UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

March 15, 2000

William T. Cottle, President and
Chief Executive Officer
STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289
Wadsworth, Texas 77483

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-498/00-04; 50-499/00-04

Dear Mr. Cottle:

This refers to the inspection conducted on February 14 to 17, 2000, at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facilities. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.

During this inspection, we followed up on previously identified inspection findings and evaluated activities conducted under the facility license related to the implementation and control of your NRC-approved fire protection program. We also reviewed the implementation of your program for identifying and correcting problems associated with the fire protection program. The inspection consisted of reviewing applicable procedures, fire brigade training and qualifications, conducting interviews with fire protection and operations personnel, and performing visual examinations of portions of the installed fire protection systems, structures, and components.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC found that the fire protection program was generally implemented satisfactorily in accordance with the requirements of your license.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are being treated as noncited violations, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. The noncited violations are described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violations or severity level of the noncited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facilities.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Dr. Dale A. Powers, Acting Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-498; 50-499
License Nos.: NPF-76; NPF-80

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No.
50-498/00-04; 50-499/00-04

cc w/enclosure:
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E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
bcc to DCD (IE01)

bcc electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
Regional Administrator **(EWM)**
DRP Director **(KEB)**
DRS Director **(ATH)**
Senior Resident Inspector **(NFO)**
Branch Chief, DRP/A **(JIT)**
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A **(DNG)**
Branch Chief, DRP/TSS **(LAY)**
RITS Coordinator **(NBH)**

Only inspection reports to the following:
D. Lange **(DJL)**
NRR Event Tracking System **(IPAS)**
Document Control Desk **(DOCDESK)**
STP Site Secretary **(LAR)**

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* See prior concurrence

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket Nos.:	50-498; 50-499
License Nos.:	NPF-76; NPF-80
Report No.:	50-498/00-04; 50-499/00-04
Licensee:	STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:	South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:	FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas
Dates:	February 14 to 17, 2000
Inspector:	C. E. Johnson, Senior Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Accompanying Personnel:	R. W. Deese, Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Approved By:	Dr. Dale A. Powers, Acting Chief Engineering and Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-498/00-04; 50-499/00-04

In this announced, routine inspection, two region-based NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the NRC-approved fire protection program and performed followup on previously identified inspection findings.

Engineering

- On February 10, 1999, the licensee identified in Licensee Event Report 50-498; -499/99-001-00 that during the review of Operating Procedure 0POP02-RH-0001, "Residual Heat Removal System Operations," Revision 10, for the residual heat removal system, it was discovered that the procedure included no steps or lineups to ensure the residual heat removal system heat exchanger flow and bypass control valves (HCV 864, 865, 866, and FCV 851, 852, and 853) were secured in their safe position. It was postulated that the non-qualified valve positioners could fail at the onset of an accident and drive the valves to their non-safe position (outside the design basis). The residual heat removal system being in a condition outside design basis was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (50-498; -499/0004-01). This violation will be treated as noncited in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-2042 (Section E8.1).

- The licensee identified in Licensee Event Report 50-498/97-011-00 that on October 20 and 21, 1997, two of the Unit 1 pressurizer safety valves (PSV-3450 and PSV-3452) were, respectively, were found outside the Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 required relief pressure tolerance of ± 2%. Failure to satisfy technical specifications required for valve setpoint limits was a violation of Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 (50-498/0004-02). This violation will be treated as noncited in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 97-17049 (Section E8.2).

- The licensee identified in Licensee Event Report 50-498/97-010-00 and 50-498; -499/97-010-01 that during maintenance on September 20, 1997, two main steam safety valves in Unit 1 (7430A and 7430B) were found to be improperly set such that they would not pass the required relief capacity set forth in the technical specifications. The failure to satisfy the requirement for relief capacity was a violation of Technical Specifications, Table 3.7-2 (50-498; -499/0004-03). This violation will be treated as noncited in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 97-14419 (Section E8.3).

Plant Support

- Overall, for the aspects of the fire protection program reviewed, the licensee's fire protection program was satisfactorily controlled, implemented, and maintained in accordance with the approved fire protection program (Section F1).

- The fire protection equipment was maintained in good condition, with some exceptions. There were minor oil leaks identified on the diesel fire pumps, and minor corrosion observed on the jockey pump (Section F2).

- The fire protection staff’s knowledge was good (Section F4).

- The observed drill was sufficient to demonstrate that the fire team members had the necessary fire fighting skills. Good communications between the fire team commander and the control room staff were noted (Section F5).

- Licensee quality assurance audits and independent self-assessments were detailed, comprehensive, and critical. However, the licensee’s internal self-assessments were not detailed or self-critical, in that, few issues and, in particular, no significant issues were identified with the program, as compared to the quality assurance audits (Section F7).

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 and 2 operated at full power during this inspection.

III. Engineering

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498; -499/99-001: residual heat removal system found in a condition outside design basis.

On February 10, 1999, during review of Operating Procedure 0POP02-RH-0001, "Residual Heat Removal System Operations," Revision 10, for the residual heat removal system, it was discovered that the procedure included no steps or lineups to ensure the residual heat removal system heat exchanger flow and bypass control valves (HCV 864, 865, 866, and FCV 851, 852, and 853) were secured in their safe position. These valves are required to be in their safe position during plant Modes 1, 2, and 3 to allow emergency core cooling flow from the low head safety injection pumps following a design basis accident. When the solenoid vent valves are in an energized condition, the associated valve positioners control the valves. This positioning mechanism consists of a number of nonsafety-related control devices that are not qualified for post-accident environments. It was postulated that the non-qualified valve positioners could fail at the onset of an accident and drive the valves to their nonsafe position (outside the design basis). The licensee's engineering analysis showed that this condition would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

The licensee determined the root cause of the condition to be inadequate implementation of design requirements. A possible contributor may have been misinterpretation of a note on the original residual heat removal flow control valve logic diagram.

The licensee's corrective actions were to open the associated disconnect switches (remove fuses) and revise the subject procedures. Additionally, residual heat removal system logic and elementary diagrams were revised to indicate that the solenoids for the heat exchanger flow and bypass valves were de-energized in plant Modes 1 through 3 to ensure the diagram note would not be misinterpreted again.

The inspectors verified that fuses had been removed and locked in a safe box in the area and that procedures were revised to include system lineups associated with these valves. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions implemented were appropriate. Criterion III states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specification drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above, Procedure 0POP02-RH-0001, "Residual Heat Removal System Operations," Revision 10, did not include steps or lineups to ensure the design requirements. The

residual heat removal system being in a condition outside design basis was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (50-498; -499/0004-01). This violation will be treated as noncited in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-2042.

E8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/97-011-00: pressurizer safety valve setpoints discovered outside required tolerances.

After one cycle of operation, two of the three Unit 1 pressurizer safety valves (PSV-3450 and PSV-3452) were shipped to a vendor laboratory for setpoint verification testing. On October 20 and 21, 1997, the two valves, respectively, were found outside the Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 required relief pressure tolerance of ± 2%. The remaining Pressurizer Safety Valve PSV-3451 tested within the required Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 tolerance.

The licensee's staff determined that the cause of the setpoint drift was an inherent valve characteristic (i.e., the massive spring assembly). The licensee's representative stated that the setpoint drift of these components was a widely known industry problem. The licensee's staff was working with the industry to resolve this problem and was a lead participant for the industry. An engineering analysis showed that the safety function was not impaired. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's actions and found them to be satisfactory. Failure to satisfy technical specifications required for valve setpoint limits was a violation of Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 (50-498/0004-02). This violation will be treated as noncited in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 97-17049.

E8.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-498/97-010-00 and 50-498; -499/97-010-01: main steam safety valves discovered not meeting required relief capacity.

During maintenance on September 20, 1997, two main steam safety valves in Unit 1 (7430A and 7430B) were found to be improperly set such that they would not pass the required relief capacity set forth in Technical Specification Table 3.7-2. It was determined that the safety valves would only pass 93 percent of their required relief flow and that this condition had occurred sometime between Unit 1's sixth and seventh refueling outages. During a historical search as part of the corrective action, one similar occurrence was identified in Unit 2 (Main Steam Safety Valve 7440) in October 1995 during Unit 2's refueling outage. This valve was also found to be capable of passing only 93 percent of required flow. This condition had occurred sometime between the fourth and fifth refueling outages.

The licensee's staff determined that the causes of these occurrences was inadequate resolution of issues regarding valve reassembly and personnel having a less than questioning attitude regarding confusing requirements. The licensee took action to clarify Procedure 0PMP04-MS-0009, "Main Steam Safety Valve Maintenance," Revision 10, for setting valve stem lift adjustments, and reviewed the lessons learned from these occurrences with maintenance personnel. The lift values for the valves were

also corrected. The licensee's analysis showed that at no time was the plant in an unanalyzed condition or operated outside of design basis. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusions. The failure to satisfy the required relief capacity of the three valves was a violation of Technical Specifications, Table 3.7-2 (50-498; -499/0004-03). This violation will be treated as noncited in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 97-14419.

E8.4 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-498; -499/9819-01: main steam safety valves as-found setpoints out-of-tolerance.

The NRC previously closed Licensee Event Reports 50-499/97-001-00, 50-498/97-005-00, 50-498/97-009-00, and Unresolved Item 50-498; -499/98-0051-01, all of which address instances of main steam safety valves lifting above the technical specification required tolerance band when tested.

The licensee's staff performed an engineering evaluation regarding this problem and determined the root cause to be an alteration of the oxide layers on the valves' seats and discs. The licensee replaced two deficient valve discs with pre-oxidized Inconel X750 discs and tested the valves and found favorable results. The licensee's representative also stated that their intention was to replace the discs in the discrepant valves on an as-needed basis, citing that the only discrepant valves that have been identified were ones that have had maintenance performed on them.

Based on the licensee's successful effort on this problem and plans for future actions, this inspection followup item is closed. This issue was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-318.

IV. Plant Support

F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities (64704)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's fire protection program to verify that the licensee had satisfactorily implemented and maintained the fire protection program, as required by the operating license. The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program procedures, exemption requests, administrative controls, fire reports, fire brigade qualifications, fire brigade staffing, and fire watch staffing to determine if they were in accordance with the approved fire protection program. The inspectors also conducted tours of the facility and observed a fire drill to verify licensee implementation of the fire protection program.

The inspectors concluded that overall, for the aspects of the fire protection program reviewed, the licensee's fire protection program was satisfactorily controlled, implemented, and maintained in accordance with the approved fire protection program.

F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment (64704)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible areas of the facility containing safe shutdown equipment, fire protection equipment, including fire suppression and detection equipment, fire rated assemblies, and fire brigade and operator emergency response equipment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed surveillance test records of selected fire protection suppression and detection equipment to verify that the equipment was appropriately maintained and functional.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors performed a plant tour with the licensee's fire protection staff. During this tour, the inspectors used current drawings for selected areas (switchgear and relay rooms) to verify the location of the suppression and detection systems.

Fire fighting equipment (e.g., hose reels and fire extinguishers) was clearly marked and accessible. Fire brigade equipment was appropriately stocked and readily available, as required by site procedures.

The inspectors observed during the plant tour that, overall, the fire protection equipment was maintained in good condition, with some exceptions. There were minor oil leaks identified on the diesel fire pumps, and minor corrosion observed on the jockey pump.

The inspectors also identified a potential procedural violation concerning combustible loading exceeding the administrative limit in Unit 1, on Elevation 60 foot, temporary access for steam generator activities. This issue is discussed in the steam generator replacement periodic status NRC Inspection Report 50-498/00-02.

c. Conclusions

Fire fighting equipment (e.g., hose reels and fire extinguishers) was clearly marked and accessible. Fire brigade equipment was appropriately stocked and readily available, as required by site procedures. Overall, the fire protection equipment was maintained in good condition, with some exceptions. There were minor oil leaks identified on the diesel fire pumps, and minor corrosion observed on the jockey pump.

F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation (64704)

The inspectors reviewed the approved fire protection procedures for the facility. The inspectors found that the procedures used were sufficient to implement the licensee's approved program.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed surveillance/test records of selected fire protection equipment for the suppression and detection systems in the relay and switchgear rooms to verify that the equipment was maintained functional. The inspectors found that the surveillance/test records were current and had been performed periodically, as required by the licensee's program.

F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance

The inspectors evaluated fire protection staff knowledge by conducting interviews and a plant walkdown with staff members. Discussions with the licensee's fire protection staff indicated that they had a good understanding of NRC requirements for the fire protection program. The fire protection staff also demonstrated a good knowledge of fire hazards associated with the facility, and familiarity with the facility's fire protection systems, testing, and analyses. The inspectors found that the fire protection staff's knowledge was good.

The inspectors also conducted interviews with three licensee personnel qualified to stand fire watch. The inspectors found that interviewed personnel had been requalified annually, as required by site procedures. The inspectors concluded that fire watch personnel were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.

F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed: (1) the readiness of the onsite fire brigade to fight fires, (2) personnel qualifications, (3) training records, and (4) a fire drill plan. In addition, the inspectors observed the performance of the fire brigade during a fire drill, and attended the fire drill critique.

b. Observations and Findings

Fire Brigade

The inspectors found that the brigade membership was comprised of the appropriate number of personnel, as required by procedures. The shift supervisor demonstrated to the inspectors that all brigade members were qualified, as evidenced by their training records.

The fire brigade training requirements were defined in Procedures 0PGP03-ZT-0131, "Fire Protection Training and Qualification Program," Revision 4, and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 13.2.2.6, "Fire Protection Training." The inspectors verified that the initial and continuing training and qualification requirements for brigade members were established in procedures.

The inspectors reviewed the training records for six fire brigade members selected by the inspectors. All six personnel were found to have completed the required initial training courses, periodic refresher training requirements, practice sessions, and brigade leader training. All personnel had received their annual physical examination. The inspectors found that the training records were in good order.

Fire Drill

The inspectors observed a fire drill conducted by the fire protection department on February 15, 2000. The inspectors noted good communications between the fire team commander and the control room staff. Appropriate team work and fire fighting skills were exhibited during the fire drill. The fire drill scenario was sufficient to demonstrate the necessary skills of the fire team members. The response of the fire team to the drill was appropriate. Also, the control room staff's actions were good, in that, control room personnel were not only following the procedures, but looking ahead into the repercussions of complications resulting from the postulated fire if it intensified and spread. Upon completion of the drill, a fire drill critique was conducted by the fire protection and quality assurance staff. There was good feedback between the fire brigade members and supervisory personnel. Condition reports were initiated due to questions raised during the critique.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill records for 1998 and 1999 to ensure the licensee was meeting the requirements of its licensing basis and commitments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The inspectors found that the licensee had conducted the appropriate number of announced and unannounced drills for each shift, quarter, and backshift.

c. Conclusions

The observed drill was sufficient to demonstrate that the fire team members had the necessary fire fighting skills. Good communications between the fire team commander and the control room staff were noted.

The qualification of the fire brigade team members met the requirements of the fire protection program. Training provided to the fire brigade team members met the necessary requirements.

F6 Fire Protection Organization and Administration

The inspectors found that the fire protection organization had recently changed. The fire protection organization had previously been in the Security Organization (Plant Support) but was currently in Systems Engineering. The fire protection staff consisted of a fire protection coordinator, a system engineer, and a test group in reliability engineering,

which consisted of a supervisor and 12 fire protection technicians. This group was responsible for the testing and surveillance activities of the fire protection systems. The licensee's representative informed the inspectors that this change would provide better control of the activities related to the fire protection program. The inspectors concluded that this change by the licensee was acceptable.

F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy and implementation of the quality assurance program for fire protection with respect to quality assurance audits and self-assessments.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors found that the quality assurance audits and contractor independent self-assessments were comprehensive and critical. These reports identified deficiencies in the fire protection program, and made good recommendations for correction of the deficiencies. However, the licensee's internal self-assessments were not detailed or self critical, in that, few issues and, in particular, no significant issues were identified with the program, as compared with the quality assurance audits.

The inspectors noted that the threshold for writing condition reports was low. Condition reports were written frequently to document deficiencies and track the closure of the deficiencies. The inspectors randomly selected condition reports and verified that the licensee's corrective actions were being properly implemented.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's quality assurance program audits and contractor independent self-assessments of the fire protection program were comprehensive and detailed. The inspectors also determined that the licensee's internal self-assessments were not detailed or self-critical, in that, few issues and, in particular, no significant issues were identified with the program, as compared to the quality assurance audits.

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues

The inspectors discussed with the fire protection system engineer a final Year 2000 (Y2K) concern with the control room fire detection systems. The system for both units was determined by the licensee to be not Y2K compliant. The licensee's representative stated that this conclusion was noted to the NRC as an exception to their Y2K preparation in previous correspondence. Condition Report 98-106 was issued January 5, 1998, to address this issue.

An operability test of the system (recognized as occurring on March 1, 2000, by the fire detection computers and February 29, 2000, by other supporting computers) was conducted in 1999. The test demonstrated a 60-second delay in transmitting local fire alarms to the control room computer, where this should have normally occurred almost instantly.

The licensee's representative stated that this would have required declaring the computers inoperable and the stationing of hourly fire watches in the monitored areas. Instead, as a temporary solution, the fire detection system computer clocks were set back to 1996 in order to properly account for recognition of this year as a leap year. The licensee's representative stated that since the system is only 2½-years old, any record reviewers would know that a 2000 date would be represented by a 1996 date. The licensee's representative stated that they were still working with the vendor to enact a permanent solution to the problem. Based on the above actions, the system was considered operable by the licensee's representatives.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The lead inspector presented the inspection results onsite to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 17, 2000, and during a supplemental telephonic exit on March 10, 2000. Licensee representatives acknowledged the findings presented.

The lead inspector asked the representatives of the licensee's management whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

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J. Drymiller, Supervisor, Security
G. Gonzales, Consulting Engineering Specialist
S. Head, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Hubenak, Senior Reactor Operator Training Instructor
B. Humble, Supervisor, Security
T. Jordan, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
J. Labuda, Coordinator, Fire Protection
M. Ludwig, Senior Quality Consultant, Quality Assurance
M. McBurnett, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
W. Mookhoek, Licensing Engineer
R. Rivera, Supervisor, Fire Protection Testing
P. Serra, Manager, Plant Protection
J. Shepard, Vice President Engineering and Technical Support
D. Wiegand, Fire Protection Engineer

NRC

C. O'Keefe, Senior Resident Inspector

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

64704	Fire Protection Program
92903	Engineering Followup

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

50-498; -499/0004-01	NCV	Residual heat removal system found in a condition outside design basis (Section E8.1).
50-498/0004-02	NCV	Pressurizer safety valve setpoints discovered outside required tolerances (Section E8.2).
50-498; -499/0004-03	NCV	Main steam safety valves discovered not meeting required relief capacity (Section E8.3).

Closed

50-498; -499/99-001-00	LER	Residual heat removal system found in a condition outside design basis (Section E8.1).
50-498/97-011-00	LER	Pressurizer safety valve setpoints discovered outside required tolerances (Section E8.2).
50-498/97-010-00 50-498; -499/97-010-01	LER	Main steam safety valves discovered not meeting required relief capacity (Section E8.3).
50-498; -499/0004-01	NCV	Residual heat removal system found in a condition outside design basis (Section E8.1).
50-498/0004-02	NCV	Pressurizer safety valve setpoints discovered outside required tolerances (Section E8.2).
50-498; -499/0004-03	NCV	Main steam safety valves discovered not meeting required relief capacity (Section E8.3).
50-498; -499/9819-01	IFI	Main steam safety valves as-found setpoints out of tolerance (Section E8.4).

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

0POP02-RH-0001	Residual Heat Removal System Operations	Revision 10
0PGP03-ZF-0001	Fire Protection Program	Revision 9
0PGP03-ZF-0011	STPEGS Fire Brigade	Revision 5
0PGP03-ZF-0018	Fire Protection System Operability Requirements	Revision 9
0PGP03-ZF-0019	Control of Transient Fire Loads and Use of Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases	Revision 1
0PGP03-ZT-0131	Fire Protection Training and Qualification Program	Revision 4
0PMP04-MS-0009	Main Steam Safety Valve Maintenance	Revision 10

Procedure Forms

0PGP03-ZF-0011, Form 3	1998 Fire Drill Schedule/Record Worksheet	Revision 4
0PGP03-ZF-0011, Form 3	1999 Fire Drill Schedule/Record Worksheet	Revision 5
0PGP05-ZN-0004, Form 1	Licensing Document Change Request 2308	Revision 7
0PAP01-ZA-0102, Form 1	Procedure Approval 30686237	Revision 5

Miscellaneous

CREE 99-8121-5	Condition Report Engineering Evaluation for the Containment Access Facility
Training Records for	Raymond Trevino, Matthew Elliott, Dawn Reis, Markus Trower, Audie Proctor, and Paul Burton
FBT 001	Fire Brigade Member Initial Training Lesson Plans

Condition Reports

CR 97-6491	CR 99-318	CR 00-2517	CR 00-3797
CR 97-14419	CR 99-2042	CR 00-2576	CR 00-4289
CR 97-17049	CR 00-1954	CR 00-2578	
CR 98-106	CR 00-2495	CR 00-2581	