

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
BRUNSWICK

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
01/07/2000	1999009	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Operations Performance Following Trip of Recirc Pump Recovery of an idle Unit 1 reactor recirculation (RR) pump following single-loop operation was successfully performed utilizing lessons-learned from previous evolutions. Clear, direct communications and good supervisory control resulted in an event-free restoration of the idle RR pump.
Dockets Discussed: 05000325 Brunswick 1						
12/04/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 2B Ter: 3B	Cold Weather Preparations The licensee's cold weather program ensures that freeze protection is maintained on safety-related and selected non-safety-related equipment, remote buildings, and instruments. Operators were knowledgeable of the program and the procedures provided instructions and check sheets if outside temperatures dropped below designated thresholds.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
12/04/1999	1999008-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3C Sec: Ter:	Lack of Programmatic Controls for Instructional Aids A violation with two examples was identified when it was determined that no proceduralized control programs existed for instructional aids in the form of hard cards and plant warning labels.
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11/05/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Operator Response Following 1B Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine Trip The plant responded as designed to a loss of the 1B reactor feedwater pump turbine (RFPT) and the subsequent insertion of a manual scram due to lowering reactor water level. Operator response to this event was prompt and efficient, taking actions in advance of the automatic protective features (LER 99-009-00).
Dockets Discussed: 05000325 Brunswick 1						
10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Licensed Operator Alternate Safe Shutdown Training The adequacy of licensed operator alternate safe shutdown (ASSD) training and the quality of supporting materials was very good. The use of photographic representations of plant equipment during performance of procedure steps was an effective and efficient method of providing classroom training.
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10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: OPS Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	ASSD and Fire Protection Procedures No discrepancies were noted during the review of plant alternate safe shutdown (ASSD) and fire protection procedures. Plant procedures provided sufficiently detailed guidance for operator actions to safely shut down the plant in the event of a loss of control room habitability.
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09/20/1999	1999007	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 2A Ter:	Operator Workarounds to Compensate for Equipment Deficiencies A weakness was identified concerning operator workarounds that were placed in operating procedures to compensate for equipment deficiencies. In two examples, plant deficiencies were not properly addressed and the licensee used proceduralized operator workarounds to correct the impact of the deficiencies on plant operations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
09/20/1999	1999007-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Startup Procedure Noncompliances A violation with two examples was identified for failures to follow plant procedures during a Unit 2 startup. These failures resulted in a Group 1 primary containment isolation system actuation and a subsequent manual scram.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
09/11/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Hurricane Recovery Activities During hurricane recovery and plant startup activities, additional personnel were made available to supplement the shift. Supplemental personnel were given specific responsibilities and priorities, and good command and control were maintained. The duty shift maintained control and responsibility for any changes to system configuration and status. No deficiencies were noted during the observed portions of the startup activities.
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09/11/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 3A Ter:	Plant Response During Hurricane Dennis Both units were taken to hot shutdown as a result of a prediction of hurricane-force winds from Hurricane Dennis. The shutdowns were completed successfully and all required safety features functioned as designed. The plant experienced no damage to safety-related structures or components. Recovery planning for staffing, responsibilities, and needed actions led to a prompt and thorough assessment of both units' readiness to restart.
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08/03/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Recovery of Idle Reactor Recirculation (RR) Pump Following Single-Loop Operation Recovery of an idle RR pump following single-loop operation continued to be a challenge for the licensee. Operators made eight attempts to maneuver Unit 1 to the low-power, low-recirculation flow conditions required to start an idle RR pump. Feedwater system flow oscillations under these conditions resulted in power oscillations and indications of the unit being operated in the thermal hydraulic instability restricted region. During each attempt, the operators had to increase flow in the operating loop to exit the restricted region before the idle pump could be started. Corrective actions and lessons-learned from a previous event allowed the operators to maintain positive control over plant systems (LER 50-325/1999-002-00).
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07/31/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec: ENG	NRC	NEG	Pri: 4A Sec: Ter:	Travelling Screen Design and Methods The licensee's current design and methods to prevent or alleviate intake structure traveling screen differential pressure (d/p) anomalies were not effective. The licensee formulated corrective actions to address these deficiencies. These corrective actions included review of design changes in the intake canal and preparation of an abnormal operating procedure to handle intake canal anomalies that could affect traveling screen d/p's.
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07/27/1999	1999005-01	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	NRC	NCV	Pri: 5A Sec: 2A Ter:	1B Nuclear Service Water Strainer Instrument Corrective Action A corrective action violation was identified when the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality with the 1B nuclear service water (NSW) pump discharge strainer differential pressure (d/p) instrument, 1-SW-PDIC-140. As a result, the pump operated without adequate indication to verify that the required pump flow was being achieved. The licensee was recording d/p instrument readings for each of the service water pump discharge strainers but never questioned the abnormal indication on the 1B NSW pump discharge strainer.
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07/15/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	Adverse Condition Identification by Operations Personnel A continuing weakness with adverse condition identification by on-shift operations personnel was identified. The flow input for the reactor protection system flow bias scram was bypassed and a TS LCO was entered due to surveillance test activities on the 2A core spray subsystem. Despite operator knowledge that this adverse condition had occurred previously on several occasions, the condition was not brought to management's attention nor entered into the corrective action program.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
07/15/1999	1999005-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Failure to Enter TS 3.0.3 A violation was identified when the licensee failed to correctly enter the applicable Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) when the 2A core spray system was removed from service coincident with a diesel generator (DG) 1 outage. The LCO specified entry into TS 3.0.3. The actions required by TS 3.0.3 were not recognized or initiated as required and the redundancy of the core spray and low pressure coolant injection systems was not recognized (LER 50-324/ 99-007-00).
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06/28/1999	1999005	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operator Log-taking The inspectors noted problems with operator log taking in that some important activities and events were not logged. Similar problems had been observed during two other scrams that occurred in 1999.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operation Oversight of the Fire Watch Program Fire watch requirements were being met for the areas with deficient fire protection equipment. However, some administrative aspects of the fire watch program were not being performed. These administrative deficiencies did not have a significant safety impact on plant operations. However, they did demonstrate a lack of detailed operations oversight of the fire watch program.
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06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Control Room Command, Control, and Communications Operations personnel generally demonstrated strong command and control of control room activities during normal operations on Unit 1 and startup activities on Unit 2. Procedural requirements for command, control, and communications were met. Senior site management, as well as department and first line supervisors, demonstrated strong supervisory oversight and observed activities.
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06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Control Room Configuration Control Configuration Control of safety-related equipment was correctly maintained. Technical Specification-required surveillance tests and instrument checks were correctly performed and accurately recorded. Procedural and regulatory requirements were met for inoperable equipment and Limiting Conditions for Operation were correctly identified and recorded.
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06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operator Knowledge and Conduct Operators generally followed good operating practices and maintained shift professionalism in conducting plant operations. Operators were aware of ongoing plant activities and surveillance testing. Administrative controls were adequate to ensure in-plant work activities were being performed with the knowledge of control room personnel.
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06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3C Sec: 3A Ter:	Monitoring of Licensed Operator Candidates in the Control Room Licensed operator candidates performing on-the-job training in the control room were closely monitored by licensed operators assigned oversight responsibility. This was considered to be a strength.
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06/19/1999	1999004-03	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Reactor Recirculation Discharge Bypass Valve Inoperability A violation was identified for the licensee determination that the "B" low pressure coolant injection subsystem had been inoperable for greater than the Technical Specification allowed action time. The subsystem inoperability was a result of missing valve actuator components in the reactor recirculation (RCR) system discharge bypass valve which caused valve binding on three occasions. The valve binding prevented the valve from closing and therefore made the valve inoperable (LER 50-324/1999-004-00).
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05/21/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Pre-job Briefing Coverage of Operating Experience and Contingencies Operating experience was not comprehensively communicated during a pre-job briefing for transitioning from dual-loop reactor recirculation pump operation to single loop operation, and proposed contingencies for monitoring alternate bottom-head drain temperature were inadequate.
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05/20/1999	1999004-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	Failure to Promptly Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality A violation was identified for the failure of the licensee to initiate condition reports (CRs) for trips of the reactor protection system and the manipulation of a component in the control room without proper authorization. A negative trend in the identification of nonconforming conditions was identified based on these findings, as well as licensee and third-party assessments.
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05/19/1999	1999004-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Condensate System Transient A violation was identified when an operator failed to follow procedure during the alignment of the condensate system pumps. This resulted in the inadvertent start of two condensate pumps and one condensate booster pump.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	MISC	Pri: 2A Sec: 5B Ter:	Spiking LPRMs Spiking local power range monitors (LPRM) resulted in two reactor protection system scrams on Unit 2 while the vessel was defueled. During the first scram, a control rod drive (CRD) had not been completely removed from service and the CRD inserted. All systems functioned as designed.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5B Sec: 5A Ter:	Condition Report Classification Guidance Review of the classification of several condition reports revealed that guidance provided for the classification of nonconforming conditions was misleading. Based on procedure instructions, nonconformances such as operability or reportability determinations might not have received appropriate root cause determinations based on inappropriate classification as improvement items.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Fuel Movement Fuel movement activities on Unit 2 were observed to be conducted consistent with the fuel handling procedure. Independent verification was used before moving a fuel assembly or control blade. Three-part communications were maintained throughout between the refuel bridge personnel and between bridge personnel and the control room. A senior reactor operator was present at all times during refueling activities.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 1A Ter:	Diesel Generator Walkdown A general walkdown of the four diesel generators verified their operability and configuration appropriate to the mode of plant operation. All accessible valves in the main system flow paths were in the correct positions. Power supplies and breakers were correctly aligned and available for system initiations. Local control panels were properly aligned for standby mode and displayed indications were consistent with expected values.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec: ENG	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 5B Ter: 4B	Turbine Trip Reactor Scram Response Operators responded promptly and efficiently to a main turbine trip and subsequent automatic reactor scram. The licensee's event review team performed an overall event analysis which provided the necessary root cause analysis and corrective actions to support management's decision to restart Unit 2. Engineering review of an unexpected lifting and reseating of two safety relief valves (SRVs) in response to a main steam line pressure spike was adequate to explain the event and validate the proper operation of the SRVs (LER 50-324/1999-002-00).
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Alternate Safe Shutdown Walkdown A walkthrough simulating the shutdown of both units from outside the control room was performed to establish the significance of an identified adverse condition. Walkthrough participants were observed to provide acceptable feedback regarding areas for improvement in the procedures, walkthrough set-up, and implementation. The lack of simulation of the effects the simulated fire had on safety-related equipment and the use of two individuals to represent seven operators limited the ability of the walkthrough to satisfactorily simulate conditions for demonstration of acceptable operator command-and-control and emergency action level classification.
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05/08/1999	1999003-01	Pri: OPS Sec: ENG	NRC	NCV	Pri: 5A Sec: 2A Ter:	Degraded Drywell Pressure Instrumentation A corrective action violation was identified when measures were not established to ensure that a condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Water accumulation in the common sensing line to the Unit 1 high drywell (DW) pressure and reactor building -to-suppression pool vacuum breaker instruments caused a non-conservative instrument bias that would have caused the instruments to actuate above the Technical Specification allowed setpoint values and above the analytical safety limit for DW pressure (LER 50-325/1999-004-00).
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03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter: 2A	Insufficient Caution Tag Guidance. The caution tag associated with a nonconforming reactor vessel bottom head temperature indication did not contain sufficient guidance. The guidance provided did not direct the operators to the procedure containing the necessary plant condition requirements and temperature validation methodology. A caution tag associated with the reactor recirculation pump speed control instrument was inappropriately removed, since the operator work around it addressed still existed. These issues were addressed and corrected by the licensee.
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03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter: 3B	Auxiliary Operator Observations During observation of a turbine building auxiliary operator during routine activities good system knowledge, procedural adherence, and housekeeping practices were demonstrated.
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03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 4B Ter:	Safe Shutdown Risk Management Assessment The licensee completed a safe shutdown risk management assessment which consisted of an independent review of the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage schedule by a team of multi-disciplined personnel. The assessment team focused on maintaining defense in depth for five key safety functions, identified higher risk evolutions, and recommended schedule enhancements. The review and assessment of the outage schedule was both comprehensive and thorough. The licensee took appropriate actions in response to the assessment to minimize outage risk.
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03/27/1999	1999002-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Failure to Perform CREVS Surveillance Testing A review of a control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) test revealed discrepancies with the test methodology and deficiencies with the test acceptance criteria. The acceptance criteria did not contain all logic system functional testing requirements. A violation was identified for a missed surveillance test (LER50-325 / 1999-005-00).
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03/27/1999	1999002-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Pressure Switch Setpoint Shift A violation was identified by the licensee when all four of the RCIC steam supply pressure-low pressure switches were found to be calibration-checked below the Technical Specification allowed value (LER 50-324 / 1999-001-00).
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02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Operator Actions During Manual Scram Event Various procedure cautions regarding Reactor Coolant System temperature, particularly the 145 degrees Fahrenheit (F) difference in vessel to coolant temperature, were not a concern when the operators read them because neither the operators nor management believed that temperature stratification could occur during single-loop operations.
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02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Operator Actions During Manual Scram Event The operators did not meet management expectations or procedural guidance for timely procedure implementation or log-taking throughout the manual scram.
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02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter:	Nuclear Assessment Section (NAS) Audits NAS audits were performed by a well-trained and independent staff and were performed at the required frequencies for the required programs. The audits reviewed were detailed, direct, and successful at identifying both discrete and programmatic weaknesses.
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02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter: 5C	Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) and Nuclear Safety Review Committee (NSRC) Meetings PNSC meetings were conducted in accordance with procedural guidance. PNSC discussions were thorough and probing. NSRC meetings met the charter requirements, and demonstrated careful attention by its members to plant nuclear safety events and issues.
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02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5B Sec: Ter:	Corrective Action Trend Reports The condition report (CR) trending program was being adequately conducted in accordance with the procedure. Quarterly trend reports were extensive and included site-wide and individual unit trend evaluations. In addition, continuous trending was identifying trends to management through adverse trend CRs. Management was appropriately prioritizing issues and providing resources for equipment performance issues.
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02/12/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 3A Ter:	Training and Implementation of a Special Procedure to Secure the B Reactor Feed Pump Validation of a special procedure for securing the 2B reactor feed pump turbine (RFPT) with an inoperative control system was performed on the simulator. Throughout the simulator session formal communications and procedural adherence were maintained. Operations and engineering support personnel were available to discuss procedure enhancements and expected system response. The Unit 2 downpower to 60 percent reactor thermal power and removal of the 2B RFPT were performed effectively.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Material Condition and Housekeeping for ASSD Equipment The material condition and general housekeeping for alternate safe shutdown (ASSD) equipment was good. The inspectors identified no safety concerns as a result of walkdowns of ASSD equipment.
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10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: MAINT Sec: ENG	NRC	POS	Pri: 5B Sec: 4C Ter:	Use of Operational Experience for Maintenance Activities Observed maintenance on the Unit 2 notch override/emergency rod in switch following a control rod mispositioning event on September 26 found no deficiencies with the maintenance activities or paperwork. The reactor manual control system intermittent malfunction troubleshooting was enhanced by the use of the licensee's Operational Experience program.
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10/21/1999	1999008-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3C Ter:	Failure to Follow Independent Verification Procedure The inspectors identified a procedure violation while observing a clearance being hung on the Unit 1 high-pressure coolant injection system. Contrary to independent verification procedure requirements, a reactor operator positioned a component and independently verified the position of the same component with no valve position indication.
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10/20/1999	1999007	Pri: MAINT Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 3B Ter:	Standby Gas Treatment System Maintenance A detailed walkdown of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system indicated that it was well-maintained and able to perform its intended safety function. General housekeeping in the area of the SBGT trains was excellent and support systems were functioning as expected. The system engineer was very knowledgeable and current on all issues affecting the SBGT system.
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09/29/1999	1999007	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: 4C Ter:	Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting The Maintenance Rule expert panel meeting discussions on covered topics were thorough and productive. The bases for all decisions were logical, risk-informed, and well-documented.
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07/08/1999	1999005	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	Conduct of Underwater Inspection Activities The activities associated with the underwater inspection of the service water intake structure were completed thoroughly and professionally. A well-coordinated effort by plant staff allowed the inspections to be completed without incident.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	MISC	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Foreign Material Control Activities Control of foreign material in foreign material exclusion areas remained a challenge during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Eight foreign material items were found to be in the reactor vessel and the fuel pool during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Corrective actions implemented by the licensee for foreign materials in the reactor vessel and the fuel pool were effective in minimizing the risk to fuel integrity.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
06/16/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	MISC	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Fuel Rod Cracks on Fuel Pin The licensee identified that a single fuel rod had multiple cracks totalling approximately 120 inches long. Early identification and effective suppression resulted in cracks that were narrow. A discernable fret mark was noted, although no debris was located at the site of the fretting.
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06/16/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter:	Planning and Support for Failed Fuel Inspection The failed fuel inspection activities were well planned with ample health physics support including an emphasis on exposure reduction during the work.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:	Recirculation Valve Seal Welding The licensee experienced problems when attempting to apply a seal weld to reactor recirculation valve no. 2-B32-F023B. The problems were caused by unexpected leakage of water past the valve seat and inadequate venting capability. The licensee was ultimately successful in completing the repair.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 2B Ter:	Freeze Sealing Freeze sealing activities associated with the repairs on the reactor recirculation pump 2B discharge bypass motor operated valve were conducted adequately. The governing procedure did not take into account industry experience for monitoring nitrogen flow. This did not result in an adverse condition. The licensee was considering this in their lessons learned for this evolution.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: 3A Ter:	Valve Actuator Maintenance Observed maintenance activities on the reactor recirculation pump 2B discharge bypass motor operated valve actuator found that the technicians were very knowledgeable and skilled with the task. The technicians did not observe any broken or severely worn parts that would have effected actuator operability. The inspectors found that the technicians made an accurate assessment.
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05/08/1999	1999003-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: 5A Ter:	Maintenance Rule (MR) Implementation Failure An MR violation was identified for maintenance rule functional failures, which were not correctly dispositioned for the inoperability of the Unit 1 high drywell pressure instruments.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec: ENG	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Inservice Inspection Activities Inservice examination activities observed were performed in a skillful and thorough manner by knowledgeable examiners. Discontinuities were properly recorded and evaluated by knowledgeable examiners using approved procedures.
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12/25/1999	1999009	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: 1B Ter:	Technical Evaluation of Degraded Plant Condition On Unit 2, the licensee determined that the number two main turbine bypass valve would not function as designed and was therefore inoperable. The inspectors found that the licensee's technical evaluation of this condition as well as their planned corrective actions were accurate and thorough.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
11/05/1999	1999008	Pri: ENG Sec: OPS	NRC	NEG	Pri: 4A Sec: 4C Ter: 3B	Evaluation and Implementation of Major Plant Modifications During review of the reactor feedwater pump turbine trip and resulting scram that occurred on Unit 1 on November 5, the inspectors identified design evaluation and implementation deficiencies for major plant modifications. Specifically, for the Maximum Extended Operating Domain and Power Up-Rate modifications, the inspectors determined that continuing problems existed in both the implementation of the modifications as well as the review and evaluation of their impact on integrated plant operations.
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10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5B Sec: 4C Ter:	Troubleshooting Instructions In general, troubleshooting instructions provided an adequate description of activities and possible operational affects. However, several troubleshooting activities were identified where the possible operational affects were not fully addressed by engineering. The licensee indicated that reinforcement of the expectations for the content of troubleshooting instructions would be provided to appropriate plant personnel.
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09/11/1999	1999006	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: 4B Ter:	Inservice Testing of Service Water Pumps Review of Inservice Testing documents for routine and corrective maintenance for a conventional service water pump and a residual heat removal service water pump, revealed that procedures were appropriately implemented by engineering. Pump reference values were appropriately reestablished after maintenance activities and the changes were noted in the record of test. All discrepancies had been appropriately identified and entered by the licensee into the corrective action program.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
08/31/1999	1999006	Pri: ENG Sec: MAINT	NRC	MISC	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Implementation of Unit 1 Digital Feedwater Control System Y2K Modification The implementation of the modification for the Unit 1 digital feedwater control (DFWC) system was completed and tested on August 31 without any problems. This modification was the same as that installed in Unit 2 during the last refueling outage and was reviewed previously by the NRC. With the successful completion of the DFWC modification, all outstanding issues noted in the previous Year 2000 inspection have been resolved.
Dockets Discussed: 05000325 Brunswick 1						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	MISC	Pri: 2A Sec: 5C Ter:	Y2K Readiness Project Activities The plant Y2K Readiness Project activities and contingency planning were about 99 percent complete. The digital feedwater modification for Unit 2 has been completed, and was scheduled to be installed for Unit 1 by November 16, 1999. All other Y2K activities were scheduled to be completed by the end of June 1999.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: ENG Sec: MAINT	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 5C Ter:	Control of Vendor Contractor Work During the Unit 2 refueling outage, the licensee did not adequately address or disposition an identified problem with vendor contractor work at the facility. One issue involved incorrect configuration of Motor Operated Valve wire jumpers, and the other concerned a wedge spring and spring retainer plate which were not installed in a reactor recirculation system valve in accordance with plant drawings. However, the licensee had recently changed its control of vendor contractor work to require that individuals be qualified in Brunswick's quality assurance program, that the vendor use Brunswick facility procedures, and that a Brunswick project manager be assigned to each work task. The licensee stated that in the past, vendor work activities were not always monitored such that quality standards were achieved.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 4A Sec: Ter:	Design Calculation Discrepancies In general, changes to plant design documentation reviewed were completed consistent with the guidance in the applicable engineering procedures. During review of the service water and control room emergency ventilation systems, the inspectors noted minor discrepancies in the assumptions for several design calculations. These discrepancies were corrected and verified to be bounded by existing calculations and/or design documentation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Engineering Resolution of MOV Deficiencies Engineering resolution of several motor operated valve deficiencies was satisfactorily performed. Nonconformances were promptly identified, satisfactorily evaluated, and either promptly repaired or entered into the work schedule.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						

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02/13/1999	1999001-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4A Sec: 5B Ter:	Inadequate THI Modification Implementation A violation was identified for the failure to adequately review and evaluate the impact of the thermal hydraulic instability (THI) modification on plant operations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000325 Brunswick 1						
02/13/1999	1999001-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 5A Sec: 4A Ter:	Failure To Perform Volumetric Examinations In Accordance With Generic Letter 88-01 A violation for failure to perform volumetric examinations in accordance with licensee procedures that invoke Generic Letter 88-01 was identified (LER 50-324 \ 1999-001-00).
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
01/15/2000	1999009	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Liquid Effluent Radioactivity Levels The amounts of radioactivity released from the plant in liquid effluents has remained stable over the last several years and the radiation doses resulting from those releases were a small percentage of regulatory limits.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
01/15/2000	1999009	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter:	Storage of Radioactive Material The licensee was effectively labeling, controlling, and storing radioactive material as required by 10 CFR 20.1904. All radioactive material storage areas observed were appropriately posted to specify the radiological conditions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
01/15/2000	1999009	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Radioactive Material Shipment Program The licensee had effectively implemented a program for shipping radioactive materials in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Transportation regulations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Maintenance of Emergency Lighting System The maintenance inspection and surveillance test program for the emergency 8-hour battery-powered lighting system was sufficient to ensure that the system design function was met. The emergency lighting units were operational and the lighting heads were aimed to provide adequate illumination to perform the required shutdown actions denoted in alternate safe shutdown (ASSD) procedures
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						

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10/23/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Maintenance of ASSD Sound-Powered Phone System The surveillance test program for the alternate safe shutdown (ASSD) sound-powered phone system was sufficient to verify proper operation of the system. The sound-powered phone jacks were installed at the proper locations to support required shutdown actions identified in the ASSD procedures.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
09/16/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Hurricane Floyd Preparations and Response The licensee's preparations for Hurricane Floyd and activities during and after the storm were timely, comprehensive, and appropriate. Actions following the storm were also appropriate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
09/08/1999	1999006	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 3C Ter:	Transfer of Spent Resin from Radwaste Building to Storage Liner Reactor water clean-up spent resin was successfully transferred from the radwaste building to a storage liner located in the protected area. This was the first in a series of planned resin transfers. Health physics controls were effective in reducing overall exposure for the activity; area dose rates were lower than expected. Operations management provided continuous oversight of the evolution.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
08/23/1999	1999008-03	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2A Sec: 3B Ter: 5A	Fire Pump Concurrent Inoperability A violation was identified for the licensee's failure to properly identify that a missing temperature switch affected the operability of the engine-driven fire pump and to promptly correct this condition. As a result of this failure, licensee personnel subsequently allowed the motor-driven fire pump to be removed from service for maintenance. With both pumps concurrently inoperable, the licensee's ability to mitigate a fire was degraded due to the unavailability of satisfactory means to provide water fire suppression (LER 50-325,324/1999-008-00).
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
07/19/1999	1999005	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 2A Ter:	Site Boundary Integrity The integrity of the site protected area boundary was intact. No obstructions or gaps were noted in the fence. Security personnel were appropriately stationed and attentive.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Plant Worker Knowledge of Dose Setpoints About half of the ten radiation workers questioned concerning knowledge of their dosimetry alarm setpoints did not know their alarm setpoints.
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06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Radiological Work and Access Controls Licensee radiation surveys, postings, access controls, and radiological work controls were effective and were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Plant Personnel Doses Individual radiation doses were well below regulatory limits. The Brunswick ALARA program reduced site collective personnel radiation doses for planned activities.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
06/19/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 1A Ter:	Health Physics Support of Operations and Maintenance During Refueling Health physics support of operations and maintenance activities was good. Adequate coverage was noted during observed maintenance activities. The use of individual radio headsets and remote-indicating dosimetry allowed personnel in the drywell to reduce the time spent in high dose rate areas and thereby reduce personnel exposure.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/18/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:	Licensee Drywell Pre-startup Inspection Performance A pre-startup inspection of the drywell found that general housekeeping was adequate to ensure the drywell was free of foreign material and ready to support a plant startup. Health physics support and coordination for this activity were effective in reducing personnel exposure.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Fire Bridgade Response Vulnerability A fire brigade response time vulnerability for the control room was identified and included in the plant corrective action program.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 2B Ter:	Fire Brigade Performance Overall fire brigade performance in fire responses and drill participation for drills conducted during the first quarter of 1999 was marginal. Fire brigade drill program implementation required four remedial drills and a series of four additional training drills before all established brigade drill objectives were successfully accomplished. A number of fire brigade drills had been performed in risk significant plant locations.
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05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 4C Ter:	Management Oversight of Fire Protection Program Upgrade (FPPU) Phase 1 Issues were identified associated with incomplete and ineffective management oversight of implementation of the FPPU Phase I upgrades for the fire protection administrative, training and fire drill programs. Fire brigade performance was marginally effective but the previously identified declining trend had stabilized.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 4B Ter:	Reactor Building Fire Response The Unit 2 reactor building (RB) was evacuated as a result of a fire in a distribution panel on the 20 foot elevation. Quick response by a contract health physics technician in the area resulted in the fire being extinguished within eight minutes. Operations personnel promptly established responsibilities, accessed required procedures, and mustered the fire brigade. Engineering responded quickly to evaluate the damaged components and recommend those components to reenergize to allow continuation of RB activities. Good feedback regarding equipment issues and areas for improvement were identified during the post-fire review.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Pre-Fire Plans Fire brigade pre-fire plans provided clear and sufficient fire brigade instructions and met the requirements of the fire protection program.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Personal Protective Fire Fighting Equipment The inspectors determined that the personal protective fire fighting equipment provided to the brigade was in good condition, properly maintained, and provided a sufficient level of personal safety needed to handle onsite fire emergencies. Backup lighting in the dressout area provided an adequate level of lighting in support of fire brigade operations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Fire Protection Equipment Appropriate emphasis had been placed on the operability of the fire protection equipment and components. The number of degraded fire protection components was low. Manual fire fighting equipment, automatic fire detection systems, and suppression features of fire zone/areas were operational and were well maintained.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: 2A Ter:	Combustible Control Implementation of the fire protection program requirements for control of combustible fire hazards was effective. Plant personnel followed combustible control procedures to manage the use and temporary storage of transient combustibles in safety-related areas. Plant housekeeping and trash control were in accordance with procedure requirements .
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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	Health Physics Personnel Performance Observed health physics technician activities during periods of high worker access into the radiological controlled area (RCA) found that technicians were knowledgeable regarding recent changes to the RCA egress controls and the new scrub policy. Activities were generally conducted consistent with site requirements. Minor discrepancies with crossing the RCA boundary in the small article monitor area were quickly addressed and corrected.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	NAS Review of Fire Protection The licensee's Nuclear Assessment Section (NAS) assessment of the facility's Fire Protection Upgrade Program (FPPU) was effective in reporting fire protection program performance to management. The fire protection upgrade project was on schedule and had a positive impact on the quality of fire protection procedures and pre-fire plans. The NAS audit recommended that operations and training management consider additional emphasis on self-assessment in the area of fire protection to determine the status of the FPPU.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
05/08/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: 5C Ter: 1C	Fire History Six incidents of smoke or equipment overheating were identified in the past 15-month period which were primarily caused by electrical component faults within safety-related areas. These fire-related conditions were properly identified and mitigating actions were taken in a timely manner. No trends were identified.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	MISC	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Radioactive Effluent Release Report The licensee's 1998 effluent releases increased significantly but continued to be a small fraction of allowable limits.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Routine Radioactive Effluent Stream Sampling The licensee technical staff utilized good planning, procedures, and communications in performing routine radioactive effluent stream sampling.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Access Authorization Program A review of the licensee's access authorization program concluded that the program was meeting regulatory guidance
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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Protected Area Perimeter Barrier Changes Changes to the protected area perimeter barrier met the Physical Security/Contingency Plan and regulatory requirements.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Physical Security/Contingency Plan Changes The Physical Security/Contingency Plan changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the security programs.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Security Event Logs Security event logs reviewed appropriately tracked, resolved, and documented safeguards events in accordance with regulatory requirements.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Security Audits/Self-Assessments Licensee-conducted audits were thorough, complete, and effective in terms of uncovering weaknesses in the security system, procedures, and practices. The audit findings and recommendations were reviewed by management, appropriately assigned, analyzed, and prioritized for corrective action. Corrective actions were technically adequate and performed in a timely manner. The audit/self-assessment program continued to be a program strength.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 1C Ter:	Radiological Environmental Air Samplers Inspected radiological environmental air samplers were properly calibrated, operated in accordance with licensee procedures, and were well maintained.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: 1C Ter:	Quality Controls for Gamma Spectroscopy Systems Licensee quality controls for gamma spectroscopy systems met procedure requirements and were effectively implemented.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
03/27/1999	1999002-03	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Failure to Label Container of Radioactive Material A violation was identified for failure to accurately label a container of radioactive material in the radioactive material storage facility.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
03/27/1999	1999002-04	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Inadequate Designation of Emergency Response Plan Staffing Review of the staffing rosters for Operations responsibilities for the emergency response, alternate safe shutdown, and fire brigade programs revealed a conflict. A violation was identified due to the Site Emergency Coordinator being assigned multiple duties, in the event of a shutdown of both units from outside the control room, which was contrary to the emergency response plan.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	MISC	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Increased Radiological Effluents Fuel leaks and tramp uranium resulted in increased radiological effluents in 1997 and 1998. [The effluents were still well within regulatory limits for offsite doses, but the plant saw an increase from 713 to 947 to over 2200 curies of radioactive noble gas effluents in 1996, 1997, and 1998 respectively.]
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
02/13/1999	1999001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Emergency Preparedness Program Readiness The licensee's emergency preparedness program was being maintained in a state of full operational readiness. Changes to the program since the January 1997 inspection were consistent with commitments and NRC requirements, and did not decrease the licensee's overall state of preparedness.
Dockets Discussed: 05000324 Brunswick 2 05000325 Brunswick 1						
02/13/1999	1999001-05	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 5C Sec: Ter:	Failure To Adequately Complete Fire Protection Commitments A violation was issued for the failure to complete those corrective actions required to properly implement sensitivity testing as required by the fire protection program. The inspectors determined that previous corrective actions had not been completed or had been erroneously voided. The testing required to restore licensee compliance was scheduled to be completed by April 15, 1999.
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Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.