

March 27, 2000

Mr. James N. Adkins
Vice President - Production
United States Enrichment Corporation
Two Democracy Center
6903 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda, MD 20817

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 70-7002/2000004(DNMS)

Dear Mr. Adkins:

On March 17, 2000, the NRC completed an environmental protection, emergency preparedness and training inspection at your Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The enclosed report presents the results of the inspection.

Your conduct of activities observed during the inspection at Portsmouth was generally characterized by safety conscious operations, sound environmental protection policies and procedures and adequate radiological work controls. No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of the inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Patrick L. Hiland, Chief
Fuel Cycle Branch

Docket No. 70-7002
Certificate No. GDP-2

Enclosure: Inspection Report 70-7002/2000004(DNMS)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 70-7002
Certificate No: GDP-2

Report No: 70-7002/2000004(DNMS)

Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation

Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South
P.O. Box 628
Piketon, OH 45661

Dates: March 13-17, 2000

Inspectors: Darrel G. Wiedeman
Senior Health Physicist

Mary L. Thomas
Fuel Cycle Inspector

Approved By: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief
Fuel Cycle Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/2000004(DNMS)

Environmental Monitoring Programs

- The inspectors concluded that overall the effluent environmental monitoring program at Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant was determined to be of high quality and adequate to collect representative environmental samples for the analysis of radioactive releases from the site and for the determination of doses to members of the public. (Section R1.1)

Training Program

- The inspectors concluded that the training program at Portsmouth met the applicable NRC requirements. The inspectors also noted that the training records reviewed for newly hired employees and emergency response organization were current. (Section O5.1 and P5.1)

Emergency Preparedness Program

- The inspectors observed that the emergency preparedness and health physics staff maintained a good inventory of well-maintained emergency response equipment and supplies that were in a state of operational readiness. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the public warning system maintenance and surveillance tests were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and the manufacturer's recommendations. (Section P2.2)

Report Details

I. Operations

05 General Employee Staff Training and Qualification

O5.1 Training Requirements and Implementation

a. Inspection Scope (88010)

The inspectors reviewed the incorporation and implementation of new employee related training requirements and emergency squad (E-Squad) training requirements, as specified in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), into plant procedures and practices.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the system and records used by the plant training organization to document training requirements and completed training. The system included a matrix of training requirements, by position, and the current training status of individuals assigned to the respective positions. The system appeared well organized and comprehensive. Based upon a sampling review of the matrices, the inspectors determined that the matrices incorporated all of the SAR-required training. Specifically, the training matrices for the E-Squad members and fire fighters (FF) included a requirement for testing and training of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) requirements, a SAR-required training course. In addition, the training requirements for newly hired employees included general employee training a requirement for basic radiation worker training, a training course necessary for unescorted access to radiologically controlled areas of the plant.

The inspectors also reviewed a random sample of monthly training reports, issued by the training organization to plant managers, which documented the training status of all plant staff. Plant procedures direct the management to use the report information to ensure that plant staff do not perform work following the expiration of required training. The report is distributed approximately one week prior to the end of the month and indicates training qualifications that expire at the end of the month, in 30 days, and in 60 days. During discussions with the training staff, the inspectors were informed that plant managers are expected to review the training status of their staff and to issue work restriction memorandums for individuals with expired training requirements. This expectation was consistent with documented SAR and procedural requirements.

Based upon a cursory review of training records for E-Squad and FFs and monthly training status reports, the inspectors determined that the employees met the training qualifications and requirements

The inspectors performed a further sampling review of training records for newly transferred, hired, or temporarily assigned staff and determined that plant management had implemented work restrictions for the involved individuals prior to their appointment to the positions or following issuance of the most recent monthly training status report.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the training program at Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) met the applicable NRC requirements.

II. Environmental and Effluent Monitoring

R1 Radiological Protection

a. Inspection Scope (88045)

The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's programs for the assessment and control of releases of radioactive airborne emissions and liquid effluents, and evaluated the environmental and effluent monitoring program for the assessment and characterization of radiological contaminants in the environs surrounding the site. The primary program areas reviewed included: the environmental sampling program for ambient air, soil, sediment, vegetation and direct radiation; and the sampling and assessment of airborne emissions and liquid effluents through controlled release pathways.

The inspectors reviewed site specific data for the meteorological programs described in Section 5.1 of the SAR. Meteorological data is required for the assessment of potential offsite radiological dose consequences from airborne emissions from the facility.

R1.1 Environmental Monitoring

Radiological environmental monitoring programs (REMP) are conducted at PORTS to assess the impact of the facility operations to the environment in the immediate vicinity of the plant site. The REMP supplemented the radiological effluent monitoring program by verifying anticipated concentrations of radioactivity in the environment and related exposures to members of the public. Sample locations were selected based on meteorological data as well as other considerations, such as the locations of residential areas with gardens, in order to monitor exposure pathways important to human exposure.

Environmental samples that were collected and analyzed were compared against various predetermined action levels. Reviews of anomalous environmental sample results were triggered by action levels that were based on previous years of data and background data. A review of various sampling data for the period 1997 to 1999 did not identify any cases where action levels were high enough to trigger a review.

R1.2 Ambient Air

b. Observations and Findings

Fourteen permanent ambient air collection stations were being maintained. Five were located onsite, six were located offsite around the reservation boundary, and three were located further offsite, which included one upwind of the prevailing site wind direction to collect background data. Each station contains a continuous low-volume air sampler with a membrane filter for collection of radioactive particulates. Most stations also contained a continuous high-volume air sampler with an 8 inch x 10 inch glass micro fibre filter for collection of radioactive particulates. The high-volume particulate

filters were collected weekly and the low-volume membrane filters were collected monthly. The filters are analyzed for gross alpha and gross beta-gamma.

The inspectors visited six of the air monitoring stations that were co-located with environmental thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and observed a technician check the filters. The monitoring stations were observed to be of high quality, were generally well maintained, and the technician was knowledgeable and proficient in changing the filters.

c. Conclusions

The ambient air sampling program was determined to be adequate to collect representative air samples for the assessment of radioactive particulate releases from the site.

R1.3 Soil

b. Observations and Findings

Soil samples from 31 locations surrounding the site were collected during the spring and fall of 1998 and 1999 and analyzed on a semi-annual basis to monitor the environmental impact of the plant's emissions on the soil surrounding the site. Nine samples were collected at internal site locations (inside the fence line), twelve at onsite locations outside the fence line, six at offsite locations, and another four at remote locations from the site. Soil samples were analyzed for total uranium, gross alpha, gross beta and technetium-99. Action levels which would trigger further review were established based on previous years' data and the results of the background samples.

The inspectors visited five of the locations where soil samples were collected. Each of the locations were considered to be well suited for the collection of soil samples. All were in undisturbed areas where agricultural or other activities that could disturb the soil would not be expected to occur, and a minimal amount of gravel or rocks were present.

c. Conclusions:

The PORTS soil sampling program was determined to be adequate to monitor the environmental impact of the plant's emissions on the soil surrounding the site.

R1.4 Sediment

b. Observations and Findings

Sediment samples are taken from 12 locations surrounding the site, of which four were at 10 mile points from the site. These samples are collected and analyzed on a semi-annual basis to monitor the environmental impact of the plant's emissions on the soil surrounding the site. Sediment samples were analyzed for total uranium, gross alpha, gross beta and technetium-99. Action levels were established based on previous years' data and the results of upstream sediment samples. The inspectors visited six of the locations where sediment samples were collected. Each of the six sampling locations were observed to be well suited for the collection of sediment samples.

c. Conclusions

The sediment sampling program was adequate to monitor the environmental impact of the plant's operation to assess for the accumulation of radiological contaminants in receiving streams around the plant site.

R1.5 Vegetation/Produce

b. Observations and Findings

Vegetation samples were collected semiannually from the same onsite, offsite and remote sampling locations where soil samples were collected. Vegetation samples consisting of wide-blade grass (forage for grazing animals) were collected and analyzed for total uranium and technetium-99. When available, produce samples were also collected within 16 kilometers from the site from local farmers and gardeners, and analyzed for uranium and technetium-99. Action levels which would trigger further review were established based on previous years' data and the results from the background samples.

The inspectors visited six of the locations where vegetation samples were collected. Each of the locations were considered to be well suited for the collection of vegetation samples.

c. Conclusions

The vegetation sampling program was determined to be adequate to monitor the environmental impact of the plant's emissions on the vegetation surrounding the site.

R1.6 Direct Radiation

b. Observations and Findings

The certificatee maintains 19 locations surrounding the PORTS facility where external gamma radiation is monitored. Direct radiation monitoring is conducted using TLDs located at nine onsite locations, eight offsite locations, and two at locations distant from the site for background comparisons. The TLDs are collected by the certificatee and read quarterly by the certificatee's contractor International Chemical Nuclear (ICN). A review of direct radiation record data for calendar years 1998 -1999 indicated all locations were well below the predetermined action levels.

c. Conclusions

The direct radiation monitoring program being conducted at PORTS was adequate.

R1.7 Liquid Effluents

b. Observations and Findings

Effluent water generated at the site includes cooling tower blowdown water, once through cooling water, sewage treatment plant effluent, rain runoff, and process wastewater. Wastewater generated at the site comes from decontamination and

cleaning activities. This wastewater is processed in the decontamination and recovery facility (X-705, Decontamination Building and X-700, Cleaning Building) to remove radionuclides prior to being discharged to the onsite sewage treatment plant. The sewage treatment plant discharges to Outfall W003, which was one of eight United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) leased water outfalls that are being monitored for radioactive effluents. W003 discharges directly to the Scioto River.

Wastewater generated in the decontamination and recovery facility is processed through a biode-nitrification facility in Building X-700. However, before the waste stream is transferred for biode-nitrification, a sample is taken and verified that the technetium concentrations are less than 0.0002 grams/Liter (g/L) (0.2 ppm) and uranium content is less than or equal to 0.005 g/L (5.0 ppm). By ensuring that these criteria are met, eventual releases from the sewage treatment plant would meet concentration guidelines for releases to uncontrolled areas.

A review of the analytical results of the uranium and technetium data from the waste stream prior to a transfer to the biode-nitrification facility indicated the radiological levels in the waste stream were within the levels required. Additionally, the certificatee obtained the liquid radioactive effluent sample analysis results from the laboratory data base and calculated a waterborne dose to a hypothetical member of the public based on the drinking water and fish consumption pathways to demonstrate compliance with NRC requirements for radiation exposure to members of the public. The calculated dose was projected for the entire year. The calculated maximum 50-year committed effective dose equivalent for 1999, based on the sample data to date was 0.0022 mrem.

There are eight locations where USEC conducted effluent sampling of water that originated within the site. These locations are sampled for radiological contamination. Sampling for the presence of other non-radiological contaminants is based on the requirements of USEC's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit issued by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. These samples are also taken at these outfalls. Because many of the outfalls did not maintain a continuous flow, the sampling includes either continuous time proportional composite samplers or grab samples when flow is present at the outfall. The outfalls continuously sampled were sampled such that a weekly composite sample is collected. These samples are analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, total uranium, and technetium-99.

USEC also obtained grab samples from Little Beaver Creek, Big Beaver Creek, Big Run Creek, and the Scioto River as part of the site REMP. These surface waters were sampled both upstream and downstream of USEC discharges into these surface waters. The Scioto River and one downstream location in Little Beaver Creek were sampled weekly. All other locations were sampled monthly. These samples were also analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, total uranium, and technetium-99.

The inspectors visited three of the outfalls and observed a technician collecting weekly composite and grab samples at several of the sample locations. At the sampling sites visited, the sampling lines appeared to be adequately located for collection of a representative sample of the effluent from the outfalls. The sampling technician appeared to be knowledgeable and proficient.

The inspectors reviewed USEC's data from the collection, sampling, and release of liquid effluents. The data indicated that the releases were being carried out as

described in the SAR. The procedures and their implementation were determined to be adequate to prevent liquid radioactive effluent releases in excess of regulatory limits.

c. Conclusion

Overall the effluent water sampling program at PORTS was determined to be of high quality and adequate to collect representative water samples for the analysis of radioactive releases from the site and for the determination of doses to members of the public.

IV. Plant Support

P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation

P2.1 Qualifications of First Responders to Emergencies

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspectors reviewed the required training for E-Squad and FFs and the readiness of the E-Squad to assist the incident commander (IC) in mitigating an off-normal process condition.

b. Observation and Findings

The inspectors noted that Procedure XP2-EP-EP1055, "Incident Command System," identified E-Squad and other specified organizations that the IC can request to assist in the response to an emergency. Procedure XP2-SF-SF1031, "Administration of Emergency Squad," provides guidance for maintaining the E-Squad to assist the IC during an incident as needed. Procedure XP2-EP-EP1055 requires, in part, that E-Squad members successfully pass a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) training program and fit test. The inspectors requested a current list of E-Squad members from the plant shift superintendent. The E-Squad list presented consisted of 25 members. Subsequently, the inspectors reviewed the training records for the 25 E-Squad members and concluded that all members and FF were current with their training and SCBA fit testing.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that all E-Squad members and FFs were properly trained and fit tested for use of SCBA.

P2.2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Activities

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspectors toured the emergency operation center, emergency response vehicle (ERV), and emergency response room (ERR), to determine whether the emergency response equipment, instrumentation, and supplies located in these emergency repositories were maintained in a state of operational readiness. The decontamination trailer and field team monitoring kits were also inspected. The inspectors also reviewed the original design basis for audible coverage of the public warning system (PWS) and

weekly, monthly, quarterly and semiannual testing and maintenance related to the testing of the PWS and controls.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors noted that the ERV and ERR contained the quantities and equipment identified in the emergency preparedness implementing procedures. Cabinets containing emergency equipment and field kits were clearly identifiable, contents were orderly, and well maintained. Survey meters examined were calibrated and operational, and self-contained breathing apparatus air tanks were full. In addition, the inspectors verified via documentation (in support of maintenance, periodic tests or surveillance) that inventory and operational checks were timely, and that equipment and instrumentation stored at selected locations (Fire Service's and ERV) were operational and properly maintained.

The inspectors reviewed the 1999 PWS audible test results and verified the results met audible coverage contained in Report ERCI-R/88-05.

The inspectors noted that the certificatee measured sound pressure level of the sirens during the semiannual PWS testing. The inspectors asked the emergency response manager (ERM) what design bases supported that the PWS audible capacity had not degraded since the original system installation. The ERM stated audible test results indicated no degradation in PWS performance between 1998-1999. The inspectors verified that the certificatee tested the PWS system impedance during the weekly surveillance test.

The inspectors reviewed the PWS weekly, monthly, quarterly and semiannual surveillance tests for compliance with Procedure XP2-EP-EP4001 (Revision 0, December 31, 1997), "Test and Inspection of the Public Warning System," and the manufacturer's testing recommendations. Through record review, the inspectors identified that the certificatee performed a PWS surveillance test in accordance with Procedure XP2-EP-EP4001 for the period reviewed (1999). Additionally, the inspectors identified that the PWS surveillance required by Procedure XP2-EP-EP4001 exceeded the PWS manufacturer's recommendations. Specifically, the inspectors noted that the PWS manufacturer's surveillance guidance did not specify a weekly maintenance surveillance or a load test on the emergency back-up battery. The inspectors noted that the certificatee's battery load test for the PWS batteries per Procedure XP-GP-EM6203, "Battery Load Testing on Public Warning Siren System (ME202AC)," followed good industrial practice for testing batteries for degradation.

c. Conclusions

The emergency preparedness and health physics (HP) staff maintained a good inventory of well-maintained emergency response equipment and supplies that were in a state of operational readiness. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the PWS maintenance and surveillances were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and manufacturer's recommendations.

P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness

P5.1 Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspectors reviewed a random sample of training records for emergency response organization (ERO) personnel. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the qualifications of FFs and HPs (first responders to an emergency) for mitigating an off-normal process condition.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed training records for ERO personnel for compliance with training requirements of Procedure POEF-TR-04, "Training Development and Administrative guide for Emergency Management." The inspectors determined that the site qualified crisis, response, and regulatory liaison managers had completed, and were current, with the required emergency response training courses as required by Procedure POEF-TR-04.

The inspectors discussed with the ERM the qualification of the FF and HP personnel in responding to off-normal plant conditions during an emergency. Procedure UE2-HP-RP1036, "Radiological Protection Training and Qualification," specified the training requirements for HPs and Procedure XP2-SS-FS1031, "Fire Protection Program," specified the training requirements for FFs.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the site qualified crisis, response, and regulatory liaison managers were current with required ERO training.

08.0 Miscellaneous Operational Issues (92702)

- 08.1 (Closed) Certificatee Event Report 35403: The certificatee reported that a smoke head was declared inoperable and they observed a small out gassing. The certificatee responded in a 30-day report dated May 25, 1999, and indicated that by July 1, 2000, bellows sealed valves will be installed at the tails withdraw. Based on planned corrective actions, this item is closed.
- 08.2 (Closed) Certificatee Event Report 35513: The certificatee reported that on February 19, 1999, a smoke head activated in Building X330. The certificatee responded in a 30-day report dated March 26, 1999, and indicated that by July 1, 2000, bellows sealed valves will be installed. Based on planned corrective actions, this item is closed.
- 08.3 (Closed) Certificatee Event Report 35643: The certificatee reported an actuation of the Building X330 tails smoke head. The certificatee responded in a 30-day report and indicated that by July 1, 2000, bellows sealed valves will be installed. Based on planned corrective actions, this item is closed.

- 08.4 (Closed) Certificatee Event Report 36032: The certificatee reported that on August 15, 1999, they received a safety system actuation in Building X333, LAW station compressor area (CADP actuation). The certificatee responded in a 30-day report dated September 13, 1999, and provided a SCAQ Problem Investigation Report (dated September 8, 1999) that indicated that the root cause was due to excessive pressure. The certificatee implemented new procedures. Based upon the revised procedures, this item is closed.
- 08.5 (Closed) Certificatee Event Report 36236: The certificatee reported that on September 27, 1999, they received three cascade automatic data processing (CADP) system smoke head alarms in Building X-333. The certificatee responded in 30-day letter dated October 28, 1999, and indicated that a seal was replaced on Cell 33-2-4 which corrected the problem. Based on the stated corrective action, this item is closed.
- 08.6 (Closed) Certificatee Event Report 36398: The certificatee reported that an O-ring steam leak was caused by foreign material on the sealing surface. The certificatee responded in a 30-day letter dated November 23, 1999, and indicated that on October 29, 1999, valve B3E-1 was closed and tagged until the purge line could be replaced and remounted. Based on planned corrective action, this item is closed.
- 08.7 (Closed) IFI 070-7002/99010-02: Failure to question the initial classification and PAR when field monitoring teams found no indications of an offsite release. Based on planned corrective actions, this item is closed.
- 08.8 (Closed) IFI 070-7002/99010-03: Actions to improve command and control of TSR operations. Procedures were developed and staff were trained on the new procedures. This item is considered closed.
- 08.9 (Closed) IFI 070-7002/99013-02: Information covered in RAD worker training program was technically incorrect. The certificatee revised the training module for RAD training I and II to include site specific issues and Transuranic (TRU) issues. This item is considered closed.
- 08.10 (Closed) IFI 070-7002/99013-03: Air sampling procedures did not give sufficient detail to enable unambiguous implementation. The certificatee issued a memorandum on February 28, 2000, titled "Air monitoring Technical Basis Document" that clarified this issue. This item is considered closed.
- 08.11 (Closed) IFI 070-7002/99013-04: Site dosimeters had not been tested to verify the vendors algorithm. The certificatee issued a memorandum on October 5, 1999, titled "Technical Basis for Use of ICN TLDs 760 at PORTS" that clarified this issue. This issue is considered closed.
- 08.12 (Closed) VIO 070-7002/98010-01: Failure to place work restrictions on E-Squad members whose SCBA training was deficient. During this inspection the inspectors verified that all E-squad and FFs were SCBA trained and fit tested. This item is considered closed.
- 08.13 (Closed) IFI 070-7002/99013-05: Measurement of wind speed at the MET tower was questionable. The certificatee issued a problem report (PR) and management clarified this issue to the staff. This item is considered closed.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff and management on March 17, 2000. Plant staff acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)

- *M. Cade, Regulatory Engineer
- *L. Cole, Group Manager, Training
- *D. Couser, Training Manager
- *L. Fink, Commitment Management Manager
- *G. Goslow, Environmental Compliance
- *R. Lawton, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager
- *P. Miner, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager
- *J. Opry, Shift Operations
- *T. Sensue, Senior Regulatory Engineer
- *R. Smith, Production Support Manager
- *T. Taulbee, Health Physics/Radiation Protection Manager
- *B. Wiseman, Health Physics Technician
- *K. Zimmerman, Fire Services

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- *D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident Inspector

*Denotes those present at the March 17, 2000, exit meeting.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 83822: Radiation Protection
IP 88045: Environmental Controls
IP 88025: Maintenance and Surveillance Activities
IP 88050: Emergency Preparedness Training and Retraining
IP 88050: Emergency Preparedness Activities
IP 90712: In-Office Reviews of Written Reports on Non-routine Events
IP 92702: Follow up of Previous Inspection Issues

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Discussed

None

Closed

35403	LER	Smoke head declared inoperable, small out gassing.
35513	LER	Smoke head activated in Building X330.
35643	LER	Smoke head activated in Building X330.
36032	LER	Safety system actuation in Building X333.
36236	LER	Smoke head activated in Building X-333.
36398	LER	Steam leak caused by foreign material on sealing surface.
070-7002/99010-02	IFI	Failure to question initial classification of event without field data.
070-7002/99010-03	IFI	Actions to improve command and control operations.
070-7002/99013-02	IFI	Technically incorrect RAD worker training subjects.
070-7002-99013-03	IFI	Inadequate air sampling procedures.
070-7002/99013-04	IFI	TLDs not tested to verify vendors algorithm.
070-7002/99013-05	IFI	Questionable technique to measure wind speed at MET tower.
070-7002/98010-01	VIO	Failure to place work restrictions on E-Squad members whose SCBA training was deficient.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CER	Certificatee Event Report
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DNMS	Division of Nuclear Material Safety
E-Squad	Emergency Squad
ERM	Emergency Response Manager
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
ERR	Emergency Response Room
ERV	Emergency Response Vehicle
FF	Fire Fighter
HP	Health Physics
IC	Incident Command
ICN	International Chemical Nuclear
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PDR	Public Document Room
PORTS	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
PWS	Public Warning System
REMP	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
SAR	Safety Analysis Report
SCBA	Self-Container Breathing Apparatus
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
TRU	Transuranic
USEC	United States Enrichment Corporation
VIO	Violation