12412-SAR-002

DOCKET NO. 72-1015

UMS®

UNIVERSAL MPC SYSTEM®

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

for the

UMS® UNIVERSAL STORAGE CASK

Amendment for

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

Site Specific Spent Fuel

March 2000 UMSS-00B

NAC INTERNATIONAL

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Table 1-1 Terminology

Universal Storage System	The storage component of the Universal MPC System (UMS®) designed by NAC for the storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
Universal Transport Cask	The packaging consisting of a Universal Transport Cask body with a closure lid and energy-absorbing impact limiters. The Universal Transport Cask is used to transport a Transportable Storage Canister containing spent fuel. The cask body provides the primary containment boundary during transport.
Confinement System	The components of the Transportable Storage Canister intended to retain the radioactive material during storage.
Contents	Twenty-four PWR fuel assemblies, or fifty-six BWR fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies may be configured as Site Specific Fuel. The fuel assemblies are contained in a Transportable Storage Canister.
Standard Fuel	Irradiated fuel assemblies having the same configuration as when originally fabricated consisting generally of the end fittings, fuel rods, guide tubes, and integral hardware. For BWR fuel, the channel is considered to be integral hardware. The design basis fuel characteristics and analysis are based on the standard fuel configuration.
Consolidated Fuel	A nonstandard fuel configuration in which the individual intact fuel rods from one or more fuel assemblies are placed in a single container or a lattice structure that is similar to a fuel assembly.
Intact Fuel (Assembly or Rod) (Undamaged Fuel)	A fuel assembly or fuel rod with no fuel rod cladding defects, or with known or suspected fuel rod cladding defects not greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks.

Table 1-1 Terminology (Continued)

Damaged Fuel (Failed Fuel)	A fuel assembly or fuel rod with known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks. Damaged Fuel must be placed in a Maine Yankee Fuel Can.
High Burnup Fuel	A fuel assembly having a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU, which must be preferentially loaded in periphery positions of the basket. Intact High Burnup Fuel having a cladding oxide layer thickness of 80 microns or less, as determined by measurement and statistical analysis, may be stored as intact fuel. High Burnup Fuel having a cladding oxide layer thickness greater than 80 microns is stored as damaged fuel.
Site Specific Fuel	Spent fuel configurations that are unique to a site or reactor due to the addition of other components or reconfiguration of the fuel assembly at the site. It includes fuel assemblies which hold nonfuel-bearing components, such as control components or instrument and plug thimbles, or which are modified as required by expediency in reactor operations, research and development or testing. Modification may consist of individual fuel rod removal, fuel rod replacement of similar or dissimilar material or enrichment, the installation, removal or replacement of burnable poison rods, or containerizing damaged (failed) fuel. Site specific fuel includes irradiated fuel assemblies designed with variable enrichments and/or axial blankets, fuel that is consolidated and fuel that exceeds design basis fuel parameters.

Table 1-1 Terminology (Continued)

Maine Yankee Fuel Can	A specially designed stainless steel screened can sized to hold an intact fuel assembly, consolidated fuel, or damaged fuel. The can screens permit draining and drying, while precluding the release of gross particulates into the canister cavity.
Transportable Storage Canister (Canister)	The stainless steel cylindrical shell, bottom end plate, shield lid, and structural lid that contain the fuel basket structure and the contents.
Shield Lid	A thick stainless steel disk that is located directly above the fuel basket. The shield lid comprises the first part of a double-welded closure system for the Transportable Storage Canister. The shield lid provides a containment/confinement boundary for storage and shielding for the contents.
- Drain Port	A penetration located in the shield lid to permit draining of the canister cavity.
- Vent Port	A penetration located in the shield lid to aid in draining and in vacuum drying and backfilling the canister with helium.
- Port Cover	The stainless steel covers that close the vent and drain ports, and that are welded in place following draining, drying, and backfilling operations.
- Quick Disconnect	The valved nipple used in the vent and drain ports to facilitate operations.
Structural Lid	A thick stainless steel disk that is positioned on top of the shield lid and welded to the canister. The structural lid is the second part of a double-welded closure system for the Transportable Storage Canister. The structural lid provides a confinement boundary for storage, shielding for the contents, and canister lifting/handling capability.

Table 1-1 Terminology (Continued)

Fuel Basket (Basket)	The structure located within the Transportable Storage Canister that provides structural support, criticality control, and primary heat transfer paths for the fuel assemblies.
- Support Disk	The primary lateral load-bearing component of the fuel basket. The PWR support disk is a circular stainless steel plate with 24 square holes machined in a symmetrical pattern. The BWR support disk is a circular carbon steel plate with 56 square holes machined in a symmetrical pattern. Each square hole is a location for a fuel tube.
- Heat Transfer Disk	A circular aluminum plate with 24 (PWR basket) or 56 (BWR basket) square holes machined in a symmetrical pattern. The heat transfer disk enhances heat transfer in the fuel basket.
- Fuel Tube	A stainless steel tube having a square cross-section with enclosed BORAL neutron poison material on its exterior surfaces. One fuel tube is inserted through each square hole in the support disks and heat transfer disks. Fuel assemblies are loaded into the fuel tube.
- Tie Rod	A stainless steel rod used to align, retain, and support the support disks and the heat transfer disks in the fuel basket structure. The tie rods extend from the top weldment to the bottom weldment.
- Spacer	Installed on the tie rod between the support disks (BWR only) or between the support disks and top and bottom weldments (BWR and PWR) to properly position the disks and provide axial support for the support disks.
- Split Spacer	Spacers installed on the tie rod between the support disks and the heat transfer disks to properly position the disks and provide axial support for the support disks and the heat transfer disks.

Table 1-1 Terminology (Continued)

Vertical Concrete Cask (Concrete Cask)	A concrete cylinder that contains the Transportable Storage Canister during storage. The Vertical Concrete Cask is formed around a steel inner liner and base and is closed by a shield plug and lid.
- Shield Plug	A thick carbon steel plug installed in the top end of the Vertical Concrete Cask to reduce skyshine radiation. The shield plug contains a 1-inch thick neutron shield.
- Lid	A thick carbon steel plate that serves as the bolted closure for the Vertical Concrete Cask. The lid precludes access to the canister and provides additional radiation shielding.
- Liner	A thick carbon steel shell that forms the annulus of the concrete cask. The liner serves as the inner form during concrete pouring and provides radiation shielding of the canister contents.
- Base	A carbon steel weldment that contains the air inlets, the concrete cask jacking points and the pedestal that supports the canister inside of the concrete cask.
Transfer Cask	A shielded lifting device for handling of the Transportable Storage Canister during loading of spent fuel, canister closure operations, and transfer of the canister into or out of the Vertical Concrete Cask during storage, or into or out of the Universal Transport Cask during transportation. The transfer cask incorporates bottom doors that permit the vertical loading of the storage and transport casks.
- Transfer Cask Lifting Trunnions	Four low alloy steel trunnions used to lift and move the transfer cask.

Table 1-1 Terminology (Continued)

Adapter Plate	A carbon steel plate assembly that attaches to the top of the transport or concrete cask to facilitate installation and alignment of the transfer cask. It also provides the operating mechanism for the transfer cask bottom doors.
NS-4-FR	A solid, borated, hydrogenous, synthetic, polymer material with neutron absorption capabilities, similar to those of borated water. Developed by BISCO Products, Inc., NS-4-FR is now supplied by Japan Atomic Power Company and its product licensees.
Air Pad Rig Set (Air Pallet)	A device used to lift the Vertical Concrete Cask by using high volume air.
Heavy Haul Trailer	The trailer used to transport the empty or loaded Vertical Concrete Cask.
Margin of Safety	An analytically determined value defined as the "factor of safety" minus 1. Factor of safety is also analytically determined, and is defined as the allowable stress or displacement of a material divided by its actual (calculated) value.

1.3.2.1 Maine Yankee Site Specific Spent Fuel

The configurations of Maine Yankee site specific fuel assemblies that have been evaluated and found to be acceptable contents are:

- Fuel assemblies with up to 176 fuel rods removed from the assembly lattice.
- Fuel assemblies with fuel rods replaced with stainless steel rods, solid Zircaloy rods or fuel rods enriched to 1.95 wt %.
- Fuel assemblies with burnable poison rods replaced with hollow Zircaloy tubes.
- Fuel assemblies that are variably enriched with a maximum fuel rod enrichment of 4.21 wt % ^{235}U and that also have a maximum planar average enrichment of 3.99 wt % ^{235}U.
- Fuel assemblies with variable enrichment and/or annular axial blankets.
- Fuel assemblies with a control element inserted.
- Fuel assemblies with an instrument thimble inserted in the center guide tube.
- Fuel assemblies with up to two fuel rods inserted in any or all of the guide tubes.
- Consolidated fuel.
- Fuel assemblies having up to 100% of the rods damaged in each assembly.
- Fuel assemblies having a burnup of greater than 45,000 MWD/MTU but less than 50,000 MWD/MTU.

These site specific fuel configurations are evaluated against the limits established for the UMS® Storage System based on the design basis fuel. The site specific fuel is either shown to be bounded by the evaluation of the design basis fuel or is separately evaluated to establish limits which are maintained by preferential loading administrative controls. Where applicable to specific configurations, the preferential loading controls are described in Section 2.1.3.1.1. The preferential loading controls take advantage of design features of the UMS® Storage System to allow the loading of fuel configurations that may have higher burnup or additional hardware or fuel source material that is not specifically considered in the design basis fuel evaluation.

The Transportable Storage Canister loading procedures will indicate that the loading of a fuel configuration with removed fuel or poison rods, damaged or consolidated fuel in a Maine Yankee fuel can, or fuel with burnup greater than 45,000, but less than 50,000, MWD/MTU is administratively controlled in accordance with Section 2.1.3.1 and Table 2.1.3.1-1. As shown in the table, only one consolidated fuel lattice is loaded in any single canister. Preferential loading positions in the canister basket are shown in Figure 2.1.3.1-1.

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The Maine Yankee fuel can design and fabrication specification summary is provided in Table 2.1.3.1-2. The major physical design parameters of the Maine Yankee fuel can are provided in Table 2.1.3.1-3. The structural evaluation of the Maine Yankee site specific fuel configurations is provided in Section 3.6.1. As shown in Section 4.5.1, the maximum allowable heat load for the contents of a Maine Yankee fuel can is 0.958 kW.

2.1.3.1.6 Maine Yankee Site Specific Spent Fuel Preferential Loading

The estimated Maine Yankee site specific spent fuel inventory is shown in Table 2.1.3.1-1. (Note that the population of fuel in a given configuration may change based on future spent fuel inspection or survey.) As shown in this table, certain fuel configurations are preferentially loaded to take advantage of the design features of the Transportable Storage Canister and basket to allow the loading of fuel that does not specifically conform to the design basis spent fuel. The designated preferential loading positions are shown in Figure 2.1.3.1-1. The corner positions are designated by the letter "C." These positions are used primarily for the loading of fuel with missing fuel rods, fuel with fuel rods that have been replaced by rods of other material, for consolidated fuel lattices, and for damaged fuel. The requirements for preferential loading schemes using the corner positions result primarily from shielding or criticality evaluations of the designated fuel configurations.

Maine Yankee consolidated fuel is loaded in a Maine Yankee fuel can and is, therefore, designated for a corner position. Preferential loading is also used for spent fuel having a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU. This fuel is assigned to peripheral locations designated by the letter "P" in Figure 2.1.3.1-1. The thermal analysis supporting the use of these locations for higher burnup fuel is presented in Section 4.5.1. As described in that section, the interior locations must be loaded with fuel that has lower burnup and/or longer cool times in order to maintain the design basis heat load and component temperature limits. Loading tables, which provide the limits for decay heat on a per assembly basis, are also provided in Section 4.5.1.

High burnup fuel (45,000 – 50,000 MWD/MTU) may be loaded as intact fuel provided that the cladding oxide layer is less than, or equal to, 80 microns thick. The high burnup fuel must be loaded as failed fuel (i.e., in a Maine Yankee fuel can), if the cladding oxide layer is greater than 80 microns thick. Since the transportable storage canister is tested to be leak tight, no additional confinement analysis is required for the high burnup fuel.

Fuel assemblies with a control element inserted will be loaded in a Class 2 canister and basket for storage and transport due to the increased length of the assembly with the control element installed. However, these assemblies are not restricted as to loading position within the basket.

2.1.3.1.7 Maine Yankee High Burnup Fuel

There are ninety (90) Maine Yankee fuel assemblies that have achieved a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU. As described in Section 2.1.3.1.6, these fuel assemblies are preferentially loaded in peripheral locations in the basket. The high burnup assemblies are similar to the other Maine Yankee fuel planned to be placed in dry storage (i.e., those with burnup less than 45,000 MWD/MTU), but have design differences that support the high burnup objective.

The Combustion Engineering 14 x 14 high burnup fuel assemblies incorporate a lower (fuel rod) internal pressure than the UMS design basis fuel, which results in lower cladding stress throughout their reactor and storage life, and a greater cladding thickness. The greater cladding thickness, together with a larger fuel rod diameter, provide additional margin against regulatory limits. Some of the fuel assemblies have a "low tin" Zircaloy cladding, which results in lower hydrogen pick-up in the cladding and a lower cladding oxide layer thickness.

Publicly available DOE-sponsored research studies on high burnup fuel have measured irradiated Zircaloy material properties. These studies show that even at burnups over 50,000 MWD/MTU, Zircaloy cladding has adequate material strength and ductility to maintain the fuel rod integrity through all conditions of storage. The research demonstrates that the Zircaloy cladding material yield and ultimate strengths increase, while the ductility decreases. These studies show that the Zircaloy material property changes occur during the early stages of irradiation and do not change significantly during the higher burnup periods.

The Maine Yankee high burnup fuel assemblies were fabricated according to their respective fuel specifications without any discrepancies or deviations that affected cladding. Review of Plant Operating Data demonstrates that the fuel has not been subjected to any unanalyzed events that could potentially lead to excessive cladding stress.

Review of fuel inspection records and video tapes of the Maine Yankee high burnup fuel assemblies shows that the fuel is essentially identical to fuel that is burned less than 45,000 MWD/MTU, with no evidence of damage or excessive cladding oxidation.

The supporting data and information demonstrates that the physical and mechanical characteristics of the high burnup fuel assemblies are essentially identical to the fuel assemblies with burnup less than 45,000 MWD/MTU. Consequently, the high burnup fuel assemblies can be safety stored in the NAC-UMS® System.

Figure 2.1.3.1-1 Preferential Loading Diagram for Maine Yankee Site Specific Spent Fuel



Table 2.1.3.1-1 Maine Yankee Site Specific Fuel Population

Site Specific Spent Fuel Configuration[1]	Number of Assemblies[2]	Canister Loading Position
Inserted Control Element Assembly (CEA)[3,4,5]	168	Any
Inserted In-Core Instrument (ICI) Thimble	138	Any
Consolidated Fuel	2	Corner[6,7,8]
Fuel Rod Replaced by Rod Enriched to 1.95 wt %	3	Any
Fuel Rod Replaced by Stainless Steel Rod or Zircaloy Rod	18	Any
Fuel Rods Removed	10	Corner
Variable Enrichment	72	Any
Variable Enrichment and Axial Blanket	68	Any
Burnable Poison Rod Replaced by Hollow Zircaloy Rod	80	Corner
Damaged Fuel[9,10]	12	Corner
Burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU	90	Periphery[11]

1. The total number of fuel assemblies in inventory is approximately 1,434.
2. The number of fuel assemblies in some categories may vary depending on future fuel inspections and/or Engineering Evaluations.
3. A fuel assembly with an inserted CEA must be loaded in a Class 2 canister.
4. A fuel assembly without an inserted CEA must not be loaded in a Class 2 canister.
5. CEAs may not be inserted in damaged fuel assemblies, consolidated fuel assemblies or assemblies with irradiated stainless steel replacement rods.
6. Basket corner positions are positions 3, 6, 19, and 22 in Figure 12B2-1. Corner positions are also periphery positions.
7. Only one Consolidated Fuel lattice may be loaded in any Transportable Storage Canister.
8. Consolidated Fuel must be loaded in a Maine Yankee fuel can.
9. All fuel classified as damaged must be placed in a Maine Yankee fuel can, including fuel assemblies with damaged fuel rods or poison rods inserted in guide tubes.
10. All spent fuel, including that held in a Maine Yankee fuel can, must conform to the loading limits presented in Tables 12B2-8 and 12B2-9 for cool time.
11. Basket periphery positions are positions 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 in Figure 12B2-1. Periphery positions include the corner positions.

Table 2.1.3.1-2 Maine Yankee Fuel Can Design and Fabrication Specification Summary

Design

- The Maine Yankee Fuel Can shall be designed in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NG except for: 1) the noted exceptions of table 12B3-1 for fuel basket structures; and 2) the Maine Yankee Fuel Can may deform under accident conditions of storage.
- The Maine Yankee Fuel Can will have screened vents in the lid and base plate. Stainless steel meshed screens (250x250) shall cover all openings.
- The Maine Yankee Fuel Can shall limit the release of material from damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris to the canister cavity.
- The Maine Yankee Fuel Can lifting structure and lifting tool shall be designed with a minimum factor of safety of 3.0 on material yield strength.

Materials

- All material shall be in accordance with the referenced drawings and meet the applicable ASME Code sections.
- All structural materials are ASME SA 240, Type 304 stainless steel.

Welding

- All welds shall be in accordance with the referenced drawings.
- The final surface of all welds shall be liquid penetrant examined in accordance with ASME Code Section V, Article 6, with acceptance in accordance with ASME Code, Section NG-5350.

Fabrication

- All cutting, welding, and forming shall be in accordance with ASME Code Section III, NG-4000.

Acceptance Testing

- The Maine Yankee Fuel Can (first unit) and handling tool shall be load tested and visually inspected at the completion of fabrication.

Quality Assurance

- The Maine Yankee Fuel Can shall be constructed under a quality assurance program that meets 10 CFR 72 Subpart G. The quality assurance program must be accepted by NAC International and the licensee prior to initiation of the work.
- A Certificate of Conformance (or Compliance) shall be issued by the fabricator stating that the component meets the specifications and drawings.

Table 2.1.3.1-3 Major Physical Design Parameters of the Maine Yankee Fuel Can

Parameter	Value
Overall Length (in.)	162.8
Inside Cross Section (in.)	8.52 x 8.52
Outside Cross Section (in.) (1)	8.62 x 8.62
Can Wall Thickness	18 Gauge (0.048 in.)
Internal Cavity Length (in.)	160.0
Empty Weight (nominal) (lbs.)	130

Note (1) Outside cross section of Maine Yankee Fuel Can upper structure is 8.82 x 8.82 in. at top (4.5 in.) for lid engagement and fuel can lifting. This upper structure is located above the top weldment plate of the fuel basket assembly.

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the can to minimize the potential for dispersal of the fuel material into the canister cavity volume.

The Maine Yankee fuel can is designed to hold an intact fuel assembly, a damaged fuel assembly, a fuel assembly with a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU and having a cladding oxidation layer thickness greater than 80 microns, or consolidated fuel in the Maine Yankee fuel inventory.

The fuel can is a square cross-section tube made of Type 304 stainless steel with a total length of 162.8 inches. The can walls are 0.048-inch thick sheet (18 gauge). The minimum internal width of the can is 8.52 inches. The bottom of the can is a 0.63-inch thick plate. Four holes in the plates, screened with a Type 304 stainless steel wire screen (250 openings/inch x 250 openings/inch mesh), permit water to be drained from the can during loading operations. Since the bottom surface of the fuel can rests on the canister bottom plate, additional slots are machined in the fuel can (extending from the holes to the side of the bottom assembly) to allow the water to be drained from the can. At the top of the can, the wall thickness is increased to 0.15-inches to permit the can to be handled. Slots in the top assembly side plates allow the use of a handling tool to lift the can and contents. To confine the contents within the can, the top assembly consists of a 0.88-inch thick plate with screened drain holes identical to those in the bottom plate. Once the can is loaded, the can and contents are inserted into the basket, where the can may be supported by the sides of the fuel assembly tube, which are backed by the structural support disks. Alternately, the empty fuel can may be placed in the basket prior to having the designated contents inserted in the fuel can.

In normal operation, the can is in a vertical position. The weight of the fuel can contents is transferred through the bottom plate of the can to the canister bottom plate, which is the identical load path for intact fuel. The only loading in the vertical direction is the weight of the can and the top assembly. The lifting of the can with its contents is also in the vertical direction.

Classical hand calculations are used to qualify the stresses in the Maine Yankee fuel can.

A conservative bounding temperature of 600°F is used for the evaluation of the fuel can for normal conditions of storage. A temperature of 300°F is used for the lifting components at the top of the fuel can and for the lifting tool.

Calculated stresses are compared to allowable stresses in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NG. The ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NG allowable stresses used for stress analysis are:

Property	600°F	300°F
S_u	63.3 ksi	66.0 ksi
S_y	18.6 ksi	22.5 ksi
S_m	16.7 ksi	20.0 ksi
E	25.2×10^3 ksi	27.0×10^3 ksi

The Maine Yankee fuel can is evaluated for dead weight and handling loads for normal conditions of storage. Since the can is not restrained, it is free to expand. Therefore, the thermal stress is considered to be negligible.

The Maine Yankee fuel can lifting components and handling tools are designed with a safety factor of 3.0 on material yield strength.

3.6.1.2.1 Dead Weight and Handling Loading Evaluation

The weight of the Maine Yankee fuel can is 130 lbs. The maximum compressive stress acting in the tube of the fuel can is due to its own weight in addition to that of the top assembly. A 10% dynamic load factor is applied to the fuel can weight for an applied load of 143 pounds to account for loads due to handling. Based on the minimum cross sectional area of $(8.62)^2 - (8.52)^2 = 1.714$ in^2, the margin of safety at 300°F is:

$$M.S. = 20{,}000/(143/1.714) - 1$$
$$M.S. = +LARGE$$

3.6.1.2.2 Lifting Evaluation

Based on the loaded weight of the fuel can, the lift evaluation does not require the use of the design criteria of ANSI N14.6 or NUREG-0612. However, for purposes of conservatism and good engineering practice, a factor of safety of three on material yield strength is used for the stress evaluations for the lift condition. Since a combined stress state results from the loading

4.5 Thermal Evaluation for Site Specific Spent Fuel

This section presents the thermal evaluation of fuel assemblies or configurations, which are unique to specific reactor sites or which differ from the UMS® Storage System design basis fuel. These site specific configurations result from conditions that occurred during reactor operations, participation in research and development programs, and from testing programs intended to improve reactor operations. Site specific fuel includes fuel assemblies that are uniquely designed to accommodate reactor physics, such as axial fuel blanket and variable enrichment assemblies, and fuel that is classified as damaged. Damaged fuel includes fuel rods with cladding that exhibit defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks.

Site specific fuel assembly configurations are either shown to be bounded by the analysis of the standard design basis fuel assembly configuration of the same type (PWR or BWR), or are shown to be acceptable contents by specific evaluation.

4.5.1 Maine Yankee Site Specific Spent Fuel

The standard spent fuel assembly for the Maine Yankee site is the Combustion Engineering (CE) 14 x 14 fuel assembly. Fuel of the same design has also been supplied by Westinghouse and by Exxon. The standard 14 x 14 fuel assembly is included in the population of the design basis PWR fuel assemblies for the Universal Storage System (See Table 2.1.1-1). The maximum decay heat for the standard Maine Yankee fuel is the design basis heat load for the PWR fuels (23 kW total, or 0.958 kW per assembly). This heat load is bounded by the thermal evaluations in Sections 4.4 for the normal conditions of storage and Chapter 11 for off-normal and accident conditions.

Some Maine Yankee site specific fuel has a burnup greater than 45,000 MWD/MTU, but less than 50,000 MWD/MTU. This fuel is evaluated in Section 4.5.1.2. As shown in that section, loading of fuel assemblies in this burnup range is subject to preferential loading in designated basket positions in the Transportable Storage Canister and certain fuel assemblies in this burnup range must be loaded in a Maine Yankee fuel can.

The site specific fuels included in this evaluation are:

1. Consolidated fuel rod lattices consisting of a 17 x 17 lattice fabricated with 17 x 17 grids, 4 stainless steel support rods and stainless steel end

fittings. One of these lattices contains 283 fuel rods and 2 rod position vacancies. The other contains 172 fuel rods, with the remaining rod position locations either empty or containing stainless steel dummy rods.

2. Standard fuel assemblies with a Control Element Assembly (CEA) inserted in each one.
3. Standard fuel assemblies that have been modified by removing damaged fuel rods and replacing them with stainless steel dummy rods, solid zirconium rods, or 1.95 wt % enriched fuel rods.
4. Standard fuel assemblies that have had the burnable poison rods removed and replaced with hollow Zircaloy tubes.
5. Standard fuel assemblies with in-core instrument thimbles stored in the center guide tube.
6. Standard fuel assemblies that are designed with variable enrichment (radial) and axial blankets.
7. Standard fuel assemblies that have some fuel rods removed.
8. Standard fuel assemblies that have damaged fuel rods.
9. Standard fuel assemblies that have some type of damage or physical alteration to the cage (fuel rods are not damaged).
10. Two (2) failed fuel rod lattices, designated CF1 and CA3. CF1 is a lattice having approximately the same dimensions as a standard fuel assembly. It is a 9 x 9 array of tubes, some of which contain damaged fuel rods. CA3 is a previously used fuel assembly lattice that has had all of the rods removed, and in which damaged fuel rods have been inserted.
11. Standard fuel assemblies that have defective fuel rods stored in their guide tubes.
12. Fuel assemblies with a burnup greater than 45,000 MWD/MTU, but less than 50,000 MWD/MTU.

The Maine Yankee site specific fuels are also described in Section 1.3.2.1.

The thermal evaluations of these site specific fuels are provided in Section 4.5.1.1. Section 4.5.1.2 presents the evaluation of Maine Yankee fuel inventory that is not bounded by the evaluation performed in Section 4.4.7. This fuel may have higher burnup than the design basis fuel, have a higher decay heat on a per assembly basis, have a burnup/cool time condition that is outside of the cladding temperature evaluation presented in Section 4.4.7, or be subject to all of

4.5.1.1.5 Standard Fuel with In-core Instrument Thimbles

Certain fuel assemblies have in-core instrument thimbles stored within the center guide tube of each fuel assembly. Storing an in-core instrument thimble assembly in the center guide tube of a fuel assembly will slightly increase the axial conductance of the fuel assembly (helium replaced by solid material). Therefore, there is no negative impact on the thermal performance of the fuel assembly with this configuration. The thermal performance of these fuel assemblies is bounded by that of the standard fuel assemblies.

4.5.1.1.6 Standard Fuel Assemblies with Variable Enrichment and Axial Blankets

The thermal conductivities of the fuel assemblies with variable enrichment (radial) and axial blankets are considered to be essentially the same as those of the standard fuel assemblies. Since the heat load per assembly is limited to the design basis heat load, there is no effect on the thermal performance of the system due to this loading configuration.

4.5.1.1.7 Standard Fuel Assemblies with Removed Fuel Rods

Except for assembly number EF0046, the maximum number of missing fuel rods from a standard fuel assembly is 14, or 8% (14/176) of the total number of rods in one fuel assembly. The maximum heat load for any one of these fuel assemblies is conservatively determined to be 0.63 kW. This heat load is 34% less than the design basis heat load of 0.958 kW. Fuel assembly EF0046 was used in the consolidated fuel demonstration program and has only 69 rods remaining in its lattice. This fuel assembly has a heat load of 70 watts, or 7% of the design basis heat load of 0.958 kW. Therefore, the thermal performance of fuel assemblies with removed fuel rods is bounded by that of the standard fuel assemblies.

4.5.1.1.8 Fuel Assemblies with Damaged Fuel Rods

Damaged fuel assemblies are standard fuel assemblies with fuel rods with known or suspected cladding defects greater than hairline cracks or pinhole leaks. Each damaged fuel assembly will be placed in a Maine Yankee fuel can. The primary function of the fuel can is to confine fuel material within the can and to facilitate handling and retrievability. The Maine Yankee fuel can is shown in Drawings 412-501 and 412-502. The placement of the loaded fuel cans is restricted by the operating procedures and/or Technical Specifications to loading into the four fuel tube

positions at the periphery of the fuel basket as shown in Figure 12B2-1. The heat load for each damaged fuel assembly is limited to the design basis heat load 0.958 kW (23 kW/24).

A steady-state thermal analysis is performed using the three-dimensional canister model described in Section 4.4.1.2 simulating 100% failure of the fuel rods, fuel cladding, and guide tubes of the damaged fuel held in the Maine Yankee fuel can. The canister is assumed to contain twenty (20) design basis PWR fuel assemblies and damaged fuel assemblies in fuel cans in each of the four corner positions.

Two debris compaction levels are considered for the 100% failure condition: (Case 1) 100% compaction of the fuel rod, fuel cladding, and guide tube debris resulting in a 52-inch debris level in the bottom of each fuel can, and (Case 2) 50% compaction of the fuel rod, fuel cladding, and guide tube debris resulting in a 104-inch debris level in the bottom of each fuel can. The entire heat generation rate for a single fuel assembly (i.e., 0.958 W) is concentrated in the debris region with the remainder of the active fuel region having no heat generation rate applied. To ensure the analysis is bounding, the debris region is located at the lower part of the active fuel region in lieu of the bottom of the fuel can. This location is closer to the center of the basket where the maximum fuel cladding temperature occurs. The effective thermal conductivities for the design basis PWR fuel assembly (Section 4.4.1.5) are used for the debris region. This is conservative since the debris (100% failed rods) is expected to have higher density (better conduction) and more surface area (better radiation) than an intact fuel assembly. In addition, the thermal conductivity of helium is used for the remainder of the active fuel length. The results of the thermal analyses performed for 100% fuel rod, fuel cladding, and guide tube failure are:

Description	Maximum Temperature (°F)			
	Fuel Cladding	Damaged Fuel	Support Disk	Heat Transfer Disk
Case 1 (100% Compaction)	654	672	598	594
Case 2 (50% Compaction)	674	594	620	616
Design Basis PWR Fuel	670	N/A	615	612
Allowable	716	N/A	650	650

Boundary conditions corresponding to the normal condition of storage are used at the outer surface of the canister model (see Section 4.4.1.2). A steady-state thermal analysis is performed.

As demonstrated, the extreme case of 100% fuel rod, fuel cladding, and guide tube failure with 50% compaction of the debris results in temperatures that are less than 1% higher than those calculated for the design basis PWR fuel. The maximum temperatures for the fuel cladding, damaged fuel assembly, support disks, and heat transfer disks remain within the allowable temperature range for both 100% failure cases. Additionally, the temperatures used in the structural analyses of the fuel basket envelope those calculated for both 100% failure cases.

4.5.1.1.9 Standard Fuel Assemblies with Damaged Lattice

Certain standard fuel assemblies may have damage or physical alteration to the lattice or cage that holds the fuel rods, but not exhibit damage to the fuel rods.

The effective thermal conductivity for the fuel assembly used in the thermal analyses in Section 4.4 is determined by the two-dimensional fuel model (Section 4.4.1.5). The model conservatively ignores the conductance of the steel cage of the fuel assembly. Therefore, damage or physical alteration to the cage has no effect on the thermal conductivity of the fuel assembly used in the thermal models. The thermal performance of these fuel assemblies is bounded by that of the standard fuel assemblies.

4.5.1.1.10 Failed Fuel Rod Holders

The Maine Yankee site specific fuel inventory includes two (2) damaged fuel lattices designated CF1 and CA3. CF1 is a 9 x 9 array of tubes having roughly the same dimensions as a fuel assembly. Some of the tubes hold damaged fuel rods. CA3 is a previously used fuel assembly cage, into which damaged fuel rods have been inserted.

Similar to the fuel assemblies that have damaged fuel rods, the damaged fuel lattices will be placed in Maine Yankee fuel cans and their location in the basket is restricted to one of the four corner fuel tube positions of the basket. The decay heat generated by the fuel in each of these lattices is less than one-fourth of the design basis heat load of 0.958 kW. Therefore, the thermal performance of the damaged fuel lattices is bounded by that of the standard fuel assemblies.

4.5.1.1.11 Assemblies with Damaged Fuel Rods Inserted in Guide Tubes

Similar to fuel assemblies that have damaged fuel rods, the fuel assemblies that have damaged fuel rods stored in their guide tubes are placed in Maine Yankee fuel cans and their loading positions are restricted to the four corner fuel tubes in the basket. Storing fuel rods in the guide tubes of a fuel assembly slightly increases the axial conductance of the fuel assembly (helium replaced by solid material). The design basis heat load bounds the heat load for these assemblies. Therefore, the thermal performance of these fuel assemblies is bounded by that of the standard fuel assemblies.

4.5.1.2 Maximum Allowable Heat Loads for Maine Yankee Site Specific Spent Fuel

This section includes evaluations for the Maine Yankee fuel inventory that is not bounded by the evaluation performed in Section 4.4.7. This fuel may have higher burnup than the design basis fuel, have a higher decay heat on a per assembly basis, have a burnup/cool time condition that is outside of the cladding temperature evaluation presented in Section 4.4.7, or be subject to all of these differences.

Maximum allowable clad temperatures and decay heats are evaluated for:

1. Fuel with burnup in excess of 45,000 MWD/MTU (maximum 50,000 MWD/MTU),
2. Preferential loading patterns with hotter fuel on the periphery of the basket, and
3. Preferential loading with fuel exceeding design basis heat load (0.958 kW) per assembly on the basket periphery.

As shown in Section 4.4.7, the standard CE 14 x 14 fuel assembly has a significantly lower cladding stress level than the equivalent burnup Westinghouse 14 x 14 assembly. It is, therefore, conservative to apply the characteristics of the design basis assembly to the CE 14 x 14 Maine Yankee fuel assemblies. (Note that the Westinghouse 14 x 14 assembly evaluated in Section 4.4.7 is the fuel assembly used in Westinghouse reactors, but it is not the Westinghouse 14 x 14 assembly built for use in the CE reactors, such as the Maine Yankee reactor.)

The maximum allowable decay heat, listed either on a per canister or per assembly basis, is combined with dose rate limits in Chapter 5 to establish cool time limits as a function of burnup and initial enrichment. Cool time limits are shown in Tables 5.6.1-10 for Maine Yankee fuel assemblies without installed control components, and in Table 5.6.1-12 for fuel assemblies with installed control components.

High burnup fuel (45,000 – 50,000 MWD/MTU) may be loaded as intact fuel provided that the cladding oxide layer is less than, or equal to, 80 microns thick. The high burnup fuel must be loaded as failed fuel (i.e., in a Maine Yankee fuel can), if the cladding oxide layer is greater than 80 microns thick. Since the transportable storage canister is tested to be leak tight, no additional confinement analysis is required for the high burnup fuel.

4.5.1.2.1 Maximum Allowable Temperature and Decay Heat for 50,000 MWD/MTU Fuel

To evaluate higher burnup fuel, cladding oxidation layer thickness and fission gas release fractions are established. Maine Yankee reports that for high burnup fuel rods (i.e., rod peak burnup up to 55,000 MWD/MTU), ABB/Combustion Engineering Incorporated imposes a cladding oxide layer thickness of 120 microns as an operational limit and reports that the maximum gas release fraction (fuel pellet to rod plenum in intact fuel rods) is less than 3% [36]. Therefore, the allowable cladding temperature calculations employ a cladding oxide layer thickness of 0.012 cm (120 microns). This is conservative with respect to the 80 micron cladding oxide layer thickness considered for high burnup fuel that is loaded as intact fuel. A 12% release fraction, established for BWR fuel, is conservatively applied for the higher burnup PWR fuel.

Using the evaluation method presented in Section 4.4.7 and a cladding oxidation layer thickness of 0.012 cm, the cladding stress levels for the 50,000 MWD/MTU burnup PWR assembly (maximum stress) are determined and listed in Table 4.5.1.2-1. The data is plotted against the generic allowable temperature curves in Figure 4.5.1.2-2. Included in Figure 4.5.1.2-2 are the 35,000 MWD/MTU to 45,000 MWD/MTU limit lines developed in Section 4.4.7. The intercept of the 50,000 MWD/MTU results in the limiting cladding temperatures shown in Table 4.5.1.2-2. The resulting maximum allowable heat load per canister for fuel assemblies with burnup of 50,000 MWD/MTU is listed in Table 4.5.1.2-3.

4.5.1.2.2 Preferential Loading with Hotter Fuel on the Periphery of the Basket

The design basis heat load for the UMS thermal analysis is 23 kW uniformly distributed throughout the basket (0.958 kW per assembly). This heat load applies to the basket structural components at any initial fuel loading time. Further reduction in heat load is required for the Maine Yankee fuel assemblies that fall outside the bounds of the requirement of maximum heat load as shown in Tables 4.4.7-8 and 4.5.1.2-3. These assemblies include:

1. Fuel assemblies (with specific burnup and cool time) that may exceed the maximum allowable decay heat dictated by their cladding temperature allowable (exceeding the limits as shown in Tables 4.4.7-8 and 4.5.1.2-3), if loaded uniformly (all 24 fuel assemblies with the same burnup and cool time, i.e., the same decay heat).
2. Fuel assemblies that are expected to exceed the design basis heat load of 0.958 kW per assembly (maximum heat per assembly less than 1.05 kW).

To ensure that these fuel assemblies do not exceed their allowable cladding temperatures, a loading pattern is considered that places higher heat load assemblies at the periphery of the basket (Positions "A" in Figure 4.5.1.2-1) and compensates by placing lower heat load assemblies in the basket interior positions (Positions "B" in Figure 4.5.1.2-1). There are 12 interior basket locations and 12 peripheral basket locations in the UMS PWR basket design. The maximum total basket heat loads indicated in Tables 4.4.7-8 and 4.5.1.2-3 are maintained for these peripheral loading scenarios.

Two preferential loading scenarios are evaluated. The first approach limits any assembly to the 0.958 kW design basis heat load limit (23 kW divided by 24 assemblies), while the second approach increases the per assembly heat load limit to 1.05 kW for assemblies in the basket peripheral locations. The split approach allows maximum flexibility at fuel loading.

In order to load the preferential pattern, the fuel cladding maximum temperature must be maintained below the allowable temperatures for peripheral and interior assemblies. The requirement of maximum total heat load per basket, as shown in Tables 4.4.7-8 and 4.5.1.2-3, must also be met.

4.5.1.2.2.1 Peripheral Assemblies Limited to a Decay Heat Load of 0.958 kW per Assembly

With a basket heat load of 23 kW, uniformly loaded, the maximum cladding temperature of a peripheral assembly location was determined to be 566°F (297°C) based on the thermal analysis using the three-dimensional canister model as presented in Section 4.4.1.2. While any basket location is restricted to a heat load of 0.958 kW, any non-uniform loading with a total basket heat load less than 23 kW will result in a peripheral assembly cladding temperature less than 297°C. This temperature is well below the lowest maximum allowable clad temperature of 313°C indicated in Table 4.5.1.2-2 (which was already reduced to 95% of the actual allowable of 329°C). Fuel assemblies at a maximum heat load of 0.958 kW may, therefore, be loaded into the peripheral basket location at any cool time, provided interior assemblies meet the restrictions outlined below.

Decay Heat Limit on Fuel Assemblies Loaded into Basket Interior Positions

Interior fuel assembly decay heat loads must be reduced from those in a uniform loading configuration, see Table 4.4.7-8 and Table 4.5.1.2-3, to allow loading of the higher heat load

assemblies in the peripheral locations. A parametric study is performed using the three-dimensional periodic model as described in Section 4.5.1.1 (Figure 4.5.1.1-2) to demonstrate that placing a higher heat load in the peripheral locations does not result in heating of the fuel assemblies in the interior locations beyond that found in the uniform heat loading case. The side surface of the model is assumed to have a uniform temperature of 350°F.

Two cases are considered (total heat load per cask = 20 kW for both cases):

1. Uniform loading: Heat load = 0.833 (20/24) kW per assembly for all 24 assemblies
2. Non-uniform loading:
   Heat load = 0.958 (23/24) kW per assembly for 12 Peripheral assemblies
   Heat load = 0.708 (17/24) kW per assembly for 12 Interior assemblies

The analysis results (maximum temperatures) are:

	Case 1 Uniform Loading (°F)	Case 2 Non-Uniform Loading (°F)
Fuel (Location 1)	675	648
Fuel (Locations 2 & 4)	632	611
Fuel (Location 5)	577	588
Fuel (Locations 3 & 6)	563	576
Basket	611	592

Locations are shown in Figure 4.5.1.2-1.

The maximum fuel cladding temperature for Case 2 (non-uniform loading pattern) is well below that for Case 1 (uniform loading pattern). The comparison shows that placing hotter fuel in the peripheral locations of the basket and cooler fuel in the interior locations (while maintaining the same total heat load per basket) reduces the maximum fuel cladding temperature (which occurs in the interior assembly), as well as the maximum basket temperature.

Because the basket interior temperatures decrease for non-uniform loading, it is conservative to determine the maximum allowable heat load for the interior assemblies based on the values (total allowed heat load) shown in Tables 4.4.7-8 and 4.5.1.2-3, and the heat load for the fuel assemblies in 12 peripheral locations (12 x 0.958 kW). For example, the 10-year cooled, 45,000 MWD/MTU fuel in a uniform loading pattern, is restricted to a basket average heat load of 19.5

kW per Table 4.4.7-8. Placing 12 fuel assemblies at 23/24 (0.958) kW into the basket periphery requires the interior assemblies to be reduced to 0.667 kW per assembly to retain the 19.5 kW basket total heat load. Table 4.5.1.2-4 contains the matrix of maximum allowable heat loads per assembly as a function of burnup and cool time for interior assemblies for the configuration with the peripheral assemblies having a maximum heat load of 0.958 kW per assembly.

4.5.1.2.2.2 Peripheral Assemblies Limited to a Decay Heat Load of 1.05 kW per Assembly

The Maine Yankee fuel inventory includes fuel assemblies that will exceed the initial per assembly heat load of 0.958 kW at a loading prior to August 2002. To enable loading of these assemblies into the storage cask, higher peripheral heat load is evaluated. The maximum heat load for peripheral assemblies is set at 1.05 kW.

The maximum basket heat load for this configuration is restricted to 23 kW. Given the higher than design basis heat load in peripheral basket locations, an evaluation is performed to assure that maximum cladding allowable temperatures are not exceeded.

Based on the parametric study (uniform versus non-uniform analysis) of the 20 kW basket, a 15% redistribution of heat load resulted in a maximum increase of 13°F (576-563=13) in a peripheral basket location. Changing the basket peripheral location heat load from 0.958 kW maximum to 1.05 kW is a less than 10% redistribution for the 23 kW maximum basket heat load. The highest temperature of a peripheral basket location may, therefore, be estimated by adding 13°F to 566°F (maximum temperature in peripheral assemblies for the 23 kW basket). The 579°F (304°C) is less than the lowest maximum allowable cladding temperature of 313°C indicated in Table 4.5.1.2-2 (which was already reduced to 95% of the actual allowable of 329°C). Fuel assemblies at a maximum heat load of 1.05 kW may, therefore, be loaded into the peripheral basket location at any cool time, provided interior assemblies meet the restrictions outlined below.

Decay Heat Limit on Fuel Assemblies Loaded into Basket Interior Positions

Basket interior assemblies heat load limits are based on the same method used for the configuration with 0.958 kW assemblies in peripheral locations, with the exception that each peripheral fuel assembly is assigned a maximum decay heat of 1.05 kW. The higher peripheral heat load in turn will reduce the allowable heat load in the interior locations. Table 4.5.1.2-5 contains the maximum allowable decay heats for basket interior fuel assemblies, with an assembly heat load of 1.05 kW for peripheral locations.

Figure 4.5.1.2-1 Canister Basket Preferential Loading Plan



"A" indicates peripheral locations.
"B" indicates interior locations.
Numbered locations indicate positions where maximum fuel temperatures are presented.

loading pattern, permitting 1.05 kW per peripheral assembly, reduces the minimum cool time based on thermal constraints to 6 years. The storage cask dose rate constraint is satisfied for the preferentially loaded assembles after 5 years cooling. Recognizing that only two of the assemblies in the Maine Yankee spent fuel inventory, R439 and R444, require peripheral loading, the transfer cask dose rate limit is not applied for these two assemblies. Since the dose rate comparisons are made on the basis of an assumed fuel cask of assemblies, the transfer cask dose rate limit is unnecessarily restrictive.

5.6.1.4.4 Consolidated Fuel

There are two consolidated fuel lattices intended for storage (and transfer) in the Universal Storage Cask. The lattices house fuel rods taken from assemblies as shown in Table 5.6.1-6. This fuel has decayed for over twenty years and does not represent a significant shielding issue.

A limiting cool time analysis is conducted by identifying a fuel assembly description analyzed in the loading table analysis that bounds the parameters of the fuel rods in the consolidated fuel lattices. The parameters of those fuel rods are shown in Table 5.6.1-15. The CE 14 x 14 fuel at 30,000 MWD/MTU and 1.9 wt % enrichment represents a bounding assembly type since it has a significantly higher burnup and a lower enrichment than the original assemblies. This fuel requires six years cool time before it can be loaded in the storage or transfer cask as shown in Table 5.6.1-10. The consolidated fuel has been cooled for at least 24 years. For container CN-1 lattice, one can immediately conclude that dose rates are bounded by the limiting fuel.

However, the CN-10 lattice contains significantly more fuel rods than an intact assembly. Neglecting the mitigating effects of additional self-shielding, this situation is addressed by comparing the radiation source strength of the limiting fuel at six and 24 years cool time. Conservatively assuming that all fuel rods present in CN-10 are at the limiting conditions of 30,000 MWD/MTU and 1.9 wt %, the ratio of the source rate in the CN-10 to the source rate in the limiting fuel assembly is shown to be less than one for each source type in Table 5.6.1-16. For each source type, the ratio is computed as:

Ratio = (Num Rods in CN-10)(Source Rate at 24 Yr) / (Num Rods in F/A)(Source Rate at 6 Yr)

Hence, CN-10 is also bounded by the limiting case as of January 1, 2001.

5.6.1.4.5 Damaged Fuel and Fuel Debris

The Maine Yankee spent fuel inventory contains damaged fuel rods and fuel debris. Damaged fuel rods and fuel debris will be placed into a screened Maine Yankee fuel can prior to loading in the UMS basket. Damaged rods and fuel debris in Maine Yankee fuel cans are restricted to loading into one of the four corner basket locations. The damaged fuel mass can not exceed the fuel mass of 100% of an intact fuel assembly. Damaged fuel rods may be loaded in the can with intact rods.

To approximate the effect of collapsed fuel inside the Maine Yankee fuel can, a three-dimensional shielding analysis was performed doubling the source magnitude and material density in the four corner basket locations. Conservatively, the screened can itself is not included in the shielding model. As expected, the increased self-shielding of the collapsed fuel material minimizes the dose rate increase resulting from the source term density doubling. Based on a cask average surface dose rate of less than 40 mrem/hr under normal operating conditions, no significant increases in personnel exposures are expected as a result of the collapsed fuel material.

Where no collapse of the fuel rods occurs, the analysis presented for the intact fuel assemblies bounds that of the damaged fuel rods. Since the additional shielding provided by the screened canister is not being credited by this approach, the actual expected dose rates will be lower for the transportable storage canisters loaded with damaged fuel. For cases in which the Maine Yankee fuel can holds fuel rods from multiple assemblies, the minimum cool time for the rods containing the most restrictive enrichment and burnup combination is applied to the contents of the entire can.

Fuel debris must be placed into a rod structure prior to loading into the screened canister. Once the fuel debris is configured in a rod structure it can be treated from a shielding perspective identical to the damaged fuel rods.

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6.6.1.3.2 Fuel Debris

Prior to loading fuel debris into the screened Maine Yankee fuel can, fuel debris must be placed into a rod type structure. Placing the debris into rods confines the spent nuclear material to a known volume and allows the fuel debris to be treated identically to the damaged fuel for criticality analysis.

Based on the arguments presented in Section 6.6.1.3.1, the maximum k_s of the UMS® canister with fuel debris will be less than 0.95, including associated uncertainty and bias.

6.6.1.4 Maine Yankee Fuel Comparison to Criticality Benchmarks

The most reactive system configuration parameters for Maine Yankee fuel have been compared to the range of applicability of the critical benchmarks evaluated using the KENO-Va code of the SCALE 4.3 CSAS sequence. As shown below, all of the Maine Yankee fuel parameters fall within the benchmark range.

Parameter	Benchmark Minimum Value	Benchmark Maximum Value	Maine Yankee Fuel Most Reactive Configuration
Enrichment (wt. % ^{235}U)	2.35	4.74	4.2
Rod pitch (cm)	1.26	2.54	1.50
H/U volume ratio	1.6	11.5	2.6
^{10}B areal density (g/cm^2)	0.00	0.45	0.025
Average energy group causing fission	21.7	24.2	22.5
Flux gap thickness (cm)	0.64	5.16	2.22 to 3.81
Fuel diameter (cm)	0.790	1.265	0.896
Clad diameter (cm)	0.940	1.415	1.111

The H/U volume ratio for the assembly is shown. The lattice H/U volume ratio is 2.2 for the clad gap flooded scenario.

The results of the NAC-UMS® System benchmark calculations are provided in Section 6.5.2.

Figure 6.6.1-1 24 Removed Fuel Rods - Diamond Shaped Geometry, Maine Yankee Site Specific Fuel



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11.1.6 Off-Normal Events Evaluation for Site Specific Spent Fuel

This section presents the off-normal events evaluation of spent fuel assemblies or configurations, which are unique to specific reactor sites. These site specific fuel configurations result from conditions that occurred during reactor operations, participation in research and development programs, and from testing programs intended to improve reactor operations. Site specific fuel includes fuel assemblies that are uniquely designed to accommodate reactor physics, such as axial fuel blankets and variable enrichment assemblies, fuel with burnup that exceeds the design basis, and fuel that is classified as damaged.

Site specific fuel assembly configurations are either shown to be bounded by the analysis of the standard design basis fuel assembly of the same type (PWR or BWR), or are shown to be acceptable contents, by specific evaluation of the configuration.

11.1.6.1 Off-Normal Events Evaluation for Maine Yankee Site Specific Spent Fuel

Maine Yankee site specific fuels are described in Section 1.3.2.1. A thermal evaluation has been performed for Maine Yankee site specific fuels that exceed the design basis burnup as shown in Section 4.5.1.2. As shown in that section, loading of fuel with a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU is subject to preferential loading in designated basket positions in the Transportable Storage Canister.

With preferential loading, the design basis total heat load of the canister is not changed. Consequently, the thermal performance for the Maine Yankee site specific fuels is bounded by the design basis PWR fuels. Therefore, no further evaluation is required for the off-normal thermal events (severe ambient temperature conditions and blockage of half of the air inlets) as shown in Sections 11.1.1 and 11.1.2. In Section 3.6.1.1, the total weight of the canister contents for Maine Yankee site specific fuels is shown to be bounded by the PWR design basis fuels. Therefore, the evaluation for the off-normal canister handling load in Section 11.1.3 bounds the canister configuration loaded with Maine Yankee fuels.

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11.2 Accidents and Natural Phenomena

This section presents the results of analyses of the design basis and hypothetical accident conditions evaluated for the Universal Storage System. In addition to design basis accidents, this section addresses very low probability events, including natural phenomena, that might occur over the lifetime of the ISFSI, or hypothetical events that are postulated to occur because their consequences may result in the maximum potential impact on the immediate environment.

The Universal Storage System includes Transportable Storage Canisters and Vertical Concrete Casks of five different lengths to accommodate three classes of PWR fuel or two classes of BWR fuel. In the accident analyses of this section, the bounding cask parameters (such as weight and center of gravity) are conservatively used, as appropriate, to determine the cask's capability to withstand the effects of the accidents.

The results of analyses show that no credible potential accident exists that will result in a dose of ≥ 5 rem beyond the postulated controlled area. The Universal Storage System is demonstrated to have a substantial design margin of safety and to provide protection to the public and to occupational personnel during storage of spent nuclear fuel.

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11.2.15 Accident and Natural Phenomena Events Evaluation for Site Specific Spent Fuel

This section presents the accident and natural phenomena events evaluation of spent fuel assemblies or configurations, which are unique to specific reactor sites. These site specific fuel configurations result from conditions that occurred during reactor operations, participation in research and development programs, and from testing programs intended to improve reactor operations. Site specific fuel includes fuel assemblies that are uniquely designed to accommodate reactor physics, such as axial fuel blankets and variable enrichment assemblies, fuel with burnup that exceeds the design basis, and fuel that is classified as damaged. Damaged fuel includes fuel rods with cladding that exhibits defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks.

Site specific fuel assembly configurations are either shown to be bounded by the analysis of the standard design basis fuel assembly of the same type (PWR or BWR), or are shown to be acceptable contents, by specific evaluation of the configuration.

11.2.15.1 Accident and Natural Phenomena Events Evaluation for Maine Yankee Site Specific Fuel

Maine Yankee site specific fuels are described in Section 1.3.2.1. A thermal evaluation has been performed for Maine Yankee site specific fuels that exceed the design basis burnup, as shown in Section 4.5.1.2. As shown in that section, loading of fuel with a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU is subject to preferential loading in designated basket positions in the Transportable Storage Canister, and certain high burnup fuel may require loading in the Maine Yankee fuel can.

With preferential loading, the design basis total heat load of the canister is not changed. Consequently, the thermal performance for the Maine Yankee site specific fuels is bounded by the design basis PWR fuels. Therefore, no further evaluation is required for the thermal accident events, as presented in Sections 11.2.6, 11.2.7, and 11.2.13.

As shown in Section 3.6.1.1, the total weight of the contents of the Transportable Storage Canister for Maine Yankee fuels is bounded by the total weight for the PWR design basis fuels. However, some design parameters for the Maine Yankee site ISFSI pad are different from those for the design basis ISFSI pad. Therefore, the hypothetical accident (non-mechanistic) tip-over event is evaluated to ensure that the maximum tip-over g-load remains below the bounding g-load (40g) used in the evaluation of the PWR canister and basket in Section 11.2.12.4. The evaluation of the UMS®

Vertical Concrete Cask tip-over event on the Maine Yankee site ISFSI pad is presented in Section 11.2.15.1.1. The methodology used is similar to that used in Section 11.2.12.3.1.

Although the total weight, and the maximum g-load, for the Maine Yankee fuel is bounded by the PWR design basis fuels, the maximum weight of the consolidated fuel lattices (2,100 lbs) is larger than that of a single PWR Class 1 design basis fuel assembly (1,567 lbs). This additional weight need only be considered in the support disk evaluation for a side impact condition, similar to the analysis presented in Section 11.2.12.4.1. A parametric study is presented in Section 11.2.15.1.2 to demonstrate that the maximum stress in the support disk due to the consolidated fuel lattice remains bounded by the maximum stress for the support disk for the PWR design basis fuels for a side impact condition.

Section 11.2.15.1.3 provides the structural evaluation for the Maine Yankee fuel can for the 24-inch drop (Section 11.2.4) and the tip-over (Section 11.2.12) accident events.

A Maine Yankee site earthquake evaluation is presented in Section 11.2.15.1.4 to demonstrate the stability of the Vertical Concrete Cask on the Maine Yankee site ISFSI pad.

11.2.15.1.1 Maine Yankee Vertical Concrete Cask Tip-Over Analysis

This section evaluates the maximum acceleration of the Transportable Storage Canister and basket during the Vertical Concrete Cask tip-over event on the Maine Yankee site ISFSI pad. This evaluation applies the methodology of Section 11.2.12 for the design basis cask tip-over evaluation.

A finite element model is generated using the LS-DYNA program to determine the acceleration of the vertical concrete cask during the tip-over event.

The concrete pad in the model corresponds to a pad 31-feet by 31-feet square and 3-feet thick, supporting one concrete cask in the center of the pad. The soil under the concrete pad is considered to be 40-feet by 40-feet square and made up of two layers: a 4.5-foot thick upper layer and a 10-foot thick lower layer. Only one-half of the concrete cask, pad and soil configuration is modeled due to symmetry. Both the Class 1 and Class 2 UMS® configurations are evaluated.

The model includes a half section of the concrete cask, the concrete ISFSI pad and soil subgrade, as shown:



Concrete Pad Properties

Vertical concrete cask tip-over analyses are performed for ISFSI pad concrete compressive strengths of 3,000 and 4,000 psi. The Poisson's Ratio (ν_c) is 0.22. The concrete dry density is considered to be between 135 pcf and 145 pcf. To account for the weight of reinforcing bar in the pad, three values of Density (ρ) are used in the model:

ρ (lbs/ft^3)	E_c (psi)	K_c (psi)
140	2.994×10^6	1.782×10^6
145	3.156×10^6	1.879×10^6
152	3.387×10^6	2.016×10^6

The corresponding values of Modulus of Elasticity (E_c) and Bulk Modulus (K_c) are also provided, where:

$$\text{Modulus of Elasticity } (E_c) = 33\rho_c^{1.5}\sqrt{f_c^{'}} \quad \text{(ACI 318-95)}$$

$$\text{Bulk Modulus } (K_c) = \frac{E_c}{3(1-2\nu_c)} \quad \text{(Blevins [19])}$$

Soil Properties

The soil properties used in the model are based on two soil layers. The vertical concrete cask tip-over analyses are performed for two different combinations of soil densities: (1) 4.5-foot thick upper layer density of 135 pcf (Modulus of Elasticity, E = 162,070 psi), with a 10-foot thick lower layer density of 127 pcf (E = 31,900 psi); and (2) 4.5-foot thick upper layer density of 130 pcf, with a 10-foot thick lower layer density of 127 pcf. The Poisson's Ratio (ν_s) of the soil is 0.45.

Vertical Concrete Cask Properties

The material properties used in the model for the Vertical Concrete Cask are the same as the properties used in the PWR models in Section 11.2.12.3. The tip-over impact is simulated by applying an initial angular velocity of 1.485 rad/sec (PWR Class 1) and 1.483 rad/sec (PWR Class 2), respectively to the entire cask. The angular velocity values are determined by the method used in Section 11.2.12 based on the weight of the loaded concrete cask with Maine Yankee fuel (285,513 pounds and 297,509 pounds for PWR Class 1 and PWR Class 2 respectively).

A cut-off frequency of 210 Hz (PWR Class 1) and 190 Hz (PWR Class 2) is applied to filter the analysis results from the LS-DYNA models and determine the peak accelerations. The resulting calculated accelerations on the canister at the location of the top support disk and of the top of the structural lid are tabulated for all of the analysis cases that were run. The maximum accelerations at the two key locations on the canister for the PWR Class 1 and Class 2 configurations are:

Component Location	Position Measured from the Bottom of the Concrete Cask (inches)		Acceleration (g)	
	Class 1	Class 2	Class 1	Class 2
Top Support Disk	176.7	185.2	32.3	34.2
Top of the Canister Structural Lid	197.9	207.0	35.3	37.6

The impact accelerations for the vertical concrete cask tip-over on the Maine Yankee ISFSI pad site are observed to be slightly higher than those reported in Section 11.2.12.3.1 for the design-basis ISFSI pad. Therefore, peak accelerations are calculated for the top support disk and are evaluated with respect to the analysis presented in Section 11.2.12.4.1.

To determine the effect of the rapid application of the inertia loading for the support disk, a dynamic load factor (DLF) is computed using the method presented in Section 11.2.12.4. The DLF is computed to be 1.07 and 1.02 for PWR Class 1 and Class 2, respectively. Applying the DLFs to the 32.3g and 34.2g results in peak accelerations of 34.6g and 34.9g for the top support disk PWR Class 1 and Class 2, respectively. The DLFs for the canister lids are considered to be unity since the lids have significant in-plane stiffness and are considered to be rigid. Additional sensitivity evaluations considering varying values of the ISFSI concrete pad density have been performed. The results of those evaluations demonstrate that the maximum acceleration for the canister and basket are below 40g. Therefore, the maximum acceleration for the canister and basket for the cask tipover accident on the Maine Yankee site ISFSI pad is bounded by the 40g used in Section 11.2.12.4.1 (Analysis of canister and basket for PWR configurations for tip-over event).

11.2.15.1.2 Parametric Study of Support Disk Evaluation for Maine Yankee Consolidated Fuel

A parametric study is performed to show that the PWR basket loaded with a Maine Yankee consolidated fuel lattice is bounded by the PWR basket design basis loading for a side impact condition. Only one consolidated fuel lattice, in a Maine Yankee Fuel Can, will be loaded in any single Transportable Storage Canister. However, Maine Yankee Fuel Cans holding other intact or damaged fuel can be loaded in the other three corner positions of the basket. (Maine Yankee Fuel Cans may be loaded only in the four corner positions of the basket. See Figure 11.2.15.1.2-2 for corner positions.) Therefore, the bounding case for Maine Yankee is the basket configuration with twenty (20) Maine Yankee fuel assemblies, three (3) fuel cans containing spent fuel, and one (1) fuel can containing consolidated fuel.

A two-dimensional ANSYS model is employed for the parametric study as shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.2-1. The load from a PWR fuel assembly is modeled as a pressure load at the inner surface of each support disk slot opening. The design basis fuel pressure loading (1g) is 12.26 psi. Based on the same design parameters (slot size = 9.272 in., disk thickness = 0.5 inch, and the number of disks = 30), the pressure load corresponding to a Maine Yankee standard CE 14 x 14 fuel assembly is 10.3 psi. The pressure load is 11.3 psi for a Maine Yankee fuel can holding an intact or damaged fuel assembly. For a Maine Yankee fuel can holding consolidated fuel the pressure load is 17.0 psi.

This study considers a 60g side impact condition for four different basket orientations: 0°, 18.22°, 26.28° and 45°, as shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.2-2. Note that 60g bounds the maximum g-load for the PWR support disks (40g) due to the Vertical Concrete Cask tip-over accident as shown in Section 11.2.12.

A total of five cases are considered in the study. Inertial loads are applied to the support disk in all cases. The base case considers that all 24 fuel positions hold design basis PWR fuel assemblies. The other four cases (Cases 1 through 4) represent four possible load combinations for the placement of four Maine Yankee fuel cans in the corner positions, one of which holds consolidated fuel. The remaining twenty basket positions hold Maine Yankee standard 14 × 14 fuel assemblies. The basket loading positions are shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.2-2. The load combinations evaluated in the four Maine Yankee fuel can loading cases are:

Case	Basket Position 1	Basket Position 2	Basket Position 3	Basket Position 4
1	Consolidated	Damaged	Damaged	Damaged
2	Damaged	Consolidated	Damaged	Damaged
3	Damaged	Damaged	Damaged	Consolidated
4	Damaged	Damaged	Consolidated	Damaged

Table 11.2.15.1.2-1 provides a parametric comparison between the Base Case and the four cases evaluated, based on the maximum sectional stress in the support disk. As shown in the table, the maximum stress in the PWR basket support disk loaded with 20 standard fuel assemblies and four Maine Yankee fuel cans, including one holding consolidated fuel, is bounded by that for the support disk loaded with the design basis PWR fuel.

Additionally, a three-dimensional analysis was performed for Case 4 with a 26.28° drop orientation using the three-dimensional canister/basket model presented in Section 11.2.12.4.1. Results of the analysis for the top support disk, where maximum stress occurs, are presented in Tables 11.2.15.1.2-2 and 11.2.15.1.2-3. The minimum margin of safety is +1.12 and +0.11 for P_m stresses and $P_m + P_b$ stresses, respectively. The minimum margin of safety for the corresponding analysis for the design basis PWR configuration is +0.97 and +0.05 for P_m and $P_m + P_b$ stresses, respectively (See Table 11.2.12.4.1-4). Therefore, it is further demonstrated that the maximum stress in the PWR support disk loaded with Maine Yankee fuel with consolidated fuel is bounded by the stress for the PWR support disk loaded with the design basis PWR fuel.

Sliding Evaluation of the Vertical Concrete Cask

To keep the cask from sliding on the concrete pad, the force holding the cask (F_s) has to be greater than or equal to the force trying to move the cask.

Based on the equation for static friction:

$$F_s = \mu N \geq G_h W$$
$$\mu\left(1 - G_v\right)W \geq G_h W$$

Where:

μ = coefficient of friction
N = the normal force
W = the weight of the concrete cask
G_v = vertical acceleration component
G_h = resultant of horizontal acceleration component

Substituting G_h and G_v for the two cases:

Case 1) $\mu(1 - 0.667a) \geq 0.566\,a$

$$\mu \geq \frac{0.566a}{1 - 0.667a}$$

Case 2) $\mu(1 - 0.267a) \geq 1.077\,a$

$$\mu \geq \frac{1.077a}{1 - 0.267a}$$

For a = 0.38g

Case 1) $\mu \geq 0.29$

Case 2) $\mu \geq 0.45$

The analysis shows that the minimum coefficient of friction, μ, required to prevent sliding of the concrete cask is 0.45. The coefficient of friction between the steel bottom plate of the concrete cask and the concrete surface (broom finish) of the storage pad, 0.50, is greater than the coefficient of friction required to prevent sliding of the concrete cask [45,46]. Therefore, the concrete cask will not slide under design-basis earthquake conditions. The factor of safety is 0.50 / 0.45 =1.11 which is greater than the required factor of safety of 1.1 in accordance with ANSI/ANS-57.9 [1].

11.2.15.1.5 Buckling Evaluation for High Burnup Fuel Rods

This section addresses the potential buckling of intact Combustion Engineering 14 x 14 fuel rods with a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU and having a cladding oxide layer up to 80 microns (0.003 inch) thick. An end drop orientation is considered with an acceleration of 60g, which subjects the fuel rod to axial loading. A reduced clad thickness is assumed, due to the 80 micron thick cladding oxide layer.

For the buckling evaluation for the end drop orientation, the fuel rods are laterally restrained by the grids and may come into contact with the fuel assembly base. The only vertical constraint for the fuel rod is the base of the assembly. The weight of the fuel pellets is included in this evaluation, as the pellets are considered to be vertically supported by the cladding. A two-dimensional model comprised of ANSYS BEAM3 elements, shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.5-1, is used for the evaluation. This evaluation is considered to be the bounding condition (as opposed to an evaluation, which considers the cladding only).

During the end drop, the fuel rod impacts the fuel assembly base. The fuel rod itself will respond as an elastic bar under a sudden compression load at its bottom end. The duration of this impact is bounded by the first extentional mode shape of the fuel rod. Contribution of higher frequency extentional modes of the rod would tend to shorten the duration of impact of the fuel rod with the fuel assembly base. The fuel rod, upon initiation of impact, corresponds to an undeformed state. In the process of the impact, the compression of the fuel rod will increase to a maximum and then return to a near uncompressed state, at which point the time of impact has been completed. This actually represents half of a cycle of the lowest frequency mode shape of the fuel rod. The shape of the time dependence of the deformation is sinusoidal. The single extentional mode shape can also be considered to be a single degree of freedom with a corresponding mass and stiffness. In viewing such an event as a spring mass system, the time variation of the deformation during the impact is expected to be sinusoidal.

The buckling mode for the fuel rod is governed by the boundary conditions. For this configuration, the grids provide a lateral support, but no vertical support. The only vertical restraint is considered to be at the point of contact of the fuel rod and the base of the assembly. The weight of the fuel rod pellets and cladding is assumed to be uniformly distributed along the length of the fuel rod. In the end drop, this results in the maximum compressive load occurring at the base of the fuel rod. The first buckling mode shape corresponding to these conditions is computed as shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.5-2.

Typically eigenvalue buckling is applied for static environments. For dynamic loading, it is assumed that the duration of the loading is sufficiently long to allow the system to experience the complete load, even as the deformation associated with the buckling is commenced. For dynamic loading, the lateral motion, which would correspond to the buckled shape, will correspond to the lowest mode shape. This lowest frequency mode shape is shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.5-2 and corresponds to a frequency of 26.2 Hz. The similarity of the two shapes shown in Figure 11.2.15.1.5-2 is expected, since both have the same displacement boundary conditions, the same stiffness matrix, and the same governing finite element equations, i.e.,

$$[K]\{\phi_i\} = \lambda_i\,[A]\{\phi_i\}$$

where:

[K] = structure stiffness matrix
$\{\phi_i\}$ = eigenvector
λ_i = eigenvalue
[A] = mass matrix for the mode shape calculation or stress stiffening matrix for the buckling evaluation

Based on the time duration of the impact and the inherent inability of the fuel rod to rapidly displace in the lateral direction, the effect of the actual lateral motion of buckling can be computed with a dynamic load factor (DLF) [47]. The expression for the DLF for a half-sine loading for a single degree of freedom is given by

$$\mathrm{DLF} = \frac{2\beta\cos(\pi/2\beta)}{1-\beta^2}$$

where:

β = ratio of the first extentional mode frequency to the first lateral mode frequency

These values, computed in this section, are $\beta = 8.52$ and DLF = 0.24.

This DLF is applied to the end drop acceleration of 60g, which is the bounding load to potentially result in the buckling of the fuel rod. The product of 60g × DLF (= 14.4g) is well below the vertical

acceleration corresponding to the first buckling mode shape, 40g as computed in this section. This indicates that the time duration of the impact of the fuel onto the fuel assembly base is of sufficiently short nature that buckling of the fuel rod cannot occur.

An effective cross-sectional property is used in the model to consider the properties of the fuel pellet and the fuel cladding. The modulus of elasticity (EX) for the fuel pellet has a nominal value of 26.0 x 10^6 psi [48]. To be conservative, only 50 percent of this value is used in the evaluation. The EX for the fuel pellet was, therefore, taken to be 13.0 x 10^6 psi. The same value of EX (13.0 x 10^6 psi) was also conservatively used for the Zircaloy or stainless steel cladding. Reference information shows that there is no additional reduction of the ductility of the cladding due to extended burnup into the 45,000 – 50,000 MWD/MTU range [49].

The bounding dimensions and physical data (minimum clad thickness, maximum rod length and minimum number of support grids) for the Maine Yankee fuel rod used in the model are:

Outer diameter of cladding (inches)	0.44
Cladding thickness (inches)	0.023*
Cladding density (lb/in^3)	0.237
Fuel pellet density (lb/in^3)	0.396

*Note that the cladding thickness has been reduced by 80 microns (0.003 inch).

The elevation of the grids, measured from the bottom of the fuel assembly are: 2.3, 33.0, 57.2, 70.7, 89.6, 108.4, 127.3 and 144.9 (inches).

The effective cross-sectional properties (Ei_{eff}) for the beam are computed by adding the value of EI for the cladding and the pellet, where:

E = modulus of elasticity (lb/in^2)
I = cross-sectional moment of inertia (in^4)

The lowest frequency for the extentional mode shape was computed to be 223.2 Hz. The first mode shape corresponds to a frequency of 26.2 Hz. Using the expression for the DLF previously discussed, the DLF is computed to be 0.24 (β = 8.52).

The buckling calculation used the same model employed for the mode shape calculation. The load that would potentially buckle the fuel rod in the end drop is due to the deceleration of the rod. This loading was implemented by applying a 1g acceleration in the direction that would result in compressive loading of the fuel rod. The acceleration corresponding to the first buckling mode is computed to be 40.0g, which is much higher than the g-load corresponding to the first buckling mode of 14.4g. Therefore, the fuel rods do not buckle during a 60g end drop.

Figure 11.2.15.1.5-1 Two-Dimensional Beam Finite Element Model for Maine Yankee Fuel Rod



Figure 11.2.15.1.5-2 Mode Shape and First Buckling Shape for the Maine Yankee Fuel Rod

First Lateral Dynamic
Mode Shape at 26.2 Hertz



First Buckling
Shape at 40.0g



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Spent fuel having a burnup from 45,000 to 50,000 MWD/MTU is assigned to peripheral locations, and based on a cladding oxide layer thickness determination, may require loading in a Maine Yankee fuel can. The interior locations must be loaded with fuel that has lower burnup and/or longer cool times in order to maintain the design basis heat load and component temperature limits for the basket and canister.

The Fuel Assembly Limits for the Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL are shown in Table 12B2-7. Part A of the table lists the STANDARD, INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY and SITE SPECIFIC FUEL that does not require preferential loading except as required by Section B 2.1.2 to assure that short-term fuel cladding temperature limits are not exceeded.

Part B of the table lists the SITE SPECIFIC FUEL configurations that require preferential loading due to the criticality, shielding or thermal evaluation. The loading pattern for Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL that must be preferentially loaded is presented in Section B 2.1.3. The preferential loading controls take advantage of design features of the UMS® Storage System to allow the loading of fuel configurations that may have higher burnup or additional hardware or fuel source material that is not specifically considered in the design basis fuel evaluation. The preferential loading required by Part B must also consider the preferential loading requirements of Section B 2.1.2 for short-term cladding temperature limits.

Fuel assemblies with a control element inserted are loaded in a Class 2 canister and basket due to the increased length of the assembly with the control element installed. However, these assemblies are not restricted as to loading position within the basket.

The Transportable Storage Canister loading procedures for Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL will indicate that the loading of a fuel configuration with removed fuel or poison rods, or a MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN, or fuel with burnup between 45,000 MWD/MTU and 50,000 MWD/MTU, is administratively controlled in accordance with the requirements of Section B 2.1.3.

Table 12-1 NAC-UMS® System Controls and Limits

Control or Limit	Applicable Technical Specification	Condition or Item Controlled
1. Fuel Characteristics	Table 12B2-1	Type and Condition
	Table 12B2-2	Class, Dimensions and Weight for PWR
	Table 12B2-3	Class, Dimensions and Weight for BWR
	Table 12B2-4	Minimum Cooling Time for PWR Fuel
	Table 12B2-5	Minimum Cooling Time for BWR Fuel
	Table 12B2-7	Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL Loading
	Table 12B2-8	Minimum Cooling Time for Maine Yankee Fuel – No CEA
	Table 12B2-9	Minimum Cooling Time for Maine Yankee Fuel – With CEA
2. Canister	LCO 3.1.4	Time in Transfer Cask (fuel loading)
Fuel Loading	Table 12B2-1	Weight and Number of Assemblies
	Table 12B2-7	Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL Loading
	Table 12B2-4	Minimum Cooling Time for PWR Fuel
	Table 12B2-5	Minimum Cooling Time for BWR Fuel
Drying	LCO 3.1.2	Vacuum Drying Pressure
Backfilling	LCO 3.1.3	Helium Backfill Pressure
Sealing	LCO 3.1.5	Helium Leak Rate
Vacuum	LCO 3.1.1	Time in Vacuum Drying
External Surface	LCO 3.2.1	Level of Contamination
Unloading	LCO 3.1.7	Fuel Cooldown Requirements
3. Concrete Cask	LCO 3.2.2	Surface Dose Rates
	Note 1	Cask Spacing
	Note 2	Cask Handling Height
4. Surveillance	LCO 3.1.6	Heat Removal System
5. Transfer Cask	12B 3.4(8)	Minimum Temperature
	LCO 3.1.8	Canister Removal from the CONCRETE Cask
6. ISFSI Concrete Pad	Note 3	Pad Concrete Thickness
	Note 3	Pad Subsoil Thickness
	Note 3	Pad Concrete Compressive Strength

1. Limits are presented in the Operating Procedures of Chapter 8.
2. Lifting height and handling restrictions are provided in Section A5.1.1 of Appendix 12A.
3. Limits are verified at the time of construction of the ISFSI per Section B 3.4 (7) of Appendix 12B.

A 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION

A 1.1 Definitions

----------NOTE----------

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout Chapter 12.

Term	Definition
ACTIONS	ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.
CANISTER	See TRANSPORTABLE STORAGE CANISTER
CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY	The CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY includes the following components and equipment: (1) a canister transfer station that allows the staging of the TRANSFER CASK with the CONCRETE CASK or transport cask to facilitate CANISTER lifts involving spent fuel handling not covered by 10 CFR 50; and (2) either a stationary lift device or mobile lifting device used to lift the TRANSFER CASK and CANISTER.
CONCRETE CASK	See VERTICAL CONCRETE CASK
INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)	The facility within the perimeter fence licensed for storage of spent fuel within NAC-UMS® SYSTEMs (see also 10 CFR 72.3).
INTACT FUEL (ASSEMBLY OR ROD) (Undamaged Fuel)	A fuel assembly or fuel rod with no fuel rod cladding defects, or with known or suspected fuel rod cladding defects not greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks.

(continued)

LOADING OPERATIONS	LOADING OPERATIONS include all licensed activities on an NAC-UMS® SYSTEM while it is being loaded with fuel assemblies. LOADING OPERATIONS begin when the first fuel assembly is placed in the CANISTER and end when the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM is secured on the transporter. LOADING OPERATIONS does not include CANISTER transfer operations between the TRANSFER CASK and the CONCRETE CASK or transport cask.
INITIAL PEAK PLANAR-AVERAGE ENRICHMENT	THE INITIAL PEAK PLANAR-AVERAGE ENRICHMENT is the maximum planar-average enrichment at any height along the axis of the fuel assembly. The 4.0 wt % ^{235}U enrichment limit for BWR fuel applies along the full axial extent of the assembly. The INITIAL PEAK PLANAR-AVERAGE ENRICHMENT may be higher than the bundle (assembly) average enrichment.
NAC-UMS® SYSTEM	NAC-UMS® SYSTEM includes the components approved for loading and storage of spent fuel assemblies at the ISFSI. The NAC-UMS® SYSTEM consists of a CONCRETE CASK, a TRANSFER CASK, and a CANISTER.
OPERABLE	The CONCRETE CASK heat removal system is OPERABLE if the difference between the ISFSI ambient temperature and the average outlet air temperature is ≤ 102°F for the PWR CANISTER or ≤ 92°F for the BWR CANISTER.

(continued)

STORAGE OPERATIONS	STORAGE OPERATIONS include all licensed activities that are performed at the ISFSI, while an NAC-UMS® SYSTEM containing spent fuel is located on the storage pad within the ISFSI perimeter.
TRANSFER CASK	TRANSFER CASK is a shielded lifting device that holds the CANISTER during LOADING and UNLOADING OPERATIONS and during closure welding, vacuum drying, leak testing, and non-destructive examination of the CANISTER closure welds. The TRANSFER CASK is also used to transfer the CANISTER into and from the CONCRETE CASK and into the transport cask.
TRANSPORT OPERATIONS	TRANSPORT OPERATIONS include all licensed activities involved in moving a loaded NAC-UMS® CONCRETE CASK and CANISTER to and from the ISFSI. TRANSPORT OPERATIONS begin when the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM is first secured on the transporter and end when the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM is at its destination and no longer secured on the transporter.
TRANSPORTABLE STORAGE CANISTER (CANISTER)	TRANSPORTABLE STORAGE CANISTER is the sealed container that consists of a tube and disk fuel basket in a cylindrical canister shell that is welded to a baseplate, shield lid with welded port covers, and structural lid. The CANISTER provides the confinement boundary for the confined spent fuel.
TRANSFER OPERATIONS	TRANSFER OPERATIONS include all licensed activities involved in transferring a loaded CANISTER from a CONCRETE CASK to another CONCRETE CASK or to a TRANSPORT CASK.

(continued)

UNLOADING OPERATIONS	UNLOADING OPERATIONS include all licensed activities on a NAC-UMS® SYSTEM to be unloaded of the contained fuel assemblies. UNLOADING OPERATIONS begin when the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM is no longer secured on the transporter and end when the last fuel assembly is removed from the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM.
VERTICAL CONCRETE CASK (CONCRETE CASK)	VERTICAL CONCRETE CASK is the cask that receives and holds the sealed CANISTER. It provides the gamma and neutron shielding and convective cooling of the spent fuel confined in the CANISTER.
STANDARD FUEL	Irradiated fuel assemblies having the same configuration as when originally fabricated consisting generally of the end fittings, fuel rods, guide tubes, and integral hardware. For BWR fuel, the channel is considered to be integral hardware. The design basis fuel characteristics and analysis are based on the STANDARD FUEL configuration.
DAMAGED FUEL	A fuel assembly or fuel rod with known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks. DAMAGED FUEL must be placed in a MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN.

(continued)

HIGH BURNUP FUEL	A fuel assembly having a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU, which must be preferentially loaded in periphery positions of the basket. Intact HIGH BURNUP FUEL having a cladding oxide layer thickness of 80 microns or less, as determined by measurement and statistical analysis, may be stored as intact fuel. HIGH BURNUP FUEL having a cladding oxide layer thickness greater than 80 microns is stored as damaged fuel.
FUEL DEBRIS	An intact or a partial fuel rod or an individual intact or partial fuel pellet not contained in a fuel rod. Fuel debris is inserted into a 9 x 9 array of tubes in a lattice that has approximately the same dimensions as a standard fuel assembly.
CONSOLIDATED FUEL	A nonstandard fuel configuration in which the individual fuel rods from one or more fuel assemblies are placed in a single container or a lattice structure that is similar to a fuel assembly. CONSOLIDATED FUEL is stored in a MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN.

(continued)

SITE SPECIFIC FUEL	Spent fuel configurations that are unique to a site or reactor due to the addition of other components or reconfiguration of the fuel assembly at the site. It includes fuel assemblies, which hold nonfuel-bearing components, such as control components or instrument and plug thimbles, or which are modified as required by expediency in reactor operations, research and development or testing. Modification may consist of individual fuel rod removal, fuel rod replacement of similar or dissimilar material or enrichment, the installation, removal or replacement of burnable poison rods, or containerizing damaged fuel. Site specific fuel includes irradiated fuel assemblies designed with variable enrichments and/or axial blankets, fuel that is consolidated and fuel that exceeds design basis fuel parameters.
MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN	A specially designed stainless steel screened can sized to hold INTACT FUEL, CONSOLIDATED FUEL or DAMAGED FUEL. The screens preclude the release of gross particulate from the can into the canister cavity.

B2.0 APPROVED CONTENTS

B 2.1 Fuel Specifications and Loading Conditions

The NAC-UMS® System is designed to provide passive dry storage of canistered PWR and BWR spent fuel. The system requires few operating controls. The principal controls and limits for the NAC-UMS® System are satisfied by the selection of fuel for storage that meets the Approved Contents presented in this section and in Tables 12B2-1 through 12B2-5 for design basis spent fuels.

This section also permits the loading of fuel assemblies that are unique to specific reactor sites. SITE SPECIFIC FUEL assembly configurations are either shown to be bounded by the analysis of the standard design basis fuel assembly configuration of the same type (PWR or BWR), or are shown to be acceptable contents by specific evaluation of the configuration.

Separate evaluation may establish different limits, which are maintained by administrative controls for preferential loading. The preferential loading controls allow the loading of fuel configurations that may have higher burnup, additional hardware material or unique configurations as compared to the design basis fuel.

Unless specifically excepted, SITE SPECIFIC FUEL must meet all of the conditions specified for the design basis fuel presented in Table 12-1.

If any Fuel Specification or Loading Conditions of this section are violated, the following actions shall be completed:

- The affected fuel assemblies shall be placed in a safe condition.
- Within 24 hours, notify the NRC Operations Center.
- Within 30 days, submit a special report that describes the cause of the violation and actions taken to restore compliance and prevent recurrence.

B 2.1.1 Fuel to be Stored in the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM

INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES meeting the limits specified in Tables 12B2-1 through 12B2-5 may be stored in the NAC-UMS® SYSTEM.

B 2.1.2 Preferential Fuel Loading

Loading of the fuel assemblies designated for a given TRANSPORTABLE STORAGE CANISTER must be administratively controlled to ensure that the dry storage fuel cladding temperature limits are not exceeded for any fuel assembly, unless all of the designated fuel assemblies have a cooling time of 7 years of more. When preparing the loading schemes for each canister, ALARA principles will be used in determining the specific assemblies to be placed in each basket location. The fuel with shorter cooling times (thus, higher fuel cladding temperature allowable and higher radiation source strength) will be placed in the center of the basket.

CANISTERS containing fuel assemblies, all of which have a cooling time of 7 years, or more, do not require preferential loading, because analyses have shown that the fuel cladding temperature limits will always be met for those CANISTERS. CANISTERS containing fuel assemblies with cooling times from 5 to 7 years must be preferentially loaded based on cooling time. By controlling the placement of the fuel assemblies with the shortest cooling time (thermally hottest) in the basket interior, preferential loading ensures that the allowable fuel cladding temperature for a given fuel assembly is not exceeded. The preferential loading of fuel into the CANISTER based on cooling time is described below.

The normal temperature distribution in the loaded TRANSPORTABLE STORAGE CANISTER results in the basket having the highest temperature at its center and lowest temperature at the outer edge. Considering this temperature distribution, spent fuel with the shortest cooling time (and, therefore, having a higher allowable cladding temperature) is placed in the center of the basket. Fuel with the longest cooling time (and, therefore, having a lower allowable cladding temperature) is placed in the periphery of the basket.

(continued)

Using a similar argument, fuel assemblies with cooling times between the highest and lowest cooling times of the designated fuel, are placed in intermediate fuel positions.

For the PWR fuel basket configuration, shown in Figure 12B2-1, fuel positions are numbered using the drain line as the reference point. Fuel positions 9, 10, 15 and 16 are considered to be basket center positions for the purpose of meeting the preferential loading requirement. The fuel with the shortest cooling times from among the fuel designated for loading in the CANISTER will be placed in the center positions. A single fuel assembly having the shortest cooling time may be loaded in any of these four positions. Fuel positions 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22, 23 and 24 are periphery positions, where fuel with the longest cooling times will be placed. Fuel with the longest cooling times may be loaded in any of these 12 positions. Similarly, designated fuel assemblies with cooling times in the midrange of the shortest and longest cooling times will be loaded in the intermediate fuel positions – 4, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20 and 21.

For the BWR fuel basket configuration, shown in Figure 12B2-2, fuel positions are also numbered using the drain line as the reference point. Fuel positions 23, 24, 25, 32, 33 and 34 are considered to be basket center positions for the purpose of meeting the preferential loading requirement. The fuel with the shortest cooling times from among the fuel designated for loading in the CANISTER will be placed in the center positions. However, the single fuel assembly having the shortest cooling time will be loaded in either position 24 or position 33. Fuel positions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, 20, 28, 29, 37, 38, 44, 45, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 are periphery positions, where fuel with the longest cooling times will be placed. Fuel with the longest cooling times may be loaded in any of these 23 positions. Designated fuel assemblies with cooling times in the midrange of the shortest and longest cooling times will be divided into two tiers. The fuel assemblies with the shorter cooling times in the midrange will be loaded in the inner intermediate fuel positions - 15, 16, 17, 22, 26, 31, 35, 40, 41, and 42. Fuel assemblies with the longer cooling times in the midrange will be loaded in the outer intermediate fuel positions - 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 18, 21, 27, 30, 36, 39, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50.

(continued)

These loading patterns result in the placement of fuel such that the shortest-cooled fuel is in the center of the basket and the longest-cooled fuel is on the periphery. Based on engineering evaluations, this loading pattern ensures that fuel assembly allowable cladding temperatures are satisfied.

B 2.1.3 Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL Preferential Loading

The estimated Maine Yankee SITE SPECIFIC FUEL inventory is shown in Table 12B2-6. As shown in this table, certain of the Maine Yankee fuel configurations must be preferentially loaded in specific basket fuel tube positions.

Corner positions are used for CONSOLIDATED FUEL, certain HIGH BURNUP FUEL and DAMAGED FUEL or FUEL DEBRIS loaded in a MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN, for fuel assemblies with missing fuel rods or fuel with fuel rods that have been replaced by rods of other material. Designation for placement in corner positions results primarily from shielding or criticality evaluations of these fuel configurations. CONSOLIDATED FUEL is conservatively designated for a corner position, even though analysis shows that these lattices could be loaded in any basket position. Corner positions are positions 3, 6, 19, and 22 in Figure 12B2-1.

Preferential loading is also used for spent fuel having a burnup between 45,000 and 50,000 MWD/MTU not loaded in the MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN. This fuel is assigned to peripheral locations, positions 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 in Figure 12B2-1. The interior locations must be loaded with fuel that has lower burnup and/or longer cool times to maintain the design basis heat load and component temperature limits for the basket and canister, and the spent fuel short-term temperature limits, as described in Section B 2.1.1.

Fuel assemblies with a control element inserted will be loaded in a Class 2 canister and basket due to the increased length of the assembly with the control element installed. However, these assemblies are not restricted as to loading position within the basket.

The Transportable Storage Canister loading procedures will indicate that loading of a fuel configuration with removed fuel or poison rods, CONSOLIDATED FUEL, or a MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN with HIGH BURNUP FUEL, DAMAGED FUEL or FUEL DEBRIS, or HIGH BURNUP FUEL, is administratively controlled in accordance with Section B 2.1.

Table 12B2-7 Maine Yankee Site Specific Fuel Limits (continued)

B. Allowable Contents requiring preferential loading based on shielding, criticality or thermal constraints. The preferential loading requirement for these fuel configurations is described in Table 12B2-6. (continued)

5. FUEL enclosed in a Maine Yankee fuel can. The allowable contents of the MAINE YANKEE FUEL CAN are:

   a) A PWR Intact Fuel Assembly.
   b) A PWR INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY with damaged fuel rods within the guide tube positions.
   c) A Damaged Fuel Assembly with up to 100% of the fuel rods classified as damaged and/or damaged or missing assembly hardware components.
   d) Individual intact or damaged fuel rods in a rod type structure, which may be a guide tube, to maintain configuration control.
   e) Fuel debris consisting of fuel rods with exposed fuel pellets or individual intact or partial fuel pellets not contained in fuel rods.
   f) Consolidated fuel lattice structure with a 17 x 17 array formed by grids and top and bottom end fittings connected by four solid stainless steel rods. Maximum contents:
      - Up to 289 fuel rods
      - Lattice weight ≤ 2,100 pounds
   g) HIGH BURNUP FUEL (45,000 to 50,000 MWD/MTU)

C. Unenriched fuel assemblies are not authorized for loading.

Table 12B2-8 Loading Table for Maine Yankee CE 14 x 14 Fuel with No Non-Fuel Material – Required Cool Time in Years Before Assembly is Acceptable

30 GWD/MTU Burnup		**Minimum Cool Time [years] for[1]**			
Enrichment	**Standard**	**Pref(0.958i)**	**Pref(0.958p)**	**Pref(1.05i)**	**Pref(1.05p)**
1.9	5	5	5	5	5
2.1	5	5	5	5	5
2.3	5	5	5	5	5
2.5	5	5	5	5	5
2.7	5	5	5	5	5
2.9	5	5	5	5	5
3.1	5	5	5	5	5
3.3	5	5	5	5	5
3.5	5	5	5	5	5
3.7	5	5	5	5	5
35 GWD/MTU Burnup		**Minimum Cool Time [years] for**			
Enrichment	**Standard**	**Pref(0.958i)**	**Pref(0.958p)**	**Pref(1.05i)**	**Pref(1.05p)**
1.9	5	5	5	5	5
2.1	5	5	5	5	5
2.3	5	5	5	5	5
2.5	5	5	5	5	5
2.7	5	5	5	5	5
2.9	5	5	5	5	5
3.1	5	5	5	5	5
3.3	5	5	5	5	5
3.5	5	5	5	5	5
3.7	5	5	5	5	5
40 GWD/MTU Burnup		**Minimum Cool Time [years] for**			
Enrichment	**Standard**	**Pref(0.958i)**	**Pref(0.958p)**	**Pref(1.05i)**	**Pref(1.05p)**
1.9	7	7	6	15	5
2.1	6	6	6	15	5
2.3	6	6	5	14	5
2.5	5	5	5	14	5
2.7	5	5	5	14	5
2.9	5	5	5	6	5
3.1	5	5	5	6	5
3.3	5	5	5	6	5
3.5	5	5	5	6	5
3.7	5	5	5	6	5

1. Cool times for preferential loading of fuel assemblies with a decay heat of either 0.958 or 1.05 kw per assembly, loaded in either interior (i) or periphery (p) basket positions.

B 3.4.2 Maine Yankee Site Specific Parameters and Analyses

The design basis site-specific parameters and analyses that require verification by Maine Yankee are:

1. The temperature of 76°F is the maximum average yearly temperature. The 3-day average ambient temperature shall be 106°F or less.

2. The allowed temperature extremes, averaged over a 3-day period, shall be greater than –40°F and less than 133°F.

3. The design basis earthquake horizontal and vertical seismic acceleration levels at the top surface of the ISFSI pad are bounded by the values shown:

Horizontal g-level in each of Two Orthogonal Directions	Corresponding Vertical g-level (upward)
0.38g	0.38 x 0.667 = 0.253g

4. The analyzed flood condition of 15 fps water velocity and a height of 50 feet of water (full submergence of the loaded cask) are not exceeded.

5. The potential for fire and explosion shall be addressed, based on site-specific considerations. This includes the condition that the fuel tank of the cask handling equipment used to move the loaded CONCRETE CASK onto or from the ISFSI site contains no more than 50 gallons of fuel.

6. Physical testing shall be conducted to demonstrate that the coefficient of friction between the concrete cask and ISFSI pad surface is at least 0.5. The ISFSI pad surface, or test pad surface, shall be prepared as described in B 3.4.2 (7).

(continued)

B 3.4.2 Maine Yankee Site Specific Parameters and Analyses (continued)

7. In addition to the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)(ii), the ISFSI pads and foundation shall include the following characteristics as applicable to the end drop, earthquake or tip-over analyses:

a.	Concrete thickness	36 inches maximum
b.	Pad subsoil thickness	4.5 feet maximum (upper layer) 10 foot minimum (lower layer)
c.	Specified concrete compressive strength	≤ 4,000 psi at 28 days
d.	Concrete dry density (ρ)	$135 \leq \rho \leq 145$ lbs/ft^3
e.	Soil in place density (ρ)	$\rho \leq 135$ lbs/ft^3 (upper layer) $\rho \leq 127$ lbs/ft^3 (lower layer)
f.	Soil Modulus of Elasticity	≤ 150,000 psi (upper layer) ≤ 30,000 psi (lower layer)
g.	Surface	Broom Finish / Brushed Surface

The concrete pad maximum thickness excludes the ISFSI pad footer. The compressive strength of the concrete should be determined according to the test method given in Section 5.6 of ACI-318. Steel reinforcement is used in the pad and footer. The basis for acceptance of concrete shall be as described in Section 5.6 of ACI-318. The soil modulus of elasticity should be determined according to the test method described in ASTM D4719.

The surface of the ISFSI pad shall have a broom finish or brushed surface as defined in ACI 116R-90 and described in Sections 7.12 and 7.13.4 of ACI 302.1R.

8. In cases where engineered features (i.e., berms, shield walls) are used to ensure that requirements of 10 CFR 72.104(a) are met, such features are to be considered important to safety and must be evaluated to determine the applicable Quality Assurance Category on a site specific basis.

B 3.4.2 Maine Yankee Site Specific Parameters and Analyses (continued)

9. TRANSFER CASK OPERATIONS shall only be conducted with surrounding air temperatures ≥ 0°F.

B 3.5 CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY (CHF)

B 3.5.1 TRANSFER CASK and CANISTER Lifting Devices

Movements of the TRANSFER CASK and CANISTER outside of the 10 CFR 50 licensed facilities, when loaded with spent fuel are not permitted unless the movements are made with a CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY designed, operated, fabricated, tested, inspected and maintained in accordance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" and the below clarifications. This Technical Specification does not apply to handling heavy loads under a 10 CFR 50 license.

B 3.5.2 CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY Structure Requirements

B 3.5.2.1 CANISTER Station and Stationary Lifting Devices

1. The weldment structure of the CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY shall be designed to comply with the stress limits of ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 for linear structures. The applicable loads, load combinations, and associated service condition definitions are provided in Table 12B3-2. All compression loaded members shall satisfy the buckling criteria of ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF.

2. If a portion of the CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY structure is constructed of reinforced concrete, then the factored load combinations set forth in ACI-318 (1995) for the loads defined in Table 12B3-2 shall apply.

3. The TRANSFER CASK and CANISTER lifting device used with the CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY shall be designed, fabricated, operated, tested, inspected and maintained in accordance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.

(continued)