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February 17, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Numbers 50-369 and 50-370
Proposed Technical Specifications (TS) Amendment
TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating
Catawba TAC Numbers MA6962 and MA6963
McGuire TAC Numbers MA7004 and MA7005

Reference: Letter from M.S. Tuckman to NRC, same subject,
dated November 3, 1999

Letter from M.S. Tuckman to NRC, same subject,
dated January 14, 2000

In the above referenced letter, dated January 14, 2000, McGuire had committed to provide a response to an NRC question regarding the power factor change for Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.14. Catawba had responded to the same question in the above referenced letter dated January 14, 2000. This letter is relevant to McGuire only and has no effect on the Catawba amendment.

Attachment 1 contains a repeat of the question and McGuire's response. Attachment 2 contains the revised marked-up Technical Specification and Bases pages for McGuire. Due to the response to the above stated question, it is necessary to revise these pages. The previously submitted marked-up pages, Attachment 1b of the above referenced letter dated November 3, 1999, should be discarded and not used by the staff as a basis of review.

Attachment 3 contains the revised reprinted Technical Specification and Bases pages for McGuire. Due to the response to the above stated question, it is necessary to revise these pages. The previously submitted reprinted pages, Attachment 2b of the above referenced letter dated November 3, 1999, should be discarded and not used by the staff as basis of review.

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Since the response to the above stated question and resulting marked-up and reprinted Technical Specification and Bases pages are clarifying in nature, the previous No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination remains valid.

Inquiries on this matter should be directed to P.T. Vu at (704) 875-4302.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "M.S. Tuckman".

M.S. Tuckman

Attachments

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M.S. Tuckman, being duly sworn, states that he is Executive Vice President of Duke Energy Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this amendment to the Catawba Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses Numbers NPF-35 and NPF-52 and the McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses Numbers NPF-9 and NPF-17 and Technical Specifications; and that all statements and matters set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

M. S. Tuckman

M.S. Tuckman, Executive Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to me:

Feb 17, 2000
Date

Mary P. Nelson
Notary Public

My commission expires:

JAN 22, 2001
Date

SEAL

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xc (with attachments):

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NCMPA-1
NCEMC
PMPA
SREC
Catawba Document Control File 801.01
Catawba RGC Date File
ELL-EC050

ATTACHMENT 1

**MCGUIRE RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION 4 FROM JANUARY 6, 2000
CONFERENCE CALL**

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE RELATED TO DIESEL GENERATOR
TESTING**

MCGUIRE UNITS 1 &2

Reference: Letters, M. S. Tuckman to NRC, 11/3/99 and 1/14/00

Question 4

Proposed request to perform SR 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.14 at a unity or lagging power factor within the DG unit capability. We [NRC] realize that if the bus voltage during testing is already high due to high grid voltage, increasing the DG VAR output may cause the bus voltage to exceed allowable limits. We have previously accepted the following wording in the technical specification with clarification in the Basis that these surveillances will be performed under inductive load conditions that are as close to design-basis conditions as possible subject to offsite power conditions:

"Verify each DG, when connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power and operating with maximum kVAR loading that offsite power conditions permit, operates for >24 hours...."

Please indicate your intention to perform these SRs as close to design conditions as possible.

Duke Response

McGuire intends to perform these SRs as close to design conditions as possible. McGuire will adopt the following in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.14:

"This Surveillance is performed with the DG connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power supply. The DG is tested under maximum kVAR loading, which is defined as being as close to design basis conditions as practical subject to offsite power conditions. Design basis conditions have been calculated to be greater than 0.9 power factor. During DG testing, equipment ratings are not to be exceeded (i.e., without creating an overvoltage condition on the DG or 4 kV emergency buses, over-excitation in the generator, or overloading the DG emergency feeder while maintaining the power factor greater than or equal to 0.9)."

ATTACHMENT 2

REVISED MARKED-UP TS AND BASES PAGES FOR MCGUIRE

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.1.9</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <p>1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.</p> <p>2. If performed with the DG synchronized with offsite power, it shall be performed at a power factor ≤ 0.9.</p> </div> <p>Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Following load rejection, the frequency is ≤ 63 Hz; b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is ≥ 3740 V and ≤ 4580 V; and c. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the frequency is ≥ 58.8 Hz and ≤ 61.2 Hz. 	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.8.1.10</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">NOTES</p> <p>This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.</p> </div> <p>Verify each DG does not trip and voltage is maintained ≤ 4784 V during and following a load rejection of ≥ 3600 kW and ≤ 4000 kW.</p>	<p>18 months</p>

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.1.13 Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ESF actuation signal except:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Engine overspeed; b. Generator differential current; c. Low lube oil pressure; and d. Generator voltage - controlled overcurrent. 	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.8.1.14 -----NOTES-----</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test. 2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. 3. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer. <p>-----</p> <p><i>Insert 1</i> Verify each DG operating at a power factor ≤ 0.9 operates for ≥ 24 hours:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. For ≥ 2 hours loaded ≥ 4200 kW and ≤ 4400 kW; and b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded ≥ 3600 kW and ≤ 4000 kW. 	<p>18 months</p>

(continued)

Insert 1:

,when connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power and operating with maximum kVAR loading that offsite power conditions permit,

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower.

The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified is equal to 60% of a typical 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG. SR 3.8.1.9.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.9.b and SR 3.8.1.9.c are steady state voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover following load rejection. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.

Insert 2

Insert 3

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems. In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, Note 2 requires that, if synchronized to offsite power, testing must be performed using a power factor ≤ 0.9 . This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience, and is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

SR 3.8.1.10

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide for DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Although not representative of the design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience, a power factor of approximately unity (1.0) is used for testing. This power factor is chosen in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations to minimize DG overvoltage during testing.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

Insert 3 This SR has been modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbation to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.11.

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.4, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG autostart time of 11 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of the emergency bus and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or residual heat removal (RHR) systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that DG noncritical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal, and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, low lube oil pressure, generator voltage-controlled overcurrent) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, taking into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is not normally performed in MODE 1 or 2, but it may be performed in conjunction with periodic preplanned preventative maintenance activity that causes the DG to be inoperable. This is acceptable provided that performance of the SR does not increase the time the DG would be inoperable for the preplanned preventative maintenance activity.

SR 3.8.1.14

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.9, requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, ≥ 2 hours of which is at a load equivalent from 105% to 110% of the continuous duty rating and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

Insert 2

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor of ≤ 0.9 . This power factor is chosen to be representative of

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

~~the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.~~
The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by ^{two} ~~three~~ Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the power factor limit will not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems. Note ~~3~~ ² allows gradual loading of the DG in accordance with recommendation from the manufacturer.

Insert 3 →

SR 3.8.1.15

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 11 seconds. The 11 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.

Insert 2:

This Surveillance is performed with the DG connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power supply. The DG is tested under maximum kVAR loading, which is defined as being as close to design basis conditions as practical subject to offsite power conditions. Design basis conditions have been calculated to be greater than 0.9 power factor. During DG testing, equipment ratings are not to be exceeded (i.e., without creating an overvoltage condition on the DG or 4 kV emergency buses, over-excitation in the generator, or overloading the DG emergency feeder while maintaining the power factor greater than or equal to 0.9).

Insert 3:

This Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

ATTACHMENT 3

REVISED REPRINTED TS AND BASES PAGES FOR MCGUIRE

ATTACHMENT 3

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Remove Page

3.8.1-8
3.8.1-11
B 3.8.1-17 through
B 3.8.1-26

Insert Page

3.8.1-8
3.8.1-11
B 3.8.1-17 through
B 3.8.1-25

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.1.9 Verify each DG, when connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power and operating with maximum kVAR loading that offsite power conditions permit, rejects a load greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Following load rejection, the frequency is ≤ 63 Hz; b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is ≥ 3740 V and ≤ 4580 V; and c. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the frequency is ≥ 58.8 Hz and ≤ 61.2 Hz. 	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.8.1.10 Verify each DG does not trip and voltage is maintained ≤ 4784 V during and following a load rejection of ≥ 3600 kW and ≤ 4000 kW.</p>	<p>18 months</p>

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.1.13 Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ESF actuation signal except:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Engine overspeed; b. Generator differential current; c. Low lube oil pressure; and d. Generator voltage - controlled overcurrent. 	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.8.1.14 -----NOTES-----</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test. 2. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer. <p>-----</p> <p>Verify each DG, when connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power and operating with maximum kVAR loading that offsite power conditions permit, operates for ≥ 24 hours:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. For ≥ 2 hours loaded ≥ 4200 kW and ≤ 4400 kW; and b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded ≥ 3600 kW and ≤ 4000 kW. 	<p>18 months</p>

(continued)

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.7

See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8

Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 18 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.9

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. For this unit, the single load for each DG and its kilowatt rating is as follows: Nuclear Service Water Pump which is a 576 kW motor. This Surveillance may be accomplished by:

- a. Tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power, or while solely supplying the bus; or
- b. Tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus.

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified is equal to 60% of a typical 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG. SR 3.8.1.9.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.9.b and SR 3.8.1.9.c are steady state voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover following load rejection. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.

This Surveillance is performed with the DG connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power supply. The DG is tested under maximum kVAR loading, which is defined as being as close to design basis conditions as practical subject to offsite power conditions. Design basis conditions have been calculated to be greater than 0.9 power factor. During DG testing, equipment ratings are not to be exceeded (i.e., without creating an overvoltage condition on the DG or 4 kV emergency buses, over-excitation in the generator, or overloading the DG emergency feeder while maintaining the power factor greater than or equal to 0.9).

This Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

SR 3.8.1.10

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide for DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

Although not representative of the design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience, a power factor of approximately unity (1.0) is used for testing. This power factor is chosen in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations to minimize DG overvoltage during testing.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

SR 3.8.1.11

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.4, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG autostart time of 11 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of the emergency bus and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or residual heat removal (RHR) systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG systems to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.12

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (11 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for ≥ 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d ensures that the emergency bus remains energized from the offsite electrical power system on an ESF signal without loss of offsite power.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1 and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that DG noncritical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal, and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, low lube oil pressure, generator voltage-controlled overcurrent) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, taking into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is not normally performed in MODE 1 or 2, but it may be performed in conjunction with periodic preplanned preventative maintenance activity that causes the DG to be inoperable. This is acceptable provided that performance of the SR does not increase the time the DG would be inoperable for the preplanned preventative maintenance activity.

SR 3.8.1.14

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.9, requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, ≥ 2 hours of which is at a load equivalent from 105% to 110% of the continuous duty rating and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

This Surveillance is performed with the DG connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power supply. The DG is tested under maximum kVAR loading, which is defined as being as close to design basis conditions as practical subject to offsite power conditions. Design basis conditions have been calculated to be greater than 0.9 power factor. During DG testing, equipment ratings are not to be exceeded (i.e., without creating an overvoltage condition on the DG or 4 kV emergency buses, over-excitation in the generator, or overloading the DG emergency feeder while maintaining the power factor greater than or equal to 0.9). The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows gradual loading of the DG in accordance with recommendation from the manufacturer.

This Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

SR 3.8.1.15

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 11 seconds. The 11 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.

SR 3.8.1.16

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.11, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and the DG can be returned to standby operation when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the autostart logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in standby operation when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an autoclose signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, and takes into consideration unit

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

conditions required to perform the Surveillance. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.17

Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions will not be compromised as the result of testing and the DG will automatically reset to standby operation if a LOCA actuation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Standby operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.13. The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12. The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading was not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.18

Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The load sequence time interval tolerance in Table 8-1 of Reference 2 ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Table 8-1 of Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the

Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. This takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.1.19

In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. The reason for Note 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.20

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 8.
3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, July 1993.
4. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
5. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
6. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.
8. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.
9. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979.
11. IEEE Standard 308-1971.