

March 3, 2000

**PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE** PNO-II-00-012

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region II staff in Atlanta, Georgia on this date.

<b><u>Facility</u></b>	<b><u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u></b>
Carolina Power & Light Co.	X Notification of Unusual Event
Brunswick 1 2	Alert
Southport, North Carolina	Site Area Emergency
Dockets: 50-325, 50-324	General Emergency
	Not Applicable

Subject: UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

On March 3, 2000, with Unit 1 in cold shutdown (Mode 5) for a refueling outage, a loss of offsite power to the Unit 1 balance-of-plant and emergency busses occurred at 0931. Unit 2 was at 100% power at the time of the event. A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0950 due to the loss of offsite power. The reactor cavity and spent fuel pool were fully flooded and the fuel transfer gates opened to support refueling activities. Reactor coolant temperature was approximately 86 degrees fahrenheit. All four emergency diesels (EDGs) started as expected with EDGs numbers 1 and 2 loading and supplying power to their respective Unit 1 emergency busses. Cooling to the water surrounding the fuel in the unit was briefly interrupted. Cooling was restored in approximately 21 minutes after power to the emergency busses was restored from the EDGs. Reactor coolant increased a small amount, peaking at 89 degrees fahrenheit. All movement of fuel maintenance work for the outage was suspended.

While attempting to return the power supply for the 4160 volt E2 emergency volt bus from the EDGs to offsite power, EDG number 2 tripped on overcurrent. An EDG building fire protection actuation (release of halon) was received. There was no immediate evidence of a fire in the area. During this period, shutdown cooling was again interrupted. Shutdown cooling was restored by starting the alternate train pumps within 18 minutes.

The loss of the Unit 1 bus resulted in the decision by operators to begin a shutdown of Unit 2 because two offsite power circuits were inoperable and there was no power to the Unit 2 equipment powered from the Unit 1 E2 bus. Operators initiated a shutdown sequence at 1356.

At 1756, the licensee restored offsite power and terminated the shutdown of Unit 2. At 1843, the licensee exited the Unusual Event for Unit 1.

1E34

The NRC resident and senior resident inspector were on site and have been evaluating the activities associated with the event. Region II staffed the Incident Response Center to establish an open line of communication with the licensee to monitor their recovery activities. Region II has notified the State.

The licensee issued a press release to address local media and government

inquiries and notified State agencies. Region II notified the State and has responded to media inquiries.

This information is current as of 1900 EST.

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