

May 4, 2000

Mr. Guy G. Campbell, Vice President - Nuclear  
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company  
5501 North State Route 2  
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT (TAC NO. MA6968)

Dear Mr. Campbell:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 241 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. The amendment is in response to your application dated November 2, 1999 (Serial Number 2612, License Amendment Request No. 97-0011).

This amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TSs) to modify 1) TS Table 3.3-4, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints," to remove the "Trip Setpoint" values for Instrument String Functional Unit "F", Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Level, 2) the "Allowable Values" entry for this same Functional Unit, consistent with updated calculations using current setpoint methodology, 3) TS 3/4.3.2.1, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation," and Bases to reflect the removal of "Trip Setpoints" described above, and 4) TS 3/4.5.4, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems - Borated Water Storage Tank," and Bases to increase the minimum volume of water in the BWST.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen P. Sands, Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate III  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-346

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 241 to  
License No. NPF-3  
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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License No. NPF-3  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 241  
License No. NPF-3


1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee) dated November 2, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 241, are hereby incorporated in the license. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 120 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Anthony J. Mendiola, Chief, Section 2  
Project Directorate III  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 241

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

Insert

3/4 3-9

3/4 3-9

3/4 3-13

3/4 3-13

3/4 5-7

3/4 5-7

B 3/4 3-1

B 3/4 3-1

B 3/4 5-2a

B 3/4 5-2a

## INSTRUMENTATION

### 3/4.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

#### SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.3.2.1 The Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) functional units shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4, with the exception of Instrument Strings Functional Units d, e, and f, and Interlock Channels Functional Unit a which shall be set consistent with the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

##### ACTION:

- a. With a SFAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the functional unit inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3, until the functional unit is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with Table 3.3-4.
- b. With a SFAS functional unit inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.3-3.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.3.2.1.1 Each SFAS functional unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of functional units affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each functional unit affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME\* of each SFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL. Each test shall include at least one functional unit per function such that all functional units are tested at least once every N times the REFUELING INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant functional units in a specific SFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Units" Column of Table 3.3-3.

\* The response times (except for manual initiation) include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, when applicable. The response time limit (except for manual initiation) includes movement of valves and attainment of pump or blower discharge pressure.

TABLE 3.3-4

SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
<b>INSTRUMENT STRINGS</b>		
a. DELETED	DELETED	DELETED
b. Containment Pressure – High	$\leq 18.4$ psia	$\leq 18.52$ psia#
c. Containment Pressure - High-High	$\leq 38.4$ psia	$\leq 38.52$ psia#
d. RCS Pressure – Low	N.A.	$\geq 1576.2$ psig##
e. RCS Pressure - Low-Low	N.A.	$\geq 441.42$ psig##
f. BWST Level	N.A.	$\geq 101.6$ and $\leq 115.4$ in. H <sub>2</sub> O##
<b>SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS</b>		
a. Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%)	$\geq 3744$ volts for $\leq 7.8$ sec	$\geq 3558$ volts $\leq 7.8$ sec
b. Diesel Generator Start, Load Shed on Essential Bus (59%)	$\geq 2071$ and $\leq 2450$ volts for $0.5 \pm 0.1$ sec	$\geq 2071$ and $\leq 2450$ volts for $0.5 \pm 0.1$ sec#
<b>INTERLOCK CHANNELS</b>		
a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve and Pressurizer Heater	N.A.	$< 328$ psig## *

# Allowable Value for CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

\* Referenced to the RCS Pressure instrumentation tap.

## Allowable Value for CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.5.4 The borated water storage tank (BWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. An available borated water volume of between 500,100 and 550,000 gallons,
- b.  $\geq 2600$  and  $\leq 2800$  ppm of boron, and
- c. A minimum water temperature of 35°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the BWST inoperable because of boron concentration or temperature not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the BWST inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration or temperature not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.5.4 The BWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the available borated water volume in the tank,
  2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the water temperature when outside air temperature  $< 35^\circ\text{F}$ .

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The response time limits for these instrumentation systems are located in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and are used to demonstrate OPERABILITY in accordance with each system's response time surveillance requirements.

For the RPS, SFAS Table 3.3-4 Functional Unit Instrument Strings d, e, and f, and Interlock Channel a, and SFRCS Table 3.3-12 Functional Unit 2:

Only the Allowable Value is specified for each Function. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint analysis. The nominal trip setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints measured by CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS do not exceed the Allowable Value if the bistable is performing as required. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing are consistent with the assumptions of the specific setpoint calculations. Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the safety analysis to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip parameter. These uncertainties are defined in the specific setpoint analysis.

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Setpoints must be found within the specified Allowable Values. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current specific setpoint analysis.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift to ensure that the instrument channel remains operational between successive tests. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall find that measurement errors and bistable setpoint errors are within the assumptions of the setpoint analysis. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint analysis.

The frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 or 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES (Continued)

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Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a Control Room fire, which could result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown. Re-energization of DH-9A and DH-9B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-7B are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BWST. Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-7B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

The Decay Heat Isolation Valve and Pressurizer Heater Interlock setpoint is based on preventing over-pressurization of the Decay Heat Removal System normal suction line piping. The value stated is the RCS pressure at the sensing instrument's tap. It has been adjusted to reflect the elevation difference between the sensor's location and the pipe of concern.

### 3/4.5.4 BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on the BWST minimum volume (500,100 gallons of borated water, conservatively rounded up from the calculated value of 500,051 gallons) and boron concentration ensure that:

- 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core following manual switchover to the recirculation mode, and



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 241 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3  
FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-346

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 2, 1999, the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee) proposed modifying the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed changes would revise the DBNPS Safety Features Actuation System Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) level instrumentation setpoints consistent with updated calculations using current setpoint methodology, increase the minimum available BWST borated water volume requirement, and other related changes. The specific changes include the following:

TS Table 3.3-4, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints"

The "Trip Setpoint" values for Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, are proposed to be removed. This is consistent with NUREG-1430, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications - Babcock and Wilcox Plants." The nominal trip setpoint values are specified in the setpoint analysis and will be listed in the "Instrument Index," a DBNPS-controlled document and the DBNPS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).

The "Allowable Value" for Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, will be modified to be consistent with current setpoint methodology.

The footnote to "Allowable Value" for Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, will be modified to indicate that the Allowable Values apply only to the Channel Functional Test and are no longer applicable to both the Channel Functional Test and the Channel Calibration.

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.2.1, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation"

The LCO would be modified to reflect the elimination of the "Trip Setpoint" values for Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, of TS Table 3.3.-4, described above.

### Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.4, "Borated Water Storage Tank"

The allowable minimum available borated water volume in the BWST is proposed to be increased from 482,778 gallons to 500,100 gallons.

### Bases 3/4.5.4, "Borated Water Storage Tank"

The Bases will be revised to reflect the increase in BWST water volume.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND

The DBNPS was originally licensed to require an automatic switchover from the BWST to the containment emergency sump during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) after the BWST reached a low level. However, in January 1981, the staff approved a license amendment request that allows a manual switchover of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps from the BWST to the containment emergency sump. The amendment took into consideration valve stroke times and operator actions. The amendment followed a December 5, 1980, event at DBNPS in which inadvertent actuation of safety features occurred with an automatic alignment of the ECCS pumps to a dry emergency sump.

The BWST level is one of the station variables monitored by the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS). When the BWST level setpoint is reached, an Incident Level 5 actuation occurs indicating that the BWST has been nearly depleted. A permissive is generated to allow a manual transfer to the containment emergency sump. A minimum of 360,000 gallons of borated water from the BWST must be injected in order to provide for sufficient net positive suction head for the pumps when drawing suction from the containment emergency sump. In addition, suction must be manually transferred to the containment emergency sump prior to the BWST reaching a level where pump cavitation (due to lack of net positive suction head when drawing suction from the BWST) or pump air entrainment (due to vortexing) would be of concern. Thus, the SFAS BWST level trip setpoint is constrained in both directions.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 50-346/97-201, dated September 4, 1997, noted the need to resolve inconsistencies between various licensee documents for the BWST setpoints. In addition, the inspection report also noted that while certain licensee documents performed the function of a calculation or analysis, they did not comply with the format and review requirements for calculations. While the inspectors did not identify any safety concern regarding the BWST level setpoints, the licensee agreed to reissue an internal licensee document as a calculation which would include verification of assumptions and references. In addition, an evaluation of interfacing documents and other affected calculations would be performed. NRC Inspection Report 50-346/98-011, dated September 3, 1998, documented completion of the licensee's actions and closeout of this issue.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

#### TS Table 3.3-4, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints"

##### Removal of Trip Setpoints

The "Trip Setpoint" values for Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, are proposed to be removed. This is consistent with NUREG-1430, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications - Babcock and Wilcox Plants." The nominal trip setpoint values are specified in the setpoint analysis and will be listed in the "Instrument Index," a DBNPS-controlled document and the DBNPS USAR.

The Commission has provided guidance for the contents of TSs in its "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" ("Final Policy Statement"), 58 FR 39132 (July 22, 1993). Consistent with this approach, the Final Policy Statement identified four criteria to be used in determining whether particular safety functions are required to be included in the TS. The Commission's policy provides that those existing TS LCOs which do not satisfy the four specified criteria may be relocated to the USAR, such that future changes could be made to these provisions pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

The staff has previously concluded that trip setpoints do not meet the four criteria of the Final Policy Statement and, therefore, can be relocated from the TSs to the licensee's USAR. As stated by the licensee, trip setpoints have been removed from NUREG-1430. Therefore, the staff concludes that removing the trip setpoints from Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, from TS Table 3.3-4, is acceptable.

##### Revised Allowable Values

The BWST low level setpoint generates a SFAS Incident Level 5 signal which generates a permissive to allow a manual transfer of ECCS pump suction from the BWST to the containment sump. The BWST low level setpoint must allow for the following:

- A minimum of 360,000 gallons of borated water from the BWST must be injected in order to provide for sufficient net positive suction head for the ECCS pumps when drawing from the containment sump.
- Suction must be transferred to the containment emergency sump prior to the BWST reaching a level where pump cavitation or pump air entrainment (due to vortexing) would be of concern.
- The setpoint must account for operator actions to accomplish the manual transfer.

As part of documenting the BWST setpoints as a formal calculation in response to the NRC inspection findings, the licensee decided to revise the allowable values for the BWST low level setpoint to include a more conservative design basis. This additional conservatism would address retention of sufficient inventory in the BWST to preclude significant air entrainment through vortex formation. This was not factored into the original design basis.

The staff previously approved the licensee's request to remove the automatic transfer of ECCS pump suction from the BWST to the containment emergency sump. Included in this approval was the assumption that control room operators would initiate action to transfer ECCS pump suction within 3 minutes of receiving a BWST low level signal. Considering that valve movement takes 90 seconds, complete transfer of pump suction is assumed to be accomplished within 4½ minutes after the SFAS BWST low level permissive is generated. This allotted time for the operator action is the same as the value acceptable to the staff when the manual switchover was originally licensed.

The previous allowable value for BWST low level was  $\geq 88.3$  and  $\leq 101.7$  inches. With the additional conservatism to preclude vortex formation in the BWST, the licensee proposes to increase the allowable values to  $\geq 101.6$  and  $\leq 115.4$  inches. The BWST level setpoint analysis is in accordance with Instrument Society of America (ISA)-S67.04, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation," September 1994, and ISA-RP67.04, Part II, "Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," September 1994. Since the proposed changes to the SFAS BWST low level allowable values will make the TS consistent with updated calculations using approved setpoint methodology, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

#### Deletion of Channel Calibration

Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, in TS Table 3.3-4 currently has a footnote indicating that the Allowable Value will be used for both the Channel Functional Test and the Channel Calibration. The licensee has proposed to revise the footnote to indicate that the Allowable value only applies to the Channel Functional Test and, therefore, is no longer applicable to the Channel Calibration. The application of the proposed Allowable Value to only the Channel Function Test and not the Channel Calibration is consistent with the methodology of NUREG-1430, Revision 1, wherein the sensor is calibrated separately from the rest of the instrument string. Since the staff has previously found this approach acceptable as indicated in the reference to NUREG-1430, the staff finds this proposed change acceptable.

#### Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.2.1

LCO 3.3.2.1 states that the functional units identified in TS Table 3.3-3, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation," shall be operable with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of TS Table 3.3-4. This LCO also makes specific exceptions to those functional units of TS Table 3.3-4 where the Trip Setpoints have been removed from the TS.

Consistent with their proposal to remove the trip setpoint to Instrument Strings Functional Unit "f," BWST Level, of TS Table 3.3-4, the licensee has proposed to insert a similar exception to LCO 3.3.2.1. The staff finds this proposed change acceptable because it is consistent with the change to remove the Trip Setpoint from TS Table 3.3-4.

#### TS 3/4.5.4, "Borated Water Storage Tank"

TS 3/4.5.4 currently requires that the volume of water in the BWST be between 482,778 and 550,000 gallons. The licensee's proposed change to increase the BWST low level setpoint to preclude vortex formation when the ECCS pumps are taking suction from the BWST has, in turn, required an increase in the minimum volume of water in the BWST. In this regard, the licensee has determined that the minimum volume of water in the BWST should be increased to 500,100 gallons. Therefore, the licensee has proposed modifying TS 3/4.5.4 to require that the volume of water in the BWST be between 500,100 and 550,000 gallons.

The staff finds the increased volume of water in the BWST to be a conservative change in the licensing basis and, therefore, acceptable.

The licensee's submittal requested a similar change to increase the minimum BWST water volume in TS 3/4.1.2.9, "Borated Water Sources - Operating." However, this change is no longer necessary because this TS was deleted in License Amendment No. 238 issued on March 14, 2000.

#### Changes to TS Bases

The licensee has proposed to revise the TS Bases 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2, "Reactor Protection System and Safety System Instrumentation," and TS Bases 3/4.5.4, "Borated Water Storage Tank," to reflect the TS changes described above. The staff finds these proposed changes acceptable because they reflect the changes found acceptable to the TS.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 70087). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Douglas Pickett, NRR

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