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A Duke Energy Company

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March 30, 2000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket 50-269, -270, -287
Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.4 and 50.71, please find attached 7 copies of the latest revisions to the Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC). The SLC Manual is Chapter 16.0 of the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This manual is intended to contain commitments and other station issues that warrant higher control, but are not appropriate for inclusion into the Technical Specifications (TS). Instead of being updated with the annual UFSAR Update, the SLC Manual will be updated as necessary throughout the year.

Very truly yours,

W. R. McCollum, Jr.
Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Station

CMB/cmb
Attachment

xc: Luis A. Reyes
Regional Administrator, Region II

D. E. LaBarge, ONRR

M. C. Shannon
Oconee Senior Resident Inspector

A001

March 30, 2000

To: Manual Holders

Subject: Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC) Revision

On March 23, 2000, Station Management approved revisions to SLC 16.9.11 Turbine Building Flood Protection Measures, to be implemented on 3/29/00. The subject change modifies the SLC to provide guidance in the Bases that delineates what is required for operability of the Turbine Building Basement Water Emergency High Level Alarm.

Remove these pages	Insert these pages
LOEP 1	LOEP 1
LOEP 6	LOEP 6
SLC page 16.9.11-6	SLC page 16.9.11-6
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Any questions concerning this revision may be directed to Noel Clarkson at 864-885-3077.

Regulatory Compliance
By: Conice Breazeale
Regulatory Compliance

Oconee Nuclear Station
Selected Licensee Commitments
List of Effective Pages

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to opening a condenser waterbox access-hatch and for any openings > 24 inches, including multiple openings equivalent to 24 inches diameter. Single isolation is acceptable, but the isolation boundary must include physical barriers, such as locked closed valves, and not just administrative barriers, such as valve tags. Physical barriers may include blocks or blank flanges. A stoppel plug or wet-tapping machine may also act as a physical barrier. This SLC is intended to address only the isolation of the opening from the lake. This SLC is applicable to the LPSW pump inlet isolation valves: LPSW-1,-2,-3 and 3LPSW-120,-123. Note that the discharge of each LPSW pump is 18"; thus, there are no valves downstream of the pumps within the scope of the SLC.

If Keowee lake level is greater than 791 ft., reverse gravity flow can be used to provide suction to the LPSW and SSF ASW pumps. An analysis was performed to determine the optimum flowpath to supply suction to these pumps while minimizing any excess flow that would contribute to additional flooding. This analysis determined that flowpaths through one condensate cooler and one flow control valve on each of two units would be optimum. As a result of this analysis, Condensate Coolers CCW Flow Control Valves for Units 2 and 3 (2, 3CCW-84) have been permanently failed open by having their instrument air supplies removed. If either flowpath through Units 2 or 3 will be unavailable, an alternate flowpath should be provided on Unit 1 by failing open 1CCW-84.

Commitment f requires that the Turbine Basement Water Emergency High Level alarm shall be operable. The Turbine Basement Water Emergency High Level Alarm consists of a 2 out of 4 logic circuit, which yields 6 different alarm circuit combinations. Operability is based on at least 1 of the 6 alarm circuit combinations being functional.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR Sections 3.4.1.1.1, 9.2.2, 9.6, and Figure 9-9, 12/31/97 update.
2. Engineering Directives Manual EDM-210, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants or the Maintenance Rule."
3. OSS-0254.00-00-1003, "Design Basis Specification for the Condenser Circulating.Water (CCW) System," Rev. 11.
4. 0SS-0254.00-00-3005, "Design Basis Specification for the Turbine Building Structure," Rev. 1.
5. AP/1,2,3/A/1700/10, "Uncontrollable Flooding of Turbine Building," Approved 4/30/97.
6. Calculation No. C-OSA-SA-83-0002-0, Rev. 0, 3/l/83, "Turbine Building Flood CCW Reverse Flow Analysis."
7. Calculation No. OSC-6522, Rev. 0, 2/29/96, "Turbine Building Flood CCW Reverse Flow Analysis."
8. Calculation No. OSC-6577, Rev. 0, 6/7/96, "CCW Turbine Building Flood Analysis."
9. PT/1,2,3/A/0261/07, "Dam Failure Test."
10. IP/O/B/0235/03. "Turbine Basement Water Level Alarm System Check."
11. Calculation No. 0SC-5771, PRA Risk-Significant SSC's for the Maintenance Rule."
12. Work Process Manual Section 607. "Maintenance Rule Assessment of Equipment Removed From Service".
13. OP/1,2,3/A/1104/12, "Condenser Circulating Water System."
14. Calculation OSC-6081, Rev. 2, CCW Seismic-LOOP Response."
15. Oconee Unit 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Rev. 1, November. 1990.