February 3, 2000

Mr. John H. Mueller
Chief Nuclear Officer
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Operations Building, Second Floor
P. O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (TAC NO. MA3895)

Dear Mr. Mueller:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 89 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated October 16, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated May 10 and December 8, 1999.

This amendment changes portions of the TS regarding the Service Water System.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-410

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-69
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Sincerely,

Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
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Docket No. 50-410

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2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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Unit No. 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-410

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 89
License No. NPF-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated October 16, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated May 10 and December 8, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 89 are hereby incorporated into this license. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Marsha K. Gamberoni, Acting Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 3, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 89

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

DOCKET NO. 50-410

Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
xii	xii
xix	xix
3/4 3-105	3/4 3-105
3/4 3-106	3/4 3-106
3/4 3-108	3/4 3-108
3/4 7-1	3/4 7-1
3/4 7-2	3/4 7-2
3/4 7-3	3/4 7-3
3/4 7-4	3/4 7-4
3/4 7-5	3/4 7-5
3/4 7-6	3/4 7-6

Replace the following pages of the Technical Specifications Bases with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

B3/4 7-1	B3/4 7-1
---	B3/4 7-1a (new)

PAGE

TABLE 3.3.9-1

PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

TRIP FUNCTION	INSTRUMENT NUMBER	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS (a)	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS	ACTION
1. Feedwater System/Main Turbine Trip System				
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8	2ISC*LSH1624A,B,C	3	1	140
2. Service Water System				
a. Discharge Bay Level	2SWP*LS30A,B	2	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	142
b. Intake Tunnel 1 & 2 Water Temperature	2SWP*TSL64A, 65A	1/Division	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	144
	2SWP*TSL64B, 65B	1/Division	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	144
c. Service Water Bay	2SWP*LS73A,B	2	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	143
d. Service Water Pumps Discharge Strainer Differential Pressure - Train "A"	2SWP*PDSH1A,C,E	1/Strainer	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	146
e. Service Water Pumps Discharge Strainer Differential Pressure - Train "B"	2SWP*PDSH1B,D,F	1/Strainer	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	146
f. Service Water Supply Header Discharge Water Temperature	2SWP*TY31A,B	2	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	147
g. Service Water Inlet Pressure for EDG*2 (HPCS, Division III)				
1) Division I Supply Header	2SWP*PSL95A	1	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	145
2) Division II Supply Header	2SWP*PSL95B	1	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *	145

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition, except for discharge bay level and service water bay level which may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours without placing the Trip System in a tripped condition and Reactor Vessel Level-High, Level 8 channel, which may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition.

* When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.

TABLE 3.3.9-1 (Continued)

PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

ACTION 140 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore at least one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 141 - Not used.

ACTION 142 - Monitor discharge bay level continuously if level reaches trip setpoint, provide an alternate flow discharge path by locking closed 2SWP*MOV30A or 2SWP*MOV30B.

ACTION 143 - Monitor service water bay level continuously if level reaches Trip Setpoint provide an alternate intake to the service bay by locking open 2SWP*MOV77A or 2SWP*MOV77B.

ACTION 144 - Place intake heaters in service if lake temperature $< 38^{\circ}F$ or take the ACTIONS required by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2, as appropriate.

ACTION 145 - Lock closed 2SWP*MOV95A or 2SWP*MOV95B and declare EDG-2 (HPCS, Division III) inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.

ACTION 146 - Monitor the effected pump discharge pressure and the applicable service water loop header pressure to determine the differential pressure across the strainer; if the differential pressure exceeds the setpoint manually start the strainer or declare the effected service water pump inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2, as appropriate.

ACTION 147 - Monitor service water local discharge temperature indicators as applicable per Specification 4.7.1.1.1.a.2 or 4.7.1.2.1.a.2.

TABLE 4.3.9.1-1

PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP FUNCTION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. Feedwater System/Main Turbine Trip System				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8	NA	Q	R	1
2. Service Water System				
a. Discharge Bay Level	NA	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
b. Intake Tunnel 1 & 2 Water Temperature	W	R	R**	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
c. Service Water Bay	NA	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
d. Service Water Pumps Discharge Strainer Differential Pressure - Train "A"	S	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
e. Service Water Pumps Discharge Strainer Differential Pressure - Train "B"	S	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
f. Service Water Supply Header Discharge Water Temperature	S	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
g. Service Water Inlet Pressure for EDG*2 (HPCS, Division III)				
1) Division I Supply Header	NA	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *
2) Division II Supply Header	NA	R	R	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, *

* When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.
** Calibration excludes sensors; a comparison test of the four RTDs will be done.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1.a Two independent service water system loops shall be OPERABLE. Each loop shall be comprised of two OPERABLE service water pumps capable of taking suction from Lake Ontario and transferring the water to the associated safety-related equipment.

b. Four OPERABLE service water pumps shall be in operation.

c. Service water supply header discharge water temperature shall be 82°F or less.

d. The intake deicing heater system shall be OPERABLE and in operation when intake tunnel water temperature is less than 38°F; Division I shall have 14 heaters in operation in each intake structure and Division II shall have 14 heaters in operation in each intake structure.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3

ACTION:

a. With one or more required service water pumps inoperable in one loop or one loop inoperable for reasons other than specified in ACTION b or c, restore the inoperable service water loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With one service water supply header cross connect valve inoperable, verify the service water supply header cross connect valve is open within 1 hour and restore the service water supply header cross connect valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours*, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. With one or more nonsafety-related service water header flow paths with one service water isolation valve inoperable, isolate the affected nonsafety-related service water flow path(s) within 72 hours* or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

d. With the service water system inoperable for reasons other than specified in ACTION a, b, or c, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

---

* May be cycled intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the valve to OPERABLE status.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 (Continued)

ACTION:

e. With one required service water pump not in operation, restore four service water pumps to operation within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

f. With two or more required service water pumps not in operation, restore three service water pumps to operation within 1 hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

g. With the service water supply header discharge water temperature exceeding 82°F, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

h. With one required Division of heaters either inoperable or not in operation or both, when the intake tunnel water temperature is less than 38°F, restore the heaters to OPERABLE status and in operation within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1.1 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE.

a. By verifying the service water supply header discharge water temperature to be less than or equal to 82°F.

   1. At least once per 24 hours, and

   2. At least once per 4 hours when the last recorded water temperature is greater than or equal to 75°F, and

   3. At least once per 2 hours when the last recorded water temperature is greater than or equal to 79°F.

b. At least once per 12 hours by verifying the water level at the service water pump intake is greater than or equal to elevation 233.1 feet.

c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying four service water pumps in operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1.1 (Continued)

d. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve - manual, power-operated, or automatic, servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position - is in its correct position.

e. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying:

1. After a simulated test signal, each automatic valve servicing nonsafety-related equipment actuates to its isolation position.

2. After a simulated test signal, each service water system cross connect and pump discharge valve actuates automatically to its isolation position.

3. For each service water pump, after a simulated test signal, the pump starts automatically and the associated pump discharge valve opens automatically, in order to supply flow to the system safety-related components.

f. At least once per 18 months:

1. Perform a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST of the service water pump starting logic.

2. Verify each pump runs and maintains service water pump differential pressure equal to or greater than 70 psid with a pump flow equal to or greater than 9000 gpm.

4.7.1.1.2 The Intake Deicing Heater System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying the intake tunnel water temperature is greater than or equal to 38°F, or

b. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the current of the heater feeder cables at the motor control centers is 20 amps* or more (total for three phases when adjusted to degraded voltage conditions) per division in each intake structure.

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying the resistance is ≥ 28 ohms for each feeder cable and associated heater elements in the intake deicing heater systems.

* For 14 heater elements in operation.

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.2.a The necessary portions of the service water system needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE shall be OPERABLE.

b. Service water supply header discharge water temperature shall be 82°F or less.

c. The necessary Divisions of the intake deicing heater system shall be OPERABLE and in operation when intake tunnel water temperature is less than 38°F; each required Division shall have 14 heaters in operation in each intake structure.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and *.

ACTION:

a. With required portions of the service water system inoperable, declare the associated equipment inoperable and take ACTIONS required by the applicable Specifications.

b. With the service water supply header discharge temperature exceeding 82°F, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

c. With one or more required Divisions of heaters either inoperable or not in operation or both, when the intake tunnel water temperature is less than 38°F, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.2.1 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. By verifying the service water supply header discharge water temperature to be less than or equal to 82°F:

   1. At least once per 24 hours, and

   2. At least once per 4 hours when the last recorded water temperature is greater than or equal to 75°F, and

   3. At least once per 2 hours when the last recorded water temperature is greater than or equal to 79°F.

---

* When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.2.1 (Continued)

b. At least once per 12 hours by verifying the water level at the service water pump intake is greater than or equal to elevation 233.1 feet.

c. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve - manual, power-operated, or automatic, servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position - is in its correct position.

d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying:

1. After a simulated test signal, each automatic valve servicing nonsafety-related equipment actuates to its isolation position.

2. After a simulated test signal, each service water system cross connect and pump discharge valve actuates automatically to its isolation position, and

3. For each service water pump, after a simulated test signal, the pump starts automatically and the associated pump discharge valve opens automatically, in order to supply flow to the system safety-related components.

e. At least once per 18 months:

1. Perform a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST of the service water pump starting logic.

2. Verify each pump runs and maintains service water pump differential pressure equal to or greater than 70 psid with each pump flow equal to or greater than 9000 gpm.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.2.2 The Intake Deicing Heater System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying the intake tunnel water temperature is greater than or equal to 38°F, or

b. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the current of the heater feeder cables at the motor control centers is 20 amps* or more (total for three phases when adjusted to degraded voltage conditions) per division in each intake structure.

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying the resistance is ≥ 28 ohms for each feeder cable and associated heater elements in the intake deicing heater systems.

* For 14 heater elements in operation.

BASES

3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the service water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal or accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits. Pumps that are required to be in operation shall also be OPERABLE. The maximum service water supply header discharge water temperature assumed in the analyses is 82°F (analytical limit).

Independence in the service water system, as required by the Specification, is achieved by OPERABILITY of the divisional separation logic and valves (2SWP*MOV50A, 2SWP*MOV50B). During normal plant operating conditions, the two divisions of the service water system must be interconnected to meet the LOCA analyses assumptions.

The nonsafety-related service water header flow paths refer to the two supply and two return headers. Each flow path contains two isolation valves (a total of eight valves). When one isolation valve is inoperable, the affected flow path must be isolated by closing one of the isolation valves in the associated flowpath within 72 hours (i.e., 2SWP*MOV3A or 3B, 2SWP*MOV19A or 19B, 2SWP*MOV93A or 93B, or 2SWP*MOV599). In the case when 2SWP*MOV599 is inoperable and cannot be closed, 2SWP*MOV3A or 3B and 2SWP-V8 shall be closed.

The intake deicing heater Specification ensures that adequate intake flow area is available for the service water system. In order to prove that the system is supplying adequate heat to the bar racks, a portable ammeter shall be used to check the full load current of the heaters. The current should be checked on a weekly basis. Current shall be measured for each phase at each of the four motor control center locations. The measured current is adjusted to degraded voltage conditions (518 volts). If a major deviation from rated current is detected, further investigation is required to determine if an open circuit exists in the individual heater circuits. The 18-month verification of circuit resistance readings provides a check for long-term degradation of circuit insulation.

The heat load during Operational Conditions 4, 5, and * can vary significantly, depending on the time since plant shutdown and the equipment/heat loads that are required to be in service. As a result, the number of service water pumps required to be operable or in operation can vary. In addition, service water is only required to be operable for the equipment which is required to be operable for the current plant conditions. Maintaining service water flow rates and pressure within acceptable limits assures the availability of flow to safety related components and prevents pump runout following automatic initiation of LOCA loads. When the required portions of the service water system are inoperable (e.g., pumps, flow paths, valves), the associated equipment must be declared inoperable and the Actions required by the applicable Specifications must be taken.

3/4.7.2 REVETMENT-DITCH STRUCTURE

The purpose of the revetment-ditch structure is to protect the plant fill and foundation from wave erosion, expected during the probable maximum windstorm for a maximum still water elevation of 254 feet.

The revetment-ditch structure is Seismic Category I and is designed to withstand the impact of waves. So long as the fill is in place, waves cannot impact Category I structures because of the lack of sufficient depth of water to sustain such waves.

The revetment-ditch structure can sustain a high degree of damage and still perform its function, protecting the site fill from erosion. Thus, the operability condition for operation of the revetment-ditch structure has been written to ensure that severe damage to the structure will not go undetected for a substantial period of time and to provide for prompt corrective action and NRC notification.

3/4.7.3 CONTROL ROOM OUTDOOR AIR SPECIAL FILTER TRAIN SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the control room outdoor air special filter train system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design-basis-accident conditions. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours during

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-410

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 16, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated May 10 and December 8, 1999, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC or the licensee) proposed a license amendment to change the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 (NMP2).

The proposed changes to TS 3/4.7.1.1 would (1) ensure that 4 service water (SW) pumps are operating with the divisional cross connect valves open during Operational Condition 1, 2, and 3 (currently, the TS requires 2 SW pumps associated with one loop to be operating); (2) increase the number of division 1 and 2 heaters required to be operable from 7 per division per intake to 14 per division per intake; (3) revise the actions necessary for having less than the required equipment to reflect the new limits for SW equipment; and (4) increase the SW supply header discharge water temperature from 81 ^{0}F to 82 ^{0}F.

TS 3.7.1.2 ("Service Water System-Shutdown"), TS Table 3.3.9-1, and TS Table 4.3.9.1-1 would be revised to add "when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment" to the applicability section. TS Table 3.3.9-1 would be revised to decrease the temperature at which the Intake Deicing Heaters are required to be in service from 39 ^{0}F to 38 ^{0}F. The proposed change to TS 3.7.1.2 would specify that the necessary portions of the SW system needed to support equipment required to be operable shall be operable; the Action Section would reflect this change. The change to surveillance requirement (SR) 4.7.1.2.1 would increase the flow rate of SW pumps from 6500 gpm to 9000 gpm, and would change the SW pumps pressure from 80 psi discharge pressure to 70 psi differential pressure. The change to SR 4.7.1.2.2 would decrease the intake tunnel water temperature from 39 ^{0}F to 38 ^{0}F. The surveillance for the Intake Deicing Heaters would be changed to reflect the increase in the number of heaters required. The title of "Plant Service Water System" would be changed to "Service Water System."

By letters dated May 10 and December 8, 1999, NMPC provided additional information in support of the application for amendment. The additional information does not affect the Commission's finding of no significant hazards consideration that was issued in a Federal Register notice (63 FR 66596, December 2, 1998).

2.0 BACKGROUND

The NMP2 SW system is designed to provide cooling water from Lake Ontario to various safety and non-safety related components/systems. It consists of six 50 percent-capacity pumps, two independent supply headers (Loops A and B), and their associated piping, valves, and instrumentation and controls. A cross-tie, equipped with two normally open motor-operated isolation valves[1] in series, is provided between the supply headers to allow the operation of a combination of any required number of the six SW pumps to provide cooling water to either loop. SW for non-safety related components/systems is tapped off from Loop A. Each of the tap-off lines is provided with two motor-operated isolation valves in series. All essential electrical components supporting Loop A and Loop B are powered from Division I and Division II electrical buses, respectively.

During normal plant operation and the initial phase of normal plant shutdown, four SW pumps are required to remove plant heat loads. The remaining pumps serve as spares[2] to accommodate periodic maintenance. Following a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), two SW pumps are required to provide cooling water for the safe shutdown of the reactor and to mitigate the consequences of the LOCA. The SW system is designed to operate in the following logic:

a. Following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) or a LOCA coincident with a LOOP and a single failure of the Division 1 or Division 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG),[3] the operating SW pumps trip, the SW supply header cross-tie isolation valves close automatically, and the non-safety related components/systems required for normal operation are isolated from the SW system. Two SW pumps are required to provide cooling water for the safe shutdown of the reactor and the long-term cooling of the reactor and the containment. One SW pump is automatically restarted and is sufficient to meet the short-term cooling requirements, while a second SW pump is manually started to meet the long-term cooling requirements.

   However, following a LOCA with a partial LOOP, the operating SW pumps will trip, the non-safety related components/systems will still be isolated from the SW system, but the SW supply header cross-tie isolation valves will not close automatically. Two SW pumps are required to provide cooling water for the safe shutdown of the reactor and the long-term cooling of the reactor and the containment. One SW pump for each loop is restarted automatically in a timed sequence.

b. Following a LOCA with offsite power available, the SW pumps that are operating remain in operation, the SW supply header cross-tie isolation valves remain open, and the non-safety related components/systems will not be automatically isolated from the SW system.

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1 When the cross-tie isolation valves are closed, each loop is supported by three SW pumps.

2 The spare SW pumps are cycled periodically to ensure their operability/availability.

3 A failure of the Division I or Division II EDG is the worst case of a single failure.

In the original analysis, it was assumed that a LOCA coincident with a LOOP and a single failure of the Division I or Division II EDG was the limiting design basis for the SW system. Accordingly, the current TS 3.7.1.1 (a.k.a, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1.1) was established to require, during plant Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3, that both SW loops[4] are operable and one loop is in operation to assure that either Loop A or Loop B will be available to provide cooling water for the safe shutdown of the reactor and for the long-term cooling of the reactor and the containment.

Recently, NMPC identified that a LOCA with offsite power available and a trip (single failure) of one of the four operating SW pumps is the limiting design basis for the SW system. This event is limiting because the SW supply header cross-tie isolation valves do not close automatically and the non-safety related components/systems are not isolated from the SW system. NMPC performed an analyses and concluded that in order to support the required safety-related systems for the safe shutdown of the reactor and for the long-term cooling of the reactor and the containment following a LOCA with offsite power available, a minimum of three SW pumps (all three SW pumps can be in the same loop) is required. Therefore, NMPC proposed to revise the current LCO 3.7.1.1 and its associated Actions and SRs to reflect the results of the recent LOCA analysis using the revised limiting design basis for the SW system.

NMPC also proposed to revise LCO 3.7.1.2 and its associated Actions and SRs to assure consistency with the assumptions used in the analyses to establish the SW pump requirement[5] during plant shutdown. The current TSs, which do not account for the varying heat loads during various plant shutdown conditions, require the same number of SW pumps to be operable in Operational Conditions 4, 5, and when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, as required in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3.

In addition, NMPC proposed to revise TS Table 3.3.9-1, "Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation," and TS Table 4.3.9.1-1, "Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," to include periods when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.

NMPC also proposed miscellaneous changes to the TSs (e.g., system title identified in the index and TS Section 3/4.7.1, etc.). These miscellaneous changes are primarily of an editorial nature. NMPC also forwarded revised insertion pages for TS Bases 3/4.7.1 reflecting these changes.

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4 Two SW pumps for each loop are required to be operable.

5 NUREG-1434 allows the OPERABILITY requirements of the SW system to be determined by the systems they support during plant Operational Conditions 4 and 5, providing that plant Operating Procedures have provisions to administratively control the system lineups (requirements) and pump operating parameters.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 TS Section LCO 3.7.1.1, "Plant Service Water System[6] - Operating."

1. Current LCO 3.7.1.1 (in part) and its sub-section (a) require two independent SW system loops (with two operable SW pumps for each loop) to be OPERABLE with one loop in operation during plant Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3.

   NMPC proposed to replace part of the current LCO 3.7.1.1 and its sub-section (a) with two new subsections for plant operation during Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3. The two new subsections are (1) LCO 3.7.1.1(a) to require two independent SW system loops (with two operable SW pumps for each loop) to be OPERABLE; and (2) LCO 3.7.1.1(b) to require four OPERABLE SW pumps to be in operation.

   With four SW pumps in operation during plant Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3, if a LOCA were to occur with offsite power available and a single failure of SW pumps (a trip of one of the four SW pumps) occurs, three SW pumps would remain operating. These would be sufficient to provide cooling water for safe shutdown of the reactor and for long-term cooling of the reactor and containment. Additional pumps could be manually started or non-essential cooling loads could be manually isolated from the SW system.

   On the basis of its review, the staff finds these proposed changes to be consistent with NMPC's accident analysis assumptions, including the worst single failure. Therefore, these changes are acceptable.

2. Current LCO 3.7.1.1.b (sequenced to "c") is revised to raise the SW supply header water temperature limit from 81 °F to 82 °F.

   In its application for amendment, NMPC stated that the essential components cooled by the SW system are designed for a maximum inlet temperature of 82 °F; therefore, 82 °F is the design basis analytical limit (AL) for this parameter. The current TS limit is 81 °F and the 1 degree difference accounts for uncertainty of the measuring instrumentation loop.

   NMPC explained the need for changing the current value of 81 °F. During the original plant licensing process, NMPC had assumed an uncertainty of 1 degree, but recent calculations for the SW system instrument loop uncertainty resulted in a loop uncertainty of 1.63 °F. Rather than adjusting the existing TS temperature value to account for the larger uncertainty, NMPC proposed to specify the AL (which contains no instrument uncertainty allowance) in the TS, and adjust the associated surveillance procedures to account for the calculated loop uncertainty of 1.63 °F. NMPC states that the methodology used for uncertainty calculations is consistent with the guidance provided in the Instrument Society of America (ISA) Standard 67.04-1982, which is endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 2, "Instrument Setpoints for

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[6] NMPC proposed that the title, "Plant Service Water System," be changed to "Service Water System."

Safety-Related Systems." Changing the SW surveillance procedures to include "test acceptance criteria" for the monitored SW header temperature to be a maximum of 80.37 °F (i.e., 82 - 1.63 = 80.37) is acceptable to the staff. Thus, NMPC's surveillance procedures will ensure that SW supply header temperature monitoring is accomplished using correct values of the instrument loop uncertainties, such that actual temperature is appropriately determined. NMPC also provided a change to the TS Bases to clearly identify that the specified 82 °F is an AL. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change to be acceptable.

3. Current LCO 3.7.1.1 (in part, sequenced to "d"), which requires the operability of the intake deicing heater system, is revised to increase the number of operating Division 1 and Division 2 heaters from 7 per Division per intake structure to 14 per Division per intake structure.

   The intake deicing heater system is designed to minimize ice formation on the Ultimate Heat Sink System's intake structure bar racks. NMPC finds that maintaining 14 heaters in operation in each intake structure when the intake tunnel water temperature is less than 38 °F will maintain the surface temperature of the associated intake bars at least 1 °F above a bulk water temperature of 32 °F, even with the maximum expected SW flow through only one intake structure with one division of heaters. Increasing the number of operating and operable Division 1 and Division 2 heaters from 7 to 14 is a more conservative change to provide assurance that both intake structures will remain sufficiently free of ice blockage and, thus, to assure adequate flow in the event of a LOCA with or without a LOOP. Therefore, the proposed increase is acceptable.

4. NMPC proposed to change the current LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (a) to provide an Allowed Outage Time (AOT) of 72 hours for the conditions when one or more SW pumps for one loop are inoperable or a loop that is inoperable for reasons other than those specified in Action (b) or (c). If the inoperable loop is not restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, the reactor must be in, at least, HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

   NMPC stated that the AOT of 72 hours was developed taking into account that the LCO and other Actions provide assurance that three SW pumps are in operation (Action f), the supply header cross-tie valves are normally open (Action b) during plant operation, and the probability of a LOCA occurring during this period is low.

   The staff finds that the proposed AOT of 72 hours and the requirements for reactor shutdown in LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (a) are consistent with the guidance described in the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1434), Section B 3.7.1, "Bases - SW System," and therefore, are acceptable.

5. NMPC proposed to replace current LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (b), (c), and (d) with the following five new Actions labeled (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f):

   (1) New LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (b)

New Action (b) requires that an inoperable SW supply header cross-tie valve be verified open within 1 hour and restored to operable status within 72 hours. Otherwise, the reactor must be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

NMPC stated that the 1-hour AOT for verifying that the supply header cross-tie valve is open was developed taking into account the impact of the SW system on primary containment and secondary containment integrity[7] and the low probability of a LOCA occurring during this period. The 72-hour AOT was developed taking into account the redundant capabilities afforded by the operable SW supply header cross-tie valve, and the low probability of a LOOP or a LOCA coincident with a LOOP occurring during this period.

The staff finds that the proposed 1-hour AOT for verifying that the supply header cross-tie valve is open, the 72-hour AOT for restoring the supply header cross-tie valve to operable status, and the requirements for reactor shutdown in LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (b) are consistent with the guidance described in NUREG-1434, Section B 3.7.1. Therefore, these changes are acceptable.

(2) New LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (c)

New Action (c) requires isolation of non-essential SW header flow path(s) within 72 hours if one SW isolation valve is inoperable. If isolation is not completed within 72 hours, the reactor must be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

NMPC stated that the 72-hour AOT was developed taking into account the redundant capabilities afforded by the operable SW isolation valve in each affected non-essential flow path and the low probability of a LOOP or a LOCA coincident with a LOOP occurring during this period.

The staff finds that the proposed AOT of 72 hours and the requirements for reactor shutdown in LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (c) are consistent with the guidance described in NUREG-1434, Section B 3.7.1. Therefore, these changes are acceptable.

(3) New LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (d)

New Action (d) requires that if the SW system is inoperable for reasons other than those specified in Actions (a), (b), or (c) above, the reactor must be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

There is no AOT associated with this Action because the inoperable condition of the SW system could result in a loss of its heat removal function during a LOOP, LOCA, or

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[7] Currently, for Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3, the LCO 3.6.1.1 Action for restoring primary containment includes a 1-hour AOT, and the LCO 3.6.5.1 Action for restoring secondary containment includes a 4-hour AOT.

a LOCA coincident with a LOOP. This Action is more restrictive relative to the requirements specified in current Actions (b), (c) and (d).

On the basis of its review, the staff finds this proposed new LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (d) acceptable.

(4) New LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (e)

LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (e) requires that, if a SW pump is not in operation but is required to be in operation to satisfy the four SW pumps in operation requirement of LCO 3.7.1.1 discussed above, four SW pumps must be restored to operation in 72 hours. If a required SW pump is not restored to operation within 72 hours, the reactor must be in, at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The 72-hour AOT was developed based upon the fact that (1) the remaining three operating SW pumps are adequate to achieve a safe shutdown of the reactor, and (2) the probability of a LOCA occurring during this period is low.

The staff finds that the proposed AOT of 72 hours and the requirements for reactor shutdown in LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (e) are consistent with the guidance described in NUREG-1434, Section B 3.7.1. Therefore, these changes are acceptable.

(5) New LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (f)

New Action (f) requires that, if two or more required SW pumps are not in operation, three pumps must be restored to operation within 1 hour. If three SW pumps are not restored to operation within 1 hour, the reactor must be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

NMPC stated that the 1-hour AOT was developed taking into account (1) the impact of the SW system on primary containment and secondary containment integrity, and (2) the low probability of a LOCA occurring during this period.

On the basis of its review, the staff finds this proposed new LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (f) acceptable.

6. Current LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (e) (sequenced to "d") is revised to increase from 81 °F to 82 °F the temperature at which a reactor shutdown is required.

   This proposed change, which substitutes the AL of 82 °F for the existing temperature, corresponds to the proposed change to current LCO 3.7.1.1.b discussed in item 2 above. Therefore, the staff finds it to be acceptable on the same basis.

7. Current LCO 3.7.1.1 Action (f) (sequenced to Action (h)) is revised to establish an AOT of 72 hours when one Division of intake deicing heaters is inoperable or not in operation or both, and the intake tunnel (lake) water temperature is less than 38 °F.

The proposed change provides an AOT of 72 hours to restore inoperable heaters to operable status and place it in operation before shutting down the reactor, when one division of the intake de-icing heaters is either inoperable or are not placed in operation or both while the lake water temperature is 38 °F or less. In its submittal, NMPC stated that the proposed 72-hour AOT takes into consideration the facts that (1) the number of heaters per intake structure is increased from 7 to 14 (discussed in item 3 above), (2) the 14 heaters per intake structure of the redundant division will be operable during these 72 hours and are adequate to maintain both intake structures free of ice blockage, and (3) the probability of a LOOP event or a LOCA coincident with a LOOP event is low. The staff agrees that this provides an adequate basis for the 72-hour AOT and, therefore, finds the proposed change acceptable.

8. SR 4.7.1.1.1.a is revised to increase the SW supply header discharge water (a.k.a., Ultimate Heat Sink UHS) temperature from 81 °F to 82 °F for verification of SW system operability.

   This proposed change is consistent with the change discussed in paragraph 3.1.2 above, which substitutes the AL of 82 °F for the existing temperature of 81 °F. Therefore, the staff finds it to be acceptable.

9. SR 4.7.1.1.2.a is revised to decrease the intake tunnel water UHS temperature from 39 °F to 38 °F for verification of intake deicing heater system operability.

   (See discussion in Section 3.3 below.)

10. SR 4.7.1.1.1.c is added to verify four SW pumps in operation at least once every 24 hours to assure that the proposed LCO 3.7.1.1.b is met.

    Since four SW pumps are normally in operation and are monitored in the control room, the staff finds this proposed new SR 4.7.1.1.1.c to be acceptable.

11. Current SR 4.7.1.1.1.e.2 (re-sequenced to "f.2") is revised such that the SW pump pressure and flow requirements reflect the current analyses assumptions.

    Since the modified SW pump parameters were used in the limiting analysis and are well within the design limits of the pumps, the staff finds this proposed revision to current SR 4.7.1.1.1.e.2 acceptable.

12. SR 4.7.1.1.2.a is revised to decrease the intake tunnel water (UHS) temperature from 39 °F to 38 °F for verification of intake deicing heater system operability.

    (See discussion in Section 3.3 below.)

13. SR 4.7.1.1.2.b is revised to increase the current that is measured during operation of the heaters from 10 amps per Division to 20 amps per Division when adjusted to degraded voltage conditions.

    NMPC stated that the number of heaters per intake structure per division had been increased from 7 to 14. Therefore, the value of the feeder current is adjusted from its

current value of 10 amps to 20 amps per division to address the increase in the number of heaters. NMPC also stated that this adjustment accounts for the degraded voltage condition. The staff finds this proposed change acceptable.

3.2 TS Section LCO 3.7.1.2, "Plant Service Water System[8] - Shutdown."

The SW system is a support system for many TS-required components (e.g., EDG, RHR heat exchangers, etc.). The heat loads during Operational Conditions 4, 5, and when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, can vary significantly depending upon the time since plant shutdown and the status of non-essential loads. As a result, the number of SW pumps required to be operable or in operation can vary. The current LCO 3.7.1.2, which requires the same number of SW pumps to be operable in Operational Conditions 4, 5, and when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, as in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3, does not account for the varying heat loads. Therefore, NMPC proposed to revise the SW system shutdown requirements contained in LCO 3.7.1.2 and its associated Actions and SRs to reflect the varying heat loads that are required during Operational Conditions 4, 5, and when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.

In its letter of May 10, 1999, responding to the NRC staff's request for additional information, NMPC stated that compliance with the proposed TS will be controlled by means of plant operating procedures. Operating Procedure N2-OP-11 is used to administratively control system lineups and pump operating parameters during shutdown conditions.

On the basis of its review, the staff finds that the proposed revisions to LCO 3.7.1.2 and its associated Actions and SRs are consistent with the guidance described in NUREG-1434, Section B 3.7.1[9] and that they will assure that the SW system is capable of providing the required cooling water under varying plant shutdown conditions. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed LCO 3.7.1.2 and its associated Actions and SRs acceptable.

3.3 TS Table 3.3.9-1, "Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation."

1. Statement of Action 144 is changed to specify "<38 °F", rather than "≤ 39 °F," as the allowable value (AV) requiring the intake de-icing heater system heaters to be placed into service when the Lake Ontario water temperature reaches this temperature.

   The de-icing heaters are designed to minimize ice formation on the UHS system, and specifications for the intake de-icing heater system ensures that an adequate ice-free intake flow area is available for the SW system. The current TS Table 3.3.9-2, "Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints," (which is not changed by the proposed amendment) specifies the setpoint for actuation of the de-icing heaters to be a lake (i.e., "intake tunnel 1 & 2") temperature of "≥39 °F" and the corresponding allowable value to be "≥38 °F." NMPC proposes to change the lake temperature specified in the statement of Action 144 for placing intake heaters in service from " ≤ 39 °F" to "< 38 °F" to be consistent with the allowable value in TS Table 3.3.9-2.

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[8] See Footnote 6

[9] See Footnote 5

NMPC explained that the AL for the lake temperature regarding ice formation is 34 °F, and that the latest revised uncertainty calculations for the intake temperature loop determined the total loop uncertainty to be ±2.8 °F. Subtracting this loop uncertainty value from the allowed value of 38 °F yields 35.2 °F, which is above the AL of 34 °F. Thus, reducing the AV from "≤ 39 °F" to "< 38 °F" will not reduce the margin to an unacceptable limit. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

2. In TS Table 3.3.9-1, the column titled "Applicable Operational Conditions" is supplemented for the Functional Units 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g.1, and 2.g.2 by a footnote stating "When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment."

   This change to the applicability of TS Table 3.3.9-1 adds a new operational condition involving the handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. NMPC explained that this addition is appropriate because the SW system is required to support some loads during these periods. Therefore, the proposed addition specifies that the SW system instrumentation is to be operable during these periods. The staff agrees that the addition is appropriate and, therefore, acceptable.

3. In TS Table 4.3.9.1-1,"Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," the column titled "Operational Conditions For Which Surveillance [is] Required" is supplemented for the Functional Units 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g.1, and 2.g.2, by a footnote stating "When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment."

   This change corresponds to the change to TS Table 3.3.9-1 discussed in Section 3.3.2 above. The staff agrees that the operational conditions for which surveillance of SW system actuation instrumentation is required should include when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. Thus, the staff finds the change to TS Table 4.3.9.1-1 to be appropriate and acceptable.

3.4 Miscellaneous Proposed TS Changes

In addition to the above proposed TS changes, NMPC proposed to change the system title identified in the Index and in TS Sections 3/4.7.1 from "Plant Service Water System" to "Service Water System."

These changes are editorial in nature, and do not alter technical requirements or affect previous analyses. The staff finds these miscellaneous proposed TS changes acceptable.

NMPC also proposed to revise the Bases for 3/4.7.1 to reflect the title change and provide clarification of certain Actions.

On the basis of its review of NMPC's rationale and the evaluation discussed above, the staff concludes that the above proposed changes to TS will assure that the SW system at NMP2 will provide sufficient cooling water to support plant operation under various conditions (normal operation, shutdown, or LOCA). Therefore, as stated previously, the staff finds the proposed changes to the NMP2 TS to be acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official (J. Dunkelburger) asked whether the proposed SW supply header discharge temperature of 82 ^{0}F and the proposed intake tunnel water temperature of 38 ^{0}F include allowances for instrumentation uncertainty and, if not, how NMPC would assure that these temperature limits are not exceeded due to instrument uncertainty. This issue is discussed in Section 3.0 of this safety evaluation.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The staff has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 66596). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: February 3, 2000

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 3, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: BiWeekly Notice Coordinator

FROM: Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION IN BIWEEKLY FR NOTICE - NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE (TAC NO. MA3895)

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment: October 16, 1998, as supplemented by letter dated May 10, 1999, and December 8, 1999.

Brief description of amendment: This amendment changes portions of the Technical Specifications regarding the Service Water System.

Date of issuance: February 3, 2000

Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment No.: 89

Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in FEDERAL REGISTER: December 2, 1998 (63 FR 66596)

The May 10 and December 8, 1999, letters provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 3, 2000.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

February 3, 2000

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DATED: February 3, 2000

AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69 NINE MILE POINT UNIT NO. 2

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