

Template: NRR-058

April 25, 2000

Mr. James A. Hutton
Director-Licensing, MC 62A-1
PECO Energy Company
Nuclear Group Headquarters
Correspondence Control Desk
P.O. Box No. 195
Wayne, PA 19087-0195

SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: ONE-TIME EXTENSION TO THE COMPLETION TIME FOR ONE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SUBSYSTEM INOPERABLE FROM 7 TO 14 DAYS (TAC NOS. MA8320 AND MA8322)

Dear Mr. Hutton:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 231 and 236 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated February 29, 2000, as supplemented on March 31, 2000.

These amendments will add a note to the completion time of Condition A for TS 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink." This note will provide a one-time extension to the completion time for one ESW subsystem inoperable from 7 to 14 days. This note will allow the replacement of one ESW pump currently scheduled to occur in May 2000 and will expire on May 31, 2000.

A copy of the safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,
/RA/

Bartholomew C. Buckley, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 231 to DPR-44
2. Amendment No. 236 to DPR-56
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 25, 2000

Mr. James A. Hutton
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PECO Energy Company
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These amendments will add a note to the completion time of Condition A for TS 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink." This note will provide a one-time extension to the completion time for one ESW subsystem inoperable from 7 to 14 days. This note will allow the replacement of one ESW pump currently scheduled to occur in May 2000 and will expire on May 31, 2000.

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Bartholomew C. Buckley, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2
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Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 231 to DPR-44
2. Amendment No. 236 to DPR-56
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,
Units 2 and 3

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PECO ENERGY COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-277

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 231
License No. DPR-44

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by PECO Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated February 29, 2000, as supplemented on March 31, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I.
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 231 , are hereby incorporated in the license. PECO Energy Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than May 31, 2000.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 25, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 231

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-44

DOCKET NO. 50-277

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3.7-3
B 3.7-8

Insert

3.7-3
B 3.7-8

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink

LCO 3.7.2 Two ESW subsystems and normal heat sink shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One ESW subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore ESW subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days *
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. <u>OR</u> Both ESW subsystems inoperable. <u>OR</u> Normal heat sink inoperable.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours 36 hours

* The Completion Time to this Action is temporarily extended to 14 days. This note will expire May 31, 2000.

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the ESW System and normal heat sink are determined by the systems they support, and therefore the requirements are not the same for all facets of operation in MODES 4 and 5. Thus, the LCOs of the systems supported by the ESW System and normal heat sink will govern ESW System and normal heat sink OPERABILITY requirements in MODES 4 and 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one ESW subsystem inoperable, the ESW subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESW subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ESW subsystem could result in loss of ESW function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the redundant ESW System capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem, the low probability of an event occurring during this time period, and is consistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring an inoperable DG. *

B.1 and B.2

If the ESW System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or both ESW subsystems are inoperable, or the normal heat sink is inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.2.1

This SR verifies the water level in the pump bay of the pump structure to be sufficient for the proper operation of the ESW pumps (the pump's ability to meet the minimum flow rate and anticipatory actions required for flood conditions are

(continued)

* The Completion time to this Action is temporarily extended to 14 days. The additional 7 days is based on probabilistic risk assessment study. This note will expire May 31, 2000.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PECO ENERGY COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-278

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 236
License No. DPR-56

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by PECO Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated February 29, 2000, as supplemented on March 31, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I.
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 236, are hereby incorporated in the license. PECO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than May 31, 2000.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 25, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 236

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-56

DOCKET NO. 50-278

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3.7-3
B 3.7-8

Insert

3.7-3
B 3.7-8

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink

LCO 3.7.2 Two ESW subsystems and normal heat sink shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One ESW subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore ESW subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days *
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. <u>OR</u> Both ESW subsystems inoperable. <u>OR</u> Normal heat sink inoperable.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours 36 hours

* The Completion Time to this Action is temporarily extended to 14 days. This note will expire May 31, 2000.

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the ESW System and normal heat sink are determined by the systems they support, and therefore the requirements are not the same for all facets of operation in MODES 4 and 5. Thus, the LCOs of the systems supported by the ESW System and normal heat sink will govern ESW System and normal heat sink OPERABILITY requirements in MODES 4 and 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one ESW subsystem inoperable, the ESW subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESW subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ESW subsystem could result in loss of ESW function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the redundant ESW System capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem, the low probability of an event occurring during this time period, and is consistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring an inoperable DG. *

B.1 and B.2

If the ESW System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or both ESW subsystems are inoperable, or the normal heat sink is inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.2.1

This SR verifies the water level in the pump bay of the pump structure to be sufficient for the proper operation of the ESW pumps (the pump's ability to meet the minimum flow rate and anticipatory actions required for flood conditions are

(continued)

* The Completion time to this Action is temporarily extended to 14 days. The additional 7 days is based on probabilistic risk assessment study. This note will expire May 31, 2000.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 231 AND 236 TO FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE NOS. DPR-44 and DPR-56
PECO ENERGY COMPANY
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3
DOCKET NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 29, 2000, as supplemented on March 31, 2000, the PECO Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would allow a one-time extension from 7 to 14 days of the allowed outage time (AOT) for one emergency service water (ESW) subsystem inoperable. This will allow greater flexibility in the replacement of the "B" ESW pump to avoid potential unscheduled plant shutdowns or requests for temporary relief for non-risk-significant conditions. The March 31, 2000, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Since the mid-1980's, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been reviewing and granting improvements to TSs that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on TS improvements of July 22, 1993, the NRC stated that it...

...expects that licensees, in preparing their Technical Specification related submittals, will utilize any plant-specific PSA (probabilistic safety assessment)¹ or risk survey and any available literature on risk insights and PSAs. . . Similarly, the NRC staff will also employ

¹PSA and PRA are used interchangeably herein.

Enclosure

risk insights and PSAs in evaluating Technical Specifications related submittals. Further, as part of the Commission's ongoing program of improving Technical Specifications, it will continue to consider methods to make better use of risk and reliability information for defining future generic Technical Specifications requirements.

The NRC reiterated this point when it issued the revision to 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications," in July 1995. In August 1995, the NRC adopted a final policy statement on the use of PRA methods in nuclear regulatory activities that encouraged greater use of PRA to improve safety decision making and regulatory efficiency. The PRA policy statement included the following points:

1. The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
2. PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current regulatory requirements...
3. PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be as realistic as practicable and appropriate supporting data should be publicly available for review.

There are two ESW pumps ("A" and "B") that provide emergency cooling for certain loads from Units 2 and 3. Ongoing testing performed in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program demonstrates that the performance of the "B" ESW pump is degrading as measured by reduced system flow. Although the pump currently meets operability requirements, performance is degrading such that the pump will eventually become inoperable. The licensee has scheduled the pump for replacement during May 2000 while the units are at power. The utility has indicated it expects replacement of the ESW pump to occur within the 7-day Completion Time of the Allowed Outage Time. However, in order to preclude the possible need for regulatory action on an expedited basis to extend the Completion Time, PECO Energy Company requested a change to the TSs. The licensee considers 7 days to be the maximum amount of additional time necessary to address potential uncertainties that would prevent restoring the pump to operable status.

3.0 EVALUATION

The staff evaluated the licensee's proposed amendment to extend the TS Completion Time (Completion Time and AOT are used interchangeably herein) for one ESW train out of service from 7 days to 14 days using insights derived from traditional engineering considerations and the use of PRA methods to determine the safety impact of extending the Completion Times.

Traditional Engineering Evaluation

The current Peach Bottom TSs address the ESW system and the normal heat sink. Two 100-percent capacity ESW pumps provide emergency cooling to the coolers for the four

emergency diesel generators (that provide emergency ac power to the two units) and provide cooling to Unit 2 and 3 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) loads. The ESW pumps are credited in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) accident analyses for loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) and are needed for loss of offsite power events. A non-safety grade emergency cooling water (ECW) pump can provide backup to an ESW pump. TS 3.7.2 requires two ESW subsystems to be operable during modes 1, 2, and 3. With one ESW subsystem inoperable, the Required Action is to restore the ESW subsystem to Operable status within 7 days, or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours (Condition B), and Mode 4 within 36 hours.

The proposed change will provide a one-time extension from 7 to 14 days to the Completion Time for the Condition of one ESW subsystem inoperable. The proposed change will allow the replacement of one ESW pump, currently scheduled to occur in May 2000, and will expire on May 31, 2000. The licensee indicated that replacement of the ESW pump cannot be guaranteed within the existing Completion Time and may result in an unscheduled shutdown or a request for temporary relief to allow continued plant operation. After performing an engineering review, the licensee determined that a 7-day extension would provide sufficient margin to resolve most anticipated problems associated with pump replacement.

When the staff receives risk-informed TS change requests, it expects to receive a mixture of traditional engineering evaluation and PRA analysis. The traditional engineering portion of the submittal addressed defense-in-depth aspects of the Peach Bottom design including provisions to preclude simultaneous equipment outages that could erode the risk profile of the units and consideration of potential severe weather conditions prior to beginning ESW pump replacement (see discussion of Tier 2 below). The licensee indicated that the AOT extension request does not degrade safety margins, including UFSAR acceptance criteria. The licensee's traditional engineering evaluation and our traditional engineering evaluation did not identify any significant concerns with the proposed AOT extension.

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Evaluation

The staff used a three-tiered approach to evaluate the risk associated with the proposed TS changes. The first tier evaluated the PRA model and the impact of the Completion Time extension for an ESW subsystem on plant operational risk. The second tier addressed the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations, by identifying the need for any additional constraints or compensatory actions that, if implemented, would avoid or reduce the probability of a risk-significant configuration during the time when one ESW subsystem is out of service. The third tier evaluated the licensee's program to ensure that the applicable plant configuration will be appropriately assessed from a risk perspective before entering into or during the proposed Completion Times. Each tier and the associated findings are discussed below.

Tier 1 Evaluation

When evaluating the risk significance of a TS change request, the staff evaluates the importance of the equipment affected by the request. The ECCS heat loads would be high following a LOCA, and ECCS equipment is normally cooled by the Unit 2 or Unit 3 Service Water systems (SW). The ESW system is only needed if the SW system fails (e.g., if offsite power is lost) or if the emergency diesel generators start (ESW provides diesel generator cooler secondary side cooling). For accidents where the EDGs do not start and the SW system is

operable, there is no need for ESW system operation. The ESW pumps are considered to be important equipment from a risk standpoint.

To complete the first tier evaluation, the staff investigated the quality of the Peach Bottom PRA. In conference calls on March 15 and March 28, 2000, with the licensee, and as supplemented by a letter on March 31, 2000, from the licensee, it was determined the Peach Bottom PRA was originally certified by a team from the BWR Owner's Group (BWROG) in November 1996 as part of the BWROG pilot program for PRA certification. In November 1998 there was a recertification of the Peach Bottom PRA by another BWROG team using the final methodology for certification. Based on the comments from the November 1998 certification team and plant improvements made in the interim, the licensee updated the PRA again in 1999. The licensee stated that this upgrade resolved important comments from the 1998 certification in areas such as initiating event frequency, grouping of initiators, plant-specific data, human reliability analysis reassessment, and common cause failure evaluations. The 1999 update was checked by a quality assurance process involving PECO PRA experts normally involved with other nuclear units, as well as by the experts involved with the Peach Bottom PRA. The combination of BWROG certification and licensee quality assurance review provides adequate assurance of the quality of the Peach Bottom PRA insights regarding the proposed one-time AOT extension for ESW.

The licensee modeled the inoperability of the "B" ESW pump during the period of its replacement by modifying the base PRA model so that the "B" pump was out of service all the time. The PRA was then rerun to determine the increase in core damage frequency (CDF) over that of the base case. Multiplying the increase in CDF by the number of days the "B" ESW pump will be inoperable (14 days) and dividing by 365 days per year gives the increase in core damage probability (CDP) (note that CDP is unitless). Based on information provided by the licensee, the increase in CDP due to the proposed AOT extension is 4×10^{-8} for Unit 2 and 2×10^{-8} for Unit 3. These values are less than the acceptance guideline value from Regulatory Guide 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications" of a 5×10^{-7} increase in CDP.

This completes the staff's first tier evaluation of the licensee's proposal to extend the Completion Time for one ESW subsystem from 7 to 14 days. Based on the above discussion, the staff finds acceptable the PRA model used by the Peach Bottom licensee and also concludes that there is minimal impact from the Completion Time extensions for the ESW system on plant operational risk.

Tier 2 Evaluation

The licensee identified in its submittal that it has an emergency cooling water (ECW) pump. The pump has adequate flow capacity and independent power supply to act as a backup to the "A" ESW pump during the period the "B" pump is being replaced. The licensee indicated in a March 15, 2000, teleconference that the pump does not have the "pedigree" of the ESW pumps and their support systems, but was procured as part of the Q-list. The ECW pump passed its operability test in January 2000. The licensee indicated that the ECW pump and the "A" ESW subsystem will not have scheduled test or maintenance performed on them during the period the "B" ESW pump is inoperable (i.e., during its replacement.)

In conference calls with the licensee on March 15 and March 28, 2000, and in a supplemental submittal on March 31, 2000, the licensee stated that work planners at Peach Bottom use a risk-based computer program, ORAM-Sentinel, to determine the instantaneous core damage frequency of the units, which depends on proposed equipment configurations, and whether proposed equipment configurations could put the units in a state where the "color" of the plant would change if equipment were taken out of service. Here "color" refers to the color codes used by the licensee to indicate the degree to which defense-in-depth (DID) is maintained in the facility after equipment is taken out of service or becomes inoperable (normally, green, yellow, orange, and red, with green indicating the highest level of DID exists and red indicating the lowest level). ORAM-Sentinel operates based on cutsets from the 1999 Peach Bottom PRA.

The work planners brief the control room operators and management every morning about the planned test and maintenance work for the day. They provide the operators with a "Return to Service List" and a "Remain in Service List." These lists indicate the priority with which equipment should be returned to service and lists which equipment should not be removed from service, if possible. The work planners place this assessment of the "color" of the plant for the upcoming week (based on maintenance and testing for the week) on the WEB. The work planners provide similar information when emergent work occurs. The shift supervisors supplement this work with a list of protected equipment (including equipment not modeled in the PRAs) for the operators, which is also put on the WEB. The work planning process in conjunction with operator awareness helps reduce the likelihood that the units will end up in a risk-significant configuration.

The licensee identified that their procedures for the replacement of the "B" ESW pump include checking for the threat of severe weather in the next few days as well as monitoring the river water level prior to starting the replacement. The staff finds this system of monitoring equipment configurations acceptable for extension of the Completion Time.

Tier 3 Evaluation

The licensee, in conjunction with its work planners, uses a risk-based computer program, ORAM-Sentinel, to determine if proposed equipment configurations could put the unit(s) in a less safe situation. The staff is aware of this program, which is capable of providing information about the risk significance of various equipment configurations. The staff therefore, finds that the Completion Time for one ESW subsystem may be extended to 14 days, one time, until May 31, 2000, with a negligible effect on risk.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The

Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 12589). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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