January 19, 2000

Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr. Vice President

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc. Post Office Box 1295

Birmingham, Alabama 35201

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SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE

OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MA5316 AND MA5317)

Dear Mr. Beaslev:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 111 to Facility Operating License NPF-68 and Amendment No. 89 to Facility Operating License NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated April 19, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated November 1, 1999.

The amendments revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.5.2 and associated Bases to allow the loss of voltage and degraded voltage trip setpoints to be treated as "nominal" values. The change also included a Note to SR 3.3.5.2, stating in part that a Trip Setpoint may be set more conservatively than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions. The NRC staff took exception to the Note and requested the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (licensee) to revise its submittal by deleting the Note to SR 3.3.5.2. Accordingly, the licensee deleted the Note and re-submitted the proposed TS change by letter dated November 1, 1999.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Ramin Assa, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

C FAIF CHAIR

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 111 to NPF-68


2. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-81

3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

January 19, 2000

Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

Ramin Assa, Project Manager, Section 1

Project Directorate II

Division of Licensing Project Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 111 to NPF-68

2. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-81

3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

cc:
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 111 License No. NPF-68

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated April 19, 1999 as supplemented by letter dated November 1, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 111, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1

Richard L. Emch, n.

Project Directorate II

Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: January 19, 2000



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 89 License No. NPF-81

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated April 19, 1999 as supplemented by letter dated November 1, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I:
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 89 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1

Richard L. Emch. &.

Project Directorate II

Division of Licensing Project Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: January 19, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 111

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68

DOCKET NO. 50-424

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 89

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81

DOCKET NO. 50-425

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. *Overleaf pages are provided.

Remove	<u>Insert</u>	
*3.3.5-1	*3.3.5-1	
3.3.5-2	3.3.5-2	
*B 3.3.5-1	*B 3.3.5-1	
B 3.3.5-2	B 3.3.5-2	
B 3.3.5-7	B 3.3.5-7	
*B 3.3.5-8	*B 3.3.5-8	

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.5 4.16 kV ESF Bus Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

LCO 3.3.5.

Four channels per bus of the loss of voltage Function and four channels

per bus of the degraded voltage Function shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,

When associated Diesel Generator is required to be OPERABLE by

LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources—Shutdown."

AC.	T	О	N	S
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Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

	CONDITION	F	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A.	One or more Functions with only one channel on one or both buses inoperable.		el may be bypassed for up rs for surveillance testing.	
		A.1	Place channel in trip.	6 hours
B.	One or more Functions with two or more channels on one bus inoperable.	B.1	Restore at least three channels to OPERABLE status.	12 hours
C.	One or more Functions with two or more channels on two buses inoperable.	C.1	Restore at least three channels on one bus to OPERABLE status.	1 hour

ACTIONS (continued)

-	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D.	Required Actions and associated Completion Times not met in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.	D.1 <u>AND</u> D.2	Be in MODE 3. Be in MODE 5.	6 hours 36 hours
E.	Required Action and associated Completion Time not met when the associated DG is required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2.	E.1	Enter applicable Condition(s) and Required Action(s) for the associated DG made inoperable by LOP DG start instrumentation.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	FREQUENCY	
SR 3.3.5.1	Perform COT.	92 days
SR 3.3.5.2	Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value as follows:	18 months
	 A. Loss of voltage Allowable Value ≥ 2912 V with a time delay of ≤ 0.8 second. 	
	Loss of voltage Nominal Trip Setpoint 2975 V with a time delay of ≤ 0.8 second.	
·	B. Degraded voltage Allowable Value ≥ 3683 V with a time delay of ≤ 20 seconds.	
	Degraded voltage Nominal Trip Setpoint 3746 V with a time delay of ≤ 20 seconds.	

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.5 4.16 kV ESF Bus Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

Each 4.16 kV ESF bus voltage is monitored by four channels of LOP instrumentation. The LOP instrumentation channels provide four separate signals from each bus to the associated sequencer. The LOP channel signals are generated by four potential transformers on each bus. Two transformers are connected between phases A and B and two transformers are connected between phases C and B. The signal from each transformer is converted in the sequencer cabinets to a 0 to 5-V dc signal, and the resulting analog signal is fed to 12 bistables also contained in the sequencer. Four bistables are set to trip on a loss of voltage signal (≥ 71.5% of bus voltage after a short time delay) and four bistables are set to trip on a degraded voltage signal (≥ 90% bus voltage for a longer period of time). Four additional bistables provide alarm functions and are not required operable by this Technical Specification. The LOP instrument channels lose their individual channel identity at the output of the bistables. The bistable output is combined in two-out-of-four logic circuitry for each trip function on each bus. The logic and actuation relays are integral to the sequencer circuitry and are required OPERABLE as part of the sequencer OPERABILITY requirements in LCOs 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 and the ESFAS actuation relay OPERABILITY requirements in LCO 3.3.2. The LOP channels are described in FSAR, Section 8.3 (Ref. 1).

The Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage instrument Functions provide signals to their respective sequencer to ensure an adequate ESF bus voltage is maintained and provide an anticipatory automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. A two-out-of-four logic combination for Loss of Voltage or Degraded Voltage on an ESF bus will initiate sequencer circuits to start the diesel generator, shed bus loads, and sequence loading of the diesel generator if required. The two-out-of-four logic on one ESF bus will also initiate sequencer circuits to start the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump associated with that bus. A two-out-of-four logic signal from both ESF buses will initiate sequencer circuitry to start the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values

The Trip Setpoints used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits presented in FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). These analytical limits have been incorporated into SR 3.3.5.2 as the Allowable Values. The selection of the Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the ESF Systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that of the ESFAS.

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 (continued)

required to be entered immediately. The actions of this LCO provide for adequate compensatory actions to support unit safety.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.5.1

SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a COT. This test is performed every 92 days. A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found within the specified Allowable Values. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and controls and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.3.5.2

SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Nominal Trip Setpoint considers factors that may affect channel performance such as rack drift, etc. Therefore, the Nominal Trip Setpoint (within the calibration tolerance) is the expected value for the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. However, the Allowable Value is the value that was used for the loss of voltage and degraded grid studies. Therefore, a channel with an actual Trip Setpoint value that is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value is considered OPERABLE; but the channel should be reset to the Nominal Trip Setpoint value (within the calibration tolerance) to allow for factors which may affect channel performance (such as rack drift) prior to the next surveillance.

The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

S.R. 3.3.5.3

The SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIMES with and without offsite power for the AFW System are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analyses. Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in the FSAR, Chapter 16 (Ref. 3). Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the Trip Setpoint value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment in both trains reaches the required functional state (e.g., pumps at rated discharge pressure, valves in full open or closed position).

For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the Response Time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to one with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal values provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.

ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

This SR is modified by a Note that clarifies that the turbine driven AFW pump is tested within 24 hours after reaching 900 psig in the SGs.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 111 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68

AND AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

1.0 INTRODUCTION

TATAL STATE OF THE STATE OF THE

By letter dated April 19, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated November 1, 1999, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., et al. (the licensee) proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (Vogtle), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.5.2 and associated Bases to allow the loss of voltage and degraded voltage trip setpoints to be treated as nominal values. Specifically, the proposed change would:

- Delete the inequalities applied to the loss of voltage and degraded voltage trip setpoints;
- Apply the term "Nominal" wherever trip setpoints are specified in SR 3.3.5.2; and
- Revise the Bases associated with Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.3.5 and SR 3.3.5.2 as necessary to support the proposed change to SR 3.3.5.2.

The supplemental letter dated November 1, 1999, provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the April 19, 1999, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Four channels of instrumentation monitor the voltage of each 4.16 kV Class 1E bus. Four bistables are set to trip on a loss of voltage and four additional bistables are set to trip on a degraded voltage signal. On a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition, the emergency diesel generators start and sequence the loads on the 4.16 kV Class 1E buses. This ensures that the engineered safeguard feature (ESF) systems required to function in an accident or a transient involving a loss of offsite power will be available.

3.0 EVALUATION

SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a Channel Calibration that is performed every 18 months. Channel Calibration is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The setpoint and response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test includes

a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay. Currently, the licensee calibrates the trip setpoints so that the as-left value is in compliance with the inequality (≥) specified in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.5.2. This infers that the calibration is onesided. Since the methodology that was used to determine the trip setpoints provided for a twosided calibration (i.e., ±), the proposed change would allow the use of the tolerance band. The licensee has also proposed to adopt the term "Nominal Trip Setpoint" instead of "Trip Setpoint" and to allow a tolerance band (lower and upper values) around the Nominal Trip Setpoint value. This approach is consistent with the licensee's setpoint methodology. The tolerance band is not specified in SR 3.3.5.2, but it is specified in the Bases of the Technical Specifications. The removal of the inequality from the trip setpoint value will allow the licensee to set the trip setpoint value consistent with the two-sided calibration tolerance defined in the setpoint methodology. The Nominal Trip Setpoint considers factors that may affect channel performance such as rack drift, etc. Therefore, the Nominal Trip Setpoint (within the calibration tolerance) is the expected value for the Channel Calibration. The Allowable Value is the value that was used for the loss of voltage and degraded grid analytical limits. These analytical limits have been incorporated into SR 3.3.5.2 as the Allowable Values. The Bases are revised to state that a channel with a trip setpoint outside its calibration tolerance, but conservative with respect to the Allowable value, is considered operable, but the channel should be reset to the nominal trip setpoint within the calibration tolerance. The staff finds that the proposed change of rewording "Trip Setpoint ≥" specified in SR 3.3.5.2 to "Nominal Trip Setpoint" still provides adequate protection to the Class 1E equipment, and the proposed change is acceptable provided the channel with a trip setpoint outside its calibration tolerance (as stated in the Bases) is reset to the nominal trip setpoint within the time specified by the Technical Specification for Surveillance testing.

The licensee's April 19, 1999, submittal included a Note to SR 3.3.5.2 that stated in part that a Trip Setpoint may be set more conservatively than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions. During the review of the proposed change, the NRC staff requested the licensee to revise its submittal by deleting the Note to SR 3.3.5.2. Specifically, the licensee's April 19, 1999, submittal included the following Note to SR 3.3.5.2:

"A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is readjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservatively than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions."

The Note is not necessary to establish operability of a channel following a Channel Calibration, and the staff objected to the provision of this note that a trip setpoint may be set more conservatively than the nominal value. Accordingly, the licensee deleted the Note to SR 3.3.5.2 and re-submitted the proposed TS change by letter dated November 1, 1999. The staff finds the deletion of the proposed Note from the original submittal to be acceptable.

Based on the above, the staff finds that the proposed change to treat loss of voltage and degraded voltage trip setpoints as "nominal" values in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.5.2 still provides adequate protection to the Class 1E equipment, is consistent with the licensee's setpoint methodology and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105, Rev. 1, and is, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 67340 dated December 1, 1999). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: N. Trehan

Date: January 19, 2000