United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
01/31/2000	1999009	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Cold weather preparations.** Cold weather preparations were performed in accordance with instructions contained within approved procedures and were completed in a timely manner and without error. Provisions to ensure systems, such as heat tracing, remained operable and were adequate. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/31/2000	1999009-01	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 1C **Sec:** 4B **Ter:**	**Inappropriate change to an emergency operating procedure.** Changes made to the "Secondary Containment Control" emergency operating procedure introduced non-conservatism and did not meet the intent of the safety evaluation performed by the engineering department. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was issued because changes made to the procedure did not provide appropriate guidance for responding to high radiation conditions within secondary containment. The NRC tracking number for the non-cited violation is 50-263/1999009-01(DRP). Furthermore, a condition report was not generated when the engineering department became aware of the procedural inadequacy. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/11/2000	1999008	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Command and control.** Operators demonstrated an increased level of alarm awareness, application of management expectations, and command and control during routine control room evolutions. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/06/2000	1999009	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Reactor shutdown activities.** Reactor shutdown and refueling activities were performed in accordance with instructions contained in approved procedures by qualified and well-trained operators. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
12/07/1999	1999008	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	Licensee	POS	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 1A **Ter:** 5A	**High pressure coolant injection system inoperable.** The licensee appropriately declared the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system inoperable, entered a 14-day limiting condition for operation, isolated and depressurized the HPCI steam line, and made a 4-hour non-emergency notification when they identified that a HPCI steam line support was loose. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
10/23/1999	1999007	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Conduct of operation during power changes.** Planned and unplanned reactor power reductions were performed in a controlled manner. Operator response to annunciators had improved since the previous inspection period. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
10/16/1999	1999007	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 1B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Untimely update of abnormal operating procedures.** Although the values specified in an abnormal operating procedure for decreasing condenser vacuum were conservative, the inspectors were concerned that this procedure, which required operators to insert a manual scram under certain conditions, was not updated in a timely manner following the power uprate/turbine upgrade program.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
08/25/1999	1999301-01	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Failure to maintain examination integrity.** While the licensee had established appropriate procedures to control test material integrity, the examination team identified a lack of plant staff understanding regarding current examination security measures that resulted in an examination compromise. The licensee took appropriate short-term corrective actions to prevent any additional exam compromise. This Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 55.49, which requires all applicants, licensees, and facility licensees to not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by 10 CFR 55, which includes initial NRC licensing examination activity, is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation with a tracking number of 50-263/99301-01(DRS).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
08/13/1999	1999006	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:** 2B	**Use of risk during operations.** The licensee properly considered risk during maintenance work and postponed the repair of a power supply in the rod position information system. The maintenance was postponed because concurrent maintenance that was scheduled on load center 109 increased the potential for a reactor trip (scram) coupled with a loss of rod position indication.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
08/12/1999	1999005	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Improper throttling of isolation valves.** The overall conduct of operations was performed in accordance with procedures and management direction in a safety-conscious manner. However, the inspectors identified an equipment operator work practice of throttling isolation valves for certain pressure gauges in order to dampen pressure oscillations while they took readings. This practice was not in accordance with management expectations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
08/10/1999	1999005-01	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 4C **Ter:** 5A	**Failure to write a condition report when test requirements not met.** A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for the failure to initiate a Condition Report, as required by administrative procedures, on two separate occasions when the 12 core spray pump motor cooler flow rate did not meet the acceptance criterion contained in the "Emergency Core Cooling Systems Pump Motor Cooler Flush" surveillance test procedure. The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/99005-01(DRP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
08/04/1999	1999005	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Conduct of power changes.** A control rod pattern adjustment was conducted by operators in a controlled and deliberate manner. Reactivity adjustments were made in accordance with procedural requirements.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:** 3B	**Reactor startup.** A reactor startup on May 27, 1999, was performed in accordance with approved procedures. Infrequent evolution briefings performed for the startup were thorough and comprehensive. Reactor thermal limits were properly monitored throughout the startup.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1C **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Procedural controls.** During a reactor startup with one average power range monitor bypassed per trip system, the licensee had procedural requirements in place to ensure that the minimum number of average power range and associated intermediate power range nuclear instruments remained operable.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
05/20/1999	1999003	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Good pre-job brief for reactor startup.** A reactor startup on April 28 was performed in accordance with approved procedures. Pre-job briefings for the startup were thorough and comprehensive.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
05/20/1999	1999003-01	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 5A **Ter:**	**Report of high pressure coolant injection system inoperability not made within 4 hours as required by 10 CFR** The licensee declared associated equipment inoperable and entered the appropriate Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation when the 13 emergency service water (ESW) pump did not start during routine surveillance testing. A Non-Cited Violation for a failure to make a non-emergency 4-hour report to the NRC within the specified time was identified. Following the return of the 13 ESW pump to an operable condition, the inspectors identified that the operators were not aware that the pump discharge check valve continued to leak and could affect operability. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is 50-263/99003-01(DRP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
05/20/1999	1999003-02	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 1B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Failure to provide a detailed procedure for the use of the feedwater pump high level trip bypass switch.** Operators were initially unaware that the main steamlines had flooded due to their reliance on an improperly programmed SPDS (safety parameter display system) level indication in conjunction with some deficiencies in operator knowledge associated with reactor vessel water level instrumentation. Main steamlines were inadvertently flooded when operators inappropriately bypassed reactor feedwater pump high level trips during a scram recovery. Operators had used an informal method for combating similar transients that had been encouraged during simulator training. The training department failed to proceduralize the informal method and operators failed to challenge the use of this non-proceduralized method. A Non-Cited Violation was issued for the failure to update Technical Specification required procedures, specifically, the use and operation of the reactor feed pump trip bypass switch. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is 50-263/99003-02(DRP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
05/20/1999	1999003-03	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 1B **Sec:** 2A **Ter:** 3A	**Inadequate procedural controls for the use of mode switch.** Operators exacerbated a reactor scram when they failed to place the mode switch in shutdown in a timely manner, resulting in a main steamline isolation. A Non-Cited Violation was identified in that procedural guidance for a reactor scram did not direct operators to place the mode switch in shutdown after a scram and before reactor pressure dropped below 840 pounds per square inch gauge. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is 50-263/99003-03(DRP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
05/20/1999	1999003	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:** MAINT	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 1B **Sec:** 2A **Ter:**	**Reactor scram due to equipment failure.** A reactor scram occurred on low reactor water level due to a failure of the digital feedwater control system. Although several complications were associated with scram recovery actions and resulted in inadvertently flooding the main steam lines, reactor water level was eventually stabilized in the normal shutdown band. Proper NRC notifications were made.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 1A **Ter:** 4B	**Weak operability evaluation.** The licensee's initial operability determination conducted for a degraded bellows leak detection system for a safety relief valve was not thorough. The subsequent review, performed after the inspectors raised concerns, was thorough and appropriately concluded the valve was operable.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Safety parameter display system loss.** A loss of the safety parameter display system associated with an unplanned outage of the plant process computer was reported to the NRC headquarters operations center in accordance with plant procedures. The inspectors found that procedures and reporting requirements were appropriate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Shift technical advisors.** A licensee review of shift technical advisor training indicated that shift technical advisors were trained and qualified as required by the associated training program. Inspectors sampled the requirements and found no deficiencies.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:** ENG	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 2A **Ter:**	**Response to drywell leak.** The licensee properly responded to a momentary increase in the drywell unidentified leak rate. The inspectors found the evaluation and the determination of the cause to be comprehensive and accurate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 3B **Ter:**	**Crew performance.** The operating shift crew observed by the inspectors passed the operating portion of the requalification examination. The licensee evaluators' findings and conclusions on the crew's performance during the dynamic simulator evaluation generally agreed with the inspectors' overall assessment. Although the inspectors identified some weaknesses pertaining to procedure use and crew communications, the aggregate individual performance deficiencies did not adversely impact the crew's ability to implement necessary mitigating actions to safely control the plant during emergencies.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Requal material.** The requalification examination material contained the necessary quantitative and qualitative attributes to provide an effective evaluation of operator skills. However, the inspectors noted some opportunities to enhance the material to better probe and evaluate operator responsibilities and performance. In particular, dynamic simulator scenarios and JPMs (job performance measures) could have been more challenging. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Exam security.** The licensee administered the annual requalification examinations according to program guidance and the examinations were consistent with regulatory guidelines. The licensee satisfactorily maintained examination security throughout the examination period; however, the inspectors noted that an added security posting on the outer door leading into the simulation facility room was needed. Also, no significant simulator performance or fidelity issues were identified. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Operator remediation.** The remediation program contained adequate measures to ensure individual and crew performance weaknesses were identified, assigned, and remediated prior to resumption of licensed duties. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Operator physical examination requirements.** The operators' license conditions were in conformance with program guidance and regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 55.21 for biennial physical examinations. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 3B **Ter:** 3C	**Operator past performance problems.** Based on the review of past documents, licensed operators had demonstrated some past performance deficiencies pertaining to procedure adherence, communications, and command and control. Consequently, during this requalification inspection, the inspectors noted several instances in which operators demonstrated similar deficiencies in procedure use and communications. The licensee's operator continuing training program and the operations department were continuing to address these issues at the conclusion of the inspection. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 3C **Ter:**	**Shift manager duties.** The inspectors, through observations and review of simulator scenario requalification examinations and discussions with licensee personnel, noted difficulties in the shift manager's (SM) ability to simultaneously implement the duties of the SM, emergency director (ED), and shift technical advisor (STA) roles during plant emergency conditions. In addition, during a plant fire casualty, the SM would also assume the duties of the shift supervisor. The licensee indicated that they were reviewing further actions to streamline the functions of the SM. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 3B **Ter:**	**Control room activities.** Control room operators demonstrated an appropriate level of attentiveness to the operating panels and were knowledgeable of plant conditions. The inspectors considered the implementation of an end-of-shift briefing (post-shift briefing) as a positive practice. In general, operators conducted control room activities in a professional manner. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Operator requal training feedback.** The licensee's feedback process, that included training department self-assessment and Quality Assurance group audits, was satisfactorily implemented. The licensee conducted good, self-critical audits which provided constructive feedback into both the initial license operator training and licensed operator requalification training programs. However, the licensee's operations department had not yet implemented a formal self-assessment program. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
03/12/1999	1999010	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Self-contained breathing apparatus for operators.** The licensee appropriately maintained self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for licensed operators as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and station procedural requirements. All licensed operators had current SCBA medical examinations, SCBA training, and SCBA fit-testing. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 1A **Sec:** 3A **Ter:** 2B	**Operator response to Group IV isolation.** The high pressure coolant injection system responded as expected to the Group IV isolation signal received unexpectedly during surveillance testing. Operators correctly implemented the abnormal procedure for the Group IV isolation. The licensee made a four-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, and initiated a condition report associated with this event. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Service water configuration.** Inspectors identified a minor failure with maintaining the service water radiation monitor system configuration as required by procedure when operators did not restore the system to a normal line-up upon completion of system flushing. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** OPS **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Operator response to loss of building negative pressure.** Operators demonstrated good communications, control room demeanor, and procedure use when emergency operating procedures were implemented on a loss of reactor building negative pressure. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
01/31/2000	1999009	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Licensee	POS	**Pri:** 3B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Non-destructive testing for welds properly assessed.** The licensee demonstrated a good questioning attitude while resolving non-destructive examination issues associated with welds on sections of replaced residual heat removal service water system piping. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/31/2000	1999009	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3C **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Performance of maintenance.** Good communications skills, technician knowledge, use of three-part communication, self-checking, and engineering involvement were observed during maintenance activities. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/27/2000	1999009	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Licensee	NEG	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 2B **Ter:**	**Near-miss tagging error.** Inappropriate assumptions associated with maintenance on a motor-operated valve resulted in safety tags being removed prior to the completion of maintenance on the valve. This "near-miss" safety tagging error was entered into the licensee's corrective action program for tracking and resolution. Aggressive immediate and followup corrective actions were initiated. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/11/2000	1999008	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** 3C **Ter:**	**Power uprate procedure.** Procedures that required changes as a result of the recent reactor power level increase (rerate), which remained outstanding after the rerate, were properly controlled to prohibit use or were identified as having no impact on plant operations. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
11/17/1999	1999008	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Self	MISC	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:** 2A	**Reactor core isolation cooling system 4-hour notification.** The licensee appropriately made a 4-hour non-emergency report to the NRC when they discovered a problem with a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system flow indicator that could have affected RCIC system operability. When troubleshooting revealed that the problem was due to instrument drift, which would not have prevented the RCIC system from performing its function, the licensee retracted the 4-hour notification. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
11/04/1999	1999007-05	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Safety-related non-MCC (motor control center) molded case circuit breakers (MCCB) not periodically overcurr** A testing program to ensure that safety-related 120-volt alternating current molded case circuit breakers would perform as designed did not exist and a non-cited violation was issued. (Associated item URI 50-263/99005-02(DRP)). The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/99007-05(DRP). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
10/19/1999	1999007-03	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 5A **Ter:**	**Failure to initiate 10 CFR 50.72, 4-hour report for reactor core isolation cooling system inoperability.** A non-cited violation was identified for a failure to notify the NRC of the inoperable RCIC, a reportable event, within the allotted time. Additionally, system engineers initially failed to consider all likely possibilities associated with improperly sized gaskets installed in RCIC. The NRC tracking number for this issue is 50-263/1999007-03(DRP). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
10/19/1999	1999007-04	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Self	NCV	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Failure of work order to restore reactor core isolation cooling system per procedures.** An inoperable reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system resulted from installation of an incorrect flange gasket upstream of the RCIC turbine governor valve. A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate maintenance procedures associated with troubleshooting the inoperable valve. The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/1999007-04(DRP). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
09/23/1999	1999006	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:** 2B	**Conduct of surveillance activity.** Activities specified in surveillance test procedures were performed in a professional and thorough manner by qualified technicians and operators who completed the activities in accordance with procedural requirements, using proper radiation protection practices with radiation protection technicians present as required, calibrated test equipment, good self-checking techniques, three-way communications, and good communications with the control room. Supervisors and system engineers frequently monitored job progress. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
09/23/1999	1999006-01	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Licensee	NCV	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** 4B **Ter:**	**Single failure vulnerability of the residual heat removal system when in suppression pool cooling mode.** The licensee identified that with the residual heat removal system in the suppression pool cooling mode an accident event sequence existed that could result in the number of available emergency core cooling system pumps being less than that assumed in the USAR. Because the licensee had not previously identified this potential problem, plant operating procedures had not been written to require entry into an LCO. This procedure inadequacy was identified as a non-cited violation. (LER 50-263/99-02-00) The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/99006-01(DRP). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
09/23/1999	1999006-02	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Licensee	NCV	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 2B **Ter:**	**High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system to be declared inoperable with MO-2071 [HPCI Test Return Isol** The licensee identified that the HPCI test return valve was unable to close against maximum expected differential pressure during certain assumed accident sequences. Because the HPCI system would be inoperable with this valve open, an LCO should have been entered whenever this valve was opened during plant operations. Because the licensee had not previously identified this potential problem, plant operating procedures had not been written to require entry into the LCO. (LER 50-263/99-07-00) The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/99006-02(DRP). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
08/12/1999	1999005	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 2B **Ter:**	**Standby gas treatment system material condition.** Material condition of the accessible portions of Division B of the standby gas treatment system and accessible portions of the reactor building service water radiation monitor system was adequate. Minor drawing and equipment labeling issues with Division B of the standby gas treatment system were brought to the attention of the licensee and entered into the corrective action program. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
08/12/1999	1999005	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:** 2B	**Conduct of surveillance.** Activities specified in surveillance test procedures, including tests involving torus vacuum breakers and main steamline isolation instrumentation, were performed in a thorough manner by qualified technicians and operators and were performed in accordance with procedures and management direction in a safety-conscious manner. Supervisors and system engineers frequently monitored job progress. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
08/12/1999	1999005	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:** 2B	**Conduct of maintenance.** Work performed during maintenance activities, including maintenance involving an emergency diesel generator and the control room ventilation system, was thorough and performed in accordance with procedures and management direction in a safety-conscious manner. Maintenance supervisors and system engineers were involved in the oversight of these activities. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Maintenance overtime.** Controls on overtime utilization were adequately implemented by the licensee for the maintenance staff that the inspectors assessed. The licensee's control of overtime met the Technical Specification administrative requirements governing overtime. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 5C **Ter:**	**Surveillance tests and valve lineups.** Surveillance tests and valve lineups associated with reactor startup were performed by qualified individuals using approved procedures. Deficiencies identified during the performance of activities were properly dispositioned and corrected. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:** ENG	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:**	**Operability of service water pumps.** Operability of safety-related service water pumps was properly assessed after sandblasting material was introduced into the vicinity of the equipment through the ventilation system during the preparation of the building exterior for painting. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
05/20/1999	1999003	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:** OPS	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** 4C **Ter:**	**Impact of temporary modification on high pressure coolant injection system.** The licensee did not evaluate the impact of a temporary modification to the high pressure coolant injection system steam drains prior to performance of surveillance testing. During the testing, the configuration of the modified drains resulted in the receipt of an alarm that was normal for the condition, but not indicated as "expected" in the surveillance test procedure. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Deficient level of detail in a procedure.** The inspectors noted a deficiency with the level of detail of instructions in the procedure followed for the calibration of relays associated with the safeguard bus degraded voltage protection, in that a short duration, 125-volt direct current ground resulted and relay technicians experienced difficulty in the setup of the voltage test source. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Control rod drive hydraulic accumulator level switch work.** Replacement of a control rod drive hydraulic accumulator level switch was performed by knowledgeable technicians who followed instructions in approved procedures. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
04/08/1999	1999002-02	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	Licensee	NCV	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**High pressure coolant injection system Group IV isolation during surveillance test.** During the performance of the quarterly high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) surveillance test, a high steam flow signal isolated the steam to the HPCI turbine. The surveillance test was terminated. The high steam flow signal was not caused by any piping integrity problems. The cause of this event was an inadequate surveillance procedure. The surveillance procedure steps did not ensure that the high steam flow setpoint would be avoided. This failure to have an adequate procedure was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," and is being tracked as 50-263/99002-02(DRP). LER 50-263/99-001-00. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 2B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Maintenance on scram pilot valves.** The inspectors observed the maintenance, isolation restoration, and post-maintenance testing associated with work order 9903983, "Install New Diaphragms into Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves," and identified no deficiencies. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** MAINT **Sec:** OPS	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Residual heat removal system material condition.** The material condition of the residual heat removal (RHR) system was good. The adequacy of general housekeeping for "B" RHR pump room came into question when a partially burned swipe was found under the 14 RHR pump motor heater. The cognizant system engineer promptly addressed the operability issue concerning 14 RHR pump and the other RHR equipment discrepancies that were identified. Operations took adequate actions to address the plant housekeeping issues. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/31/2000	1999009	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Report of historical performance indicators.** A brief review of the historical performance indicators submitted to the NRC, and subsequent interviews with engineers indicated that a problem may exist with the accuracy of the data. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
01/31/2000	1999009	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 4A **Sec:** 3B **Ter:**	**Heat exchanger testing methodology inaccuracies.** The licensee's methodology for performing residual heat removal heat exchanger efficiency tests did not provide adequate controls on the service water flow rate parameters established for conducting the test. The licensee corrected the deficiency and successfully confirmed the operability of the associated heat exchangers.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
01/08/2000	1999009	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Conservative applications of risk to refueling plan.** The inspectors concluded that the licensee conservatively applied shutdown risk concepts during the planning and execution of the refueling outage. The implementation of the outage plan was conducted effectively and in a controlled manner.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
11/02/1999	1999008	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	WK	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** 5B **Ter:**	**Standby liquid control system weak procedure.** The standby liquid control system relief valve remained operable with some valve seat leakage. The failure to document the amount of leakage that was acceptable was considered a weakness.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
09/23/1999	1999006	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 4A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:**	**Non-conservative assumption in engineering calculation.** A safety review performed by the licensee to show that the 12 core spray pump remained operable did not use the most conservative pump conditions as calculation inputs. However, the margin to exceeding bearing design temperatures remained large and no operability concerns were identified.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
09/23/1999	1999006-03	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 4C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Stroke time of AO-2379 in 1998 exceeded acceptance criterion but valve was not declared inoperable.** A review by the inspectors of the corrective action program as it related to inservice testing identified several potential weaknesses and one failure to declare the "reactor building to torus vacuum breaker" inoperable when it did not meet acceptance criteria. A non-cited violation was issued for failure to follow procedural requirements after the breaker did not meet inservice testing acceptance criteria. The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/99006-03(DRP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
08/12/1999	1999005	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:** 4C	**Communication between engineers and operators.** Due to poor communications between engineers and operators, reactor operators were uninformed for more than 12 hours about the resolution of a condition where the 12 core spray pump motor cooler flow rate did not meet a surveillance test procedure acceptance criterion.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Y2K review.** The inspectors conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/141, "Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." This Temporary Instruction is closed. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 4B **Ter:**	**Emergency diesel generator speed control.** The engineering department had not fully evaluated the impact of configuring the emergency diesel generator with the droop set above zero in the standby mode. Procedural enhancements and an adjustment of one breaker thermal overload setpoint were performed to further ensure operability of safety-related equipment. An engineering evaluation was initiated to reconfigure the emergency diesel generator controls to have droop set at zero when the emergency diesel generator was in the standby mode, precluding the continual evaluation of component operability as equipment degraded or was repaired. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**High-energy line break operability determinations.** Operability determinations for equipment susceptible to failure during a high-energy line break were incomplete and did not include an assessment of the full spectrum of potential single failures as required by the safety analysis report. Rather than perform the complex analysis required to determine equipment operability for the additional single failures not previously analyzed, the licensee elected to correct the deficiency by reinforcing the degraded structure that caused the adverse condition. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
05/20/1999	1999003	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Engineering evaluation of service water pump trip.** Investigations into the cause of the 13 emergency service water pump trip were appropriately scoped. No discrepancies were identified with troubleshooting activities or the operability determination. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
05/20/1999	1999003	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Weak safety review of cover on the spent fuel pool.** The licensee's safety review of the installation of a fabric cover over the spent fuel pool was weak in that it did not address whether water buildup on the top of the fabric could cause it to fall into the spent fuel pool and block the spent fuel pool cooling flow path. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
05/20/1999	1999003-04	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 2A **Sec:** 4A **Ter:**	**Failure of licensee to verify the adequacy of the design of the safety relief valve air system.** Engineers failed to evaluate the safety relief valve air system components when they identified conditions that had the potential to render the system inoperable. The issue was characterized by the inspectors as a Non-Cited Violation, with a tracking number of 50-263/99003-04(DRP). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX
By Primary Functional Area

Region III
MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**Engineering support for root valve repair.** Engineering and safety evaluations for inhibiting the reactor protection system bypass function for the turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scram were comprehensive. No safety significant issues were identified. Engineering and supervisory involvement were observed throughout the evolution. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
04/08/1999	1999002	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** 5B **Ter:**	**Engineering involvement in maintenance.** When the inspections of control rod drive hydraulic accumulator pressure switch internals indicated past leakage, the system engineer demonstrated good follow-through by having technicians inspect other instruments to aid in determining the extent of the problem. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** ENG **Sec:**	NRC	MISC	**Pri:** 4B **Sec:** **Ter:**	**10 CFR 50.59 report.** In general, the summaries in the Monticello periodic "Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments," provided sufficient detail to determine that the licensee's conclusion that the changes did not involve unreviewed safety questions was reasonable. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/14/2000	2000002	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**As low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) controls.** Refueling outage 19 activities were well planned and utilized effective ALARA controls. Accrued dose was consistent with completed work including emergent activities. Drywell shielding and scaffolding support work was well conducted. Workers exhibited good work practices and radiation protection management and technicians' work oversight was effective. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/14/2000	2000002	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Internal exposure control program.** The inspector concluded that the licensee maintained an effective internal exposure control program. Whole body counting systems were appropriately used and well maintained. The licensee's actions following the discovery of alpha contaminants in the primary system components were considered appropriate. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
01/14/2000	2000002	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Radiation postings.** Radiological postings and controls were well maintained and associated surveys were well performed. During walkdowns, the inspector observed good work practices and observed no significant, radiological impediments to routine work. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
01/14/2000	2000002	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 4C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Control of locked high radiation areas.** Access to High Radiation Areas (HRAs), Locked High Radiation Areas (LHRAs), and Very High Radiation Areas (VHRAs) were well controlled and associated keys were properly issued and accounted for by RP staff.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
11/04/1999	1999007	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Good as low as is reasonably achievable planning.** Appropriate planning for replacement of a broken pipe hanger resulted in dose being as low as is reasonably achievable.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
09/23/1999	1999006-04	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	NCV	**Pri:** 4C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Technical specification (TS) 25 percent extension allowance applied to non-TS required surveillance frequen** The method for tracking surveillance testing requirements afforded the opportunity to apply 25 percent time extensions allowed for Technical Specification surveillance requirements to non-Technical Specification requirements. A non-cited violation of NRC requirements was identified for a failure to inventory special nuclear material at a frequency not to exceed 12 months. The NRC tracking number for this issue is NCV 50-263/99006-04(DRP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
07/01/1999	1999004	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	NEG	**Pri:** 1C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Dosimeter alarm setpoint.** Although personnel were responsible to monitor their own accumulated dose, the licensee did not lower electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints to reflect radiological conditions during plant shutdown, a poor practice.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
06/24/1999	1999011	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1C **Sec:** 3A **Ter:**	**1999 Emergency Plan exercise.** Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was very good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						
06/24/1999	1999011	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1C **Sec:** 5A **Ter:** 5B	**Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were generally good. Licensee critique findings were con** Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were generally good. Licensee critique findings were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's findings.
Dockets Discussed: 05000263 Monticello						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III

MONTICELLO

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
06/24/1999	1999011	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 3A **Sec:** 1C **Ter:**	**Performance in simulator control room, technical support center, operations support center, and emergency** Performance in the simulator control room, technical support center, operations support center, and emergency operations facility during an emergency plan exercise was effective. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello
02/22/1999	1999001	**Pri:** PLTSUP **Sec:**	NRC	POS	**Pri:** 1C **Sec:** **Ter:**	**Radiation protection control of decontamination efforts.** Radiation protection activities associated with the inadvertent contamination and subsequent decontamination of the fuel pool ventilation duct work were thorough. Technicians demonstrated good exposure minimization practices during event initial response and radiation work permit planning. Effective communications were observed during the pre-job briefing associated with decontamination activities. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000263 Monticello

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX
By Primary Functional Area

Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.