



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

March 31, 2000

C. Randy Hutchinson, Vice President
Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967

**SUBJECT: PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE,
UNITS 1 AND 2**

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:

The purpose of this letter is to communicate our assessment of your performance and to inform you of our planned inspections at your facility. On March 2, 2000, we completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. We conduct these reviews to develop an integrated overview of the safety performance of each operating nuclear power plant. We use the results of the PPR in planning and allocating inspection resources and as inputs to our senior management meeting (SMM) process. This PPR evaluated inspection results and safety performance information for the period from January 25, 1999, through February 11, 2000, but emphasized the last 6 months to ensure that our assessment reflected your current performance. Our most recent summary of plant performance at Arkansas Nuclear One was provided to you in a letter dated March 19, 1999.

The NRC has been developing a revised reactor oversight process that will replace our existing inspection and assessment processes, including the PPR, the SMM, and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP). We recently completed a pilot program for the revised reactor oversight process at nine participating sites and are making necessary adjustments based on feedback and lessons learned. We are beginning initial implementation of the revised reactor oversight process industry-wide, including your facility, on April 2, 2000.

This PPR reflects continued process improvements as we make the transition into the revised reactor oversight process. You will notice that the following summary of plant performance is organized differently from our previous performance summaries. Instead of characterizing our assessment results by SALP functional area, we are organizing the results into the strategic performance arenas embodied in the revised reactor oversight process. Additionally, in assessing your performance, we have considered the historical performance indicator data that you submitted in January 2000 in conjunction with the inspection results. The results of this PPR were used to establish the inspection plan in accordance with the new risk-informed inspection program (consisting of baseline and supplemental inspections). Although this letter incorporates some terms and concepts associated with the new oversight process, it does not reflect the much broader changes in inspection and assessment that will be evident after we have fully implemented our revised reactor oversight process.

During the last 6 months, Unit 1 shut down three times to address plant material condition issues, including replacement of main turbine trip oil system diaphragms to address industry identified problems with these diaphragms, repair of an oil leak on Reactor Coolant Pump D, and replacement of the antirotation device on Reactor Coolant Pump D. Unit 1 also shut down to perform Refueling Outage 1R15.

During this assessment period, with the exception of a plant shutdown to conduct steam generator tube inspections, Unit 2 operated at or near full power.

Arkansas Nuclear One's implementation of programs in the reactor safety strategic performance arena demonstrated overall safe plant operations. However, exceptions to effective implementation of programs within the reactor safety strategic performance area were observed. Concerns were noted with your implementation of the emergency diesel generator reliability monitoring program, plant material condition, and engineering support of plant operations. These issues also resulted in concerns with Arkansas Nuclear One's problem identification and resolution processes. These areas of concern will be a focus for baseline inspections conducted during the next assessment period. At the end of the assessment period, a special inspection was in progress to review the inoperability of both Unit 1 low pressure injection/decay heat removal pumps. Unit 1 operators discovered that, when they attempted to place the pumps in service for decay heat removal, bearing temperatures increased to above the alarm setpoint. Inspection and resolution of this issue will be addressed under the previous oversight and enforcement process.

We did not identify any significant performance issues in the radiation safety or safeguards strategic performance areas. As a result, only baseline inspections are planned.

During the next assessment period, inspections associated with the Unit 1 license renewal application and the replacement of the Unit 2 steam generators will be conducted. In addition, an inspection to close out unresolved items from the safety system engineering inspection (SSEI) will be performed.

Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were used during this PPR process to arrive at our integrated view of your performance trends. The PIM for this assessment is grouped by the prior SALP functional areas of operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support, although the future PIM will be organized along the cornerstones of safety as described in the revised reactor oversight process. The attached PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence regarding Arkansas Nuclear One. We did not document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, we only documented issues that we believe warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance. In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since our last inspection report was issued but had not yet received full review and consideration. We will make this material publically available as part of the normal issuance of our inspection reports and other correspondence.

Enclosure 2 lists our planned inspections for the period April 2000 through March 2001 at Arkansas Nuclear One to allow you to resolve scheduling conflicts and personnel availability in

advance of our inspector arrival onsite. The inspection schedule for the latter half of the period is more tentative and may be adjusted in the future due to emerging performance issues at Arkansas Nuclear One or other Region IV facilities. We also included some NRC noninspection activities in Enclosure 2 for your information. Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8250.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:
Kriss M. Kennedy for PHH

P. Harrell, Chief
Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-313
50-368

License Nos.: DPR-51
NPF-6

Enclosures:

1. Plant Issues Matrix
2. Inspection Plan

cc w/enclosures:

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region IV
 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
12/18/1999	1999017	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Operators performed well during reactor startup. Unit 2 operators successfully performed the reactor startup following the completion of Midcycle Outage 2P99. The licensed operators demonstrated good reactivity management practices and communications with reactor engineering support personnel.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/13/1999	1999015	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications, and control. Unit 1 operators successfully performed the reactor coolant system draindown evolution without error and restricted activities that could have been a distraction while performing the draindown. Unit 1 operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications, and control while draining the reactor coolant system .
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/13/1999	1999015	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications and control. Unit 2 operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications, and control while draining the reactor coolant system and conducting midloop operations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
10/02/1999	1999014	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter:	Operator distraction during reactor coolant system draindown due to perform tasks simultaneously. Unit 1 operators successfully performed the reactor coolant system draindown evolution without error. However, operators in charge of the draindown were distracted on several occasions due to running the emergency diesel generator at the same time. In addition, on several occasions the emergency diesel generator was not appropriately monitored to ensure that the 24-hour surveillance run was successfully completed.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
10/02/1999	1999014	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Operator performance during Unit 1 cooldown Unit 1 operators followed their procedures, maintained the reactor coolant system within the allowed pressure and temperature limits, and demonstrated good control of the plant cooldown. The Unit 1 operators demonstrated good attention to detail and a conservative questioning attitude by stopping the cooldown and resolving a difference in readings from various reactor coolant system pressure indicators.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
10/02/1999	1999014	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 3A Ter:	Operator performance during Unit 1 shutdown Unit 1 operators followed their procedures and demonstrated excellent communications during the Unit 1 reactor shutdown. The operators responded well to the failure of the Reactor Coolant Pump P-32D antirotation device, an event that required initiation of a natural circulation reactor coolant system cooldown.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

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Region IV
 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
08/21/1999	1999012	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 3A Ter:	Operator response to emergency feedwater pump malfunction. Unit 2 operators quickly responded and evaluated plant risk when the turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A tripped on overspeed during surveillance testing. Control room operators made the conservative decision to leave the pump's mechanical overspeed trip device in the as-found tripped condition and quickly captured pump data in order for the engineering staff to evaluate the cause of the pump's erratic speed oscillations and mechanical overspeed trip.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
07/10/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Good operator response to unit auxiliary transformer malfunction Unit 2 operators performed all the required actions of the procedures and demonstrated conservative decision making and good attention to detail in response to the unit auxiliary transformer malfunctions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	EXPEDIENT RESPONSE TO PACKING LEAK IN LETDOWN FLOWCONTROL VALVE. Due to the expedient response (approximately 9 minutes from identification to isolation) by the Unit 2 control room personnel to an 8 gpm packing leak on reactor coolant system letdown flow control Valve 2CV-4816, the reactor coolant system inventory leakage into the upper south piping penetration room was limited to approximately 80 gallons.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	GOOD COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING ISOLATION AND RESTORATION OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTI The Unit 2 control room operators demonstrated good command and control by stopping work in the control room and limiting control room access, while isolating and restoring reactor coolant system letdown flow for maintenance activities. Nonlicensed operators in the field demonstrated good communications with the control room personnel during the evolutions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
04/10/1999	1999004-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	FAILURE TO SHUT EFW SAMPLE VALVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAMPLE PROCEDURE The Unit 2 chemists failed to inform the operations department to shut the emergency feedwater sample valves as required by the sampling procedure. As a result, the valves were out of position for approximately 10 days. This Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2-1999-0324 .
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
04/10/1999	1999004-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 2B Ter:	FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ALTERNATE RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS SAMPLING AS REQUIRED BY TS 3.3.3.9 On May 26, 1997, alternate radioactive gaseous sampling was not established within 1 hour of losing the normal radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation for the Unit 2 containment building. This was identified as a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.3.3.9. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2-1997-0288.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						

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Region IV
 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
04/10/1999	1999004-03	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION FLOW RATES LESS THAN TS REQUIREMENT DURING CRANE OPER On June 26, 1997, the fuel handling area ventilation system flow rate was less than the minimum required flow rate for transporting a load over the Unit 2 spent fuel storage pool. This Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification 3.9.11 is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2-1997-0435.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter: 3A	CR VENTILATION POWER SUPPLY TRANSFER PROBLEMS On three occasions during the Unit 2 refueling outage, problems occurred while transferring the power supplies for control room emergency ventilation between Units 1 and 2. On one occasion, procedure weaknesses and personnel errors caused delays in completing the transfer of power supplies and prolonged the inoperability of safety equipment. On another occasion, transferring power supplies for a system that was supporting continued operations of Unit 1 to an inoperable Unit 2 power supply to support Unit 2 outage schedules was considered nonconservative decision making. Finally, on a third occasion, Unit 1 operators prematurely declared safety equipment operable and administratively exited a Technical Specification limiting condition for operation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter: 3B	REFUELING AND REACTOR VESSEL ACTIVITIES WELL CONTROLLED DURING 2R13 Unit 2 refueling activities were well controlled and performed by knowledgeable operators and engineers. Unit 2 operators performed well while draining the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory to remove the steam generator nozzle dams. Operators continuously monitored reactor coolant system water level and demonstrated good communication and control of the evolution. Unit 2 control room operators demonstrated good command and control during the reactor startup following completion of Refueling Outage 2R13. Reactor engineering personnel and control room operators were attentive to the approach to criticality.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/17/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 1B Ter: 3A	OPERATORS' DECISION TO FULLY OPEN VALVE DURING DRAINDOWN OF THE REFUELING CANAL Operators closely monitored level while draining the refueling canal. They quickly recognized that the RCS level was decreasing rapidly and took appropriate actions to stop draining and refill RCS with a high-pressure safety injection pump. However, the operators' decision to fully open Valve 2SI-18 to drain the refueling canal increased the time required to stop draining the reactor vessel and contributed to the inadvertent entry into reduced inventory. The control room supervisor was unaware that the valve required 55 turns to close the valve from the full open position, and the shift superintendent was unaware that the valve was fully opened.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/17/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	WEAK PREJOB BRIEFING BY CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR PRIOR TO DRAINING THE REFUELING CANA The control room supervisor conducted a weak prejob briefing prior to draining the refueling canal. The prejob brief did not comply with the guidance in the licensee's administrative procedures or meet management expectations. The control room supervisor did not require the participation of all personnel with evolution responsibilities and did not cover topics such as lessons learned, previous performances of the evolution, or contingency actions. A formal briefing as described in the conduct of operations procedure was a potential barrier to this event that was not implemented.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/17/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter:	LICENSEE CONDUCTED A THOROUGH, PROBING REVIEW OF THE INADVERTENT ENTRY INTO REDUCED The licensee's event investigation team conducted a thorough, probing review of the inadvertent entry into reduced water inventory conditions, identified valid root and contributing causes, and proposed a number of corrective actions that address all of the causes identified.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region IV
 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
02/17/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	WK	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	OPERATORS UNAWARE OF THE CRITICAL RCS LEVELS ASSOCIATED WITH DRAINING THE REFUELING C Operators were generally unaware of the critical RCS levels associated with draining the refueling canal to the top of the reactor vessel. The training provided to operators on draining the refueling canal was inadequate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/17/1999	1999003-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Self	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	PROCEDURE ERROR RESULTING IN INADVERTENT ENTRY INTO REDUCED INVENTORY The precautions, limitations, and instructions contained in Procedure 2102.015, Revision 10-01, "Filling and Draining the Refueling Canal," did not reflect the significance or potential consequences of draining the refueling canal to the top of the reactor vessel. Procedure writers had not developed a graduated transition from the limited controls described in this procedure and the implementation of extensive controls for draining the RCS contained in Procedure 2103.011. As a result, operators had little margin for error in the transition from draining the refueling canal to draining the reactor vessel. Additionally, Procedure 2102.015 was inadequate because it provided an incorrect value of 90 inches for the reactor vessel flange. This incorrect information directly resulted in operators inadvertently entering reduced inventory conditions by draining the reactor vessel to a level of 56 inches above the bottom of the hot leg. The inadequacy of this procedure was identified as a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/17/1999	1999003-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	REFUELING CANAL DRAIN TASK NOT IDENTIFIED AS AN IPTE Procedure 2102.015 was inadequate because the task to lower the refueling canal water level to the top of the reactor vessel was not classified as an infrequently performed test or evolution (IPTE). The procedure writer's failure to classify the task as an IPTE, resulting in a failure to implement the additional controls, was identified as a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/17/1999	1999003-03	Pri: OPS Sec:	Self	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE Operators failed to correctly implement Procedure 2102.015 by not stationing an operator to monitor water level while draining the refueling canal. This was identified as a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
12/18/1999	1999017-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Notice of Enforcement Discretion granted regarding defective steam generator tube. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion from the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.3 for Unit 1 was verbally granted by the NRC on December 15, 1999. The licensee identified that a defective tube in Once Through Steam Generator A had not been repaired during the previous refueling outage as required by Technical Specification 4.18.5.b. The NRC's decision to grant enforcement discretion was based on the conclusion that the tube was structurally capable of withstanding normal or accident conditions without failure or leakage that would result in exceeding accident analysis assumptions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Region IV
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
12/18/1999	1999017-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:	Inoperable fuel handling area ventilation system. A violation of Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.15 was identified for having an inoperable fuel handling area ventilation system during movement of irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool on September 28, 1999. The violation was caused by inappropriate work practices and a deficient work plan, which resulted in an unauthorized modification of the fuel handling area ventilation system. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1-1999-0422.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
11/13/1999	1999015-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Failure to initiate a condition report for an adverse trend. A degrading trend in Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 lube oil pressure existed over a period of at least 4 years. The licensee had identified that a degrading trend existed but did not initiate a condition report for the adverse trend, which would have required a determination of its cause. A violation of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50 was identified for the failure to initiate a condition report for a condition adverse to quality in accordance with the licensee's condition report procedure. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1-1999-186.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
11/13/1999	1999015-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Failure to follow the emergency diesel generator reliability monitoring program. The licensee was not implementing the procedural requirements of its emergency diesel generator reliability monitoring program. The inspectors concluded that if the reports required by the emergency diesel generator reliability monitoring program had been completed and reviewed by plant management, an additional opportunity for identification of the degrading Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 lube oil pressure trend would have existed and may have resulted in correcting the condition prior to failure. A violation of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50 was identified for the failure to follow the procedural requirements of the emergency diesel generator reliability monitoring program. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR C-1999-217.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/13/1999	1999015-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Failure to operate an emergency diesel generator within its operating limits. Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 was operated outside the limits of the emergency diesel generator operating procedure on July 1, 1999, a condition prohibited by the licensee's Conduct of Operations procedure. This is a violation of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1-1999-178.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
10/02/1999	1999014-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Noncited violation for not performing a required surveillance test. In 1997, the licensee identified that Reactor Building Isolation Valves SV-1440 and SV-1443 were not being tested in accordance with Technical Specifications (Licensee Event Report 50-313/97-004). The failure to stroke test remotely operated Reactor Building Isolation Valves SV-1440 and SV-1443 in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.1.4 was identified as a violation. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						

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08/21/1999	1999012	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Poor housekeeping. Housekeeping in the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator room ventilation air intake and exhaust fan area pit was poor. Foreign material had the potential to clog the roof drains and allow rainwater to enter into both emergency diesel generator rooms at the same time through the air intake louvers. An engineering evaluation concluded that this problem would not affect operability of the emergency diesel generators.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
07/10/1999	1999008	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Good practices by craft and supervisory personnel during auxiliary transformer maintenance activities. Maintenance craft and maintenance supervisory personnel involved with the Unit 2 auxiliary transformer maintenance activities demonstrated added precaution while working around energized equipment and good peer checking and procedure place keeping techniques during the work.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN A SAFETY-CONSCIOUS MANNER. Knowledgeable maintenance technicians used approved procedures to perform routine maintenance activities in a safety-conscious manner. Maintenance craft demonstrated good attention to detail during the disassembly of Reactor Coolant System Letdown Flow Control Valve 2CV-4816 and obtained needed information to assist engineering staff in determining the reason for the failure of the valve's packing.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
04/10/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	GOOD COMMUNICATIONS, SELF-CHECKING, AND PEER-CHECKING TECHNIQUES DURING SURVEILLANCE Operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel demonstrated good communications, self-checking, and peer-checking techniques during the observed surveillance activities.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
04/10/1999	1999004-04	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: 4B Ter:	VIOLATION OF TS 4.5.1.1.2 FOR FAILURE TO TEST VALVE CV-3643 On October 22, 1997, the licensee discovered that, due to a deficient test procedure, a Unit 1 auxiliary cooling water valve had not been verified to close on an engineered safety feature actuation signal. This is a violation of Technical Specification 4.5.1.1.2. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 1-1996-0086.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
02/27/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: 5B Ter:	DIESEL GENERATOR MAINTENANCE RULE FUNCTIONAL FAILURES AND VALID TEST FAILURE Emergency Diesel Generator 2DG2 experienced two maintenance rule functional failures and one valid test failure as the result of a failed tachometer and a cracked lubricating oil valve. The system engineer performed thorough and technically sound evaluations of the failures.
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02/27/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter: 3B	REACTOR VESSEL DISASSEMBLY WELL CONTROLLED Portions of the disassembly of the Unit 2 reactor vessel observed were performed in a controlled, cautious manner. Operators established proper controls for the core alteration, and radiation protection technicians provided effective monitoring of the activity. Coordination and communication were good between the engineering, operations, and maintenance personnel involved.
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02/09/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter: 3B	INTEGRATED ECCS TEST WELL COORDINATED Maintenance, engineering, and operations personnel demonstrated good coordination during the performance of the Unit 2 integrated engineering safeguards feature test. Personnel were well prepared and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/02/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter: 3A	EMERGENCY DIESEL TESTING WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED Unit 2 operators demonstrated good communication techniques and attention to detail during the Emergency Diesel Generator 2DG1 18-month surveillance. The test was successfully performed and all equipment functioned as required.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/02/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter: 5C	SAFETY-RELATED INVERTER TESTING Personnel involved with testing new Unit 2 safety-related inverters were knowledgeable of the equipment and the test activities.
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11/08/1999	1999009-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	<p>Six examples of inadequate design controls.</p> <p>Six examples of inadequate design controls were identified as a noncited violation of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. The examples of design control problems were indicative of a declining performance in this area of engineering because of the number and scope. The examples are:</p> <p>Failure to appropriately consider the effect of Unit 2 emergency diesel generator efficiency in determining the required maximum heat loads for the affected heat exchangers in a design calculation. As a result, the calculated maximum heat loads were 2.6 to 7.9 percent higher when the efficiency was properly considered and the operating margin was reduced. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0528.</p> <p>Failure to appropriately consider the impact of exceeding the manufacturer's rating for heat removal rates (as provided in Holtec International Report HI-941175) and revise, as appropriate, the corresponding design basis documents for the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator air, lube oil, and jacket water coolers. As a result, the operating margin reduced. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0535.</p> <p>Failure to assure that the Unit 1 service water total flow design bases calculations were verified or checked for adequacy. As a result, the specification for replacement service water pumps allowed for pumps that were not capable of providing the required flow under all operating conditions to be purchased and installed. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1999-0254.</p> <p>Changes to Unit 2 design interfaces (i.e., the throttling of flow from heat exchangers) were not evaluated through the design change process. Specifically, the flow reduction through the shutdown cooling heat exchanger and the containment air coolers was accomplished through the corrective action program without performing an evaluation of the detail required for design changes. As a result, the reviews and rigor associated with design changes did not occur. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0571.</p> <p>Failure of design control measures that allowed a change in the configuration of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators' keep-warm systems, by closure of the cross-flow valves between the jacket water and air cooler heat exchangers. As a result, changes to the Final Safety analysis Report were not made and an operator workaround was created. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0562.</p> <p>Failure to control Calculation 95-E-0046-03, "Reactor Building Cooler Minimum Service Water Flow," Revision 0, as a pending calculation for Unit 1. As a result, the pending calculation was available to make design changes. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1999-0223.</p>

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11/08/1999	1999009-02	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	<p>Five examples of failure to promptly identify or correct conditions adverse to quality.</p> <p>Five examples of failure to promptly identify or correct conditions adverse to quality were identified as a noncited violation of Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. The number of examples of the failure of engineers to initiate condition reports warrants additional management attention to the implementation of the corrective action program. The examples are:</p> <p>Failure to identify and correct the low service water flow to the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators. Specifically, the licensee failed to take corrective actions to either increase the flow to a level that met the acceptance criterion (design value), change the design value so that the measured flow would be acceptable, or take other actions to have corrected the condition that was adverse to quality. As a result, the low service water flow to the emergency diesel generators went uncorrected for at least two operating cycles. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0528.</p> <p>Failure to write a condition report upon the discovery that Unit 2 cable tray heat loads were not included in Calculation 92-E-0079-01, "Determination of SW-Cooled Room Heat Loads Under Various Operating Conditions," Revision 0. As a result, the results of the calculation were nonconservative and reduced the operating margin of the room coolers. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0560.</p> <p>Failure to identify a condition adverse to quality upon the discovery that the heat loads from Unit 2 pumps were not included in Calculation 92-E-0079-01. As a consequence, the results of the calculation were nonconservative. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0560.</p> <p>Failure to take the appropriate corrective action for degraded conditions identified during thermal performance testing of the Unit 1 decay heat removal coolers. Specifically, the licensee had sufficient information to reasonably conclude that increasing the minimum required service water flow by 189.27 Lpm [50 gpm] would not correct the degrading condition, as results from previous testing demonstrated that a service water flow of greater than 6245.93 Lpm [1650 gpm] would be required to remove the accident heat load. As a result, the licensee could not demonstrate that the decay heat removal coolers could remove the required heat with a flow of 6245.93 Lpm [1650 gpm]. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1999-0250.</p> <p>Failure to take the appropriate corrective action for degraded conditions identified during thermal performance testing of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator heat exchangers. Specifically, Engineering Evaluation 980310-E101 concluded that the heat exchangers had never been capable of removing the required heat load at 1514.16 Lpm [400 gpm] and that thermal performance testing should have been conducted at 1987.34 Lpm [525 gpm]. However, this evaluation failed to consider this increase in the minimum required flow as a change in design. In addition, this engineering report inappropriately determined that the design basis calculation and the service water flow acceptance test criterion need not be changed. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1998-0250.</p>
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/08/1999	1999009-03	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	<p>Evaluation of the combined effects on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators of underpredicting the maximum heat load and microfouling of the heat exchangers.</p> <p>An unresolved item was identified as a result of the need for additional licensee evaluation of the combined effects on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators of under-predicting the maximum heat load and microfouling of the heat exchangers. Without the additional evaluation, the licensee was not able to demonstrate that the verification of the adequacy of the design was acceptable, as required by Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This item will remain open pending NRC review of the completed licensee evaluation.</p>
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						

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11/08/1999	1999009-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Evaluation of the licensee's consideration of instrument uncertainties in calculations and acceptance criteria An unresolved item was identified as a result of the need for additional NRC review of the licensee's consideration of instrument uncertainties in calculations and acceptance criteria to determine if the licensee's tests and procedures are adequate to demonstrate equipment operability.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/08/1999	1999009-05	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Four examples of failure to implement procedures Four examples of failure to implement procedures were identified as a noncited violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. The examples are: Failure to perform an "impact evaluation," for the removal of Unit 2 pipe supports, in accordance with Procedure 1000.153. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0559. Failure to follow the instructions contained within Job Orders 950824 and 950906 and Procedure 5010.017 to perform separate reports to evaluate test data from the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator heat exchanger performance tests. As a result, no engineering reports were performed. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-1999-0251 and CR-ANO-2-1999-0573. Failure to perform an evaluation in accordance with Procedure 1000.131 for a change that resulted in information in the Final Safety Analysis Report being inaccurate. Specifically, the throttling of flow through the Unit 2 Loop 1 shutdown cooling heat exchanger to 13248.94 Lpm [3500 gpm] resulted in the information in Table 9.2-1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report to be inaccurate. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0580. Failure to complete a configuration control checklist when changing the minimum service water flow to 13249 Lpm [3500 gpm] in Engineering Evaluation 991427-E202. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-1999-0549.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/08/1999	1999009-06	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Evaluation of the potentially adverse erosion/corrosion and fatigue effects of excessive service water flow. An unresolved item was identified as a result of the need for additional evaluation, by the licensee, of the potentially adverse erosion/corrosion and fatigue effects of excessive service water flow on Unit 1 components served. Without the additional evaluation, the licensee was not able to demonstrate that the verification of the adequacy of the design was acceptable, as required by Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This item will remain open pending NRC review of the completed licensee evaluation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/08/1999	1999009-07	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Evaluation of the integral effects of throttling the butterfly valve on the outlet of the containment air coolers An unresolved item was identified as a result of the need for additional licensee evaluation of the integral effects of throttling the butterfly valve on the outlet of the Unit 2 containment air coolers and the flashing potential associated with a clean heat exchanger. Without the additional evaluation, the licensee was not able to demonstrate that the verification of the adequacy of the design was acceptable, as required by Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This item will remain open pending NRC review of the completed licensee evaluation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
11/08/1999	1999009-08	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Failure to provide adequate acceptance limit for the test of the Unit 1 reactor building air coolers. Failure to provide an adequate acceptance limit for the testing results of the Unit 1 reactor building air coolers was identified as a noncited violation of Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-1999-0200 and CR-ANO-2-1999-0544.
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11/08/1999	1999009-09	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Evaluation of the available net positive suction head with one service water pump operating during a normal An unresolved item was identified as a result of the need for additional evaluation, by the licensee, of the available net-positive suction head with only one service water pump operating during a normal plant shutdown of Unit 1. Without the additional evaluation, the licensee was not able to demonstrate that the verification of the adequacy of the design was acceptable, as required by Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This item will remain open pending NRC review of the completed licensee evaluation
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
11/08/1999	1999009-10	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Operating Unit 1 with flaws in the once-through steam generators that exceeded the technical specification I A noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.1.6.3.b was identified in Licensee Event Report 50-313/98-001 for operating Unit 1 with flaws in the once-through steam generators that exceeded the technical specification limit. The corrective actions, as described in the event report, were completed.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
08/21/1999	1999012	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: 5B Ter: 5C	Good engineering support following turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump overspeed trip. Engineering and maintenance personnel provided good technical support and expertise in determining and evaluating all possible causes for the overspeed trip of the Unit 2 turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A. Their efforts and quick response resulted in reducing the amount of time that the pump was declared inoperable and unavailable to perform its safety function.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
07/10/1999	1999008	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5B Sec: Ter:	Operability evaluation did not adequately support a conclusion. An operability evaluation provided to the Condition Report Review Group did not adequately support a conclusion that Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was operable after a fuel oil leak was identified. The Condition Report Review Group requested the operability evaluation be revised.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	RECOVERY OF THE UNIT 1 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STUCK DURING LOADING OF THE DRY CASK. The recovery of the Unit 1 spent fuel assembly that became stuck during loading of the Unit 1 dry cask on May 21, 1999, was well planned and executed by the engineering personnel involved. The prejob briefing for this recovery was comprehensive and thorough and included all necessary precautions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
02/27/1999	1999001	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 4B Ter:	ADDITION OF SWING INVERTER INCREASED 120 VOLT RELIABILITY Design Change Package 96324D202 was well written, thorough, and technically accurate. The addition of a swing inverter to each train increased the reliability of the 120 volt vital AC system.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						

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12/16/1999	1999016	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Housekeeping and material condition. Material condition and housekeeping were good in the solid radioactive waste facilities and on-site storage areas.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
12/16/1999	1999016-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Failure to properly train and test the radwaste supervisor. The failure to train and test a radwaste supervisor within three years as required, was a violation of 49 CFR 172.704(d). This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee initiated Condition Report CR-ANO-C-1999-0316.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
12/16/1999	1999018	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 3C Ter:	Engineering safety filter ventilation systems were properly maintained. Engineering safety feature filter ventilation systems were properly maintained. System engineers responsible for the engineering safety feature filter ventilation systems were knowledgeable of the systems. Overall, good in-place filter and laboratory testing programs were maintained.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
12/16/1999	1999018	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter:	Good oversight and corrective action programs were in place. Quality assurance oversight was effective. Audits were intrusive and thorough, providing management with a good assessment of the radiological effluent controls program. Audit findings were properly documented, tracked in the station's condition reporting system, and closed in a timely manner. Quality assurance department surveillance reports were well written and properly assessed the program areas reviewed. Condition reports identified issues at the proper threshold to provide management with the tools needed to assess the program.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
12/16/1999	1999018	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3B Sec: 3C Ter:	An effective radioactive effluent program was in place. Overall, the radioactive effluent monitoring program was effectively maintained. The licensee's radioactive effluent sampling and analysis met the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Whole-body doses to the public from radioactive effluents releases for 1997 and 1998 were less than 1 percent of the yearly regulatory limit. A good effluent monitor calibration and channel check program was in place. Effluent monitors were properly calibrated, and channel checks were performed in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual requirements. Analytical instrumentation used to analyze effluent samples was properly maintained and calibrated.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
12/16/1999	1999018-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3C Sec: Ter:	Failure to determine Unit 2's fuel handling area ventilation system flow rate in accordance with the recomme On June 12, 1998, the licensee identified a violation of Technical Specification 4.9.11.2 for the failure to determine Unit 2's fuel handling area ventilation system flow rate in accordance with the recommendations of ANSI N510-1975. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a. of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee documented this issue in Condition Report C-1998-0149.
Dockets Discussed: 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						

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12/10/1999	1999019	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5C Sec: Ter:	Licensee personnel did not address in a condition report the fire brigade trainer's failure to discuss and doc In Condition Report CR-ANO-C-1999-0092, licensee personnel did not address the failure of the fire brigade trainer to document observed fire brigade weaknesses on the fire drill critique sheet. Further, the condition report did not address the failure of the fire brigade trainer to discuss these weaknesses with the fire brigade crew members in the post-fire drill critique meeting. The fire protection program supervisor initiated another condition report to address this concern.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
12/10/1999	1999019	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	Quality assurance audits and surveillances were critical and comprehensive. Quality assurance surveillances for the fire protection area were critical and comprehensive. The findings and recommendations were well-documented and provided good insights to the fire protection staff.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/29/1999	1999005	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	POOR RADIATION WORKER PRACTICES Poor radiation worker practices were demonstrated when a maintenance technician was observed reaching into a contamination area to perform work and was contacting structural components with his bare forearms. The health physics technician providing coverage for this work demonstrated a lack of attention to detail in that he had to be prompted by the inspector to ensure that the worker had not become contaminated.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/28/1999	1999006	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	AUDITS AND QA SURVEILLANCE REPORTS/CONDITION REPORTS. Good, effective audits and quality assurance surveillance reports of the radiological environmental monitoring program were performed by qualified auditors. Condition reports identified issues at the proper threshold to provide management with an overview of the radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring programs. Overall, corrective actions were closed in a timely manner.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/28/1999	1999006	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3B Sec: 3C Ter:	EFFECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM. Overall, the radiological environmental monitoring program was effectively implemented in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual requirements. The operation of Arkansas Nuclear One Station resulted in no detectable buildup of radioactivity offsite. A descriptive radiological environmental monitoring program implementing procedure was maintained.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/28/1999	1999006	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3B Sec: 3C Ter:	EFFECTIVE METEOROLOGICAL PROGRAM IN PLACE. An effective meteorological program was in place. Implementation of the meteorological monitoring program agreed with the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.23 and commitments in Section 3.3.3.4 of the Technical Requirements Manual. Excellent meteorological data recovery for 1997 and 1998 was noted. The meteorological monitoring equipment was maintained in good operating condition. Calibrations were performed at the required frequencies.
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05/28/1999	1999006-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING A violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to ensure the retention efficiency of iodine filter canisters. This Severity Level IV Violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee documented this issue as Condition Report C-1999-0144.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/17/1999	1998021	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	WK	Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter:	LICENSING BASIS REGARDING OPERATOR ACTION TIMELINES FOR A CONTROL OR CABLE SPREADING A weakness was identified involving the licensee's understanding, implementation, and maintenance of the licensing basis regarding operator action timelines for a control room or cable spreading room fire. The NRC identified that the time required to complete specific required operator actions following control room evacuation measured during drills and documented in the procedure basis document, exceeded the timelines provided to the NRC in correspondence to justify the acceptability of the alternative shutdown capability. The licensee did not have adequate administrative controls in place to ensure that alternate shutdown procedure changes did not adversely affect safe shutdown capability. The licensee evaluated these time differences and concluded that they had not adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensee opened corrective action items to incorporate the time critical steps and their limiting times for completion into the fire hazards analysis; and, to require that alternate shutdown procedure changes receive fire protection engineer review to ensure that the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire was not affected.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
05/17/1999	1998021-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4A Sec: 4C Ter: 5C	NOT HAVING ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, was identified involving failure to have an acceptable alternative shutdown capability for the Unit 1 control room and cable spreading room. If a fire occurred in the Unit 1 control room or cable spreading room, hot shorts could cause all eight High Pressure Injection System injection valves (CV-1219, CV-1220, CV-1227, CV-1228, CV-1278, CV-1279, CV-1284, and CV-1285) to spuriously close and to suffer mechanical damage, rendering them incapable of being reopened. This would prevent the operation of safe shutdown equipment necessary to provide reactor coolant makeup and maintain reactor coolant inventory. The licensee identified this condition in 1997 after the NRC questioned the survivability of motor-operated valves following spurious operation caused by hot shorts. During this inspection, the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-ANO-1-1998-0721, which contained a corrective action item to submit to the NRC a request for exemption from the fire protection requirements for this condition by December 31, 1999, and implemented an hourly compensatory fire watch of the Unit 1 control room and cable spreading room.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1						
05/17/1999	1998021-02	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4A Sec: 4C Ter:	POTENTIAL FOR SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF RCS HIGH/LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE COMPONENTS An unresolved item was identified involving the Units 1 and 2 alternative shutdown capability with respect to reactor coolant system high/low pressure interfaces. The NRC questioned whether the alternative shutdown capability met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3, III.L.1, III.L.2, and III.L.7. Spurious operation of high/low pressure interface valves during a postulated control room or cable spreading room fire may result in the inability to meet the performance goals of Appendix R. However, due to questions regarding the licensing basis of the facility, the Region IV Office plans to forward a request to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for assistance in determining whether the alternative shutdown capability is consistent with the licensing basis, and, if so, whether imposition of a backfit is warranted. As a result of this concern, the licensee reviewed its alternate shutdown procedures and improved the timeliness for completion of time-critical operator actions. Additionally, the licensee implemented an hourly compensatory fire watch of the Units 1 and 2 control rooms and cable spreading rooms pending resolution of this issue.
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04/30/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Performance in the physical security area and the access authorization area Performance in the physical security area was very good, and performance in the access authorization area was excellent. An effective access authorization program was established to grant individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas. The security alarm stations were redundant and well protected. The security radio and telephone communication systems were reliable. An effective program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained. Assessment aids provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones. Changes to security plans were reported within the required time frame and properly implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). A very good program for reporting security events was in place. Senior management support for the security organization was very good. The audits of the security program, the access authorization program, and the fitness-for-duty program were conducted at the required intervals and were performance based.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
04/30/1999	1999007-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	IFI	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Number of armed response officers. On-shift staffing of security armed response personnel was in accordance with the minimum requirements of the industrial security plan. However, an inspection followup item was identified involving the difference between the number of armed responders committed to the industrial security plan and the additional number of armed response personnel used during the 1994 OSRE. During the OSRE, the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to defend against the design basis threat.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
04/10/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	GOOD HP COVERAGE OF THE WORK ACTIVITIES INVOLVED WITH SPENT FUEL POOL PURIFICATION SYS Health physics technicians provided good coverage of the work activities involved with the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Purification System Filter 2F4A change out. Two health physics technicians provided continual coverage during this work and thoroughly briefed the maintenance craft involved on dose and contamination rates in the area and the radiation work permit requirements. All personnel involved demonstrated very good as low as is reasonably achievable practices.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	HEALTH PHYSICS ACTIVITIES POSITIVE DURING REACTOR VESSEL DISASSEMBLY Health physics technicians performed a thorough radiation work permit prejob briefing that clearly identified and communicated the evolution termination criteria as well as the expected dose rates. All personnel involved demonstrated good as-low-as-is-reasonably achievable practices throughout the disassembly of reactor vessel components.
Dockets Discussed: 05000313 Arkansas Nuclear 1 05000368 Arkansas Nuclear 2						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Inspection / Activity Plan

04/02/2000 - 03/31/2001

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site	No. assigned to Procedure	Planned Dates Start	Planned Dates End	Inspection Type
	PBD9	- ADVERSE WEATHER PREPS	4				
1, 2	IP 7111101	Adverse Weather Protection		2	04/02/2000	05/13/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBD33	- SG REPLACEMENT INSP - DRP	3				
2	IP 50001	Steam Generator Replacement Inspection		1	04/02/2000	07/01/2000	Regional Initiative
	PBD23	- TEMPORARY PLANT MODIFICATIONS	2				
1, 2	IP 7111123	Temporary Plant Modifications		2	04/02/2000	03/31/2001	Baseline Inspections
	OB-EXAMS	- RO/SRO EXAMS	3				
2	X02023	ANO 2/INITAL EXAMS		1	04/03/2000	04/07/2000	Not Applicable
2	X02023	ANO 2/INITAL EXAMS		3	04/24/2000	04/28/2000	Not Applicable
	EMB	- SSEI F/U	1				
1, 2	IP 92903	Followup - Engineering		1	05/01/2000	05/05/2000	Regional Reactive
	PBD-TI	- TI-144, PI DATA REVIEW	1				
1, 2	IP 2515/144	Performance Indicator Data Collecting and Reporting Process Review		1	05/14/2000	08/05/2000	Safety Issues
	PBD11	- EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT-SEMIANNUAL	4				
1	IP 7111104	Equipment Alignment		2	07/02/2000	08/19/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBD25	- DRILL EVALUATION	4				
1	IP 7111406	Drill Evaluation		2	07/02/2000	09/30/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBD36	- SG REPLACEMENT INSP - DRP	3				
2	IP 50001	Steam Generator Replacement Inspection		1	07/02/2000	09/30/2000	Regional Initiative
	EMB	- PERMANENT PLANT MODS - S/G REPLACEMENT	2				
1, 2	IP 7111117B	Permanent Plant Modifications		1	07/17/2000	07/21/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP1	- RAD MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION	2				
1, 2	IP 7112103	Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation		2	07/17/2000	07/21/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-S1	- SEC PLAN, PIV, & RESP TO CONT EVENTS	2				
1, 2	IP 7113003	Response to Contingency Events (Protective Strategy and Implementation of P		2	08/07/2000	08/11/2000	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 7113004	Security Plan Changes		2	08/07/2000	08/11/2000	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 71151	Performance Indicator Verification		2	08/07/2000	08/11/2000	Baseline Inspections
	EMB	- CHANGES	1				
1, 2	IP 7111102	Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments		1	08/21/2000	08/25/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP2	- EFFLUENTS	2				
1, 2	IP 7112201	Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems		2	08/28/2000	09/01/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP3	- RAD MATERIAL PROCESSING/SHIPPING	2				
1, 2	IP 7112202	Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation		2	09/11/2000	09/15/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP4	- ALARA PLANNING/CONTROLS 1	1				
1, 2	IP 7112102	ALARA Planning and Controls		1	09/11/2000	09/15/2000	Baseline Inspections

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ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Inspection / Activity Plan

04/02/2000 - 03/31/2001

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site	No. assigned to Procedure	Planned Dates Start	Planned Dates End	Inspection Type
	PBD34	- SG REPLACEMENT INSPEC - DRS	2				
2	IP 50001	Steam Generator Replacement Inspection		1	09/15/2000	11/30/2000	Regional Initiative
	EMB	- ISI	2				
1, 2	IP 7111108	Inservice Inspection Activities		2	09/18/2000	09/22/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-RP5	- ACCESS CONTROL TO RAD SIGN AREAS & PIV	1				
1, 2	IP 7112101	Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas		1	09/25/2000	09/29/2000	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 71151	Performance Indicator Verification		1	09/25/2000	09/29/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBD10	- ADVERSE WEATHER PREPS	4				
1, 2	IP 7111101	Adverse Weather Protection		2	10/01/2000	11/18/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBD37	- SG REPLACEMENT INSP - DRP	3				
2	IP 50001	Steam Generator Replacement Inspection		1	10/01/2000	12/30/2000	Regional Initiative
	PSB-RP6	- ALARA PLANNING/CONTROL 2	1				
1, 2	IP 7112102	ALARA Planning and Controls		1	11/13/2000	11/17/2000	Baseline Inspections
	PBD27	- U1 LICENSE RENEWAL SCOPING INSPECTION	7				
1	IP 71002	License Renewal Inspection		1	12/11/2000	12/15/2000	Other Routine
	PBD12	- EQUIPMENT ALIGNMENT-SEMIANNUAL	4				
2	IP 7111104	Equipment Alignment		2	12/31/2000	02/17/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PBD35	- DRILL EVALUATION	4				
2	IP 7111406	Drill Evaluation		2	12/31/2000	03/31/2001	Baseline Inspections
	PSB-EP1	- A&N, ERO, PI&R, EAL.EP, PIV	2				
1, 2	IP 7111402	Alert and Notification System Testing		2	01/08/2001	01/12/2001	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 7111403	Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing		2	01/08/2001	01/12/2001	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 7111405	Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies		2	01/08/2001	01/12/2001	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 71151	Performance Indicator Verification		2	01/08/2001	01/12/2001	Baseline Inspections
	OB-EXAMS	- RO/SRO EXAMS	4				
2	X02023	ANO 2/INITAL EXAMS		1	01/15/2001	01/19/2001	Not Applicable
2	X02023	ANO 2/INITAL EXAMS		3	02/12/2001	02/16/2001	Not Applicable
	PBD28	- U1 LICENSE RENEWAL-AGING MGMT REVIEW	7				
1	IP 71002	License Renewal Inspection		1	01/22/2001	02/02/2001	Other Routine
	PSB-S2	- ACCESS AUTH/ACCESS CONTROL	1				
1, 2	IP 7113001	Access Authorization Program (Behavior Observation Only)		1	02/05/2001	02/09/2001	Baseline Inspections
1, 2	IP 7113002	Access Control (Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles: Identification an		1	02/05/2001	02/09/2001	Baseline Inspections
	OB-PIR	- PIR INSPECT	5				
1, 2	IP 71152	Identification and Resolution of Problems		2	03/05/2001	03/09/2001	Baseline Inspections
	EMB	- MAINT RULE IMPLEMENTATION	1				
1, 2	IP 7111112B	Maintenance Rule Implementation		1	03/12/2001	03/16/2001	Baseline Inspections

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ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

Inspection / Activity Plan

04/02/2000 - 03/31/2001

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site	No. assigned to Procedure	Planned Dates Start End		Inspection Type
PSB-RP7 - ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING			1				
1, 2	IP 7112203	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program		1	03/26/2001	03/30/2001	Baseline Inspections

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