



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 3, 2000

Mr. L. W. Meyers
Senior Vice President
Beaver Valley Power Station
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, PA 15077

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT
RE: ONE-TIME EXTENSION OF SNUBBER SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL
(TAC NO. MA6757)

Dear Mr. Meyers:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 110 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to Duquesne Light Company's (DLC) application dated September 22, 1999, as the then licensee for BVPS-2, and supplemented by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC) letter dated April 27, 2000, which submitted License Amendment Request No. 149.

On the date of the September 22, 1999, application, DLC was the licensed operator for BVPS-2. On December 3, 1999, DLC's ownership interest in BVPS-2 was transferred to the Pennsylvania Power Company (Penn Power), and DLC's operating authority for BVPS-2 was transferred to FENOC. By letter dated December 13, 1999, FENOC requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continue to review and act upon all requests before the Commission which had been submitted by DLC. Accordingly, the NRC staff has completed its review of the requested amendment.

The amendment allows a one-time only extension to the surveillance interval of TS surveillance requirement 4.7.12.d for functional testing of snubbers. The extension is limited to first entry into MODE 6 following the defueled condition during the BVPS-2 8th refueling outage or November 30, 2000, whichever occurs sooner.

L. W. Myers

-2-

May 3, 2000

A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Daniel S. Collins, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-412

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 110 to NPF-73
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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L. W. Myers

-2-

A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,



Daniel S. Collins, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-412

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 110 to NPF-73
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES
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PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-412

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 110
License No. NPF-73

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (the licensee) dated September 22, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated April 27, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 110 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. FENOC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Marsha Gamberoni, Acting Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 3, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 110

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DOCKET NO. 50-412

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 7-25

Insert

3/4 7-25

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

c. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) the snubber has no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of the visual inspections shall be classified as unacceptable and may be reclassified acceptable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; or (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f, as applicable. All snubbers found connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as unacceptable for determining the next inspection interval. A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber. If continued operation cannot be justified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION requirements shall be met.

Snubbers which have been determined to be inoperable as a result of unexpected transients, isolated damage, or other random events, and cannot be proven operable by functional testing for the same reasons, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection period when the provision in 4.7.12.d (that failures are subject to an engineering evaluation of component structural integrity) has been met and equipment has been restored to an operable state via repair and/or replacement as necessary.

d. Functional Tests

At least once per 18 months** during shutdown, a representative sample (of at least 10%) of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For Functional Testing type of snubber shall mean a group or combination of groups by load size and kind (i.e., hydraulic or mechanical) or any other combination of load size and kind. For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.12.e or 4.7.12.f, an additional 10% shall be functionally tested.

** A one-time extension of the snubber functional test frequency for operating cycle 8 is permitted. This extension is applicable until the first re-entry into MODE 6 following defueled condition during refueling outage 2R08 or November 30, 2000, whichever is earlier.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-412

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 22, 1999, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) requested Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval of changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.12, related to the surveillance requirements for snubbers. The proposed amendment would provide a one-time extension of the surveillance interval in order to preclude a plant shutdown solely to perform testing.

At the time of the September 22, 1999, letter, DLC was the licensed operator for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 (BVPS-1) and BVPS-2. On December 3, 1999, DLC's ownership interests in both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 were transferred to the Pennsylvania Power Company, and DLC's operating authority for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 was transferred to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC). By letter dated December 13, 1999, FENOC requested that the NRC continue to review and act upon all requests before the Commission which had been submitted by DLC. By letter dated April 27, 2000, FENOC provided a supplemental submittal to the application for amendment that proposed a more restrictive allowance for extension of the surveillance interval than was originally proposed by DLC. The April 27, 2000, letter did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination or expand the amendment beyond the scope of the initial notice.

Currently, the BVPS-2 TS 3/4.7.12 requires the functional testing of a representative sample of snubbers at least once each refueling interval. During the recent extended shutdown, snubber inspections were performed, with the first inspection being performed on July 2, 1998. Given the nominal 18-month surveillance interval, and considering the 25-percent extension to the surveillance interval allowed by TS 4.0.2, the next snubber inspection would be required by

May 17, 2000. The next refueling outage, 2R08, is presently scheduled for September 30, 2000. Therefore, an additional plant shutdown would be required to complete the inspections, since many of the snubbers are not accessible during plant operation. The licensee's proposed revision of the TS would allow a one-time extension to the surveillance interval in order to eliminate the need to cycle the plant and its components through a shutdown-startup cycle. The extension would allow the next snubber surveillance to be deferred until the first re-entry into MODE 6 following the defueled condition during 2R08 or November 30, 2000, whichever comes first. As a result, the calendar time from the start of the surveillance interval (July 2, 1998) to the beginning of 2R08 (presently scheduled for September 30, 2000) will be approximately 27 months, although the actual plant operation time will be approximately 22 months.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Snubbers are passive devices that are used to restrain piping and components. Snubbers are required to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other similar event initiating dynamic loads. Visual inspections, functional tests, and service life monitoring verify snubber operability. The functional testing specified in TS 3/4.7.12 requires that, at least every 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample (of at least 10 percent) of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. TS 3/4.7.12 includes requirements that the representative sample selected for functional testing include various configurations, operating environments, and range of size and capacity of snubbers. In addition, TS 3/4.7.12 includes a requirement to increase the scope of testing (an additional 10 percent) for each selected snubber in each type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria.

The total population of snubbers subject to the sample test plan is 210. The selection of at least 10-percent from each type of snubber results in a total of 25 snubbers tested during each surveillance interval.

3.0 EVALUATION

In its letter dated September 22, 1999, the licensee stated that the amendment request is necessary due to the extended outage (approximately 9 months) that occurred in 1998. The extended outage in 1998 resulted in the start time for the BVPS-2 eighth refueling outage (2R08) being delayed until September 30, 2000. The rescheduling of 2R08 has placed the outage's start date beyond the current surveillance interval for snubber functional testing, which will expire May 17, 2000. At that time, the first group of snubbers will be due for testing. This expiration date includes the 25-percent extension provided by TS 4.0.2. The proposed change would extend the surveillance interval for all test groups (total of 25 snubbers) until the first re-entry into MODE 6 following the defueled condition during 2R08 or November 30, 2000, whichever comes first. This would result in a maximum surveillance interval extension of approximately 6.5 months for the first group of snubbers due for testing (May 17 to November 30).

As stated previously, based on the previous test date (July 2, 1998) of the first group of snubbers due for functional testing, the calendar time from the start of the surveillance interval (July 2, 1998) to the beginning of 2R08 (presently planned to begin September 30, 2000) is approximately 27 months. However, BVPS-2 did not return to power operation until September 29, 1998. In addition, BVPS-2 came down for its seventh refueling outage on February 26, 1999, for 44 days, and then came down for a forced outage on July 18, 1999, for 9 days. Therefore, the actual plant operating time during this period would be reduced to approximately 22 months. This predicted operating time still falls within the 22.5 months (18 months plus 25-percent extension) surveillance interval allowed for snubber functional testing. Therefore, even with the requested extension, the BVPS-2 snubbers are predicted to experience wear due to plant operating conditions (vibration and elevated temperatures) that is within the operating time allowed for by the TS surveillance interval of 22.5 months. For the given November 30, 2000, deadline for extending the surveillance interval, however, the maximum plant operating time would be approximately 24 months, which is 1.5 months beyond the allowed 22.5 months. For this additional 1.5 months, the licensee provided the following justification.

The licensee indicated in their September 22, 1999, letter that snubber testing experience has shown that the historical failure rate of snubbers is low. In the previous seven refueling outages, only during the first refueling outage, 2R01, did the snubber functional test sample plan identify any inoperable snubbers. In that outage, seven snubbers tested inoperable, all due to damage sustained during original construction and startup activities. Since 2R01, no inoperable snubbers were found by sample plan functional testing performed during each required surveillance interval. In addition, the latest visual inspections performed on the BVPS-2 snubbers during 2R07 (February 26, 1999 - April 12, 1999) revealed no evidence of damage or potential problem with any snubber. The licensee, therefore, stated that there is a high level of confidence that no adverse effects on the operability of the snubbers, or the systems or components supported by those snubbers, will occur as a result of the requested extension. This is acceptable to the staff.

4.0 SUMMARY

BVPS-2 was shut down for extended periods of time during the current fuel cycle and the refueling outage schedules are no longer synchronous with the 18-month surveillance requirements for snubbers in the plant TS. On the basis of the evaluation performed by the licensee, the staff concludes that the expected snubber performance for the current operating cycle would be comparable to that which would be seen during the maximum currently allowed TS surveillance interval. Therefore, the proposed surveillance interval extension is acceptable to the staff.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 62711). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: A. J. Lee
D. Collins

Date: May 3, 2000