and protective clothing requirements were implemented inconsistently.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region IV

RIVER BEND STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
02/26/1999	1998010-01	Pri: PLTSUP	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3C	Failure to Provide Guidance to Implement RWP
		Sec:			Sec:	The inspector determined that the failure to provide adequate guidance to implement a radiation work permit program was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000458 River Bend 1					Ter:	

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

RIVER BEND STATION
Inspection / Activity Plan
04/02/2000 - 03/31/2001

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site	No. assigned to Procedure	Planned Dates Start	End	Inspection Type
	PBB TM	- RI - TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS	2				
1	IP 7111123	Temporary Plant Modifications		2	04/02/2000	03/31/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP1	- RAD MONITORING INSTR	1				
1	IP 7112103	Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation		1	04/17/2000	04/21/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBB-TI	- TI-144, PI DATA REVIEW	1				
1	IP 2515/144	Performance Indicator Data Collecting and Reporting Process Review		1	05/14/2000	08/05/2000	Safety Issues
	PSB-EP1	- DRILL/EXERCISE PERF, EAL/EP, AND PIV	2				
1	IP 7111401	Exercise Evaluation		2	06/05/2000	06/09/2000	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 7111404	Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes		2	06/05/2000	06/09/2000	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 71151	Performance Indicator Verification		2	06/05/2000	06/09/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-S1	- OSRE,RESP TO CONT EVNTS, SEC PLAN, & PIV	5				
1	IP 7113003	Response to Contingency Events (Protective Strategy and Implementation of P		2	06/19/2000	06/23/2000	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 7113004	Security Plan Changes		2	06/19/2000	06/23/2000	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 71151	Performance Indicator Verification		2	06/19/2000	06/23/2000	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 81110	Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE)		2	06/19/2000	06/23/2000	Regional Initiative
	PBB EA1	- RI - EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT 01	2				
1	IP 7111104	Equipment Alignment		2	06/25/2000	08/05/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBB AW1	- RI - ADVERSE WEATHER PREP.	2				
1	IP 7111101	Adverse Weather Protection		2	06/25/2000	09/23/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBB EP1	- RI - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 01	2				
1	IP 7111406	Drill Evaluation		2	06/25/2000	09/23/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP2	- ALARA PLANNING/CONTROL 1	1				
1	IP 7112102	ALARA Planning and Controls		1	07/17/2000	07/21/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP3	- RAD MATERIAL PROCESSING/SHIPPING	1				
1	IP 7112202	Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation		1	08/07/2000	08/11/2000	Baseline Inspections
	EMB	- SSD&PC BAGMAN	1				
1	IP 7111121	Safety System Design and Performance Capability		1	08/28/2000	09/01/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP4	- ACCESS TO RAD SIGN AREAS AND PIV	1				
1	IP 7112101	Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas		1	08/28/2000	09/01/2000	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 71151	Performance Indicator Verification		1	08/28/2000	09/01/2000	Baseline Inspections
	EMB	- SSD&PC	6				
1	IP 7111121	Safety System Design and Performance Capability		3	09/18/2000	10/06/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBB AW2	- RI - ADVERSE WEATHER PREP.	2				
1	IP 7111101	Adverse Weather Protection		2	10/01/2000	12/30/2000	Baseline Inspections
	OB-EXAMS	- RO/SRO EXAMS	4				
1	X02035	RB/INITAL EXAMS		1	10/02/2000	10/06/2000	Not Applicable

This report does not include INPO and OUTAGE activities.
This report shows only on-site and announced inspection procedures.

RIVER BEND STATION
Inspection / Activity Plan
04/02/2000 - 03/31/2001

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site	No. assigned to Procedure	Planned Dates		Inspection Type
					Start	End	
1	X02035	RB/INITAL EXAMS		4	10/30/2000	11/10/2000	Not Applicable
	EMB - 50.59		1				
1	IP 7111102	Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments		1	11/13/2000	11/17/2000	Baseline Inspections
	OB-PIR - PIR INSPECT		5				
1	IP 711152	Identification and Resolution of Problems		1	11/27/2000	12/01/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBB EP2 - RI - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS		2				
1	IP 7111406	Drill Evaluation		2	12/24/2000	03/31/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-S2 - ACCESS AUTH/CONTROL		1				
1	IP 7113001	Access Authorization Program (Behavior Observation Only)		1	01/22/2001	01/26/2001	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 7113002	Access Control (Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles: Identification an		1	01/22/2001	01/26/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PBB EA2 - RI - EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT 02		2				
1	IP 7111104	Equipment Alignment		2	02/11/2001	03/31/2001	Baseline Inspections
	EMB - HEAT SINK PERF & MAINT RULE IMPLEMENT		2				
1	IP 7111107A	Heat Sink Performance		2	02/12/2001	02/16/2001	Baseline Inspections
1	IP 7111112B	Maintenance Rule Implementation		2	02/12/2001	02/16/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP6 - ALARA PLANNING/CONTROL 2		1				
1	IP 7112102	ALARA Planning and Controls		1	03/05/2001	03/09/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP5 - EFFLUENTS		1				
1	IP 7112201	Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems		1	03/26/2001	03/30/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP7 - ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING		1				
1	IP 7112203	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program		1	03/26/2001	03/30/2001	Baseline Inspections

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