

*6/8/2000*  
*Template NRR-058*

April 21, 2000

Mr. J. A. Scalice  
Chief Nuclear Officer and  
Executive Vice President  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
6A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 - ISSUANCE OF  
EXIGENT AMENDMENTS REGARDING SECONDARY CONTAINMENT  
DOORS (TAC NOS. MA8548, MA8549 AND MA8550)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 238 , 264 , and 224 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated March 29, 2000 (TS-402). They revise the Technical Specifications requirements applicable to opening of secondary containment access doors.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA by Allen G. Hansen for/

William O. Long, Senior Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management

Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 238 to License No. DPR-33
- 2. Amendment No. 264 to License No. DPR-52
- 3. Amendment No. 224 to License No. DPR-68
- 4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Distribution

File Center	PUBLIC	RCorreia	GHubbard	PDII-2 R/F	WLong
HBerkow	GHill (6)	WBeckner	BClayton	ACRS	OGC
PFredrickson, RII					

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\PDII-2\BFN\8548amd.wpd

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure  
"E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE	PDII-2/PM	PDII-2/LA	RTSB:SON	SPLB	OGC	PDII-2/SC	PDII-2/D
NAME	WLong <i>NR</i>	BClayton <i>BAC</i>	WBeckner	GHubbard	<i>McGinnis</i>	RCorreia	HBerkow
DATE	4/5/00	4/5/00	4/7/00	4/9/00	4/19/00	4/24/00	1/1/00

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

*Template NRR-058*

*DF01*



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 21, 2000

Mr. J. A. Scalice  
Chief Nuclear Officer and  
Executive Vice President  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
6A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 - ISSUANCE OF  
EXIGENT AMENDMENTS REGARDING SECONDARY CONTAINMENT  
DOORS (TAC NOS. MA8548, MA8549 AND MA8550)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. **238** , **264** , and **224** to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated March 29, 2000 (TS-402). They revise the Technical Specifications requirements applicable to opening of secondary containment access doors.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

William O. Long, Senior Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management

Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296

- Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. **238** to License No. DPR-33
  2. Amendment No. **264** to License No. DPR-52
  3. Amendment No. **224** to License No. DPR-68
  4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-259

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. **238**  
License No. DPR-33

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 29, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-33 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 238, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: **April 21, 2000**

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 238

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

DOCKET NO. 50-259

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

3.6-46  
B 3.6-105

INSERT

3.6-46  
B 3.6-105

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.4.1.1	Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.2	Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.3	Verify two standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystems will draw down the secondary containment to $\geq 0.25$ inch of vacuum water gauge in $\leq 120$ seconds.	24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.4.1.4	Verify two SGT subsystems can maintain $\geq 0.25$ inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate $\leq 12,000$ cfm.	24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS

BASES

---

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2

Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. In some cases, secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner doors. The intent is to not breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.

(continued)

---



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. **264**  
License No. DPR-52

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 29, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. **264**, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: **April 21, 2000**

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 264

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

3.6-46  
B 3.6-105

INSERT

3.6-46  
B 3.6-105

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.4.1.1	Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.2	Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.3	Verify two standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystems will draw down the secondary containment to $\geq 0.25$ inch of vacuum water gauge in $\leq 120$ seconds.	24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.4.1.4	Verify two SGT subsystems can maintain $\geq 0.25$ inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate $\leq 12,000$ cfm.	24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS

BASES

---

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2

Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. In some cases, secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner doors. The intent is to not breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.

(continued)

---



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-296

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. **224**  
License No. DPR-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 29, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. ~~224~~, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: **April 21, 2000**

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 224

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

DOCKET NO. 50-296

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

3.6-46  
B 3.6-105

INSERT

3.6-46  
B 3.6-105

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.4.1.1	Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.2	Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.3	Verify two standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystems will draw down the secondary containment to $\geq 0.25$ inch of vacuum water gauge in $\leq 120$ seconds.	24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.4.1.4	Verify two SGT subsystems can maintain $\geq 0.25$ inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate $\leq 12,000$ cfm.	24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS

BASES

---

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2

Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. In some cases, secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner doors. The intent is to not breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.

(continued)

---



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 238 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

AMENDMENT NO. 264 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

AMENDMENT NO. 224 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260, AND 50-296

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated March 29, 2000, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) requested changes to the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 relating to the opening of secondary containment doors. The associated BASES would also be revised accordingly. The proposed TS changes are based on the current staff guidance applicable to boiling water reactor (BWR/4) facilities.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

### 2.1 Secondary Containment Description and Function

The three BFN units are provided with a shared secondary containment building which encloses the primary containments and refueling areas. The secondary containment serves as an enclosure which, in the event of an accident, provides a means to collect leakage from the primary containment so that the leakage can be collected and processed by the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and discharged from an elevated release point. In order for the leakage to be adequately collected and processed by the SGTS in accordance with analytical assumptions used in the analyses of radiological consequences of design basis accidents, the secondary containment post-accident infiltration rates must be limited. This requires, among other things, that each secondary containment penetration be closed whenever any one or more of the three units is operating, or spent fuel is being handled. To enable the passage of personnel and equipment into and out of the secondary containment, without compromising secondary containment integrity, double-door systems (i.e., "locks") are provided. These locks permit passage of personnel and equipment without creating a pathway for primary containment leakage to bypass the SGTS.

### 2.1.2 Current BFN TS Requirements

The original TS permitted one secondary containment access door, in each lock, to be open whenever the other was shut. During the conversion of the TS to the NUREG-1433 standard, (Amendments 234, 253 and 212, issued July 14, 1998) a new surveillance requirement was established which precludes opening a secondary containment door for maintenance on the door, unless all units served by that penetration are shutdown.

The current SR reads:

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify each secondary containment access door is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit, then at least one door shall be closed.

### 2.2 Proposed Change

The licensee proposes to replace the current surveillance requirement with the following:

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.

The surveillance test interval of once every 31 days, would not be changed. The associated BASES would be revised to explicitly indicate (a) that maintenance on a secondary containment door is permissible as long as the other door is maintained shut and (b) all doors are normally maintained closed (i.e., secondary containment doors will be opened only for entrance, exit and door maintenance.

### 2.3 Basis for Acceptability of Proposed Change

The proposed change and its basis for acceptability have generic applicability and have been approved for incorporation in future revisions of the Standard TS. This was accomplished through "TSTF-18." [On October 2, 1998, (Reference Letter from William D. Beckner, NRC, to James Davis, Nuclear Energy Institute) the staff approved TS Task Force Traveler No. 18 (TSTF-18).]

Closure of one door in each secondary containment access opening is sufficient to preclude the infiltration of outside air of such magnitude as to prevent maintaining the necessary negative pressure inside the secondary containment under post-accident conditions. Also, the staff recognizes the need for provisions in the TS to enable secondary containment door maintenance during power operation. Prompt door maintenance without unnecessary plant shutdown and restart evolutions will result in enhanced safety and conduct of operations.

### 2.5 Statement of Exigent Circumstances

The licensee is requesting exigent approval of this proposed TS change to allow the prompt repair of main equipment lock access door. The main equipment lock is used to transfer fuel and other large items into and out of the secondary containment. It is provided with large motor-operated double doors having inflatable pneumatic seals which are supplied with inflation

air from an air receiver of the Control Air System. The seal on the inner door presently has a pinhole-size leak. TVA is concerned that the air leak could worsen if not repaired soon, potentially rendering the inner equipment access door inoperable. In this case, equipment transfer into and out of secondary containment via the main equipment lock would be prohibited by TS Limiting Condition for Operation, 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment.

With the Unit 3 refueling outage pending, it is necessary to be able to readily move equipment and material in and out of secondary containment through the main equipment lock. The inability to do so would severely hinder outage activities since the subject building access lock is the primary pathway for large equipment transport supporting refueling activities. The current TS do not contain explicit provisions for single secondary containment doors to be temporarily opened to accommodate maintenance activities. Therefore, shutdown of both Units 2 and 3 would be required to perform the seal repairs. The proposed TS change would allow the seal to be repaired online and would avoid the transition risks associated with such a reactor shutdown to perform minor door seal repair work. Thus, exigent handling serves a benefit to the public health and safety.

#### 5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92, the licensee has evaluated this proposed TS change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided by the licensee in support of this conclusion.

- A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change is an administrative clarification of the existing requirements. Verifying that one door in each access opening is closed ensures the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent the maintaining of the desired post-accident negative pressure does not occur.

Therefore the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

- B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment does not add any new equipment or require any existing equipment to be operated in a manner different from the present design. The proposed change is consistent with the SAR [Safety Analysis Report] analysis for design basis accidents. No operation outside of the existing design basis is introduced by the proposed amendment.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

- C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change is consistent with the BFN F[Final]SAR accident analysis. The change does not physically modify any equipment, setpoints, or equipment initiation sequences.

For these reasons, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff determines that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Alabama State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. Long

Date: **April 21, 2000**

Mr. J. A. Scalice  
Tennessee Valley Authority

**BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT**

cc:

Mr. Karl W. Singer, Senior Vice President  
Nuclear Operations  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
6A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Mr. Mark J. Burzynski, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
4X Blue Ridge  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Mr. Jack A. Bailey, Vice President  
Engineering & Technical Services  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
6A Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Mr. Timothy E. Abney, Manager  
Licensing and Industry Affairs  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
P.O. Box 2000  
Decatur, AL 35609

Mr. John T. Herron, Site Vice President  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
P.O. Box 2000  
Decatur, AL 35609

Senior Resident Inspector  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
10833 Shaw Road  
Athens, AL 35611

General Counsel  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
ET 10H  
400 West Summit Hill Drive  
Knoxville, TN 37902

State Health Officer  
Alabama Dept. of Public Health  
RSA Tower - Administration  
Suite 1552  
P.O. Box 303017  
Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

Mr. N. C. Kazanas, General Manager  
Nuclear Assurance  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
5M Lookout Place  
1101 Market Street  
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Chairman  
Limestone County Commission  
310 West Washington Street  
Athens, AL 35611

Mr. Robert G. Jones, Plant Manager  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
P.O. Box 2000  
Decatur, AL 35609