



April 7, 2000

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject: Response to Request for Additional Information License
Amendment Request for Power Uprate Operation

- References: (1) Letter from R.M. Krich (Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) Company) to U.S. NRC, "Request for License Amendment for Power Uprate Operation," dated July 14, 1999.
- (2) Letter from C.G. Pardee (ComEd) to U.S. NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for Power Uprate Operation," dated March 31, 2000.

In the Reference (1) letter, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for Amendment of License or Construction Permit," Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) Company proposed to operate both LaSalle County Station Units at an "uprate" power level of 3489 Megawatts Thermal (MWT). During a conference call on March 8, 2000, the NRC requested additional information concerning the proposed amendment request to support their review. The attachment to this letter provides our response to the request for additional information.

This requested information concerns the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of emergency operator actions required by emergency operating procedures.

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Additionally, as requested by the NRC in a Conference call on April 5, 2000, the following clarification concerning the Reference (2) letter is provided. ComEd has completed its review of all safety-related valves, including Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) and Air Operated Valves (AOVs). All of these valves will remain operable and will be capable of performing their intended function(s) following the power uprate. These reviews included an evaluation of our responses to Generic Letter 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," regarding pressure locking and thermal binding for MOVs; and to Generic Letter 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions," regarding the potential over-pressurization of isolated piping segments at LaSalle County Station. The responses to Generic Letters 95-07 and 96-06 remain valid for LaSalle County Station MOVs and AOVs evaluated under these generic letters.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Frank A. Spangenberg, III, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 357-6761, extension 2383.

Respectfully,



Charles G. Pardee
Site Vice President
LaSalle County Station

Attachment

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station


STATE OF ILLINOIS)
IN THE MATTER OF)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY)
LASALLE COUNTY STATION - UNIT 1 & UNIT 2)

Docket Nos. 50-373
50-374

Subject: Response to Request for Additional Information License
Amendment Request for Power Uprate Operation


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
I affirm that the content of this transmittal is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.



Charles G. Pardee
Site Vice President
LaSalle County Station

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State above named, this 7th day of April, 2000.
My Commission expires on 10-1, 2000.





Notary Public

Attachment
Additional Information Regarding PSA

The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for LaSalle are symptom based procedures. As symptoms exceed the established limits, mitigative actions are taken as prescribed by the procedures. No operator required action times are specified in the EOPs.

Power Uprate effects on the LaSalle Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) indicate slight reductions in the available times for several operator actions. Those operator actions that have a measurable impact are Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) initiation during an Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS) event, reduction of power by Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level control during an ATWS event, and alignment of the Fire Protection System as an alternate injection system during an internal flooding event.

However, the reductions in time for these three operator actions are small and do not affect the results of the current PSA calculation.