May 3, 2000

Mr. M. Wadley
President, Nuclear Generation
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-263/2000003(DRS)

Dear Mr. Wadley:

On March 24, 2000, the NRC completed an engineering team inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of that inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. The objectives of the inspection were to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspection included an assessment and evaluation of engineering support, design change and modification activities, 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations, as well as audit activities. Within these areas, we selectively observed activities in progress, reviewed procedures and representative records, observed plant conditions, and discussed activities and concerns with members of your staff.

Overall, our inspection results indicated that engineering and 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation activities at the Monticello Plant were effective. Licensee personnel were qualified for their positions and demonstrated a good knowledge of their responsibilities. Audits of engineering activities were performed by well qualified auditors and were of good quality. However, examples were noted where jumper bypasses (temporary modifications) were installed without thorough engineering evaluations. In one instance, the evaluation of three bypass jumpers, installed to prevent possible flooding of a safety related switchgear room, failed to identify that the bypasses would not have been effective if a high energy line break had occurred.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC regulatory requirements occurred. Since immediate actions were taken to correct the problem, the violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. The violation is described in the attached inspection report. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within thirty days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for the denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Electronic Reading Room (PERR) link at the NRC homepage, http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Ronald N. Gardner, Chief
Electrical Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-263/2000003(DRS)

cc w/encl: Site General Manager, Monticello
Plant Manager, Monticello
S. Minn, Commissioner, Minnesota
Department of Public Service

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No:	50-263
License No:	NPR-22
Report No:	50-263/2000003(DRS)
Licensee:	Northern States Power Company (NSP)
Facility:	Monticello Generating Station
Location:	2807 West Highway 75 Monticello, MN 55362
Dates:	March 13 - 24, 2000
Inspectors:	H. Walker, Team Leader D. Schrum, Inspector W. Scott, Inspector Trainee T. Tella, Inspector R. Winter, Inspector
Approved by:	Ronald N. Gardner, Chief, Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Monticello Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-263/2000003(DRS)

Plant Status: During this inspection period the plant was at or near full power.

During this routine announced team inspection of approximately three weeks duration, the inspection team reviewed engineering and technical support and 10 CFR 50.59 activities. The inspection also included a review of selected NRC items identified during previous NRC inspections.

The following statements summarize the inspection results in each area:

- The methods used to control design changes and modifications at the Monticello plant were effective. Modification packages were complete, well prepared, and of good technical quality. Plant changes were adequately designed and installed. Post-modification testing was specified, properly performed, and was adequate to verify that the modified equipment would perform the design function. Changes to procedures, required by the design changes, were properly completed. Design configuration and configuration controls were maintained throughout the process (Section E1.1).

- The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and safety evaluations reviewed were appropriately prepared, of good quality, and were consistent with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Screenings were performed for each item and full evaluations were performed when necessary. The evaluations were generally thorough with 10 CFR 50.59 questions appropriately answered and sufficient detail provided to support the conclusions (Section E1.2).

- In most cases, jumper bypass (temporary modification) controls were effective for temporarily installed material, equipment, and changes. The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, and evaluations were usually included in the package and were usually adequate. Jumper bypasses were controlled and tracked by use of a control room log (Section E1.3).

- Engineering evaluations for jumper bypasses were not always thorough and sometimes required that additional changes be made to correct problems. A non-cited violation was issued in this area for the failure to properly evaluate three bypass jumpers installed to prevent possible flooding of a safety related switchgear room if a high energy line break should occur (Section E1.3).

- Overall engineering support to maintenance was good. Aggressively applied circuit breaker maintenance and refurbishment had resulted in relatively few breaker failures and had reduced the risk associated with circuit breaker failures. Both design and system engineers were experienced and knowledgeable of maintenance issues and were adequately involved and responsive to maintenance activities requirements (Section E2.1).

- In most cases, engineering involvement and support for corrective action was effective. Condition reports were normally initiated for problems that occurred onsite and the initiation threshold was acceptable. With the exception of jumper bypasses, installed to correct high energy line break problems, engineering involvement in corrective actions was adequate and timely and cause investigation and actions to prevent recurrence were performed when necessary (Section E2.2).

- System engineers trended equipment performance and component failures for selected plant equipment. Condition reports were issued when adverse trends were noted; however, actions were not always taken to ensure the elimination or reduction of these trends (Section E2.3).

- The operating experience program was acceptable and adequately responded to NRC and industry information. In most instances, the information received was appropriately reviewed and evaluated and appropriate and timely actions were taken (Section E2.4).

- Audits and observations of engineering activities were performed by well qualified auditors and were of good quality. The audits and observations reviewed were well prepared, properly focused, and of good technical quality. Reviews were in depth, identified issues were clearly defined and discussed, and findings were written when appropriate (Section E7.1).

Report Details

III. Engineering

The review of engineering included both design and support engineering activities. The design review included design changes, temporary modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and screenings. Engineering support included systems engineering, problem resolution and corrective action activities as well as normal engineering involvement with operations, maintenance and other plant organizations.

E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 Design Changes and Modifications

a. Inspection Scope (37550, 37700)

The inspectors reviewed the methods used to control and support design changes and modifications to verify adequacy, control, and compliance with regulatory requirements. The review included the basic design change procedures and selected design change packages (DCPs). The DCPs were reviewed in detail and discussed with cognizant system and design engineers. Walkdowns of accessible portions of selected modification field installations verified that the selected modifications had been correctly installed and that the plant material condition in the modification area was acceptable. The selected design change packages covered a broad range of engineering areas and generally sampled risk important systems. The review included the reason for the change, 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations, design calculations, adequate oversight and reviews, post modification testing, and selected revised documents including the updated safety analysis report (USAR), calculations, drawings and procedures.

b. Observations and Findings

The DCPs reviewed were complete, of good quality, and were adequate to accomplish the design changes. The packages included a description of the change, interdepartmental reviews, required approvals, and appropriate 10 CFR 50.59 screenings or evaluations. The packages also included requirements for post modification testing and acceptance criteria for these tests as well as test results. Selected calculations, performed to support the design changes, were reviewed and the assumptions and methodology were found to be acceptable.

Modifications were properly installed and tested. Post-modification testing was adequate to verify that the modified equipment would perform the design function. The overall material condition of the plant, observed during walkdown of selected modifications, was good. Affected drawings were properly revised or red-lined as appropriate and, when necessary, surveillance and operating procedures were revised or new procedures were written.

During the review of post-modification test, MP-97Q065-11, Revision 0, for the reactor water clean-up line break isolation logic design change, the inspector identified an

attention to detail issue associated with the plant restoration to normal where the bypass valves were added by pen and ink change during the performance of the test and the required valve position was not specified. This issue was discussed with licensee personnel.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that the methods used to control design changes and modifications at the Monticello plant were adequate. DCPs were complete, well prepared, and of good technical quality. In general, the modifications were adequately designed and installed and post-modification testing was specified, properly performed, and was sufficient to verify that the modified equipment would perform the design function. Responsible system and design engineers were involved throughout the modification process and were qualified, experienced, and knowledgeable of the assigned modifications or changes in the assigned systems. Design configuration and associated controls were maintained throughout the modification process.

E1.2 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations and Screenings

a. Inspection Scope (37001)

The methods and procedures used to control 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations were reviewed to verify adequacy, control, and compliance with regulatory requirements. Emphasis in this review was on design changes and modifications, including bypass jumpers. Screenings and evaluations were reviewed for unreviewed safety questions (USQs) and for appropriate evaluations for 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. The screenings and evaluations were discussed with cognizant licensee personnel and selected evaluations were reviewed in detail to verify acceptable implementation and regulatory compliance.

b. Observations and Findings

The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations were appropriately prepared, of good quality, and were consistent with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Implementing procedures appropriately described effective methods for controlling and performing the screenings and evaluations and required that trained and qualified personnel perform the necessary reviews and evaluations. The list of the reviewed documents, the description of the changes, and the responses to the 10 CFR 50.59 questions were found to be detailed, complete, and consistent with the associated design change packages, licensing change requests, and design calculations. The evaluations adequately addressed the effects of the proposed changes on plant operations, interactions with other systems and components, new failure modes, the affects on accidents and transients, and if an USQ existed.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that the 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations reviewed were appropriately prepared, of good quality, and were consistent with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Screenings were performed for each item and full evaluations were performed when necessary. The evaluations were generally thorough with 10 CFR 50.59 questions appropriately answered and sufficient detail was provided to support the conclusions.

E1.3 Jumper Bypass Control

a. Inspection Scope (37550, 37700)

The methods used to control jumper bypasses (JBPs), or temporary modifications, were reviewed to verify adequacy, control, and compliance with regulatory requirements. The review included the controlling procedure and selected open JBP packages. The JBP packages also included the appropriate 10 CFR 50.59 screenings or evaluations. JBPs were discussed with cognizant licensee personnel and, in some cases, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of these installed temporary changes.

b. Observations and Findings

The JBP process provided adequate controls for temporarily installed material, equipment, and changes. The individual JBPs reviewed had a clearly defined purpose and scope and generally included 10 CFR 50.59 screenings. The status of JBPs was effectively tracked through use of JBP logs in the control room.

The inspectors noted several apparent problems in JBP control. The reduced scope of engineering change review and evaluations, utilized by engineering for JBPs, increased the chances that important engineering evaluations and checks would not be thorough and important items could be missed. Problems were noted with several JBPs installed to reduce or prevent flooding conditions in case of a high energy line break (HELB) accident.

During a USAR program review, licensee personnel had recently re-evaluated a HELB analysis. Several JBPs were installed to prevent or mitigate flooding conditions that could be caused by a HELB in the feedwater, service water, and fire header area. Engineering determined that a pipe break near the reactor feedpumps could cause substantial flooding in the turbine building and result in possible flooding of the Division 1, 4 kV switchgear room. Three jumper bypasses were installed to correct the problem and prevent the flooding of the 4 kV switchgear room. These jumper bypasses were:

Jumper Bypass 99-62 -- JBP 99-62 added metal plates on the bottom of doors 201, 202, and 479 to prevent water from flowing under the doors.

Jumper Bypass 2000-81 -- JBP 00-81 required that a two foot barrier be constructed outside the Division I, 4 kV switchgear room to protect the room from flooding in case a HELB occurred in the feedwater/condensate area.

Jumper Bypass 2000-89 -- JBP 00-89 required that an additional seal plate be added to the bottom of door 479 to prevent water from flowing under the door.

During a walkdown of the JBPs, the inspectors questioned whether a floor drain, located in the Division I, 4 kV switchgear room, had been plugged. Licensee personnel determined that the drain had not been plugged and that existing floor drains were open on both sides of door 479 rendering JBPs 99-62, 2000-81, and 2000-89 nonfunctional. The drain, part of the normal waste water system, was directly connected to the potentially flooded areas of the turbine building and would have provided a flow path for water into the switchgear room. Since the HELB analysis assumed the loss of offsite power and the Division II emergency diesel generator (EDG), the flooding of the Division I, 4 kV switchgear room would result in the possible loss of both Divisions of the 4 kV distribution system. The Division 1 breakers were required to crosstie the unaffected Division 1 EDG with the Division 2 bus.

Licensee personnel took immediate action to correct the unplugged drain problem. Condition Report (CR) 20001218 was written and issued to enter this problem into the corrective action system and JBP 2000-94 was written and implemented to plug the drain in the 4 kV switchgear room floor. Licensee personnel issued LER 2000-004, "Re-analysis of the High Energy Line Break Resulted in Potential Loss of Division I, 4 kV Switchgear," for this condition.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" states, in part, that design control measures provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of the design, and that changes be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the above, prior to March 16, 2000, the licensee did not have adequate design controls to protect the lower 4 kV room and to ensure that redundant trains of plant equipment would not be damaged by water during a HELB event. Based on the corrective actions taken, this Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-263/2000003-01(DRS)).

Two additional problems were noted in the jumper bypass area.

Jumper Bypass 2000-80 -- JBP 2000-80, which was installed in this area, required the removal of the latch from Appendix R door number 76. This door was a barrier separating redundant trains of equipment, which were required to achieve and maintain a safe reactor shutdown. If a HELB had occurred the removal of the latch would allow the door to open reducing pressure and water levels in the condensate pump area. The engineering evaluation for this change did not consider whether the risk was reduced or increased by making a fire door inoperable to reduce the risk of a HELB flooding type of accident. This JBP was only in place for a short time and was removed when questioned by the licensee's fire protection engineer.

Locked Containment Railroad Door -- During the inspection licensee personnel chained and locked containment railroad door # 45. This door was required to be unlatched to provide pressure relief if a HELB event should occur. Shortly afterward an operator recognized that chaining the door negated the HELB function and the chain and lock

were removed. Licensee personnel failed to identify this change as a jumper bypass and the engineering controls for a temporary were not applied. This concern was discussed with licensee personnel.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that, in most cases, JBP (temporary modification) controls were effective for temporarily installed material, equipment, and changes. The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, and evaluations were usually included in the package and were usually adequate. Jumper bypasses were controlled and tracked by use of a control room log.

Engineering evaluations for jumper bypasses were not always thorough and sometimes required that additional changes be made to correct problems. A non-cited violation was issued in this area for the failure to properly evaluate three bypass jumpers installed to prevent possible flooding of a safety related switchgear room if a high energy line break should occur.

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of engineering support to plant organizations, which included plant management, operations and maintenance. Much of the engineering support involved assistance in the documentation, evaluation, and resolution of problems.

E2.1 Engineering Support to Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope (37550)

The methods used by engineering to provide support to maintenance were reviewed to verify adequacy and control. Emphasis in this review was on the involvement of engineering in the development and implementation of predictive and preventive maintenance. The review included relevant procedures and records, maintenance and testing methods as well as discussions of the issues with cognizant engineers. Special emphasis was given to periodic maintenance and testing of breakers.

b. Observations and Findings

Engineering personnel were actively involved in prioritizing and assisting in appropriate maintenance activities. System engineers were qualified and experienced in their respective systems and were directly involved in problem investigation and resolution pertaining to their assigned systems. They directly interfaced with maintenance personnel, were knowledgeable of significant maintenance work on the assigned systems, and witnessed selected maintenance work. Procedures adequately described the duties and responsibilities of engineers in supporting maintenance and other organizations. Other duties included direct involvement in problem investigation and resolution for the assigned systems. Maintenance personnel stated that engineering provided good support to maintenance especially when a rapid response was needed.

Electrical Breaker Maintenance -- Preventive maintenance and refurbishment of 480 V and 4.1 kV Breakers were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee personnel. The methods used to perform maintenance and testing of breakers were evaluated. Controlling maintenance procedures and vendor manuals were reviewed to determine if acceptable instructions were provided to ensure adequate circuit breaker maintenance. The inspectors noted that normal breaker refurbishment was scheduled approximately every six years and vendor recommendations were usually followed in performing periodic maintenance.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that engineering support for maintenance was good. Aggressive circuit breaker maintenance and refurbishment had resulted in relatively few breaker failures and had reduced the risk associated with circuit breaker failures. Both design and system engineers were experienced and knowledgeable of maintenance issues and were adequately involved and responsive to maintenance requirements.

E2.2 Engineering Support for Corrective Action

a. Inspection Scope (37550)

An in-depth review of the corrective action system was not performed during this inspection; however, engineering support and involvement in identifying and correcting problems was reviewed. This review included records and reports in some areas, as well as discussions of engineering and corrective action issues with engineers and other cognizant personnel. Timeliness and priority of actions were considered as well as tracking of actions to correct or minimize problems.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors noted that systems engineers were well qualified and experienced and were deeply involved in systems activities including the correction of equipment and system problems. CRs were normally initiated to document equipment problems that occurred onsite and these CRs were usually initiated by the cognizant systems engineer. During the review, the inspectors noted that, with the exception of the jumper bypass area, corrective actions appeared to be adequate and timely. Several jumper bypasses were developed and installed to address flooding issues identified during a HELB analysis. It was evident that thorough evaluations of the temporary changes were not made prior to implementation and as a result additional changes had to be made to some of the changes. A complete discussion of this jumper bypass problem is included in Section E1.3 of this report.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that, in most cases, engineering involvement and support for corrective action was effective. Condition reports were normally initiated for problems that occurred onsite and the initiation

threshold was acceptable. With the exception of jumper bypasses installed to correct problems, engineering involvement in corrective actions were adequate and timely and cause investigation and actions to prevent recurrence were performed when necessary.

E2.3 Trending

a. Inspection Scope (37550)

The methods used to determine repetitive failures and detect negative quality trends were reviewed to verify adequacy, control, and compliance with regulatory requirements. The review included the controlling procedures, records, trend reports, and actions taken when negative trends were noted. Selected CRs were reviewed to determine if repetitive failures were documented and trended. The trending program and activities were discussed with cognizant licensee personnel.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors noted that system engineers trended equipment and component failures for selected plant equipment. In addition, on-going assessments were performed by Engineering Department personnel using the "Self-Assessment Trend Review Program." This program provided a structured approach for analyzing equipment and performance issues identified within the corrective action program database to identify adverse trends. Trend data was reviewed and presented monthly to management by engineering. Additional site meetings were held with other Monticello departments to identify common trends.

Corrective actions for adverse trends, within the engineering department, were assigned by management for resolution. The basic document used to identify problems and to determine trends was the CR. CRs were also written when significant adverse trends were identified. The responsibilities for actions to correct adverse trends, identified by engineering, were assigned by management for resolution. Less significant trends were assigned, but were not tracked for adequate or timely completion. This practice limited the evaluation of the effectiveness of implemented corrective actions. This issue was considered a weakness and was discussed with cognizant licensee personnel.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that system engineers trended equipment performance and component failures for selected plant equipment. CRs were issued when adverse trends were noted; however, actions were not always taken to ensure the eliminate or reduction of adverse trends.

E.2.4 Operating Experience Program

a. Inspection Scope (37550)

The Operating Experience (OPEX) program was reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee personnel to verify that industry information and problem notification

information was adequately reviewed and appropriate actions were taken if needed. This review included the methods used to process and evaluate outside or industry generic problem notifications such as generic letters, information notices, Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) notifications, service information letters, etc. The review included the controlling procedure and a selected sample of OPEX issues that had been documented for action on condition reports.

b. Observations and Findings

The OPEX program was used to assess generic problem information received from industry sources including the NRC. The controlling procedures adequately defined the methods used for the receipt, documentation, dissemination, screening, investigation, evaluation, and disposition of incoming industry information.

Licensee personnel thoroughly disseminated OPEX information to plant personnel. This included E- mailing incoming OPEX information to plant personnel and selected items were discussed at plan-of-the-day meetings, shift turnovers, and job briefings to assure the information was widely ditributed. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs that licensee personnel had initiated as a result of OPEX evaluations and determined that, in most cases, the actions taken were appropriate.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that the OPEX program was acceptable and adequately responded to NRC and industry information. In most instances, the OPEX information received was appropriately reviewed, evaluated and appropriate and timely actions were taken.

E7 Quality Assurance of Engineering Activities

E7.1 Engineering Related Audits

a. Inspection Scope (37550)

The methods used to perform and control Generation Quality Service (GQS) Department audits and observations of engineering were reviewed to verify the adequacy, control, and compliance of activities with regulatory requirements. The review included the controlling procedures and selected audit and observation reports as well as discussion of the activities with cognizant licensee personnel.

b. Observations and Findings

Quality assurance of engineering activities was provided by the GQS Department, which performed the required audits as well as observations of plant activities. Audits were usually routinely planned and scheduled, broad in scope, and covered a selected area or function. Field observations were usually less formal, narrow in scope, more specific, and of a much shorter duration. Observations normally were limited in scope, required limited planning, and were dependent on plant work in progress. Licensee personnel,

who performed both audits and observations, appeared to be well qualified and experienced in the areas assessed. CRs were usually used to document findings identified during both audits and observations. Findings were resolved in a timely manner.

c. Conclusions

Based on the inspection results, the inspectors concluded that audits and observations of engineering activities were performed by well qualified auditors and were of good quality. The audits and observations reviewed were well prepared, properly focused, and of good technical quality. Reviews were in depth, identified issues were clearly defined and discussed, and findings were written when appropriate.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues

This section describes the review, action and status of selected items which had been identified in previous NRC inspections.

E8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-263/1994008-01: All relief valves were not tested under conditions similar to operating or accident conditions. This unresolved item (URI) was written because the NRC inspectors were not sure that the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code was correctly interpreted for the testing of relief valves. Condition report 97002860 was written to track this item. Northern States Power Company (NSP) submitted an inquiry to the ASME code committee to address the issue of relief valve testing. The code committee response and the subsequent engineering evaluation appropriately addressed the issues. The inspectors have no further questions or concerns in this area. This item is closed.

E8.2 (Closed) Deviation 50-263/1996006-02: Improper use of calibration reflectors during ultrasonic testing examinations. The inspectors reviewed the deviation (DEV) and NSP's response, dated September 19, 1996. The deviation was written because calibration reflectors were not being used per previous commitments. Relief request number 9 proposed an alternate method and was submitted to the NRC for approval on November 14, 1996. The NRC approved this relief request on December 28, 1998 authorizing the use of the proposed alternative. The inspectors have no further questions or concerns in this area. This item is closed.

E8.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-263/1996009-08: The concern was whether safety-related 4 kV motors would start and accelerate with 80 percent of rated voltage applied to the motor terminals. This unresolved item (URI) was written to verify that opened torque speed analysis was performed on 4 kV emergency core cooling system pump motors. Two of the residual heat removal (RHR) pump motors had been replaced since the analysis was performed and there was no evidence that additional 80 percent voltage starting analysis had been performed for the replacement motors. The licensee tested the RHR and core spray (CS) pump motors both from offsite power and from the emergency diesel generator (EDG) power. When the replaced RHR motors and the CS pump motors started sequentially with a five second delay between motor starts, the bus voltage dipped to lower than 80% voltage but the motors accelerated satisfactorily and

picked up the pump loads. The inspectors have no further questions or concerns in this area. This item is closed.

E8.4 (Closed) Unresolved ITEM 50-263/1998009-01: Section 4.3.1.D of Procedure 4AWI-04.04-03, "Bypass Control," Revision 9, had wording that was inconsistent with 10 CFR 50.54(x) and allowed deviation from documentation requirements for conditions other than emergencies. By letter, dated August 28, 1998, licensee personnel stated that they had changed the wording of the procedure to be consistent with 10 CFR 50.54(x). In addition, the wording of the procedure specified sufficient managerial responsibilities to assure that a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or if needed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation would be performed. The inspectors have no further questions or concerns in this area. This item is closed.

E8.5 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-263/97-004: Relief requests were not written, as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g), for limited inservice inspections (ISI) of welds which could not be completely inspected. Actions to address CR 19970570, which was written on this item, required that relief requests be submitted for all limited examinations performed in the third ten year ISI interval and the required relief requests would be submitted for all limited ISIs performed in the future. The inspectors have no further questions or concerns in this area. This item is closed.

E8.6 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-263/2000-004: An analysis of a HELB on the 911 foot elevation of the Turbine Building indicated possible flooding of the Division I 4 kV switchgear room resulting in the loss of the Division I, 4 kV equipment. This event could potentially result in loss of station power from both divisions of the 4 kV distribution system. Four bypass jumpers were installed to prevent water from entering the Division I, 4 kV switchgear room in case a HELB occurred in this area. The inspectors have no further questions or concerns in this area. This item is closed.

II. Management Meetings

V1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management and staff in an exit meeting on March 24, 2000. The inspectors noted that two documents, provided during the inspection, were identified as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the information discussed during the exit and agreed that no additional proprietary information was discussed or provided.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

B. Day, Plant Manager
S. Engelke, Superintendent, Electrical and Instrument System Engineering
J. Grubb, General Superintendent of Engineering
M. Hammer, Site General Manager
S. Hammer, General Superintendent, Nuclear Generation Services
B. Linde, Superintendent, Security
S. Ludders, Principal Operations Specialist
C. Schibonski, General Superintendent, Safety Assessment
R. Siepel, Superintendent, Electrical Design Engineering
E. Sopkin, General Superintendent,
A. Wojchouski, Superintendent Safety Systems Engineering

NRC

S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Gardner, Chief, Electrical Engineering Branch, DRS

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37001:	10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program
IP 37550	Engineering
IP 37700	Design Changes and Modifications
IP 92903	Followup - Engineering

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-263/2000003-01	NCV	Inadequate engineering evaluation prior to approval and installation of jumper bypasses.

Closed

50-263/1994008-01	URI	All relief valves were not tested under conditions similar to operating or accident conditions.
50-263/1996006-02	DEV	Failure to use calibration reflectors during UT examinations. This deviation (DEV) was written to verify that opened to
50-263/1996009-08	URI	Would safety-related 4 kV motors start and accelerate with 80 percent of rated voltage applied to the motor terminals.
50-263/1998009-01	URI	Bypass control procedure 4AWI-04.04.03, “Bypass Control,” Revision 9, Section 4.3.1.D had language that was inconsistent with 10 CFR 50.54(x) and allowed deviation from documentation requirements for conditions other than an emergency.
50-263/97-004	LER	Relief requests were not submitted for limited inservice examination per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g).
50-263/2000-004	LER	Possible flooding of the Division I, 4 kV switchgear room due to a HELB.
50-263/2000003-01	NCV	Inadequate engineering evaluation prior to approval and installation of jumper bypasses.

Discussed

No items, identified during previous NRC inspections, were reviewed or discussed without closing.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
CS	Core Spray
DCP	Design Change Package
DEV	Deviation
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
GQS	Generation Quality Services
HELB	High Energy Line Break
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
ISI	Inservice Inspection
JBP	Jumper Bypass
LER	Licensee Event Report
NCV	Non-cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSP	Northern States Power Company
OPEX	Operating Experience
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
URI	Unresolved Item
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report
USQ	Unreviewed Safety Question

LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of licensee documents reviewed during the inspection, including documents prepared by others for the licensee. Inclusion on this list does not imply that NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but, rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document in this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document, unless specifically stated in the body of the inspection report.

I. Procedures

- EWI-01.04.04, System Engineering Group Organization and Responsibility Assessment, Revision 3
- EWI-08.09.01, System Engineering Group Trending Program, Revision 4
- 4 AWI-04.04.03, Bypass Control, Revision 10
- 4 AWI-04.05.01, General Work Controls, Revision 11
- 4 AWI-04.05.02, Requesting Work and Work Order Preparation, Revision 14
- 4 AWI-04.05.03, Work Order Review, Revision 11
- 4 AWI-04.05.04, Conduct of Maintenance, Alterations, and Design Changes, Revision 12
- 4 AWI-04.05.05, Work Order Closeout and Disposition, Revision 10
- 4 AWI-04.05.06, Post-Maintenance Testing, Revision 6
- 4 AWI-04.05.10, Scaffolding Controls, Revision 3
- 4 AWI-05.01.01, Introduction Design Change Process, Revision 7
- 4 AWI-05.01.04, General Instructions for Design Changes, Revision 3
- 4 AWI-05.01.05, Project Initiation, Revision 7
- 4 AWI-05.01.06, Design Input, Revision 2
- 4 AWI-05.01.07, Design Document Review, Revision 1
- 4 AWI-05.01.08, Specifications and Drawings, Revision 2
- 4 AWI-05.01.09, Design Checking and Verification, Revision 4
- 4 AWI-05.01.10, Project Descriptions, Revision 4
- 4 AWI-05.01.11, Design Change Package Content, Revision 2
- 4 AWI-05.01.12, Design Change Installation Plan, Revision 1
- 4 AWI-05.01.13, Design Change Package Review and Approval, Revision 8
- 4 AWI-05.01.14, Installation and Test Procedures, Revision 2
- 4 AWI-05.01.15, Engineering Change Requests, Revision 1
- 4 AWI-05.01.16, Turnover for Operations, Revision 4
- 4 AWI-05.01.17, Design Change Closeout, Revision 3
- 4 AWI-05.02.06, Guidance for Preventive Maintenance During Plant Operations, Revision 0
- 4 AWI-05.06.01, Safety Review Item, Revision 7
- 4 AWI-05.06.02, 10 CFR 50.59 Applicability Screening, Revision 3
- 4 AWI-05.06.01, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, Revision 1
- 4 AWI-08.09.02, Trending Program, Revision 7.
- 4 AWI-08.09.03, Self-Assessment Trend Review Program, Revision 0
- 4 AWI-10.01.01, Corrective Action Process, Revision 5
- 4 AWI-10.01.02, Employee Observation Reporting, Revision 2
- 4 AWI-10.01.03, Condition Report Process, Revision 12

- 4 AWI-10.01.04, Operability Determination, Revision 3
- 4 AWI-10.01.05, Root Cause Guidance, Revision 0
- 4 AWI-10.01.06, External Operating Experience, Revision 6
- 4 AWI-10.02.01, Actions to Correct Conditions or Prevent Recurrence, Revision 0
- 4 AWI-10.05.02 (Rev-0), Self-Assessment Program

II. Design Change Packages

- 93Q310 - Replacement of 125V Batteries #11 and #12
- 96Q175 R0 - Digital feedwater control system (DFCS) improvements
- 96Q175 R0 - Digital feedwater control system (DFCS) replacement
- 97Q035 R0 - Drywell atmosphere cooling (DAC) improvements
- 97Q065 R0 - RWCU line break isolation logic
- 97Q135 R0 - Sparing of breaker 152-403
- 97Q195 R0 - 4kv essential bus transfer testability improvement
- 98Q010 - C containment penetration instrument over-pressurization modification per GL96-006.
- 98Q060 R0 - Relocate emergency lighting batteries
- 98Q095 R0 - Generic modification for cable replacement
- 98Q140 R0 - RHRSW pump ECCS load shed bypass
- 98Q140 R0 - RHRSW pump ECCS load shed bypass
- 98Q210 R0 - Generic - Inboard MSIV seat angle change
- 99Q025 R0 - Offgas dilution fan damper and control improvements
- 99Q055 R0 - Replace MOV's MO-2035, MO-2075, MO-2076, MO-2397, MO-2398
- 99Q055 R2 - Improvements for MO-2014, MO-2015, MO-2035, MO-2397, MO-2398
- 99Q095 R0 - MO-2397 control circuit change
- 99Q145 R0 - Replacement of CRD-113 valves
- 99Q165 R0 - Core modifications for cycle 20 operation
- 99Q190 R0 - HPCI and RCIC exhaust line vacuum breaker valves replacement
- 99Q220 R0 - Emergency diesel droop project
- 99Q220 Rev 0 - Emergency Diesel Droop Project
- 99Q025 - Offgas Dilution For Damper and Control Improvements
- 99Q055 - Improvements for MO-2014, MO-2015, MO-2035, MO-2397, and MO-2398.
- 99Q145 - Replacement of CRD-113 Valves

III Jumper Bypass (Temporary Modification)

- Jumper Bypass 00-006 -- Block Recirc MG Set deluge valves to prevent inadvertent actuation of deluge system when ventilation is shutdown and room heats up. Remove after temperatures have stabilized.
- Jumper Bypass 00-007 -- Move refuel bridge over vessel for IVVI work while mode switch is in shutdown for WO9904863. Bridge forward movement is blocked from over the core while in shutdown.
- Jumper Bypass 00-022 -- Plug tube in RHR heat exchanger E-200B per WO 0000229.

- Jumper Bypass 00-025 -- To allow operation of MO-2076 during performance of PM and PMT WO9904833.
- Jumper Bypass 00-034 -- Temporary leak repair of Diesel Fire Pump Basket Strainer Backwash pipe.
- Jumper Bypass 00-036 -- Performing Post-Maintenance Testing for WO9906354.
- Jumper Bypass 00-040 -- Bypass group III isolation and MO-2397 control room handswitch bypass to enable use of temporary control switch for votes testing.
- Jumper Bypass 00-043 -- To assure shutdown cooling remains operable during #13 battery capacity test.
- Jumper Bypass 00-061 -- Freeze seal per 8167 for installation of orifices per WO9908669.
- Jumper Bypass 00-068 -- For WO 0000576, 4 switches are to be opened, 3 wires are to be lifted, and one jumper installed to perform calibration/operation testing of current/flow comparator.
- Jumper Bypass 00-070 -- This equipment will monitor parts of the Recirc MG Set power and control system to gather data during running conditions. This will aid in a power system troubleshooting effort.
- Jumper Bypass 00-072 -- To allow the recirc pumps to operate above minimum speed with feedwater flow <20%.
- Jumper Bypass 00-073 -- Input cables from LPRMs 1213B and 3613D need to be removed from back of corresponding APRM pages to prevent degradation of LPRM power supplies. - Installed 2-17-00
- Jumper Bypass 00-080 -- Remove latch from door 76 (Lower 4kv to condensate pump area) so that HELB induced flood water will relieve to the condensate pump area.
- Jumper Bypass 00-081 -- Install flood barrier to protect lower 4kv switchgear.
- Jumper Bypass 00-085 - 4179-01OCD Loop A RHR Shutdown Cooling mode.
- Jumper Bypass 00-089 -- A sill plate will be installed on the west side of door 479. This sill plate will reduce flow into the area outside the lower 4kv room that results from a HELB in the reactor feedpump area.
- Jumper Bypass 00-091 - WO0001350, repair/replace transformer XL-89.
- Jumper Bypass 00-094 -- A plug will be installed in the floor drain located inside the lower 4kv room. The plug is required to prevent backflow in the event of a HELB in the condensate system.
- Jumper Bypass 99-062 -- Per WO 99-7148 install metal strips on the bottoms of doors 201, 202 and 479 to minimize HELB induced flood water flow under these doors.
- Jumper Bypass 99-074 -- WO 9907292 disables door-24 latch mechanism so that this door can be used for a HELB vent path. Door-24 latches to be removed permanently per a Design Change.

IV. Calculations

- CA91-012 -- 125 VDC SBO Load Profile Study, Revision 3.
- CA92-024 -- 125 VDC Battery Sizing Calculation, Revision 2.

- CA93-033 -- 125VDC Voltage Drop Analysis, Revision 2.
- CA95-061 -- Maximum Main Steam Line Differential Pressure at which Inboard MSIVs can be opened, Revision 0.
- CA96-012 -- Minimum Thrust required to close Inboard MSIVs and to obtain leak tight seal, Revision 1.
- CA99-086 -- Water depth to open Railroad door #24, Revision 0.
- CA99-088 -- Replacement of B-RHR Room Door Number 34, Revision 0.
- CA00-038 -- Lower 4kv Area Flood Barrier, Revision 0.

V. Condition Report (CRs)

- 19970570 -- Failure to request exemption request on ISI welds which could not be completely inspected)for (reference LER97-004).
- 19971058 -- Evaluate motor starting capabilities with 80% Voltage at terminals dealing with URI 1996009-8.
- 19971683 -- 4kvb-36Y coil resistance as found value was out of tolerance.
- 19972860 -- Insufficient correlation data provided for coldset thermal relief valves in the IST Program dealing with URI #1994008-1.
- 19980145 -- Inadequate verification of overcurrent trip setpoint in metal-clad, low voltage circuit breakers.
- 19980170 -- Familiarization Training for changes to 4kv essential bus loss of voltage transfer logic.
- 19980177 -- Agastat relay R21 notification.
- 19980737 - "D" MSIV Exceeds Allowed Leakage in Technical Specifications.
- 19981478 - Shaft binding in GE type SBM control switches.
- 19981870 - MOV performance issues.
- 19982181 - Reply requested by letter transmitting NRC Inspection Report 50-263/98009 for URI 1998009-1.
- 19982370 - SOER98-1: Safety System Status Control.
- 19982418 - SOER98-02 Circuit breaker reliability.
- 19982515 - MSIV Inboard Valve Leak Rate Testing.
- 19990274 - MTC to perform or direct a review of EM&P Relay and Breaker Technician Training records with emphasis on technical.
- 19990548 - Timeliness of system engineers review of Surv procedure data.
- 19990712 - Error in ATWS analysis affecting Monticello power uprate.
- 19990954 - Concerns over adequacy of scaffolding controls.
- 19990966 - Single failure vulnerability of the RHR System when in suppression pool cooling mode.
- 19991002 - New Fuel Vault Potential Criticality Conditions.
- 19991162 - Several Surv tests #1343 from 1988, 89 and 90 were not completed. Engineer steps and review was not done.
- 19991327 - IN99014 - unanticipated Rx water draindown at QC.
- 19991351 - Operator training on throttle open operation of MO-2397.
- 19991403 - EDG droop setting and frequency considerations while in standby mode.

- 19992047 - Outboard MSIV AO-2-86D Relay 5A-K3G failed to energize after partial stroke during MSIV tests 0008 and 0160A.
- 19992380 - Loss of normal feed to LC-109.
- 19992427 - Bypass control observations.
- 19992442 - Generic Letter 96-06 - Commitment revision (M96835).
- 19992593 - LC 108 Supply Breaker 801 A-T alarm.
- 19992779 - Incorrect USAR Description of minimum CST inventory.
- 19992859 - Maintaining turbine building railroad door to HELB model configuration (Jumper/Bypass 99-074).
- 19993330 - Inadequate HELB practices guidance provided in 4AWI-08.01.03.
- 19993346 - Contact USA Alliance and request performance of an behavior assessment of the operations department.
- 19993399 - 4kvb-10 tripped free during post maintenance testing being conducted while out of service.
- 1999343 - AC fuses used in DC system.
- 19993466 - Scaffolding controls not adequate to prevent scaffold erection over safety significant instrument rack and MSL flow instrum.
- 19993473 - Rosemount model 1154 dp transmitters.
- 19993654 - Assess training requirements for EDG Droop Mod 99Q220 and associated LP's.
- 19993656 - Assess simulator training requirements for EDG Droop Mod 99Q220.
- 19993705 - Cable tray overfill problem.
- 19993758 - MSVI closure modeled nonconservatively in NAD analysis.
- 19993821 - OE10535 - MSIV DC coils.
- 20000132 - Local Leakage Rates Exceed Technical Specifications limits (2000 RFO).
- 20000133 - Drywell-Torus Breaker exceeded 354 inch lbs during performance of procedure 0127.
- 20000245 - 4kv relaying for 152-609 and 152-602 did not meet the as-left criteria at all test points.
- 20000252 - #11 125CVD Battery Ground.
- 20000404 - Personnel error resulted in cutting on wrong side of valve during installation of modification 99Q020.
- 20000705 - Unauthorized modification to Instrument Air Line without a Work Order - Air line not in service at the time.
- 20000882 - Instantaneous overcurrent flag dropped on alarm relay when 11 condensate pump was started.
- 20001032 - Compensatory Actions associated with TB HELB with Rx mode change.
- 20001168 - OE10774 Rosemount instrument setpoint methodology.
- 20001185 - Target relay flags found tripped on breaker 152-802, 12 cooling tower pump breaker.
- 20001218 - Open floor drain in Division 1 4kv room resulted in incorrect input assumption for the FW break HELB analysis.
- 20001254 - Evaluate the need for further controls on the reactor building RR doors to prevent blocking closed.

VI. Tests and Surveillances

- 2BVS 5.2.f.3-1, Unit 2, ASME Surveillance Requirements for Residual Heat Removal Pump 2RH01PA, Revision 18.
- 2BVS 5.2.4-4, Unit 2, ASME Surveillance Requirements for Residual Heat Removal Pump 2RH01PB, Revision 1.
- 2BVSR AF-3, Unit 2, Simultaneous Start of Both AF Pumps With Flow to the Steam Generators, Revision 2.

VIII. Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

- LER96-008 -- Reactor Water Cleanup line break reanalysis due to errors discovered during re-evaluations.
- LER97-004 -- Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Greater than allowable by technical specifications.
- LER98-001 -- Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Greater than allowable by technical specifications.
- LER99-002 -- Procedures did not require an LCO entry during suppression pool cooling.

- LER2000-001-- Containment isolation valve leakage greater than allowed by technical specifications.
- LER2000-004 - Re-analysis of the High energy line break resulted in potential loss of Division I, 4kv switchgear.

IX Operating Experience Notifications

- SOER98-02 - Circuit Break Reliability
- SRI00-009 Rev 0 - Reactor Recirculation MG Set and Pump Testing
- SRI94-014 Rev 0/1 - HPCI/RCIC system tests with CST to Torus suction path transfer
- SRI98-004 Rev 0 - Operability of Div II 125 VDC Battery while Div I 125 VDC loads are crosstied to Div II 125 VDC Battery
- SRI98-005 Rev 0 - Operability of Div I 125 VDC Battery while Div II 125 VDC loads are crosstied to Div I 125 VDC Battery
- SRI99-002 Rev 0 - Disposition of keys to control room keyswitches
- SRI99-003 Rev 0 - Compliance with 10CFR50.68 (Criticality Accident Requirements)
- SRI99-004 Rev 0 - CRD Differential Pressure Testing during power ops
- SRI99-007 Rev 0 - For stainless steel pipe cleaning and inspection procedure #8041
- SRI99-008 Rev 0 - Provide a removable covering for foreign material exclusion considerations regarding the spent fuel pool
- SRI99-009 Rev 0 - Steam Table Usage
- SRI99-013 Rev 0 - Removal of door at 935' elevation to "B" RHR Room
- SRI99-019 Rev 0 - 10CFR 50.59 Evaluation for differences between the EOPS and the Design Basis.

X. Work Orders

- WO 9905665 - This WO was for minor PM of 4KVB-05
- WO0001672 - Plug floor drain in lower 4kv room
- WO9500712 - Investigate door 45 opening
- WO9502103 - Perform 4858PM and replace close latch bearings
- WO9502104 - Perform 4858PM and replace close latch bearings4858PM Rev 10 - 4kv, GE, AMH Magneblast Air Circuit Breaker Maintenance (152-510)
- WO9502105 - Perform 4858PM and replace close latch bearings
- WO9601974 - Perform 4858PM (major) and replace close latch brg
- WO9704366 - Perform 4858PM (minor) and replace close latch brg
- WO9802027 - PM 4858 minor 4kvb-26 breaker
- WO9802028 - PM4858 minor 4kvb - 38 breaker
- WO9802036 - PM4858 Minor 4kvb-46 breaker
- WO9905667 - PM 4858 minor 4kvb-16 breaker
- WO9907991 - (MP-98Q140-03)
- WO9907992 - (MP-98Q140-04)
- WO9908622 - Preoperational test of HPCI/RCIC Vacuum Breakers

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·XI. Assessments

- Monticello Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment Report 4th Quarter 1998
- Inservice Testing Self Assessment Evaluation Report Sept. 15-18, 1998
- Engineering Performance Indicators 1998 Fourth Quarter
- Engineering Performance Indicators 1999 Third Quarter
- Engineering Performance Indicators 1999 Fourth Quarter
- MNGP Engineering / Operations Self Assessment - Final Report “Identification and Reporting of Equipment Problems 12/6 to 10/99 dated 12-29-99

XII. Audits

- AG 1998-E1 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Modifications)
- AG 1998-E2 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Environmental Qualification)
- AG 1998-E3 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Operating Experience Assessment)
- AG 1998-E4 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Environmental Qualification & Corrective Actions)
- AG 1999-E1 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Nuclear Core Design & In-Service Testing)
- AG 1999-E2 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Material Control)
- AG 1998-E3 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Nuclear Fuel Control)
- AG 1998-E4 Northern States Power Company Internal Audit (Design Basis Control)

XIII. Miscellaneous

- 4851-12PM - part of WO 9904194 - tracking PM of LCB-038
- ARP 4-B-7 Rev 1 - TB Norm Wst Sump Monitor Hi/Inop
- Attendance printout for LP 8108L-035
- Attendance printout for LP M8107-042 (Diesel Generators)
- Conditions Reports list from 1999-2000 (GEN and QAF)
- Copy of DC LS Letter 4KV motors rated for 70% voltage start?
- Copy of Initial S/U testing minimum voltage
- Drawings NE-36404-4, NE-36403-2, NE-36175
- ECCS voltage curves related to EDG testing & the droop modification
- Engineering - Operations Self Assessment Supplemental report - "Disposition of recommended actions & self assessment related observations
- Engineering Performance Indicator Trend Reports 4th Q99
- Engineering Performance Indicators 3rd Q98
- Engineering Performance Indicators 4th Q98
- Engineering/Operations Self Assessment - Final Report Dec 6-10, 1999
- EWI-08.09.01 Rev 4 Sections 1.0 and 2.0 (Page 16) System Engineering Group Trending Program
- Final Report Inservice Testing Self Assessment Evaluation Report Sept 15-18, 1998
- Fire Watch logs for Fire Door 76 for one week (2/28 - 3/6/00)
- Index for NRC Information Notices 1988/1989 (From NRC website)
- Internal Correspondence - 12/28/99 Modification 99Q220 Load Study Report
- Letter - Pressure to open railroad doors (rev 1) 8-14-96
- LP M8107-042 Rev 9 Diesel Generators
- M8108L-035 Rev 1, Handouts - 2000 RFO Modification training
- MNGP - Evaluation of Request for Relief No 9 for the 3rd 10-year interval inservice inspection program (TAC NoM97488)
- Monticello Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment Report 4th Quarter 1998
- NSP letter dated February 3, 1998 (Supplemental Response to Provide results of NSP's inquiry into the intent of OM-1 section 4.3 of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) - related to CR19972860
- PI CR19993148 - Potential weakness in scaffolding procedure
- Preliminary copy of seismic testing dome by Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization (SQRTS) group on standard tube and clamp scaffolding
- Procedure 8146 Rev 12, Scaffold Control
- Quarterly Review - Outstanding Bypasses and Jumpers(OC Review)
- Reply requested by letter transmitting NRC Inspection Report 50-263/98009
- Reply to Notice of Violation contained in NRC Inspection Report 50-263/96006(DEV 1996006-2)
- Report of 50.59's for 1999/2000
- Request for Relief for the 3rd ten year interval inservice inspection program
- Request for Relief No 9 for the 3rd 10-year interval inservice inspection program

- Status of CR's from Inservice Testing Self Assessment Report (19983053, 3054, 3055, 3056, 3057, 3058, 3059, 3060, 3061, 3062, 3063, 3064)
- SGP-06.02 Rev 3, Nuclear Network Screening Guide