

Commonwealth Edison Company
Braidwood Generating Station
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Bw000059
May 15, 2000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001


Braidwood Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-72
NRC Docket No. STN 50-456

Subject: Submittal of Licensee Event Report Number 2000-003-00

10 CFR 50.73(a) requires a Licensee Event Report (LER) to be submitted within 30 days after discovery of the event. The purpose of this letter is to provide the subject LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) by the required May 17, 2000 submittal date.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. T. W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 458-2801, extension 2980.

Respectfully,



Timothy J. Tulon
Site Vice President
Braidwood Station

Attachment: Braidwood Station, Unit 1 LER Number 2000-003-00

cc: Regional Administrator - NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)					U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION					APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98				
<h2 style="margin: 0;">LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</h2>										ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT				
FACILITY NAME (1): Braidwood Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) STN 05000456			PAGE (3) 1 of 4	
TITLE (4) Missed Technical Specification Surveillance on the 1B Diesel Generator due to Personnel Error due to Poor Supervisory Control														
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME				DOCKET NUMBER	
04	17	2000	2000 -- 003 -- 00			05	17	2000	FACILITY NAME				DOCKET NUMBER	
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		100												
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)			
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)			<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)			
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)			<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)														
NAME (Include Position Title) Gary Dudek, Shift Operations Superintendent										TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (815) 458-2801 Extension 2215				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)														
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS						CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				X NO										

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines 16)

At 0718 on April 17, 2000, Condition B for Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating" was entered for the 1B Diesel Generator (DG) being inoperable due to the 1B DG Vent Fan being Out of Service. Per Required Action B.1 of this TS, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.1 was to be performed within one hour (by 0818) to verify the required qualified circuits were available. At 1154 on April 17, 2000, the Unit 1 Unit Supervisor (US) identified the failure to perform SR 3.8.1.1 within the required timeframe. The SR was started and Condition F of TS 3.8.1 was entered at 1155 due to the failure to meet the Completion Time requirements of Required Action B.1. The SR was completed and Condition F was exited at 1204.

The safety consequences associated with this event were minimal. The SR verifies the required qualified sources of offsite AC power are available. During this timeframe, activities were being performed in the switchyard but none of these activities would have affected the availability of these power sources.

The cause of the event was poor supervisory control by the Unit 1 US.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Braidwood, Unit 1		STN 05000456	2000	-- 003	-- 00	2 of 4

(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Unit 1 Event Date: 4/17/00

Event Time: 0818

MODE: MODE 1 Reactor Power: 100
percent

RCS [AB] Temperature: 582 degrees F.
RCS [AB] Pressure: 2234 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

The 1B Diesel Generator (DG) [EK] was inoperable at the beginning of this event and contributed to the initiation of the event. The 1B DG was declared inoperable for the performance of carbon dioxide discharge testing in the DG room.

At 0518 on April 17, 2000, Operating Shift 1 placed the 1B DG Vent Fan and the 1B DG Exhaust Fan Out of Service (OOS) for carbon dioxide discharge testing and entered Administrative Action Requirement (AAR) 1BwOS VD-1a, "Diesel Ventilation Systems." This AAR allows the DG Exhaust Fan to be OOS for up to two hours, after which the DG is to be declared inoperable. The off-going Unit 1 Unit Supervisor (US) discussed the OOS with the on-coming Unit 1 US during shift turnover at 0630 and reminded the on-coming Unit 1 US of the requirement to enter Condition B of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," by 0718.

After shift turnover was completed, a shift briefing was begun at 0715 on April 17, 2000. At 0718, the Unit 1 US notified the Unit 1 Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) to enter Condition B of TS 3.8.1 for the 1B DG being inoperable due to the 1B DG Vent Fan being OOS for greater than 2 hours. Based upon this entry, Required Action B.1 of TS 3.8.1 required performance of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.1 to verify the availability of the required qualified circuits for off-site AC power sources within one hour. This surveillance is accomplished by performing 1BwOSR 3.8.1.1, "Unit One Offsite AC Power Availability Weekly Surveillance." The shift briefing continued with the discussion of other planned shift activities. The Unit 1 US became distracted after the shift meeting ended due to preparations for switching orders to be received from the load dispatcher, work package sign-ins, and a pre-job briefing to be conducted for planned work on the Unit 1 Containment Chillers [BK]. At 0818, Required Action B.1 of TS 3.8.1 should have been completed. Due to the distractions, the Unit 1 US had forgotten about the requirement to perform this Required Action.

At 1154 on April 17, 2000, a representative of the Operations staff came to the Main Control Room to discuss a fire protection surveillance that might affect switching the Main Control Room Ventilation System [VI] trains for another

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surveillance. At that time, the Unit 1 US realized that 1BwOSR 3.8.1.1 had not been performed within the required one hour time frame. The Unit 1 US immediately obtained a copy of the SR. At 1155 the US gave the SR to the Unit 1 NSO to complete. The Unit 1 US also entered Condition F of TS 3.8.1 due to the failure to meet the Completion Time requirements of Required Action B.1. At 1204, the SR was completed and Condition F was exited. The Unit 1 US immediately notified the Shift Manager of the missed TS SR. Required Action B.1 also requires the performance of SR 3.8.1.1 every eight hours after the performance of the original SR. Each of these SRs was performed satisfactorily.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of the event was poor supervisory control by the Unit 1 US contrary to Operations standards and approved procedures. Contributing causes to the event were inconsistent interpretations of the entry conditions for the DG Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and the lack of teamwork by the Main Control Room crew.

D. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:

The safety consequences associated with this event were minimal. The SR was satisfactorily completed approximately 3.75 hours after the one-hour Completion Time had expired. During this timeframe, activities were being performed in the switchyard but none of these activities would have affected the offsite AC power availability. The only activity affecting the 1B DG was the carbon dioxide discharge testing, which caused the inoperability of the 1B DG. The 1B DG was available if called upon to start. The 1A DG was Operable during this event.

There was no safety system functional failure as a result of this event.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The following immediate corrective actions were taken:

- SR 3.8.1.1 was satisfactorily completed.
- The Shift Manager, duty Station personnel, and NRC were notified of the missed SR.
- A prompt investigation was ordered by the Shift Manager.

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(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

Additional corrective actions to be taken include:

- Counseling Operations personnel for failure to perform the required TS SR in the required timeframe.
- Reinforcing expectations with the Unit NSO to ensure the Required Actions of a TS are completed.
- Development of a consistent policy on when entry into Condition B of TS 3.8.1 is to occur for occasions when the DG vent fans are inoperable. Training on this event and the policy that is developed will be conducted with licensed Operations personnel.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

The Licensee Event Reports (LERs) from 1997 through the present were reviewed. On May 23, 1997, a missed TS SR occurred due to a clerical error. This error changed the calculated due date for the SR and this was not identified until after the SR should have been performed. This was reported in LER 97-004 for Unit 1. The corrective actions from this LER would not have prevented the 1B DG missed TS SR event.

Unit 2 LER 98-003 detailed a missed entry into a Required Action of a TS due to personnel error and an inadequate procedure. The Required Actions for low specific gravity on two battery cells on the 211 Battery was not appropriately entered. The corrective actions from this LER would not have prevented the 1B DG missed TS SR event.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

NONE