

# United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II  
SURRY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
01/29/2000	1999009	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> MAINT	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> 2B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Repair of Containment Isolation Valves</b> Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment sump discharge inside containment isolation valves which failed stroke time tests were properly replaced. During the return to service of the Unit 2 valve, the outside containment isolation valve was found to have a leak rate in excess of the Technical Specification (TS) total allowable leak rate. During the repair activities, the licensee complied with TSs, successfully repaired the deficient conditions and satisfactorily performed the proper testing prior to returning the valves to service.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
01/29/2000	1999009	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> MAINT	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Spent Fuel Storage Cask Repair Activities</b> Spent fuel storage cask repair activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and were well-controlled. Problems identified during the activity were documented and placed in the licensee corrective action program.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Transnuclear Fuel Cask with Low Overpressure</b> A Transnuclear (TN-32) fuel cask with low helium pressure in the overpressure system was moved from the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation to the plant decontamination building for troubleshooting. The licensee plans to return the cask to the spent fuel pool to replace the cask seals. The cask movements and troubleshooting were accomplished without significant problems. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and planned corrective actions implemented and found them to be appropriate.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	Self	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>C Reserve Station Transformer locked out resulting in DG operation for two days</b> A loss of power to the 1H and 2J emergency busses due to a lockout of the C reserve station transformer caused emergency diesel generators (EDGs)1 and 3 to automatically start and supply power to the emergency busses. The EDGs operated successfully in this condition for two days until the transformer was returned to service.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 5A <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Management Safety Review Committee did not Open an Action Item for a Concern with the FME Program</b> The reviewed activities of the oversight committees comply with the requirements of the technical specifications and the governing procedures. However, the Management Safety Review Committee identified a concern with the foreign material exclusion program in three consecutive meetings without amplifying discussion in the minutes or opening an action item.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007-01	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 4C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to report EDG automatic initiations, due to a loss of voltage on the 1H and 2J emergency busses, withi</b> A non-cited violation was identified for failure to report an engineered safety feature actuation within the 4-hours required by 10CFR50.72. This involved emergency diesel generator automatic initiations due to a loss of voltage on the 1H and 2J emergency busses.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						

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11/06/1999	1999007-02	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	URI	<b>Pri:</b> 5C <b>Sec:</b> 5B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Review licensee's efforts at correcting PORV backup air system problems</b> Corrective actions for the power operated relief valve back up air supply system, while in (a)(1) status since 1997, have not been effective in improving system performance and troubleshooting efforts are ongoing. An unresolved item was opened to review compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action."
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007-03	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 5B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to meet the requirements of TS 3.16.B, EDG inoperable greater than 7 days.</b> A non-cited violation was identified for emergency diesel generator 3 being inoperable longer than the technical specification allowed outage time.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> ENG	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 5B <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Two Root Cause Evaluations were ineffective</b> Two of six Category 1 or 2 root cause evaluations (RCEs) reviewed by the inspectors were for failures that had occurred before and had earlier root-cause evaluations performed on them. In addition, for these RCEs, the licensee root-cause investigation teams had not initiated actions to determine what caused the earlier RCEs to be ineffective.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> ENG	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 5C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Several Operating Experience Items were Open for Long Periods of Time</b> Overall, the licensee's Operating Experience Program was adequate; however, several operating experience items were open for long periods of time (some approximately 11 years) and the licensee was not tracking these items as overdue.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> ENG	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 5C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>No Controls in place to identify items Overdue while in the Licensing Group Review Process</b> A weakness was noted in the commitment tracking system, in that, no controls were in place to identify items which are overdue while in the licensing group's review process. Specifically, four items exceeded the 30 days allowed for the licensing group's review but were not being tracked nor were they identified in weekly management reports as overdue.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> ENG	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5A <b>Sec:</b> 5B <b>Ter:</b> 5C	<b>Deviation Reporting and Corrective Action Program for Category 3 Root Cause Evaluations was adequate</b> The licensee's Deviation Reporting and Corrective Action Programs for Category 3 root cause evaluations were adequate for identification, assessment and resolution of conditions potentially adverse to quality.
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11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> ENG	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Commitment Tracking Program was Effectively Monitoring the Progress and Closure of Items</b>  In general, the commitment tracking system (CTS) effectively monitored the progress and closure of corrective action items. A random sample of specific items indicated that the items were being adequately tracked, addressed, and due date extensions were approved in accordance with plant procedures.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
09/25/1999	1999006	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 2A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Hurricane Floyd Response</b>  During Hurricane Floyd, all the requirements of the licensee's Hurricane Response Plan were met. The licensee was adequately prepared for the rain and high winds. No damage occurred to safety-related structures, systems or components.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
09/25/1999	1999006	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 3B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Licensed Operator Requalification</b>  The licensed operator requalification simulator scenarios and operating examinations were challenging and operators' performance met testing objectives. Post-examination discussions were thorough and provided a comprehensive assessment of individual and crew performance. The licensed operator requalification program met the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification,".
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
09/25/1999	1999006	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> MAINT	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> 2B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Castor Cask Repair</b>  A Castor cask with a helium leak from the secondary lid was moved from the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) to the plant decontamination building for repair. Secondary lid gaskets were replaced, and the cask was successfully leak checked and returned to the ISFSI. The cask movements and repairs were properly accomplished without significant problems.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1B <b>Sec:</b> 2A <b>Ter:</b> 3A	<b>Unit 2 Reactor Trip</b>  Except for two individual control rod position indications, plant equipment responded as expected to a low reactor coolant flow automatic reactor trip caused by a loop stop valve disk separating from its stem. The operators took the proper recovery actions and stabilized the plant at hot shutdown. The licensee later determined that the affected control rods had properly inserted and the indication problem was due to inaccuracies in the analog rod position indication system.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005-01	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 1B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to Start Protected Condensate Storage Tank Refill Within the Two Hours Specified in TS</b>  A non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with TS 3.6.H in that replenishment of the protected condensate storage tank (PCST) was not commenced within the required two hours after the cessation of PCST water consumption.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						

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08/14/1999	1999005-02	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 3A <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure During Reduced Inventory to Follow Procedural Requirements</b>  A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow operating procedures during reduced inventory operations. The procedural requirement to maintain reactor coolant system (RCS) water level indications within two inches of each other while draining the RCS was not met.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 4B	<b>Unit 2 Reactor Startup From a Refueling Outage</b>  The Unit 2 startup following a refueling outage was performed in a well-controlled manner and in accordance with operating procedures. The estimated critical position calculation accurately predicted reactor criticality.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Control Room Observations During Unit 2 Core Offload</b>  Although operators were attentive to plant conditions during the core off-load and displayed a safety-conscious awareness and attitude toward critical parameters, the inspectors observed that the licensee's operator communications expectations were not rigorously implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Unit 2 Containment Walkdown</b>  Although the overall condition of the Unit 2 containment following plant shutdown was observed to be good, the residual heat removal (RHR) pump seals exhibited signs of previous leakage. When the RHR system was placed in service, seal leakage was observed on both RHR pumps.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 5C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Unit 2 Refueling Observations</b>  Personnel demonstrated a willingness to defuel the reactor with degraded equipment. A malfunctioning instrumentation cable take up reel caused a periodic lost of gripper engagement indication which would stop hoist movement. An operator work around was used to maintain gripper engagement indication.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Unit 2 Shutdown for Refueling Outage</b>  The shutdown of Unit 2 for a scheduled refueling outage was well executed and performed in accordance with approved procedures. The operators appropriately responded to an erratic source range detector indication and failure of the main turbine to trip properly.
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05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Unit 2 Containment Closeout</b> The licensee's preparation of the Unit 2 containment prior to restart from a refueling outage was satisfactory. Minor deficiencies were identified and corrected prior to containment closeout.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003-01	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 3A <b>Sec:</b> 1A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to Place the Load Tap Changer on the A Reserve Station Service Transformer in Automatic</b> The failure to place the automatic load tap changer switch on the A Reserve Station Service Transformer in the automatic position after a manual adjustment was identified as a non-cited violation. This matter was the result of operator inattention during equipment operation.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1						
05/22/1999	1999003-02	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	Self	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 1A	<b>Failure to Properly De-energize the Unit 2 Hi CLS Logic Circuitry</b> The failure to follow procedures to properly de-energize the Unit 2 High (Hi) Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) logic circuitry during the replacement of a Hi CLS relay was identified as a non-cited violation. This resulted in an unanticipated engineered safeguards actuation of the B train of Hi CLS. Operations authorized the relay replacement under a tagout for the Hi-Hi CLS actuation logic and maintenance personnel failed to verify the relay was de-energized.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 4A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Containment Penetrations</b> Containment penetrations reviewed during the inspection period were properly aligned. The inspectors verified proper setup and configuration of air operated valves outside containment which would allow them to fail in the closed position on a loss of instrument air.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 3B	<b>Observation of Spent Fuel Cask Operation</b> The procedures used for loading and movement of spent fuel dry storage casks and related activities provided adequate details for craft personnel to conduct the work. Craft personnel performed work in an effective and professional manner and were knowledgeable and experienced. Records for spent fuel transfer activities were adequate.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002-01	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 2B <b>Ter:</b> 3A	<b>Failure to Place Reactor Protection Channel in the Tripped Condition in Accordance with TS</b> The failure to place an inoperable Reactor Protection System channel associated with the number 4 turbine stop valve limit switch in the tripped condition within six hours as required by plant Technical Specifications was identified as a non-cited violation. This matter was the result of inadequate procedure guidance and erroneous assumptions made by plant personnel.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						

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04/10/1999	1999002-02	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> PLTSUP	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 2B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Fire Watch Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of Technical Specification Requirements</b> A non-cited violation was identified during a Licensee Event Report closeout review regarding the failure to maintain a fire watch at fire barriers that were not fully operable. The fire watch was released before fire sealant material had properly cured.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 3B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Operator Simulator Requalification Training for an Operating Crew</b> Inspectors observed operator simulator requalification training for an operating crew. The scenario was challenging and operator performance and communications during the exercise were exemplary.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> OPS <b>Sec:</b> MAINT	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1A <b>Sec:</b> 2A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Power Reduction Following a Steam Generator Chemistry Excursion</b> Operators actions to reduce power following a steam generator chemistry excursion resulting from loss of the condensate polishers were appropriate and met the licensee administrative requirements associated with steam generator chemistry. Degraded condenser hotwell chemistry due to inleakage from the circulating water system caused the chemistry excursion when the condensate polishers were isolated.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
01/29/2000	1999009	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Periodic Tests</b> Periodic tests for a motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump and a charging pump were properly performed. The tests were approved by station management, performed by knowledgeable workers, and Technical Specification surveillance requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
01/29/2000	1999009	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 3A <b>Sec:</b> 3B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Spent Ion Exchanger Resin Transfer</b> Spent ion exchanger resin was properly transferred to the resin catch tank. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and followed work package instructions.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
01/29/2000	1999009-01	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to Provide Adequate PMT Instructions</b> A non-cited violation was identified for a failure to provide adequate post maintenance testing instructions for replacement of a reactor coolant pump undervoltage relay.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1						

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12/18/1999	1999008	<b>Pri: MAINT</b> <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri: 2B</b> <b>Sec: 3B</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Periodic Testing</b> A periodic test for the control room air filtration system was properly performed. The test was approved by station management, performed by knowledgeable workers, and Technical Specification surveillance requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008	<b>Pri: MAINT</b> <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri: 2B</b> <b>Sec: 3B</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Maintenance Activities</b> Maintenance activities which included jacking operations for a main feedwater regulating valve, repair of an oil leak on the "A" reserve station service transformer, and the replacement of a charging system valve were properly performed. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and followed work package instructions.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008-01	<b>Pri: MAINT</b> <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri: 1C</b> <b>Sec: 4B</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to Maintain a Fire Watch</b> A non-cited violation was identified during a Licensee Event Report closeout review regarding the failure to maintain a fire watch at fire barriers that were not fully operable. The fire watch was released before fire sealant material had properly cured. The licensee procedure allowed securing the fire watch following a 15-minute cure time, however, the manufacturer of the sealant required 24 hours to consider the material properly cured.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008-02	<b>Pri: MAINT</b> <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri: 2A</b> <b>Sec: 2B</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Fire Pump Inoperable for Greater than Allowed by Technical Specifications</b> A non-cited violation was identified during a Licensee Event Report closeout review regarding the diesel driven fire pump being inoperable for greater than the time allowed by Technical Specifications.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri: MAINT</b> <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri: 2B</b> <b>Sec: 3A</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Periodic Tests were Properly Performed</b> Periodic tests for the intake canal level probe inspection and low head safety injection pumps were properly performed. The tests were approved by station management, performed by knowledgeable workers, and technical specification surveillance requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri: MAINT</b> <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri: 2B</b> <b>Sec: 3A</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Maintenance Activities were Properly Performed</b> Maintenance activities which included lubrication and inspection of the containment spray and low head safety injection pumps were properly performed. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and followed work package instructions. A tagout on the containment spray system was properly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						

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11/06/1999	1999007-04	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to properly complete post maintenance testing prior to declaring the A LHSI pump operable</b>  A non-cited violation was identified for failure to perform all required post maintenance testing prior to returning the Unit 2 A low head safety injection pump to operable status.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
09/25/1999	1999006	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Periodic Tests</b>  Periodic tests on the intake canal level and reactor protection system logic circuits were properly performed. The tests were approved by station management, test procedures were followed by knowledgeable workers, and Technical Specification requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
09/25/1999	1999006	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 1A	<b>Maintenance Activities</b>  Maintenance activities including replacement of the boric acid filter and cleaning and inspection of Uninterruptable Power Supply 1A-1 were properly performed. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and followed work package instructions. A tagout on the chemical and volume control system was properly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 3B	<b>Observation of Maintenance Activities</b>  Maintenance activities including adjustment of the residual heat removal outlet temperature alarm setpoint, inspection and lubrication of the gimble valve on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, troubleshooting of a ventilation radiation monitor, and investigation and repair of the Unit 2 A cold leg loop isolation valve were properly performed. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and followed work package instructions. A tagout on the auxiliary feedwater system was properly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 3B	<b>Periodic Test Observations</b>  Periodic tests on the consequence limiting safeguards and reactor coolant pump underfrequency circuits and the emergency core cooling system were properly performed. The tests were approved by station management, test procedures were followed by knowledgeable workers, and Technical Specification requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> 5B <b>Ter:</b> 5C	<b>Reactor Trip Breaker Auxiliary Contact Snap Ring Failure</b>  The licensee appropriately returned the Unit 1 A reactor trip breaker to service following repair of its auxiliary contact linkage which had caused an incorrect breaker closed position indication. Inspection of the remaining reactor trip breakers did not reveal any similar linkage problems. The linkage problem would not have affected the opening function of the reactor trip breakers.
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07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 1A	<b>Observation of Maintenance Activities</b> Maintenance activities for the replacement of an emergency diesel generator air compressor pressure switch, reactor coolant filter and boric acid blending summator were properly performed. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and followed work package instructions. The tagout for the pressure switch was correctly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 1A	<b>Periodic Test Observations</b> Seven routine periodic tests observed were properly performed. The tests were properly approved by station management, test procedures were followed by knowledgeable workers and Technical Specification requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 5A <b>Ter:</b> 4B	<b>Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work Activities</b> Documentation of inservice examination activities including the A Steam Generator eddy current examinations and flow-accelerated corrosion examinations was in accordance with approved procedures. Discontinuities were properly recorded, evaluated, and dispositioned. The quality of radiographic film and welding for replacement components was very good. Code repair packages were descriptive and complete. Inspection requirements for ASME Class 2, suction piping running from the refueling water storage tank were properly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 1A <b>Ter:</b> 3A	<b>Observation of Maintenance Activities</b> Observed maintenance activities were properly performed. Personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and properly followed work package instructions. The tagout for the A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump was properly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 1C <b>Ter:</b> 3C	<b>Inspection of Unit 2 Safety Injection Check Valve</b> The licensee's planning for the inspection of low head safety injection check valve was comprehensive. Coordination between various plant departments was evident. Appropriate use of mock-ups and As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable concepts was observed. Technical input from craft workers was used extensively in the planning process.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Periodic Test (PT) Observations</b> Five routine periodic tests observed were properly performed. The tests were properly approved by station management, test procedures were properly followed by knowledgeable workers and Technical Specification requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						

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05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5A <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b> 5C	<b>Fuel Assembly Top Nozzle Replacement</b> The licensee identified a problem with hold-down spring retaining bolts on several fuel assemblies present in the Unit 2 core and decided to repair any potentially susceptible fuel assembly scheduled to be returned to the core. The top nozzles on 16 fuel assemblies were successfully replaced.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Maintenance Rule Implementation</b> The licensee had established action plans for maintenance rule (a)(1) components and was tracking implementation to return the components to monitoring and maintenance under paragraph (a)(2) of the rule.
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04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3A <b>Ter:</b> 1A	<b>Observation of Maintenance Activities</b> Maintenance activities on the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 2A-1 and the reactor coolant filter 02-RC-FL-002 were properly performed. The personnel conducting the activities were knowledgeable and properly followed work package instructions. The tagout for UPS 2A-1 was properly implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 3B <b>Ter:</b> 1A	<b>Miscellaneous Periodic Test Observations</b> Routine periodic tests for the Alternate AC Diesel Generator and the Unit 2 B charging pump were properly performed. The tests were properly approved by station management, test procedures were properly followed by knowledgeable workers and Technical Specification requirements were satisfied.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Maintenance and Testing Observations</b> Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance and testing activities were observed to be properly performed and documented. All test acceptance criteria were met.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> MAINT <b>Sec:</b> ENG	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Corrective Maintenance on the Outside Recirculation Spray Suction Valve</b> Corrective maintenance on the outside recirculation spray suction valve was performed properly and the decision not to perform local leak rate testing after repairs was valid.
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01/29/2000	1999009	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4A <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Design Change Packages</b> Based on a sample of eight design change packages (DCPs) the inspectors concluded that DCPs were technically adequate. The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, design inputs, design evaluations, assumptions and references, and installation instructions met regulatory requirements.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
01/29/2000	1999009	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>10 CFR 50.59</b> The procedure and instructions for the actual preparation of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations were indepth and thorough.
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01/29/2000	1999009-02	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Control Room Ventilation DP Problem</b> A non-cited violation was identified for a failure to maintain the ability to establish for one hour the required positive differential pressure between the control room envelope and adjoining areas.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4C <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Temporary Modification adequately Justified</b> A low number of temporary modifications (six) were installed on Units 1 and 2. The safety evaluation associated with Unit 2 temporary modification S2-99-07 for the removal of the reactor coolant loop isolation valve 2-RC-2591 disc adequately justified implementation of the modification.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
09/25/1999	1999006	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b> MAINT	Self	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> 2B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Temporary Non-code Repair of Service Water Piping</b> The licensee satisfactorily installed a temporary non-code repair on the D component cooling heat exchanger service water (SW) discharge piping. The inspection of other susceptible portions of SW piping found no further significant degradation in pipe wall thickness. The licensee has been slow to complete SW piping inspections which were committed to in 1991 as part of their response to flooding vulnerabilities identified during the Individual Plant Examination. The licensee now plans to complete these inspections during the Fall 2001 Unit 1 and the Spring 2002 Unit 2 refueling outages.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 2B <b>Sec:</b> 4C <b>Ter:</b> 2A	<b>Unit 2 Temporary Modification to Test New Analog Rod Position Indication Modules</b> The attempted installation of new analog rod position indicator (NARPI) modules without span adjustment in one direction was deemed undesirable. The licensee installed the NARPI modules to address long standing problems with the accuracy of the analog rod position indication system.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						

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08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4C <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b> 2A	<b>Unit 2 Temporary Modification to Test New Analog Rod Position Indication Modules</b> The licensee has experienced problems with the accuracy of their analog rod position indication system (RPIS) and was planning to install several new analog rod position indication (NARPI) modules in a future refueling outage. However, following the July 5, Unit 2 reactor trip, the licensee expediated installation and testing of four NARPI modules. This reflected a commitment by management to correct a long standing issue at the facility.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 4A <b>Sec:</b> 5A <b>Ter:</b> 4B	<b>Engineering Evaluation of Industry Operating Experience</b> Although non-conservative inputs in dose calculations for main steam line breaks and steam generator tube rupture accidents were used, the licensee determined that accident dose projections remained within 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion 19 guidelines. The licensee conducted an evaluation of this issue based on industry operating experience information.
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07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5A <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Engineering Evaluation of Industry Operating Experience</b> Engineers effectively evaluated industry operating experience and implemented corrective actions to address issues associated with safety injection gas binding and the iodine source term used in dose calculations. Controls were established for monitoring and venting the safety injection system to prevent gas binding events.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	MISC	<b>Pri:</b> 4A <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Recirculation Line Modification</b> The Unit 2 low head safety injection (LHSI) pump recirculation lines were modified to improve recirculation flow for the weaker pump during parallel pump operation. While the recirculation flow for the weaker pump increased from previous values, the flow rates for both LHSI pumps were below the vendor's recommended values. The licensee determined the achieved recirculation flow rates were acceptable.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4A <b>Sec:</b> 4C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Review of Design Changes</b> The inspectors reviewed a sample of design changes implemented on Unit 2 during the current refueling outage and concluded that the licensee's design change process met the requirements in the area of design control.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Review of Safety Evaluations</b> The inspectors reviewed a sample of recently completed safety evaluations performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluations reached correct conclusions concerning whether the proposed change would compromise safety and whether an unreviewed safety question was involved. Documentation of the safety evaluations was complete.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						

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05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5B <b>Sec:</b> 5C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Review of Deficiency Reports</b> The inspectors reviewed deviation reports generated during the spring 1999 refueling outage and concluded that the licensee's corrective action program was meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action."
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04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4C <b>Sec:</b> 2B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits</b> Based on a review of the containment spray and recirculation spray systems, safety-related logic circuits were being correctly tested in accordance with the concepts of Generic Letter 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 4C <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Safety Evaluation Review</b> Safety Evaluation 99-020 adequately justified installation of a procedurally controlled temporary modification on the waste gas decay tank and the controlling procedures adequately controlled installation and removal of the temporary modification.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5C <b>Sec:</b> 4A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Spent Fuel Pool Power Upgrade Modification</b> By completing the spent fuel pool power upgrade modification, the licensee has satisfied all commitments associated with issues related to spent fuel pool decay heat removal reliability and the maintenance of adequate coolant inventory in the spent fuel pool.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001-02	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to Update a Main Control Room Abnormal Operating Procedure</b> A non-cited violation was identified for failing to provide the main control room with an up-to-date copy of an abnormal operating procedure (AOP) relating to a loss of power condition affecting Unit 1. The AOP was revised following a modification to the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump power supplies.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1						
02/27/1999	1999001-03	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 4A <b>Sec:</b> 4B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Two Examples of Design Control Problems Identified by the A/E Team</b> Two examples of a non-cited violation were identified for inadequate design controls. In the first example, the design reviews for Unit 2 low head safety injection pump minimum flow requirements were inadequate. The second example involved a calculation for Number 3 emergency diesel generator battery not recognizing a transfer switch that allowed additional loads on the battery.
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02/27/1999	1999001-05	<b>Pri:</b> ENG <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 4B <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Failure to Correctly Apply 10 CFR 50.59 for a Modification to the VDC Batteries</b>  A non-cited violation of 10CFR 50.59 was identified for a 1988 modification to increase the capacity of the 125 VDC distribution system batteries and a procedure which allowed the interconnection of two batteries via a DC tie breaker. This condition involved an unreviewed safety question and therefore was not allowed under 10 CFR 50.59.
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01/29/2000	1999009-03	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	Licensee	NCV	<b>Pri:</b> 4A <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inoperable</b>  A non-cited violation was identified for failure to provide two fire barriers with the required three-hour fire rating.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Liquid Radwaste Release</b>  A liquid radwaste release was conducted in accordance with the radioactive effluent control program and the resultant radiation dose to the public was a small percentage of regulatory limits.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radioactive Waste Shipment</b>  The licensee properly prepared radioactive waste for shipment and subsequent disposal in accordance with applicable NRC and Department of Transportation requirements. Good radiation exposure control practices were employed during waste shipment preparations.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
12/18/1999	1999008	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radiological Controls for Cask Loading</b>  Radiological controls for cask loading and for preparation of the cask for transfer to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation were implemented in accordance with the applicable Technical Specification requirements.
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11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Central and Secondary Alarm Stations' functions and Communications Systems were Effective</b>  Based on alarm station operations in the areas of access control, intrusion detection, monitoring of alarms, and communication capabilities, the inspectors concluded that the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations' functions and communications systems were effective and met regulatory requirements specified in the Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures.
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11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>The Licensee's Access Control Program was Effective</b>  The licensee's access control program was effective in ensuring that favorably terminated employees' badges were deactivated in accordance with the Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures.
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11/06/1999	1999007	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Physical Security Plan Testing and Compensatory Measures</b>  The licensee was testing and maintaining security related equipment as required by the Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. Security related equipment was being repaired in a timely manner. Compensatory measures observed and reviewed through documentation met the requirements outlined in the Physical Security Plan.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 1B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors</b>  During a biennial emergency preparedness exercise, the development of the initial protective action recommendation was not in accordance with procedures; however, it did provide for the health and safety of the public.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radioactive Effluent Control Program</b>  The licensee had maintained an effective program for the control of liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents from the plant. The amounts of activity released from the plant in liquid and gaseous effluents exhibit a generally decreasing trend over the last several years and the radiation doses from those releases were a small percentage of regulatory limits.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program</b>  The licensee had complied with the sampling, analytical and reporting requirements for the radiological environmental monitoring program. Environmental sampling equipment was being well maintained, and the monitoring program was effectively implemented.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radiological Controls for the Independent Spent fuel Storage Facility</b>  Controls for radiological monitoring at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation were implemented in accordance with the applicable Technical Specification requirements.
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08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors</b> The licensee's submittals of the scope and objectives, as well as, the scenario package were timely and appropriate for the biennial emergency preparedness exercise.
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08/14/1999	1999005	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 1B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors</b> The licensee's overall performance during a biennial emergency preparedness exercise was good. The facilities were staffed and activated in a prompt manner. Good command and control was observed in the Technical Support Center and Local Emergency Operations Facility. Event classifications were timely and accurate, and off-site notifications were completed within 15 minutes.
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07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Fire Brigade Pre-Fire Strategies</b> Fire brigade pre-fire strategies properly reflected as-built plant conditions, provided clear and sufficient fire brigade instructions and met the requirements of the fire protection program.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 2A <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Inspection of Fire Brigade Equipment</b> The personal protective fire fighting equipment provided to the fire brigade met the facility's fire protection program procedural requirements, was maintained in good condition, and provided a sufficient level of personal safety needed to handle onsite fire emergencies. Backup lighting installed at the fire brigade staging dress out area provided an adequate level of lighting in support of fire brigade operations.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 2A <b>Ter:</b> 5C	<b>Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems and Equipment</b> The material condition of the plant fire protection features was in accordance with fire protection program requirements. Appropriate corrective actions were being taken to address battery powered emergency lighting and fire door issues identified by the licensee.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
07/03/1999	1999004	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 3B <b>Ter:</b> 3A	<b>Fire Brigade Performance During Drill Exercises</b> The fire brigade demonstrated good response and fire fighting performance during a simulated fire brigade drill conducted during this inspection. Control room activities in response to the drill were timely and in accordance with appropriate fire contingency operating procedures.
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<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Tour of Radiological Protected Areas</b> The licensee was effectively maintaining controls for personnel monitoring, control of radioactive material, radiological postings, radiation area controls, and high radiation area controls as required by 10 CFR Part 20.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
05/22/1999	1999003	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Occupational Radiation Exposure Control Program</b> The licensee was maintaining programs for controlling exposures As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) and continued to be effective in controlling overall collective dose. All personnel radiation exposures during 1999 to date were below regulatory limits.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	NEG	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 3B <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radiological Control Practices During Spent Fuel Cask Movement</b> A negative observation during fuel cask movement was that a health physics (HP) technician failed to allow sufficient time for the neutron survey meter to stabilize while taking readings. HP management adequately addressed this observation by revising training procedures.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Radiological Control Practices During Spent Fuel Cask Movement</b> The licensee performed proper radiological control practices during the loading of a spent fuel dry storage cask and the transportation of the cask to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
04/10/1999	1999002	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Review of Emergency Preparedness Program</b> The licensee emergency preparedness program was being maintained in a state of operational readiness and met Emergency Plan commitments. Members of the Emergency Response Organization were qualified in more than one position.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						

## United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II  
SURRY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Primary Coolant Sampling</b> A primary coolant sample was properly drawn and analyzed. Proper radiological practices were used by the technician performing the evolution.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 3C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Management for the Physical Security Program</b> Site and security management provided support to the physical security program and was effective in administrating the security program. Management controls of the security program were aggressive, effective, and comprehensive.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 1C <b>Sec:</b> 5B <b>Ter:</b> 5C	<b>Controls for Safeguards Events</b> Safeguards events were logged, tracked, trended, analyzed, and resolved according to the Physical Security Plan commitments.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 3B <b>Sec:</b> 1C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Security Force Training and Requalification</b> The security force was effectively trained and requalified according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b>	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5B <b>Sec:</b> 1C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Security Program Problem Resolution</b> The licensee assigned and analyzed problems properly so that logical conclusions could be reached. Corrective actions were appropriately prioritized. Problem analysis was a strength of the security program. The corrective action program was technically sound, effective, and performed actions in a timely manner.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b> MAINT	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 2A <b>Sec:</b> 1C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Security Equipment at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation</b> The security equipment at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation was found operational and performing as intended.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b> 05000280 Surry 1 05000281 Surry 2						

## United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II

SURRY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
02/27/1999	1999001	<b>Pri:</b> PLTSUP <b>Sec:</b> OPS	NRC	POS	<b>Pri:</b> 5A <b>Sec:</b> 1C <b>Ter:</b>	<b>Nuclear Oversight Audits and Self-Assessment Audits</b> The Nuclear Oversight audits and Self-Assessment audits were thorough, complete, and effective in uncovering weaknesses in the security system, procedures, and practices. The audit and self assessment program was a strength to the security program.
<b>Dockets Discussed:</b>						
05000280 Surry 1						
05000281 Surry 2						

# United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

## Legend

### Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

### Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

### ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

### Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.