

No. 93-08
Tel. 301/504-2240

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(Wednesday, January 27, 1993)

NOTE TO EDITORS:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received from its independent Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards the attached letter-type report on SECY-92-413, "Incident Investigation Options Reporting to the Commission."

In addition, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations has received the attached letter report on proposed resolution of generic safety issue 120, "On-Line Testability of Protection Systems."

#

Attachments:
As stated

January 13, 1993

The Honorable Ivan Selin
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Selin:

SUBJECT: SECY-92-413, "INCIDENT INVESTIGATION OPTIONS REPORTING
TO THE COMMISSION"

During the 393rd meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, January 7-8, 1993, we discussed the staff's proposed options as described in SECY-92-413 for the Incident Investigation Program. The staff proposes the formation of an Incident Investigation Group (IIG). We generally endorse this proposal and would like to be kept informed of further progress in this area. However, we have some comments regarding options being considered for the makeup of the IIG membership.

As noted in SECY-92-413, it is important that the IIG be competent and independent in order to enhance its effectiveness and credibility. We believe that these attributes may be unnecessarily compromised by some of the proposed options. In particular, we are concerned about the exclusion of experts affiliated with the nuclear steam system suppliers or architect-engineers. These people should be among those who possess the highest level of expertise available. Further, we recommend that the participation in and control of the IIG by the NRC be minimized to help preserve at least the perception of independence.

We are in general agreement with the proposed purpose and scope of the IIG function. However, we urge that further consideration be given to allowing the IIG to make recommendations on the basis of its investigation. The staff's proposal recommends that the IIG report not contain recommendations.

Sincerely,

Paul Shewmon, Chairman
Advisory Committee for
Reactor Safeguards

Reference:

SECY-92-413, dated December 16, 1992, for the Commissioners from James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, Subject: Incident Investigation Options Reporting to the Commission (Predecisional)

Mr. James M. Taylor
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Taylor:

SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 120,
"ON-LINE TESTABILITY OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS"

During the 392nd and 393rd meetings of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, December 9-11, 1992, and January 7-8, 1993, we discussed the NRC staff's actions and recommendations for resolution of Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 120, "On-Line Testability of Protection Systems." During these meetings, we had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the NRC staff, and of the documents referenced.

We agree with the NRC staff's conclusion that new regulatory requirements for existing plants are not justified, and the recommendation that GSI-120 be considered resolved. We recommend that the resolution also explicitly state how it applies to future plants.

Sincerely,

Paul Shewmon, Chairman
Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards

References:

1. Memorandum dated November 5, 1992, from W. Minners, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC, for R. Fraley, ACRS, Subject: Recommended Resolution of GSI-120, "On-Line Testability of Protection Systems," w/Enclosures
2. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-5916, Subject: Technical Findings Related to Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 120, "On-Line Testability of Protection Systems," October 1992