

October 22, 1999

**Note To:** Public Document Room  
Mail Stop: LL-6, U.S. NRC

**From:** Shah N. Malik *S. N Malik*  
Materials Engineering Branch (MEB)  
Division of Engineering Technology (DET), Office of Research (RES)  
Mail Stop: T10-E10, U.S. NRC

**Subject:** Technical Bases Development Activities for Potential Revision to 10 CFR  
50.61 Screening Criterion for Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Events in  
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Pressure Vessels.

**RES Subject File Code: 1B1**

Attached here is a set of information presented to the PWR power plant licensees and general public on the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) activities pertaining to the subject topic during a September 29-30 NRC/Industry meeting on PTS at the NRC/HQ.

Please place this package of technical information at the PDR. If you have any questions, pl. let me know (Phone: 301/415-6007). Thank you very much.

**Attachment:** As Discussed

**Copy:** Edwin M. Hackett, Assistant Branch Chief  
MEB/DET/RES

*DF03*

**Sept. 29-30 PFM/PRA (PTS) Meeting Objectives and Agenda****Objectives:**

- 1) PTS Screening Criteria Re-evaluation Project Milestones and Schedule Chart
- 2) Presentations & discussion on FAVOR Methodology and Uncertainty Analysis Steps in FAVOR code
- 3) Presentations on Near-Term Action Plans (Progress Made and Schedule).
- 4) Attempts to resolve any schedule conflicts for the Action Plans relative to the schedule for overall PTS Tech Bases Plan.
- 5) Setting tentative dates for the next meeting of the PFM Sub-group.

**Meeting Location: One White Flint North, Room 04-B6, NRC/HQ.**

**For Entry to Meeting Room, Contact: Shah Malik (415-6007) or Tanny Santos (415-6004), Doug Kalinousky (415-6788)**

**September 29, 1999:**


1:15	Welcome and Introduction	Mayfield/Hardies
1:25	Review/Acceptance of Agenda and Meeting Objectives	Malik/Hardies
1:35	PTS Screening Criteria Re-evaluation Project Milestones and Schedule Chart	Malik/Woods/Bessette
2:15	Review FAVOR PFM Methodology	Terry Dickson
3:15	BREAK	
3:30	PRA Input Table	Ron Gamble
4:30	PFM Sensitivity Analysis	Bruce Bishop
5:00	ADJOURN	

**September 30, 1999:**

8:30	Status on Action Plan 1A (Statistical Distribution on Weld, Plate Material Chemistry)	Kalinousky/Santos
8:50	Status on Action Plan 1B (Statistical Distribution on K1c, K1a)	Terry Dickson

9:10	Vessel Materials Characterization	Ron Gamble
9:30	Expert Elicitation on Flaw Distribution (Action Plan 4)	Debbie Jackson
10:00	BREAK	
10:15	Dependence Between "Initial RTndt" and "Delta RtnDt"	Dan Naimon
10:25	General Discussion on PFM Methodology	All
11:30	Summarise Work to be Continued and Any New Issues	Malik/Hardies
12:00	Next Meeting Date	Malik/Hardies
12:10	ADJOURN	

10 CFR 50.61 PTS Screening Criterion Re-evaluation Project



10 CFR 50.61 PTS Screening Criterion Re-evaluation Project

DATE: SEPT. 17, 1999

ID	Task Name	Start	Finish	2Q99	3Q99	4Q99	1Q00	2Q00	3Q00	4Q00	1Q01	2Q01	3Q01	4Q01
30	Identify Expert Panel, Issues, Elicitation Team	7/1/99	9/30/99			PFM,PRA								
31	Expert Panel Meeting, Scope Revision	10/1/99	11/30/99			PFM,PRA								
32	Elicitation from Experts by Elicitation Team	12/1/99	1/31/00				PFM,PRA							
33	Review Elicitation Results and Experts' Meeting	2/1/00	3/31/00					PFM/PRA						
34	Generic Flaw Distribution Report & Workshop	4/3/00	6/30/00						PFM,PRA					
35	Perform Tech Bases PFM Analyses Plant-1	3/1/00	5/15/00							PFM				
36	Perform Tech Bases PFM Analyses Plant-2	5/16/00	7/31/00								PFM			
37	Perform Tech Bases PFM Analyses Plant-3	8/1/00	10/13/00									PFM		
38	Perform Tech Bases PFM Analyses Plant-4	10/16/00	12/29/00										PFM	
39	Determine Uncertainties in Each of the 4 Plants	1/4/01	3/30/01											PFM,PRA,TH
40	Develop Uncertainties For Entire Population of Plants	4/2/01	5/30/01											PFM,PRA,TH
41	Public Meeting on Tech Bases Results From 4 Plants	6/1/01	6/1/01											PFM,PRA,TH
42	Develop Proposed Changes to PTS Screening Criterion	6/1/01	9/28/01											PFM,PRA,T
43	Develop Proposed Changes to 50.61 PTS Rule	6/1/01	9/28/01											NRR,RES
44	Public Meetings to Resolve Outstanding Issues	10/15/01	10/15/01											PFM,PR
45	Finalize Tech Bases to Revise 10 CFR 50.61	10/1/01	12/17/01											
46	ACRS Presentation on the Overall Project (7/99)	7/14/99	7/14/99		◆									
47	ACRS Presentaion on Methodology, Input (2/00)	2/2/00	2/2/00				◆							
48	ACRS Presentaion on Interim Results (10/00)	10/3/00	10/3/00							◆				
49	ACRS Presentaton on Screening Criterion (6/01)	6/6/01	6/6/01										◆	
50	ACRS Presentation on Final Tech Bases (11/01)	11/6/01	11/6/01											◆

Sept. 29, 1999

Status on Collecting Plant Data on RES's Fluence Map Calcs

- Cycle By Cycle Plant Data Requested for the **H. B. Robinson-2 (HBR)**, **Palisades**, **Oconee-1**, and **Calvert Cliffs-1** plants.
- Plant data informally Requested in May 1999, and formally in early August 1999.
- We have received most of the required data for **HBR**
- Received about Half of the data for **Palisades**. The remaining Palisades data was sent but was not readable and is being resent
- Received approximately 10% of the data for **Oconee-1**, and are presently trying to find out about a final delivery date on Oconee-1 from Framatome Cogema Fuels
- No data received from **Calvert Cliffs-1**, but have been promised this data will be provided by the end of September (Which is here Now !!)

Progress on Fluence Calcs:

- Fluence Calcs. for **HBR** are well underway and will be completed in the next two weeks (October 15).
- Calcs. on **Palisades** are underway, but have been delayed because of the delay in the receipt of the plant data. In addition, we had assumed that we would only have to calculate Cycles 12-15, since we had previously calculated Cycles 1-11. However, during discussions with Consumers Power, we were informed that the Palisades core physics model is being revised and the power distribution data for the previously calculated Cycles 1-11 has changed significantly. Consequently, we will have to recalculate Cycles 1-11.
- Calcs. on **Oconee-1** and **Calvert Cliffs-1** will be initiated when we receive the plant data.

# **Review of FAVOR Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics (PFM) Analysis Methodology<sup>1</sup>**

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Terry L. Dickson  
Heavy-Section Steel Technology Program  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

at  
Joint NRC-Industry Meeting  
NRC Headquarters  
Rockville, Maryland

September 29, 1999

PFM analyses are performed on the entire beltline Region (per RG 1.154).

The beltline embrittlement-related data is taken from the NRC-developed RVID Database.





Table 2 – Embrittlement map corresponding to EOL (32 EFY) per RVID database

Major region number	Subregion number	ID	Chemistry		RT <sub>INIT</sub> (°F)	RT <sub>715</sub> <sup>*</sup> (°F)		Margins (°F)	Volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )
			Cu (wt %)	Ni (wt %)		RG 1.99	Improved		
1	1	Lower Shell	0.11	0.53	-20	115.4	118.6	34.0	73.4
1	2	Lower Shell	0.11	0.56	-10	125.9	124.9	34.0	73.4
1	3	Lower Shell	0.13	0.54	10	167.4	157.2	34.0	73.4
2	4	Inter. Shell	0.11	0.55	20	155.7	154.4	34.0	85.8
2	5	Inter. Shell	0.12	0.64	-30	119.7	116.9	34.0	85.8
2	6	Inter. Shell	0.12	0.64	10	142.9**	139.9	17.0	85.8
3	7	Inter ax. Weld	0.21	0.88	-50	256.8**	241.7	56	0.88
3	8	Inter ax. Weld	0.21	0.88	-50	256.8**	241.7	56	0.88
3	9	Inter ax. Weld	0.21	0.88	-50	256.8**	241.7	56	0.88
4	10	Lower ax. Weld	0.21	0.69	-56	257.0	212.3	65.5	0.74
4	11	Lower ax. Weld	0.21	0.69	-56	257.0	212.3	65.5	0.74
4	12	Lower ax. Weld	0.21	0.69	-56	257.0	212.3	65.5	0.74
5	13	Lower circ. weld	0.23	0.23	-80	47.8**	93.9	28.0	4.90


Note: The neutron fluence at the RPV inner surface is  $4.56 \times 10^{22}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> for all subregions at EOL.

\*RT<sub>715</sub> = RT<sub>INIT</sub> + ΔRT<sub>715</sub> + Margin

\*\*Chemistry factor override



# Method 2 PTS PFM Analysis Incorporates Uncertainty Associated with Thermal Hydraulics by Including Variants for Each of the Dominant Transients



**For Transient 1-n, Variants 1-j: RPV load response**

$T(r,t)$  — for welded Regions with Residual stresses  
 $\sigma_H(r,t)$  — for plate Regions without Residual Stress  
 $\sigma_A(r,t)$

$K_f$  for range of axial and circumferential surface-breaking flaw depths


2:1 - at inner surface of RPV } for welded w/residual  
 6:1 - at deepest point of flaw } for plate w/o residual  
 10:1 - at deepest point of flaw }  
 ∞ - at deepest point of flaw }

Note: Each of the  $n_j$  transients consists of:


3 time histories  
 $(h,t)$ ,  $T(t)$ ,  $P(t)$

Distribution of event initiating frequency

# Method 2 PTS PFM Analysis Generates 2-D Array, which Includes Uncertainty Associated with Thermal Hydraulics, Embrittlement, and Flaw-Related Data



# Method 2 PTS PFM Analysis Integrates Uncertainties of Transient Initiating Frequencies with Results of PFM Analysis to Generate Distribution for Frequency Vessel Failure



For Each Vessel (1 → m):

1. Sample Initiating Frequencies:  
 $\varnothing(E)_1, \varnothing(E)_2, \dots, \varnothing(E)_{n,j}$
2. Combine  $\varnothing(E)_T$  with PFM Results  
$$\varnothing(F)_1 = \sum_{T=1}^n \varnothing(E)_T \cdot P_{FM}(T,V)$$
3. Resulting Array of  $\varnothing(F)_m$   
Generates a Histogram for  $\varnothing(F)$

# FAVOR Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics (PFM) Analyses are Based on Monte Carlo Techniques


Many deterministic fracture analyses are performed on probabilistically generated RPVs to determine if each vessel will fracture when subjected to specified transient at a particular time in the operating life of the vessel

probability of crack initiation = fractured vessels / total vessels  
probability of failure = failed vessels / total vessels




Each of the embrittlement-related parameters

- neutron fluence
- copper
- nickle
- initial unirradiated RTNDT (RTNDT<sub>0</sub>)
- radiation-induced shift in RTNDT ( $\Delta$ RTNDT)
- fracture initiation toughness ( $K_{Ic}$ )
- fracture arrest toughness ( $K_{Ia}$ )

are sampled from a normal (Gaussian) distribution about the user-specified mean value and variability, i.e. standard deviation ( $1\sigma$ )



The radiation-induced shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  for each flaw is a function of stochastically simulated (sampled) values of copper, nickel, and neutron fluence per Regulatory Guide 1.99, revision 2



Three arrows point from the three plots above to the following equation:

$$\Delta RT_{NDT} = f[\text{Cu, Ni, FI}]$$

## The Calculation of $RT_{NDT}$ includes simulation of margin term

$$RT_{NDT}(x) = RT_{NDT0} + \Delta RT_{NDT}(\text{cu, ni, fluence}(x)) + ERRTN * \sqrt{(\sigma_{RTNDT0})^2 + (\sigma_{\Delta RTNDT})^2}$$

where:


$RT_{NDT0}$  = initial unirradiated value of  $RT_{NDT}$

$\Delta RT_{NDT}$  = neutron radiation-induced shift in  $RT_{NDT}$


$\sigma RT_{NDT0}$  = 1 sigma uncertainty in initial (unirradiated)  $RT_{NDT}$

$\sigma \Delta RT_{NDT}$  = 1 sigma uncertainty in correlation used to predict  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$

$ERRTN$  = number between -3 and +3 obtained from normal distribution having a mean value of 0 and 1 sigma = 1



FAVOR Samples  $K_{IC}$  Data from a Gaussian Distribution Defined Where the ASME  $K_{IC}$  Curve is the Mean- $2\sigma$   $K_{IC}$  Curve Where  $1\sigma = 0.15 (K_{IC})_{mean}$ . The Sampling is truncated at + and  $-3\sigma$ .



$$ASME K_{IC} = (K_{IC})_{mean} - (2) (0.15) (K_{IC})_{mean} = (K_{IC})_{mean} (0.70)$$

$$(K_{IC})_{mean} = 1.43 ASME (K_{IC})$$

$$+1\sigma K_{IC} = 1.65 ASME K_{IC}$$

$$+2\sigma K_{IC} = 1.86 ASME K_{IC}$$

$$+3\sigma K_{IC} = 2.07 ASME K_{IC}$$

$$-1\sigma K_{IC} = 1.22 ASME K_{IC}$$

$$-2\sigma K_{IC} = 1.00 ASME K_{IC}$$

$$-3\sigma K_{IC} = 0.79 ASME K_{IC}$$

**Any additional uncertainties (or sensitivities) will be considered outside of the FAVOR code**

**PRA analysts may make requests for additional PFM analyses that include other uncertainties (or sensitivities) in the following variables:**

- (1) clad thickness
- (2) clad stress-free temperature
- (3) through-wall weld residual stress
- (4) epistemic (state-of-knowledge) uncertainty associated with T-H boundary conditions

In each case, the PFM analysts would execute FAVOR with some combination of new variables chosen from the above 4 variables. In each case, the PFM analysts will provide the PRA analysts with a distribution (in histogram format) for the frequency of vessel failure.

If any of these additional uncertainties (to be considered outside of the FAVOR code) are included in the analysis, the PRA analysts will be responsible for performing the Latin Hypercube Sampling of the FAVOR generated results to assemble the final distribution of the frequency of vessel failure.

# Statistically-Based Representation of $K_{Ic}$ Fracture Toughness Curves for Use in PFM Analyses (INTERIM)

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Terry L. Dickson  
Heavy-Section Steel Technology Program  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

at  
Joint NRC-Industry Meeting  
NRC Headquarters  
Rockville, Maryland

September 29, 1999

# EPRI Database of ASTM E-399

## Valid Plane-Strain $K_{Ic}$ \* (INTERIM)


- 171 valid  $K_{Ic}$  data points

- 11 materials

- HSST 02:  $n = 69$
- HSST 01:  $n = 17$
- A 533 B Cl. 1:  $n = 13$
- A 508 Cl. 2 Euro. Forg.:  $n = 12$
- A 533 B Cl. 1 weld:  $n = 10$
- A 508 Cl. 2:  $n = 10$
- HSST 03:  $n = 9$
- A 508 Cl. 2:  $n = 9$
- HSST subarc weld:  $n = 8$
- A 533 B Cl. 1 subarc weld:  $n = 8$
- A 533 B Cl. 1 weld/HAZ:  $n = 6$

- Specimens

- C(T)-1T to C(T)-11T
- WOL-1T to WOL-2T





\* EPRI NP-710-SR (1978) as amended ORNL/NRC/LTR-93/15 (1993)

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# Specimen Sizes in EPRI Dataset


(INTERIM)



# Extended Database of ASTM E-399 Valid Plane-Strain $K_{Ic}$

( I N T E R I M )

- 71 additional data points
- 4 materials
  - HSSI Weld 72W<sup>(1)</sup>:  $n = 12$
  - HSSI Weld 73W<sup>(1)</sup>:  $n = 10$
  - HSST Plate 13A<sup>(2)</sup>:  $n = 43$
  - A508 Cl. 3<sup>(3)</sup>:  $n = 6$
- Specimens
  - C(T)-1/2T to C(T)-4T




(1) NUREG/CR-5913, 1992.

(2) NUREG/CR-5788

(3) Iwate, et al., ASTM STP 803, pp II-531-561, 1983

# Current Use of $K_{Ic}$ in FAVOR


(INTERIM)



- Extended Database: N = 242 points
- HSST 01 subarc weld (Shabbits)
  - A533B subarc weld (Shabbits)
  - ▲ HSST 01 (Mager)
  - ▼ HSST 03 (Mager)
  - A533B (Mager)
  - HSST 02 (Mager/Shabbits)
  - A533 B weld (Mager)
  - A533 B weld-HAZ (Mager)
  - A508 Cl. 2. Euro. Forg. (Mager)
  - ◆ HSSI Weld 72 W
  - HSSI Weld 73 W
  - HSST Plate 13
  - A508 Cl. 3
  - ASME Sect. XI
  - Kmean
  - -3σ
  - +2σ
  - +3σ
  - -1σ
  - +1σ

$$K_{Ic} = 33.2 + 20.734 \exp[0.02(T - RT_{NDT})]$$

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Article A-4000:  
Material Properties (1998) 413-417.



# Results of Regression Analysis for Extended $K_{Ic}$ Database

- Regression analysis used TableCurve2D
- Exhaustive search of 3491 linear and 176 nonlinear model forms yielded 242 curve fits.
- 3-parameter nonlinear exponential ranked number 4
- Current  $K_{mean}$  in FAVOR is conservative in transition region and nonconservative on lower shelf relative to  $K_{mean}$  from regression analysis.




Table 5.2 Top-Ranked Model Forms Calculated by TableCurve2D

Rank	F-Statistic	Model Form
1	212.08316474	$\ln y = a + bx$
2	202.73543020	$y^{(0.5)} = a + bx$
3	202.10095146	$y = (a + cx)/(1 + bx)$ [NL]
4	194.44231080	$y = a + b \exp(cx)$ [NL]
5	176.25900038	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx$
6	171.28645651	$y = a + bx$
7	170.24942226	$y^{(0.5)} = a + bx + cx^2$
8	164.27947091	$y = a + bx + cx^2$
9	159.13106263	$\ln y = a + bx + cx^2$
10	149.87823234	$\ln y = a + bx + c \exp(x)$
11	146.13142246	$y = a + bx + c \exp(x)$
12	143.76110728	$\ln y = a + bx + cx^3$
13	141.07999819	$y = a + bx + cx^3$
14	137.29791795	$y = a + bx + cx^2 + d \exp(x)$
15	137.22995434	Fourier Series Polynomial 1x2
16	134.99360842	$y = (a + cx)/(1 + bx + dx^2)$ [NL]
17	130.98649922	$y = a + bx + cx^3 + d \exp(x)$
18	124.92269692	Chebyshev =>Std Polynomial Order 3
19	124.92269692	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 3
20	124.92269692	$y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3$
21	123.06568751	$y^{(0.5)} = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3$
22	115.33293665	$y^2 = a + bx + cx^2$
23	109.76890768	$\ln y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3$
24	104.70649060	$y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + e \exp(x)$
25	101.55552931	$y^2 = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3$
26	99.886096880	$y = (a + cx + ex^2)/(1 + bx + dx^2)$ [NL]
27	98.539924648	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx + c \exp(x)$
28	98.407676705	$y = a + bx^2 + cx^3 + d \exp(x)$
29	95.436616294	High Precision Polynomial Order 4
30	95.436616294	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 4
31	95.436616294	Chebyshev =>Std Polynomial Order 4
32	95.436616294	$y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4$
33	95.256825667	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx + cx^2$
34	94.403752943	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx + cx^3$
35	93.064358636	$y^{(0.5)} = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4$
36	90.888406094	Fourier Series Polynomial 2x2
37	84.126204190	$y = a + bx^2 + c \exp(x)$
38	82.500766448	$\ln y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4$
39	81.574302114	$y^2 = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4$
40	78.019197528	High Precision Polynomial Order 5
41	78.019197528	Chebyshev =>Std Polynomial Order 5
42	78.019197528	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 5
44	76.248415354	$y = a + b \exp(x)$
45	76.220106695	$y^{(0.5)} = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4 + fx^5$
47	73.648681893	$\ln y = a + bx^2 + c \exp(x)$
49	67.900165448	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 6
50	67.900165448	High Precision Polynomial Order 6
51	67.900165448	Chebyshev =>Std Polynomial Order 6
52	67.749311766	$y = a + bx^2 + cx^3$
53	67.736722397	$\ln y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4 + fx^5$

Table 5.2 Top-Ranked Model Forms Calculated by  
TableCurve2D


Rank	F-Statistic	Model Form
54	66.589185788	Fourier Series Polynomial 3x2
55	63.418238130	$y = a + bx^3 + c \exp(x)$
56	63.126196234	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3$
57	60.358790633	$y^{(0.5)} = a + b \exp(x)$
58	60.255288266	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 7
59	60.255288266	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 7
60	60.255288266	High Precision Polynomial Order 7
61	60.222001357	$y = a + bx^2 + cx^4$
64	57.747180396	$y = a + bx^2$
65	57.285235500	$y^{(0.5)} = a + bx^2$
66	55.585467658	$\ln y = (a + cx)/(1 + bx)$
67	54.862287108	$y^{(0.5)} = (a + cx)/(1 + bx)$
68	52.511231768	Fourier Series Polynomial 4x2
69	52.399927006	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 8
70	52.399927006	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 8
71	52.399927006	High Precision Polynomial Order 8
72	50.377723858	$\ln y = a + bx^2 + cx^3$
74	47.134766769	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4$
75	46.357029818	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 9
76	46.357029818	High Precision Polynomial Order 9
77	46.357029818	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 9
78	44.972169153	$y^2 = a + b \exp(x)$
79	42.493046529	$\ln y = a + bx^3 + c \exp(x)$
81	41.595572118	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx^2 + c \exp(x)$
82	41.553003885	Fourier Series Polynomial 5x2
83	41.522828495	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 10
84	41.522828495	High Precision Polynomial Order 10
85	41.522828495	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 10
87	40.422344924	Chebyshev Rational Order 4/4
88	40.422344924	Chebyshev = >Std Rational Order 4/4
89	39.521249612	$y^{(-1)} = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3 + ex^4 + fx^5$
90	38.415760094	High Precision Polynomial Order 11
91	38.415760094	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 11
92	38.415760094	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 11
93	35.062442660	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 12
94	35.062442660	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 12
95	35.062442660	High Precision Polynomial Order 12
96	34.629893962	Fourier Series Polynomial 6x2
97	33.566708227	Chebyshev = >Std Polynomial Order 13
98	33.566708227	Chebyshev Polynomial Order 13
99	33.566708227	High Precision Polynomial Order 13

# Application of Weibull Modeling

(INTERIM)

- Regression model assumes data scatter normally distributed
- Weibull distribution provides skewed PDF
- A Weibull model applied to the extended  $K_{IC}$  database with  $RT_{NDT}$  indexing is under study to develop a more statistically rigorous characterization of  $K_{mean}$  and data scatter.
- Maximum likelihood and method of moments parameter estimators are currently being evaluated.
- Scheduled completion of study is the end of October

Weibull PDFs for Different Shape Parameters



08/23/99.KS pth

$$f(x) = \frac{dp_f}{dx} = \frac{m(x - x_{min})^{m-1}}{x_0^m} \exp\left[-\left(\frac{x - x_{min}}{x_0}\right)^m\right]$$

OMEGA - Bringing Science to Life

# PTS Action Plan 1A

Develop Statistical Distributions  
for Material Chemistry,  $RT_{\text{NDT}}$ ,  
and Fluence

Kalinousky/Santos

September 30, 1999

# Procedure

- Obtain “valid” Cu/Ni data for various weld heats
  - CE NPSD-1039 Rev 2
- Use BESTFIT<sup>®</sup> software for distribution fitting
- For each heat, test a null hypothesis ( $H_0$ )
  - $H_0$ : Sample is from a NORMAL distribution

# Goodness-of-Fit Test

- $\chi^2$  recommended for continuous distributions in which the parameters are NOT specified
  - mean
  - standard deviation
- Must group data into separate classes
  - equal ranges of chemistry values
  - recommend 5 data points per class
  - minimum of 4 classes required

# Goodness-of-Fit Test (cont)


- Choose level of significance ( $\alpha$ )
  - $\alpha$  = probability reject  $H_0$  when true
  - typical value = 0.05
- Calculate Test Statistic ( $\chi^2$ )
- Determine Critical Value
  - from  $\chi^2$  table
  - for a given  $\alpha$  and degrees of freedom

# Goodness-of-fit Test (cont)

- Compare Test Statistic to Critical Value
  - $\chi^2 \leq$  Critical Value Accept  $H_0$
  - Otherwise Reject  $H_0$


# 21935 (Mean Value)

Copper (mean=0.19, SD=0.0308)




# W5214 (Mean Values)

Copper (mean=0.22, SD=0.0653)




Nickel (mean=0.85, SD=0.43)




# 33A277 (Mean Values)

Copper (mean=0.26, SD=0.0486)




Nickel (mean=0.16, SD=0.0128)




# 27204 (Mean Values)

Copper (mean=0.20, SD=0.0197)




Nickel (mean=1.02, SD=0.0469)




# 86054B (Mean Values)

Copper (mean=0.21, SD=0.0230)



Nickel (mean=.0463, SD=0.00446)



# Hypothesis Test Results

## Mean Values

Ho: Sample Data is from a Normal Distribution

Heat Number	Cu			Ni				
	$\chi^2$	$\alpha=0.05$	$\alpha=0.02$	$\chi^2$	$\alpha=0.05$	$\alpha=0.02$	$\alpha=0.01$	$\alpha=0.001$
21935	4.60	R	A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
W5214	5.32	R	A	24.38	R	R	R	R
33A277	3.01	A	A	5.98	R	R	A	A
27204	3.89	R	A	3.66	A	A	A	A
86054B	4.92	R	A	6.56	R	R	A	A
34B009	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
12008/20291	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

A = Accept Ho

R = Reject Ho

N/A = Not Applicable, too little data

# Normal Distribution Parameters

## Mean Values

Heat		# of Data Points	Mean	Standard Deviation	Plant
21935	Cu	5	0.19	0.0308	Calvert Cliffs 1
	Ni	2	N/A	N/A	
W5214	Cu	10	0.22	0.0653	Palisades, Robinson 2
	Ni	16	0.85	0.43	
33A277	Cu	25	0.26	0.0486	Calvert Cliffs 1
	Ni	6	0.16	0.0128	
27204	Cu	6	0.20	0.0197	Palisades
	Ni	5	1.02	0.0469	
86054B	Cu	5	0.21	0.0230	Robinson 2
	Ni	6	0.0463	0.00446	
34B009	Cu	3	N/A	N/A	Robinson 2
	Ni	3	N/A	N/A	
12008/20291	Cu	3	N/A	N/A	Calvert Cliffs 1
	Ni	3	N/A	N/A	

# Accepted Distributions

at

$$\alpha = 0.05$$

Heat Number	Copper	Nickel
21935	Weibull Uniform	N/A
W5214	Uniform Beta	None
33A277	Weibull Normal Logistic	Beta LogLogistic Pareto
27204	Uniform Beta	Lognormal Weibull Beta Normal
86054B	Uniform	None
34B009	N/A	N/A
12008/20291	N/A	N/A

# Ongoing Work

- Perform Bayesian Analysis
  - Appendix C of White Paper (N. Siu)
- Plate Distributions
- $RT_{\text{NDT}}$
- Fluence

ACTION PLAN-4

GENERIC FLAW  
DISTRIBUTION

D. JACKSON

PTS/PFM MEETING  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1999

# TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

- Expert Elicitation Process
- Schedule
- List of Experts

# EXPERT ELICITATION

- Objectives
  - verify that a generalized flaw distribution can be properly developed
  - assist in developing a generalized flaw distribution

## PLAN FOR COMPLETION

- Determine the process for the elicitation
- Define the specific issues/scope
- Determine the complexity
- Identify an expert panel
- Strawman of scope and issues to the panel

## PLAN FOR COMPLETION con't

- Panel meets to agree on scope and issues
- Elicitation training for all
- Identify an elicitation team
  - subject matter expert
  - normative expert
  - recorder
- Experts perform analyses and formulate responses

## PLAN FOR COMPLETION con't

- Elicitation team meets individually with experts
- Technical Facilitator Integrator (TFI) processes individual elicitation results
- Panel meets to review elicitation results (panel members may modify their responses to the issues)

## PLAN FOR COMPLETION con't

- TFI aggregates panel responses to form community distributions
- Publish community distributions

## STRAWMAN OF ISSUES

Clarification of objective which is "Develop a generalized fabrication flaw distribution for input into fracture mechanics calculations to address the consequences of transients in a reactor vessel"

What is a generalized flaw distribution?

Is one distribution representative or will there be one distribution or one for welds, one for base metal and one for cladding? For weldment you must consider weld designs (single v, double v, etc), welding process (auto vs. manual), materials. Should one distribution be developed from vessel specific distributions.

Fabrication processes in the various shops, were certain processes more susceptible to flaws (early on there was "dirty metal" resulting from the use of scrap metal, etc).

Surface connected flaws - what must be done to create a surface breaking flaw

How much is the base metal affected during the cladding process, in terms of under clad cracking and is under clad cracking more prevalent in French vessels?

What are the factors, variables or determinants that will have an influence on the distribution of fabrication flaws? The list below is not all inclusive.

Base Metal (Plates, forged rings)

What NDE procedure was used (sensitivity, accept/reject criteria)?

What are the flaw specifics (type, location, size)

Were flaws surface or embedded:

How many flaws per plate were detected:

Was there a difference for plates in the beltline vs. nozzle shell, etc?

What was the largest flaw detected & repaired?

Was NDE performed on all surfaces of the plates?

Did one surface contain more flaws than another surface?

Welding procedure

Welding materials

Weld design

Repairs (base metal, cladding, weldment)

Cladding

What NDE procedure was used?

What are the flaw characteristics that required repair

What was the location of most flaws?

Describe the repair process

Pre- and Post Hatch

Surface connected Flaws

Is more data available for naval vessels than for NPP vessels?

What was the difference in steel used in NPP vessels and Naval vessels

What caused the cracking the head of the Quad Cities vessel in the 1990s.

Where has industry located surface breaking flaws (nuclear and non-nuclear)

Location of vessel repairs, is there a pattern as to where the repairs are located

Are NDE results of pre-Hatch vessels less reliable and are the vessels more susceptible to flaws than post-Hatch vessels? What effect did the change of NDE of vessel fabrication processes have as there were definitely more repairs. (Hatch History is discussed below)

Prior to 1971/1972 a major discontinuity was discovered in a Hatch vessel nozzle after delivery.

Pre-Hatch era was prior to 1971

Reaction to Hatch era 1971-1975

Stabilizing era after 1975

Prior to the Hatch incident, no UT beyond the basic ASME Sec III was performed. During the reaction era numerous repairs were made because of the dramatic increase in UT requirements so vessels delivered between 1974 and 1977 had an increase repair rate. For vessels delivered after 1977 the repair rate was lower due to improvements in the welding and cladding processes

How would you determine an estimate for a flaw distribution in the base metal using the data from the weldment flaw distribution?

#### AREAS OF EXPERTISE REQUIRED

ASME Code  
Forging (Nozzle &  
Ring)



Metallurgy  
NDE

Vessel Fabrication  
Statistics

Welding  
Failure Analysis

ID	Task Name	3rd Quarter			4th Quarter			1st Quarter			2nd Quarter			3rd Quarter			4th Quarter			1st Quarter			2nd Qua	
		Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
1	Determine Elicitation Process	■																						
2	Define Specific Issues/Scope t	▨																						
3	Determine Level of Complexity	▨																						
4	Identify an Expert Panel	▨																						
5	Send Strawman Scope and Iss			▨																				
6	Panel Meets to verify issues &				▨																			
7	Elicitation Training				▨																			
8	Identify Elicitation Team			▨																				
9	Experts perform analyses							▨																
10	Individual Meetings							▨																
11	TFI Processes Results									▨														
12	Panel Meets to Review Result										▨													
13	TFI Aggretages Panel Respon											▨												
14	Publish community Distribution																							

Project:  
Date: 9/30/99

Task		Summary		Rolled Up Progress	
Progress		Rolled Up Task			
Milestone		Rolled Up Milestone			

ADDRESSES FOR LIST OF EXPERTS FOR PANEL TO DEVELOP  
GENERALIZED FLAW DISTRIBUTIONS FOR PTS SCREENING CRITERION RE-EVALUATION

AREA OF E	NAME	ADDRESS	EMAIL	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
NDE	Frank Ammirato	EPRI NDE Center 1300 Harris Blvd., Charlotte, NC	fammirato@epri.com	704-547-6081	704-547-6168
NDE/ASME	Michael Anderson	INEEL Research Center-Mail Stop 2209 2351 N. Boulevard P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415	<a href="mailto:mta2@inel.gov">mta2@inel.gov</a>	208-526-8780	208-526-0690
NDE CB&I	Francis C. Berry	3754 Brookwood Road Birmingham, AL 35223		205-967-3020	
>2	Spencer Bush Consultant	630 Cedar Avenue Richland, WA 99352-3632	<a href="mailto:SH_BUSH@pnl.gov">SH_BUSH@pnl.gov</a>	509-943-0233	509-943-6755
>2	Vic Chapman	Rolls Royce Marine Power P.O. Box 2000 Derby DE 21 England	N/A	011-44-1332-661461 x5962	011-44-1332- 622948
Vessel Fabrication CE	Domenic Canonico VP, Technology	ABB Alston Power 911 W. Main Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-4708	<a href="mailto:domenic.canonico@u&lt;br/&gt;sfse101.mail.abb.com">domenic.canonico@u sfse101.mail.abb.com</a>	423-752-2513	423-752-2650
NDE Navy	Robert Denale Branch Chief,	Naval Surface Warfare Center Code 615 Non-Destructive Evaluation 9500 MacArthur Blvd West Bethesda, MD 20817-5700	<a href="mailto:rdenale@metals.dt.na&lt;br/&gt;vy.mil">rdenale@metals.dt.na vy.mil</a>	301-227-	301-227

ADDRESSES FOR LIST OF EXPERTS FOR PANEL TO DEVELOP  
GENERALIZED FLAW DISTRIBUTIONS FOR PTS SCREENING CRITERION RE-EVALUATION

Vessel Fabrication B&W	Harold Graber	Graber Consulting 2512 Amherst NW Massilon, OH 44646		330-833-8044	
Nozzle Forging	Mr. David Hershbell, Manager Technical Services	Lenape Forging Co. 1280 Lenape Road West Chester, PA 19382		610-793-1500 x 221	610-793-3240
Metallurgy ASME Code	John Holstrup	509 Brady Point Road Signal Mountain, TN 37337			
EE Training	Stephen Hora, Professor of Management Science	University of Hawaii, Hilo 200 W. Kawli Street Hilo, HI 96720-4091		808- 974-7766	808-974-7685
EE Training	Ralph L. Kenney	101 Lombard Street Suite 704W San Francisco, CA 94111	<a href="mailto:kenneyr@aol.com">kenneyr@aol.com</a>	415-433-8388	415-434-0968
Metallurgy Welding	Carl Lundin	University of Tennessee Materials Sci & Eng 307 Dougherty Engineering Knoxville, TN 37996	<a href="mailto:lundin@utk.edu">lundin@utk.edu</a>	423-974-5310	423-974-0880
Ring Forging US Steel	Harry Lunt	13 Brocken Drive Mendham, NJ 07945	<a href="mailto:helunt@aol.com">helunt@aol.com</a>	973-543-2229	
NDE CE/PVRUF	John P. Lareau	ABB 200 Windsor Day Hill Road Windsor, CT 06095	<a href="mailto:john.p.lareau@us.abb.com">john.p.lareau@us.abb.com</a>	860-285-3590	860-285-3665

ADDRESSES FOR LIST OF EXPERTS FOR PANEL TO DEVELOP  
GENERALIZED FLAW DISTRIBUTIONS FOR PTS SCREENING CRITERION RE-EVALUATION

Forgings	Edward Nisbett	National Forge Front Street, Irvne, PA		814-563-7522	814-563-4525
Welding CB&I	Charles J. Pieper , Jr. Product Manager	Chicago Bridge & Iron Company 1501 North Division Street Plainfield, IL 60544-8984	<a href="mailto:pieperc@asme.org">pieperc@asme.org</a>	815-439-6106	815-439-6127
Failure Analysis Metallurgy	Robert Pond, Jr. President, MStructures, Inc.	P.O. Box 42093 Baltimore, MD 21284-2093	<a href="mailto:RPond@JHU.edu">RPond@JHU.edu</a>	410-321-7886	same
Metallurgy	Dr. Harold S. Reemsnyder Sr. Research Consultant	Fatigue & Fracture Bethlehem Steel Corporation Homer Research Laboratories Bethlehem, PA 18016-7699	<a href="mailto:hsreemsnyder@bsco.com">hsreemsnyder@bsco.com</a>	215-694-6737	215-694-2326
Failure Analysis	Stan Rolfe, Ph.D, P.E. Professor of Civil Engineering	The University of Kansas 2006 Learned Hall Lawrence, Kansas 66045-2225	<a href="mailto:rolfe@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU">rolfe@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU</a>	913-864-3766	913-864-3199
Metallurgy	Stan Rosinski	EPRI NDE Center 1300 Harris Blvd., Charlotte, NC	<a href="mailto:strosins@epri.com">strosins@epri.com</a>	704-547-6123	704-547-6035
ASME Vessel Fab B&W	Kenneth Stuckey Technical Consultant	Framatome Technologies, Inc. P.O. Box 10935 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935	<a href="mailto:kstuckey@framatech.com">kstuckey@framatech.com</a>	804-832-2593	804-832-3177

**ADDRESSES FOR LIST OF EXPERTS FOR PANEL TO DEVELOP  
GENERALIZED FLAW DISTRIBUTIONS FOR PTS SCREENING CRITERION RE-EVALUATION**

>2 ACRS 70s	Helmut Theilsch	195 Frances Avenue, Cranston, RI 02910-2211		401-467-6454	401-467-2398
>2	R. David Thomas R. D. Thomas & Co.	RR. 01, Box 777 E. Fairfield, Vermont 05448-9710	<a href="mailto:rdavidjr@sover.net">rdavidjr@sover.net</a>	802-827-3769	same
Vessel Fab CE	Ted Ward - Retired	ABB Alston Power 911 W. Main Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-4708			423-752-2650
Metallurgy Welding	Robert W. Warke	Edison Welding Institute 1250 Arthur E. Adams Drive Columbus, OH 43221	<a href="mailto:bobwarke@softhome.net">bobwarke@softhome.net</a>	614-699-5238	614-688-5001
Welding	Dave Waskey	Framatome Technologies, Inc. P.O. Box 10935 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935	<a href="mailto:dwaskey@framatech.com">dwaskey@framatech.com</a>	804-832-3473	804-802-3177
Vessel Fabrication LUKENS	Alex Wilson	Bethlehem Lukens Modena Road Coatesville, PA 19320		610-383-2000	6103832436 main 610-383-2674

# Review of PTS Input Variables and Analysis Assumptions

PTS Meeting  
September 29, 1999

R. GAMBLE

**Fracture Mechanics Input Evaluation Sheet (Page 1 of 3)**

Variable	Best Estimate Mean Value	Best Est. Distribution & Std. Dev.	Issue/Uncertainty	Basis for Values																																
<b>Dimensions and Applicable Material Included in the PTS Screening Reevaluation:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vessel ID</li> <li>Nominal vessel thickness</li> <li>Nominal cladding thickness</li> <li>Vessel Materials</li> </ul>	NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) all beltline plates, forgings, and welds	N/A N/A N/A N/A		RVID Data Base “ “ “ “																																
<b>Physical and Mechanical Properties:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conductivity</li> <li>Specific heat</li> <li>Density</li> <li>Expansion Coefficient</li> <li>Elastic Modulus</li> <li>Stress free temperature</li> <li>Yield</li> </ul>	<table border="0"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th><u>Base Metal</u></th> <th><u>Cladding</u></th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td>24</td> <td>10</td> <td>(BTU/hr-ft-°F)</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>0.12</td> <td>0.12</td> <td>(BTU/lb-°F)</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>489</td> <td>489</td> <td>(lb/ft<sup>3</sup>)</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>7.77e-6</td> <td>9.45e-6</td> <td>(°F<sup>-1</sup>)</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>28e+6</td> <td>22.8e+6</td> <td>(psi)</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>N/A</td> <td>468</td> <td>(°F)</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>N/A</td> <td>1,000</td> <td>(ksi)</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		<u>Base Metal</u>	<u>Cladding</u>			24	10	(BTU/hr-ft-°F)		0.12	0.12	(BTU/lb-°F)		489	489	(lb/ft <sup>3</sup> )		7.77e-6	9.45e-6	(°F <sup>-1</sup> )		28e+6	22.8e+6	(psi)		N/A	468	(°F)		N/A	1,000	(ksi)	N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A		From ASME Code at temperature = 335°F, (avg. of 550 & 120°F)  Cladding modulus and SFT from ORNL work
	<u>Base Metal</u>	<u>Cladding</u>																																		
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	N/A	468	(°F)																																	
	N/A	1,000	(ksi)																																	
<b>Fluence:</b>	Used as a parameter and includes material specific fluence mapping	Normal, $\sigma = 0.2$ of the mean (Basis: Expert Opinion)		SECY (Typical) and IPTS fluence maps																																
<b>Toughness and Toughness Related Variables:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Copper Content</li> <li>Nickel Content</li> <li>Initial RT<sub>NDT</sub></li> <li><math>\Delta</math> RT<sub>NDT</sub></li> <li>Initiation Toughness</li> <li>Arrest Toughness</li> </ul>	<u>Base Metal and Weld</u>  NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) NT-TAP 2a,b (SECY & IPTS vessels) Improved correlation, E-900 & NT-TAP 5  NT-TAP 1 NT-TAP 1	<u>Base Metal and Weld</u>  TAP 1, SECY & IPTS vessels TAP 1, SECY & IPTS vessels TAP 1, SECY & IPTS vessels Improved correlation, E-900  NT-TAP 1 NT-TAP 1	Resample or use initial sampled values in material segment when there are multiple flaws in the segment? (all variables) NT-TAP 3 & 1	RVID Data Base “ “																																

**Fracture Mechanics Input Evaluation Sheet (Page 2 of 3)**

Variable	Best Estimate Mean Value	Best Est. Distribution & Std Dev.	Issue/Uncertainty	Basis for Values
<b>Transient Conditions:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pressure-time history</li> <li>• Temperature-time history</li> <li>• Heat trans. Coef.-time history</li> </ul>	Plant/event specific Plant/event specific Plant/event specific	Estimated in T/H analysis Estimated in T/H analysis Estimated in T/H analysis		SECY-82-465 and IPTS PRA and T/H work
<b>Flaw Related Variables:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Size &amp; location distribution</li> <li>• Flaw density</li> <li>• Aspect ratio, pre-initiation</li> <li>• Aspect ratio, post-initiation</li> </ul>	<u>Welds and Base Metal</u>  NT-TAP 4 NT-TAP 4 2, 6, and 10 (axial) irradiated length; (circ.) 360°	<u>Welds and Base Metal</u>  NT-TAP 4 NT-TAP 4 Uniform distribution N/A		Expert Panel Expert Panel Surface & near surface High irradiation region & vessel configuration
<b>Residual Stress</b>	<u>Welds</u>  Table 2	<u>Base Metal</u>  N/A	N/A	ORNL data from canceled vessel
<b>Evaluation Criterion:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initiation and Arrest</li> </ul>	Yes	N/A		
<b>Post-initiation Toughness and Toughness Related Variables:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cu content</li> <li>• Ni content</li> <li>• Initial RT<sub>NDT</sub></li> <li>• Fluence</li> <li>• ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub></li> <li>• Reinitiation Toughness</li> <li>• Arrest Toughness</li> </ul>	Resampled or fixed? (NT-TAP 2c & 1) Resampled or fixed? (NT-TAP 2c & 1) Resampled or fixed? (NT-TAP 2c & 1) Attenuation per RG 1.99, Rev. 2 Improved correlation, E-900 NT-TAP 1 NT-TAP 1	NT-TAP 1 NT-TAP 1 NT-TAP 1 Normal, $\sigma = 0.2$ of the mean Improved correlation, E-900 NT-TAP 1 NT-TAP 1		

**Fracture Mechanics Input Evaluation Sheet (Page 3 of 3)**

Variable	Best Estimate Mean Value	Std. Dev. Value	Issue/Uncertainty	Basis for Values
<b>Flaw Extension:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cladding,</li> <li>• Back gouged regions</li> <li>• Repaired regions</li> </ul>	LT-TAP 3	N/A	Flaw extension for material & stress conditions in cladding, back gouged, and repaired regions	
<b>Warm Prestress:</b>	LT-TAP 4	N/A	Applicability relative to transient conditions and operator actions	PRA

## **PFM Action Plans To Be Developed For PTS Screening Reevaluation**

### **Near Term Action Plans and Activities – Due June 30, 1999**

1. White paper on uncertainty, and determination of appropriate distributions and truncation for PFM variables. Responsible individuals: Nathan Siu, Matt Mitchell, and Shah Malik.
2. Determination of input for generic reevaluation of the SECY vessel, materials classification for application to IPTS vessels, and evaluation of material conditions used for determining crack arrest. Responsible individuals: Terry Dickson and Ron Gamble.
3. Sampling sequence and flaw selection for evaluation of POF for vessel regions containing multiple flaws. Responsible individuals: Terry Dickson, Bruce Bishop, and Ron Gamble.
4. Flaw Distributions. Responsible individual: Mike Mayfield
5. Evaluate using a distribution for  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  and eliminating use of distributions for Cu, Ni, and initial  $RT_{NDT}$ . Responsible individuals: Bob Hardies, Matt Mitchell, Nathan Siu, and Art Buslik.
6. Evaluate options for including as an IPTS plant a plant that has a plate as the  $RT_{PTS}$  limiting beltline material. Responsible individual: Bob Hardies.
7. Clarify question concerning transient selection of for IPTS plants; whether this is a joint NRC/industry effort or will be done by NRC. Responsible individual: Ron Gamble

### **Long Term Action Plans and Activities – Due Date to be Decided Later**

1. Independent industry QA/V&V of FAVOR software. Responsible individual: Stan Rosinski.
2. Sensitivity studies (including master curve and cladding plasticity) and assessment of effect of uncertainties in calculated values of POF and event frequencies on risk. Responsible individual: Bruce Bishop
3. Evaluation of flaws located in cladding, back gouged regions, and repair weld regions. Responsible individuals: NRC staff.
4. Evaluate the applicability of WPS for PTS. Responsible individuals: To be determined.
5. Evaluate the potential for including constraint and shallow flaw effects in the material toughness representation. Responsible individual: Shah Malik.
6. Present a tutorial on use of the revised FAVOR software. Responsible individuals: Terry Dickson and Shah Malik.
7. Evaluate the use of an alternative to  $RT_{PTS}$  for the PTS screening criteria. Responsible individuals: Industry personnel, to be determined.

# Categorization of PWR Vessels

PTS Meeting

September 30, 1999


R. GAMBLE

# Categorization of PWR Vessels Based on RT<sub>PTS</sub> @ EOL (From RVID, Rev. 2.0.5, 6/9/99)


<u>Category</u>	<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Material</u>
• XXL (11)	$RT_{PTS} \leq 100 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$	All Materials
• XL (15)	$100 < RT_{PTS} \leq 150 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$	Limiting Material
• L (10)	$150 < RT_{PTS} \leq 200 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$	Limiting Material
• M (19)	$200 < RT_{PTS} \leq 240 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$ , or $230 < RT_{PTS} \leq 270 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$	Limiting AW or BM Limiting CW
• H (16)	$RT_{PTS} > 240 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$ , <u>or</u> $RT_{PTS} > 270 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$	Limiting AW or BM Limiting CW

Vessel Material Characterization - RT<sub>PTS</sub> Category: High


Vessel Mt.: High




tc = 0.156"  
tw = 7.88"  
IR = 78.5"




tc = 0.156"  
tw = 8.85"  
IR = 86.7"



tc = 0.156"  
tw = 8.62"  
IR = 86.7"



tc = 0.25"  
tw = 8.5"  
IR = 86.0"



**Proposed Sensitivity Studies (1) for  
PTS Screening Criteria Risk Analysis**

**B. BISHOP**

<u>No.</u>	<u>Parameter Investigated</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1	Uncertainty on Initial Ref. NDT Temperature	(2)
2	Uncertainty in Copper Content	(2)
3	Uncertainty in Nickel Content	(2)
4	Shape of Flaw Size Distribution	(2) (3)
5	Cladding Thickness	(4)
6	Stress-Free Temperature	(4)
7	Cladding Yield Strength (Plasticity)	(4)
8	Step vs. Linear Cladding Stress to Calculate SIF	(4) (5)
9	Maximum Residual Stress	(4)
10	Residual Stress Variation with Depth in Wall	(4)
11	Master Curve Fracture Toughness	(5) (6)
	a) Unirradiated Only	
	b) Irradiated	
12	Monte-Carlo Simulation Method and Results	(5) (6)
	a) Order of Regions (Welds vs. Plates First)	
	b) 10,000 each t/8 flaw vs. 10,000 vessels	
13	Any Others:	
	a) Initiation Only vs. Arrest Failure Criteria?	
	b) Pressure and Temperature?	

## **Proposed Sensitivity Studies for PTS Screening Criteria Risk Basis**

### Notes

- (1) If possible, each study would be performed using last public version of FAVOR for one surface flaw in the most embrittled region for two PTS transients (with and without re-pressurization) to the bound effects on probability.
- (2) A range of uncertainty values would be used to determine the effect of uncertainty in the uncertainty on probability.
- (3) The effects of different flaw distributions and flaw density between plates, forgings, welds and repair regions will be addressed by NRC-PNNL led task team on RPV flaws.
- (4) A range of parameter values would be used to determine the effect of the uncertainty in the parameter on probability.
- (5) Source code for current version of FAVOR code would have to be modified for these sensitivity studies.
- (6) Results from these sensitivity studies can be used to judge the degree of conservatism in the selected method.

# Uncertainty Analysis and Pressurized Thermal Shock: An Opinion

N. Siu

White Paper Last Revised September 2, 1999

## Introduction

To support current efforts regarding pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria in a manner consistent with NRC's current views on risk-informed decision making, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysts need to: a) develop estimates of risk metrics such as core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), and b) characterize the uncertainties in these estimates. Typically, this characterization is in the form of a probability distribution (see Figure 1, where  $\lambda$  represents the frequency of interest and  $\pi(\lambda)$  is the probability density function for that frequency). But what does this distribution mean? What uncertainties does it represent? Aren't CDF and LERF already measures of uncertainty? And how do we develop the CDF and LERF distributions for PTS?




Figure 1 - Example Output of a PRA

This white paper answers these questions in two steps. First, it addresses the issues of uncertainty in a methodologically oriented discussion. This includes a definition of the two "types" of uncertainties currently distinguished in PRA, and a discussion of how they are treated. Second, based on this methodological discussion, it proposes an approach for addressing uncertainties in PTS; this approach integrates thermal hydraulic (T/H) and probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses in a PRA framework. The proposed approach is then shown to be nearly identical with the current ("Method 2") PTS approach. Differences between the two approaches and their implications for PTS analysis are discussed.

It is recognized that, despite the agreement between the proposed approach and the current PTS approach, a number of details may need to be revised following input from domain experts; the intent of this paper is to provide an initial approach to the problem that is consistent with current PRA views on the treatment of uncertainty.

This paper also includes a list of references for further reading and three appendices covering probability concepts, aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, and parameter estimation.

## Uncertainty Analysis Concepts

### On the Meaning of "Frequency"

Although the analyses of CDF and LERF require the treatment of very different physical phenomena, they are, from a mathematical viewpoint, both frequencies of undesired events. This section discusses the notion of frequency *as it is typically used in PRA models*. It is shown that, in PRA, the frequency is a parameter in a probability distribution that quantifies random variability ("aleatory uncertainty") in an observable variable.

Let's start with some basic assertions that provide the foundation for subsequent discussion.

1. There are physical variables which are, in principle, observable. Examples include the time to failure of a particular component, the time at which an operator takes a particular action at a given point in an accident sequence, the average copper content in a particular subregion of a particular reactor vessel at a particular point in time.
2. We need to predict the values of a set of these variables as part of the PRA analysis.
3. Because of limitations in resources, lack of knowledge, or both, we choose to treat some of these variables as being the results of random processes. In other words, if we employ a thought experiment involving a number of repeatable trials, we envision observing a distribution of values (e.g., an empirical histogram) for the variable of interest. The "prediction," therefore, will be in terms of a probability distribution.
4. We also choose to treat the remaining variables as being deterministic. If we employ a thought experiment involving a number of repeatable trials, we envision observing a single value for the variable of interest (or, at least, a range of variability that is sufficiently small for the practical application). The prediction, therefore, will be in terms of a point value, at least in principle.

Note that because choice is involved, there is no fundamental principle as to when a variable should be modeled as being random or deterministic; the analyst needs to decide if the notion of repeatable trials makes sense for the problem being addressed. In PRAs, such things as pump failures and operator actions are modeled as being random; we treat pumps and operators as coming from populations of pumps and operators, and don't attempt to model individual pumps or individual operators. (One can argue that, even in the case of individual pumps and operators, the notion of random variability still makes sense due to such processes as environmental variation and renewal.) In the case of a reactor vessel, the choice may be less clear. A proposed approach is discussed later in this paper.

Note also that, in current PRAs, core damage events and large early release events are modeled as being the possible results of a set of interacting random processes, namely, those involving the initiating event that causes a plant transient, the response of mitigating systems to the transient, and the associated actions of human operators. The occurrences of core damage and large early release events are also, therefore, random processes.

For random events occurring over time, PRAs typically use a Poisson distribution to model event occurrence. This means that the probability of observing  $N$  core damage events in a time period  $T$  is given by:

$$P\{N \text{ events in time } T|\lambda\} = \frac{(\lambda \cdot T)^N}{N!} \cdot e^{-\lambda \cdot T} \quad (1)$$

where  $\lambda$ , which is called a “frequency,” is simply a parameter characterizing the process. As  $\lambda$  increases, the likelihood of events also increases (see Figure 2). It can be shown that the average number of events occurring in time period  $T$  is equal to  $\lambda T$ .




Figure 2 - Poisson Probability Distributions for Two Values of  $\lambda$

It turns out that for a Poisson process, if  $T_1$  is the time to the first event, then the distribution of  $T_1$  is exponential, i.e.,

$$P\{T_1 < t|\lambda\} = 1 - e^{-\lambda \cdot t} \quad (2)$$

As  $\lambda$  increases, the probability of observing the first event by a specified time also increases (see Figure 3). It can be shown that the average time to the first event is equal to  $1/\lambda$ . It can also be shown that

$$P\{T_1 < t|\lambda\} \approx \lambda \cdot t \quad \text{when } \lambda \cdot t < 0.1 \quad (3)$$

As noted earlier, CDF and LERF are the frequencies of core damage events and large early release events, respectively. Thus, they are simply parameters of Poisson distributions. Knowing the values of CDF and LERF, we can make statements about the likelihood of observing a core damage event or a large early release event in, say, the next year. Of course,

we don't know the values of CDF and LERF with a high degree of certainty. This issue is discussed in the following section.

Before concluding this discussion, it should be noted that the Poisson model, like all models, has some underlying assumptions. In particular, the Poisson model assumes that the process doesn't age, i.e., that  $\lambda$  does not change over time. In the case of CDF and LERF, this can be an unrealistic assumption. For example, if a severe accident really does occur, we can expect there to be significant changes in the industry (e.g., all plants might be shut down). Less dramatically, aging considerations might become important over time. For most PRA purposes, the Poisson model is adequate.




Figure 3 - Effect of Frequency on Time-to-Occurrence

#### Types of Uncertainties: Aleatory and Epistemic

The preceding discussion addresses uncertainties due to "inherent randomness". In earlier literature, they are often called "random uncertainties" or "stochastic uncertainties." Currently, following the terminology espoused by the ACRS, they are called "aleatory uncertainties."<sup>1</sup> Their principal characteristic is that they are (or are modeled as being) irreducible; they are defined by the form of the probability distribution (e.g., the Poisson distribution) and the value of the distribution parameters (e.g.,  $\lambda$ ).

Note that in the examples given earlier, the variability in the uncertain variable (e.g.,  $N$  or  $T_1$ ) is observable, at least in principle. In other words, repeated observations of the variable will result in an empirical distribution of values. This provides a way to think about aleatory uncertainties; if repeated trials of an idealized thought experiment (where the conditions are kept constant from trial to trial) will, assuming no measurement error, lead to a distribution of outcomes for the variable, this distribution is a measure of the aleatory uncertainties in the variable.

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<sup>1</sup>According to Webster's, *aleatory* (adj.) comes from *alia* (a dice game); relevant definitions are: (1) depending on an uncertain event; (2) relating to good or bad luck.

Another type of uncertainty addressed in PRAs is “epistemic uncertainty,”<sup>2</sup> which has been called “state of knowledge uncertainty” in earlier papers because it is due to weaknesses in the current state of knowledge of the assessor. Uncertainties in a deterministic variable whose true value is unknown are epistemic. Repeated trials of a thought experiment involving the variable will, in principle, result in a single outcome, the true value of the variable.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike aleatory uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty is reducible with the collection of additional information. In PRAs, for example, it is typically assumed that the Poisson model is a good representation for the failure of equipment while running. Therefore, it is assumed that there is a particular failure rate for each component. Initially, we may not have much failure data for a component, and our (epistemic) uncertainties in the value of the failure rate will be large. After we collect a large enough sample of failure data, we can get a very good estimate of the failure rate, i.e., the epistemic uncertainties in the value of the failure rate will be small. The epistemic uncertainties are quantified using probability distributions (see Appendix A). Figure 4 shows how, in instance, the distributions are narrowed, i.e., the uncertainties are reduced, when additional information is collected. (N represents the number of observed failures and T represents the period of observation in hours.) The method for generating these distributions, given data, is discussed in the next section.




Figure 4 - Reduction in Epistemic Uncertainty with Increased Data

The answers to the first three questions posed at the beginning of this paper are therefore as follows. (1) The distribution in Figure 1 quantifies the analyst’s uncertainties in the value of the

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<sup>2</sup>According to Webster’s, *epistemic* (adj.) comes from *epistemikos* (of knowledge, capable of knowledge); relevant definitions are: (1) of, having the character of, or relating to intellectually certain knowledge; (2) purely intellectual or cognitive; (3) subjective.

<sup>3</sup>Note that measurement error arises from an aleatory process. However, if the measured variable is, in principle, deterministic, then the uncertainties in the variable are epistemic. The apparent contradiction can be resolved by clearly defining what uncertainties are being addressed in the PRA. This issue is further discussed in Appendix A.

parameter  $\lambda$  (which represents either CDF or LERF). Specifically, the integral of the curve (which is a probability density function) between any two limits, say  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$ , gives the probability that  $\lambda$  lies in the range  $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)$ . (2) These uncertainties are epistemic; they arise from the analyst's imperfect state of knowledge regarding the true value of  $\lambda$ . (3) CDF and LERF (which are typically computed in PRAs using conventional event tree/fault tree analysis) are frequencies (as defined earlier in this paper); they are parameters that quantify aleatory uncertainties in observable variables, e.g., the time to a core damage event. There are, of course, generally epistemic uncertainties in their values.

Figure 5 shows how these two types of uncertainty can be represented in the case of such variables as event occurrence times. (An analogous representation can be developed for variables representing the number of events in a given time period.) The heavy curves (solid and dashed) are the cumulative probability distributions quantifying the aleatory uncertainties in the event occurrence time. The light curve crossing these heavy curves is the probability density function quantifying the epistemic uncertainties in  $\lambda$ ; it represents the same distribution as that illustrated in Figure 1. As shown by Equation (2), the aleatory distributions are conditioned on the value of  $\lambda$ ; the four curves shown correspond to the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile ( $\lambda_{05}$ ), median ( $\lambda_{50}$ ), mean ( $\langle \lambda \rangle$ ), and 95<sup>th</sup> percentile ( $\lambda_{95}$ ) values of  $\lambda$ . Note that PRAs typically display results in the form of Figure 1 and not Figure 5; the aleatory uncertainties in the observable variable are assumed to be understood.

It should also be noted that fundamentally, as discussed by a number of authors (e.g., see Apostolakis, 1999) and noted in Appendix A, there is only one kind of uncertainty. Why does PRA distinguish between "aleatory" and "epistemic" uncertainties? The answer is due to the fact that PRA is used to support decision making; the distinction can be important for both interpreting the PRA output, and deciding what to do with this output. This is discussed in Appendix B.




Figure 5 - Representation of Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainties in Event Occurrence Time

## Uncertainty Analysis in PRA

Current PRAs typically use two kinds of models to address aleatory uncertainties. The first, which is applied to events occurring over time (e.g., failures of already operating pumps), is the Poisson distribution already discussed. The second, which is applied to events occurring as the immediate consequence of a challenge (e.g., failures of standby pumps to start on demand), is the binomial distribution. This distribution quantifies the likelihood of outcomes resulting from a Bernoulli (or "coin flip") process. It is given by:

$$P\{R \text{ failures in } N \text{ demands} | \phi\} = \frac{N!}{R!(N-R)!} \phi^R (1-\phi)^{N-R} \quad (4)$$

where  $\phi$  is the probability of failure for a single demand. It can be seen that mathematically,  $\phi$  plays the same role as  $\lambda$ ; it is just a parameter characterizing a distribution. It can be shown that as the number of trials gets very large, the relative frequency of failures,  $R/N$ , approaches  $\phi$ . Thus,  $\phi$  can be interpreted as the fraction of times failures will occur in the long run.

Using the various  $\lambda$ 's and  $\phi$ 's corresponding to the different components included in the PRA model, the CDFs and LERFs associated with various event sequences, as well as the overall CDF and LERF, can be computed. Symbolically,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CDF} &= f_1(\underline{\lambda}, \underline{\phi}) \\ \text{LERF} &= f_2(\underline{\lambda}, \underline{\phi}) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

To quantify the epistemic uncertainties in CDF and LERF, the epistemic uncertainties in the  $\lambda$ 's and  $\phi$ 's are propagated through  $f_1$  and  $f_2$ . This is currently done on a routine basis using sampling schemes (e.g., direct Monte Carlo sampling).

The quantification of the uncertainties in the  $\lambda$ 's and  $\phi$ 's involves the collection and interpretation of a variety of forms of evidence (e.g., model predictions, expert opinion, empirical data), and the application of an appropriate estimation procedure that uses this evidence. Formally, the estimation procedure involves the application of Bayes' Theorem. The general form of this theorem is:

$$\pi_1(\underline{\theta}|E) = \frac{L(E|\underline{\theta}) \pi_0(\underline{\theta})}{\int_{\underline{\theta}} L(E|\underline{\theta}) \pi_0(\underline{\theta}) d\underline{\theta}} \quad (6)$$

where  $\underline{\theta}$  is the vector of parameters to be estimated;  $E$  is the evidence;  $L(E|\underline{\theta})$  is the likelihood function, i.e., the probability of observing the evidence if it is known;  $\pi_0(\underline{\theta})$  is the prior distribution for  $\underline{\theta}$ , i.e., the probability distribution for  $\underline{\theta}$  prior to observing the evidence; and the denominator on the right hand side of the equation is just a normalization constant.

While it may appear to be complicated, application of Equation (6) is straightforward in many practical cases. Consider the situation where we are estimating the failure rate (frequency) of a component,  $\lambda$ , and the evidence consists of an observation of  $R$  failures in a specified time interval  $T$ . The likelihood function is then the Poisson distribution as given by Equation (1); removing constants that appear in the numerator and denominator, Bayes' Theorem becomes:

$$\pi_1(\lambda|R, T) = \frac{\lambda^R e^{-\lambda \cdot T} \pi_0(\lambda)}{\int_0^{\infty} \lambda^R e^{-\lambda \cdot T} \pi_0(\lambda) d\lambda} \quad (7)$$

which has analytical solutions for some forms of the prior distribution, and which can be solved numerically using simple tools (e.g., spreadsheets or equation solving software) for arbitrary forms of the prior distribution. (The development of the prior distribution requires judgment, especially in the case where the data are sparse. Practical approaches are discussed in the paper by Siu and Kelly which is included in the list of references at the end of this paper. It is worth noting that for reasonable prior distributions, the precise shape of the distribution is unimportant when large amounts of data are available.)

It is important to observe that the likelihood function represents the aleatory model for the observable variable. In the above case, the observable variable ( $R$ ), is assumed to be the result of a Poisson process; the Poisson distribution (which has the single parameter  $\lambda$ ) is then appropriate for the likelihood function. To expand on this point, consider a slightly more complicated case where the observable variable, denoted by  $C$ , is assumed to be: a) random, and b) the result of a lognormal process, i.e., the aleatory uncertainties in  $C$  are quantified by a lognormal distribution. Assume an experiment is performed which results in  $N$  observations of  $C$ . Bayes' Theorem is then

$$\pi_1(\mu, \sigma | C_1, \dots, C_N) = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma C_i}} \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{\ln C_i - \mu}{\sigma}\right]^2\right\} \pi_0(\mu, \sigma)}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \prod_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma C_i}} \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{\ln C_i - \mu}{\sigma}\right]^2\right\} \pi_0(\mu, \sigma) d\sigma d\mu} \quad (8)$$

where  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  are the two parameters of the lognormal distribution and are related to the mean and variance of  $C$ . This equation can be solved using relatively simple software tools. An example is provided in Appendix C.

When the evidence is in more complicated forms (e.g., expert opinions), the use of Bayes' Theorem is not as straightforward. In such cases, current PRAs generally employ less formal procedures, e.g., subjective estimation of the probability distribution based on considerations of sample averages and ranges. Bayes' Theorem is an important tool for ensuring that the analyst updates his/her state of knowledge concerning the uncertain parameter in a manner consistent with the laws of probability, but it is just a tool.

### Summary Points - Uncertainty Concepts

- Uncertainties in a variable are treated in PRAs as being aleatory when the variable is assumed to be the result of a random process, i.e., repeated trials of a thought experiment will lead to a distribution of values for the variable.
- Uncertainties in a variable are treated in PRAs as being epistemic when the variable is assumed to be deterministic, i.e., repeated trials of a thought experiment will lead to a single value for the variable.
- The distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is not always clear; drawing the line between the two is generally a modeling decision.
- PRAs generally address aleatory uncertainties in the behavior of model elements through the  $\lambda$  and  $\phi$  parameters. The aleatory uncertainties in overall plant behavior are addressed using the CDF and LERF parameters; these are functions of the  $\lambda$ 's and  $\phi$ 's.
- The epistemic uncertainties in the  $\lambda$ 's and  $\phi$ 's are propagated through the PRA model to develop epistemic distributions for CDF and LERF.
- The formal approach for quantifying epistemic uncertainties in the  $\lambda$ 's and  $\phi$ 's (or any other model parameter) involves the use of Bayes' Theorem. This is a straightforward process for many practical situations, and can be accomplished using spreadsheets or simple equation solving software.

## Integrated PTS Analysis

To develop estimates of CDF and LERF associated with PTS, we know that thermal hydraulic (T/H) uncertainties and probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) uncertainties must be addressed in an integrated PRA framework. But how should this be done? Which uncertainties are aleatory? Which are epistemic? How should the results be presented? What does this mean in terms of the computational process used to generate the results?

This section proposes a particular approach for dealing with these questions. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, the intent is to provide an initial view and thereby stimulate constructive discussion. A final position cannot be developed without input from the PFM and T/H domain experts.

### The Problem

Figure 6 shows a highly simplified view of the PTS problem with respect to the issue of CDF. (The discussion for LERF follows along very similar lines.) Using conventional PRA tools (e.g., event trees and fault trees), the scenarios resulting in PTS-related challenges to a particular reactor vessel (RV) at a particular plant can be identified and their frequencies (denoted in the figure by  $\lambda_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ) estimated. These frequencies characterize the aleatory uncertainties associated with the occurrence of the PTS challenge scenarios. Conventional PRA tools (e.g., Monte Carlo or Latin Hypercube sampling) can also be used to generate distributions quantifying the epistemic uncertainties in these frequencies.

Consider the  $i$ th PTS challenge scenario defined by the PRA. Using PFM models and judgment,<sup>4</sup> we can estimate  $\phi_i$ , the conditional probability of vessel failure and core damage due to PTS, given the  $i$ th scenario. ***The parameter  $\phi_i$  is a measure of the aleatory uncertainty in the response of the vessel to the PTS challenge scenario.*** It is perhaps best interpreted as the fraction of times PTS-induced core damage will be observed, given a large number of challenges of the type defined by scenario  $i$ . Care needs to be taken in defining which PFM uncertainties contribute to  $\phi_i$ , and which contribute to the epistemic distribution for  $\phi_i$ .

Before discussing a proposed treatment of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in PFM which is based on the discussions provided earlier in this paper, we first need to address the question of why there should be a  $\phi_i$  term at all. In other words, is the behavior of the reactor vessel deterministic, given the  $i$ th PTS challenge scenario?

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<sup>4</sup>Judgment comes in when we are deciding what PFM endpoint is equivalent to core damage. Some possible endpoints are, in order of decreasing conservatism and increasing PFM uncertainty: RV crack initiation, RV through-wall crack, and catastrophic RV failure (i.e., failure of the RV beyond the capacity of available makeup). The general discussion in this paper is intended to cover all of these endpoints; the specific examples employed focus on crack initiation.

PTS Challenge Scenario 1	Prevention of PTS-Induced Core Damage	Frequency	Core Damage?
$\lambda_1$	$\phi_1$	$\lambda_1(1 - \phi_1)$	N
		$\lambda_1\phi_1$	Y
	⋮		
$\lambda_i$	$\phi_i$	$\lambda_i(1 - \phi_i)$	N
		$\lambda_i\phi_i$	Y
	⋮		
$\lambda_n$	$\phi_n$	$\lambda_n(1 - \phi_n)$	N
		$\lambda_n\phi_n$	Y

Figure 6 - Simplified PRA Representation of PTS Problem

I believe that variability in the response of the reactor vessel should be expected. This variability certainly arises because of the manner in which the PRA defines the PTS challenge scenarios. It may also arise due to modeling simplifications in the PFM analysis, even for such relatively well defined problems as crack initiation.

Consider first the issue of scenario definition. The PTS challenge scenarios identified by conventional PRAs are defined in terms of initiating events (e.g., steam line breaks) and successes or failures of mitigating equipment and actions (e.g., isolation of main feedwater on demand). Two important modeling approximations in this characterization are: a) all equipment and operator behaviors are treated as being binary (either successful or failed), and b) the timing of events is important only to the extent that it affects the definition of "success" or "failure." The T/H response of the plant to the initiating event is clearly affected by these issues.

For example, a PRA might treat two states of a pressurizer PORV block valve: the block valve closes (on demand), and the block valve fails to close. If the block valve only closes midway or takes too long to close, the PRA might (depending on the precise success criteria employed) treat these as being equivalent to a situation where the valve gate doesn't move at all. However, these different situations could lead to different temperature and pressure transients, and, therefore, different reactor vessel responses.

As another example, each initiating event treated in the PRA actually represents a set of potential accident initiators. For instance, the PRA groups steam line breaks of different sizes and locations. Again, these differences could lead to different temperature and pressure transients and different reactor vessel responses.

In general, it can be seen that each PRA-defined scenario actually represents a bundle of possible T/H scenarios. Even if reactor vessel behavior were a deterministic function of the T/H scenario, an experiment involving multiple occurrences of a particular PRA-defined PTS

challenge scenario would be expected to lead to multiple outcomes due to variations in the T/H scenarios included in the PRA scenario.

Next consider the behavior of the reactor vessel. It is for the PFM analysts to decide if there can be any *significant* variations in the response of a specified reactor vessel to a well-defined T/H scenario. However, if the current PFM approach<sup>5</sup> includes models for material behavior that do not explicitly account for all potentially important factors (see the scatter data for  $K_{ic}$ ), then vessel behavior could vary, even if all PFM model input parameters (including those defining the T/H scenario) are fixed.

Based upon the preceding arguments, it appears that the concept of aleatory uncertainties in the behavior of the reactor vessel when subjected to a PTS-challenge scenario (as defined by the PRA) is valid. The term  $\phi_i$  is therefore relevant and needs to be estimated.

### Analysis Interfaces

Before discussing a proposal concerning how  $\phi_i$  is to be estimated, a short discussion on the interfaces between the PRA, T/H, and PFM analyses is useful. This will provide a context for the discussion on estimation.


Figure 7 outlines a conceptual approach for defining the interfaces. In this approach, a PRA analysis (with some input from T/H analyses, e.g., regarding system success criteria) defines the PTS challenge scenarios in terms of initiating events (IEs) and associated equipment/operator successes and failures, and then estimates the frequencies ( $\lambda_i$ ) of these scenarios.<sup>6</sup> These PRA scenario definitions and frequencies are provided to a T/H analysis. For each PRA scenario, a set of representative T/H scenarios is defined (with some additional input from the PRA analysis, e.g., regarding the likelihood of various failure times). Each representative T/H scenario, which is chosen to represent a bundle of similar T/H scenarios, is assigned an appropriate fraction of the PRA scenario frequency, and is analyzed using an appropriate T/H model. (Note that the effect of aleatory uncertainties in key T/H parameters, if any, should be factored into the T/H scenario frequencies; the effect of epistemic uncertainties in key parameters should be addressed through the epistemic uncertainties in both the scenario frequencies and the T/H output for each T/H scenario.) The results of each T/H scenario analysis, together with an estimate of the scenario frequency, are then provided to a PFM analysis. The PFM analysis then generates an estimate of  $\phi_i$ .<sup>7</sup> The  $\phi_i$  are then combined with the  $\lambda_i$  in an integrated assessment of CDF (shown) and LERF.

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<sup>5</sup>All references to the "current PFM approach" refer to the proposed Method 2 presented at the joint NRC-industry meeting on PTS held on April 20, 1999 and discussed in subsequent NRC meetings.

<sup>6</sup>The estimation process is assumed to include the quantification of epistemic uncertainties.

<sup>7</sup>A decision needs to be made whether some reactor vessel endstate is going to be used to represent core damage, or if additional analysis between, say, through-wall crack propagation, and core damage is to be performed.



Note: the quantification of epistemic uncertainties in all parameters is not shown explicitly, but is assumed.

Figure 7 - Conceptual Interfaces Between PRA, T/H, and PFM Analyses for PTS

This approach appears to be nearly identical to that discussed at the April 30, 1999 and June 9, 1999 NRC meetings on PFM/PRA integration. Two minor differences are as follows. First, the proposed approach requires a slightly different aggregation of results (on a PRA scenario basis, rather than on an overall basis). Second, it requires that PRA scenario frequencies be explicitly allocated to the constituent T/H scenarios in a manner consistent with the PRA model.

Proposed Approach for Estimating  $\phi$

The PFM variables and parameters considered as being uncertain in the current approach to PTS are listed in Table 1. (This table is based on discussion at the June 9, 1999 NRC meeting on PFM/PRA.) My understanding is that the uncertainties in the variables and parameters listed as being "inside FAVOR," as well as the uncertainties in the T/H scenarios (each T/H scenario is effectively assigned a probability), are currently being addressed via Monte Carlo simulation in two ways (see Figure 8). First, most of the Table 1 variables and parameters (e.g., copper content, fluence, flaw size) are sampled to characterize a particular reactor vessel. Second, the possible T/H scenarios are sampled to estimate what fraction of these scenarios will lead to the failure of the given vessel. As shown in Figure 8, the first (reactor vessel-related) round of sampling effectively treats the sampled variables as being deterministic; the associated uncertainties are therefore epistemic. The second (T/H-related) round of sampling effectively treats the sampled variables as being random; the associated uncertainties are therefore aleatory. (Note that in Figure 8, the " $\phi$ " and " $P_{FM}$ " terms correspond to the " $\lambda$ " and " $\phi$ " terms, respectively, of this paper.)

Table 1 - Uncertain Variables and Parameters in PFM

<u>Inside FAVOR<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Outside FAVOR<sup>a</sup></u>
copper content	weld residual stresses
nickel content	cladding thickness
neutron fluence	stress-free temperature
flaw size	flaw size distributions <sup>b</sup>
flaw location	flaw density <sup>b</sup>
RT <sub>NDT</sub> margin	T/H pressure-temperature curve <sup>b</sup>
reactor vessel temperature	
reactor vessel stress	
$K_I$	
$K_{Ic}$ scatter	

<sup>a</sup>Based on current version of FAVOR

<sup>b</sup>Might be able to move inside FAVOR without modifying loading/stress intensity libraries




Figure 8 - Method 2 PTS PFM Analysis

This section of the paper re-examines the variables and parameters listed in Table 1 in light of the philosophical discussion provided in the first section of the paper. It then provides recommendations as to whether their uncertainties should be categorized as being aleatory, epistemic, or both.<sup>8</sup> It concludes with a discussion of the implications of any changes in categorization on FAVOR.

### *Modeling Observations and Assumptions Concerning the Reactor Vessel*

As mentioned early in this paper, the distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is, to some degree, a matter of modeling. The discussion therefore starts with some modeling observations and assumptions that will be used to provide a basis for the discussion on uncertainty-based categorization.

First, it should be recognized that, under the current PTS program, analyses will be performed for a set of specified plants and reactor vessels. Thus, although the results will be used in developing a generic screening criterion, the analyses themselves are not generic.

Second, looking at a specific reactor vessel, the vessel's material properties are essentially deterministic. In other words, the concept of "the true value" for such variables as the copper content at a specified point<sup>9</sup> is meaningful, whether or not there are problems with our current ability to reliably measure those variables. Other reactor vessel spatially dependent physical characteristics that can be viewed as being deterministic on a pointwise basis are the weld residual stresses, the vessel cladding thickness, and flaws in the vessel. Regarding the latter, it appears that the flaws in the reactor vessel are those created during manufacturing, i.e., non-catastrophic operational transients cannot initiate or propagate flaws with any significant likelihood. If this observation is incorrect, then random variations in the timing and magnitude of such transients would then lead to random variations in flaw density, size, and location.

Regarding external influences on the reactor vessel prior to the PTS challenge, it seems reasonable to assume that the spatially dependent neutron fluence can be treated as being deterministic. (There are random fluctuations in neutron flux, but time averaging will tend to smooth out these fluctuations.) Regarding external influences during the challenge, it seems that reactor coolant temperature and pressure can also be treated as being deterministic, i.e., that the impact of random fluctuations will be small (due to vessel thermal and mechanical inertia).

Third, many of the reactor vessel properties and external influences will vary with location ( $r, \theta, z$ ). This means, for example, that a sampling of the copper content over a specified vessel subregion will result in an empirical distribution of values for that property. (This distribution can be fairly broad and can be multimodal.) It should be emphasized that the existence of a sampling distribution reflects aleatory uncertainty in the sampling process. It does not necessarily mean that the pointwise values are themselves random.

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<sup>8</sup>Random variables whose distributions are uncertain have both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties.

<sup>9</sup>The "value of a continuously distributed variable at a point in the reactor vessel" is understood to mean the average value in a suitably small subvolume about that point.

## *Proposed Categorization of Uncertain Variables and Parameters*

The following proposals concerning the categorization of the variables and parameters listed in Table 1 are based upon the preceding observations and assumptions

- Copper Content: Epistemic

In the current PFM approach, which is done on a subregion basis, the copper content is sampled once per flaw. This is done because the concern is not with the average copper content in the entire subregion (whose characteristic dimensions can range from several centimeters to even a few meters), but rather with the copper content local to the flaw (and at the time of the PTS challenge). The sampling is done using a distribution derived from empirical data. As noted earlier, the procedure essentially treats the uncertainties in copper content as being epistemic in nature.

Both the flaw location and the local copper content are, in principle, deterministic. (They are essentially determined when the vessel is manufactured.) Thus, it seems reasonable (i.e., consistent with the principles described in the first part of this paper) to treat the uncertainty in the copper content as being epistemic. Sampling based distributions can be used to quantify epistemic uncertainties,<sup>10</sup> but they should not be used as aleatory distributions. Note that the current assumption that the uncertainty distribution for copper content is Gaussian may need to be revisited; the investigation can be done in a straightforward manner using standard statistical tools.

- Nickel Content: Epistemic

See the discussion for copper content.

- Neutron fluence: Epistemic

In the current PFM approach, the neutron fluence is sampled once per flaw (to support the calculation of the extent of embrittlement near the flaw). The sampling is done using a distribution derived from expert judgment concerning the accuracy of neutronics calculations. The procedure essentially treats the uncertainties in fluence as being epistemic in nature.

As argued earlier, although there are random fluctuations in the neutron flux (and therefore fluence), the time averaging used to calculate the fluence should tend to reduce the impact of these fluctuations. It therefore appears reasonable to treat the uncertainty in the fluence as being epistemic in nature. Expert judgment, which could involve a more detailed treatment which explicitly addresses the key sources of uncertainty, can be used to quantify the uncertainty.

- Flaw size: Epistemic

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<sup>10</sup>In cases where the assessor chooses to use the sampling distribution directly as a representation of his/her state of knowledge, they are numerically identical.

In the current PFM approach, uncertainties in the crack geometry are effectively treated being treated as being epistemic in nature. Since non-catastrophic operational transients apparently have little effect on flaw initiation or growth, it appears that the geometry of a given flaw should be deterministic. (It is essentially determined when the vessel is manufactured.) Therefore, it appears reasonable to treat the uncertainties in flaw size as being epistemic. As is the case with copper and nickel content, sampling based distributions can be used to quantify the epistemic uncertainties in flaw size, but they should not be used as aleatory distributions.

- Flaw location: Epistemic

See the preceding discussions on copper content and flaw size.

- RT<sub>NDT</sub> margin: Epistemic

In the current PFM approach, this term is used to account for uncertainties in both the initial, unirradiated value of RT<sub>NDT</sub>, i.e., RT<sub>NDT0</sub>, and uncertainties in the correlation used to predict the neutron radiation-induced shift in RT<sub>NDT</sub>, i.e., ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub>. As with most of the other variables and parameters discussed, the uncertainties are treated as being epistemic in nature.

This treatment appears to be reasonable. The parameter RT<sub>NDT0</sub> is derived experimentally under a specified protocol. For the purposes of the PTS analysis, it appears that it can be considered as a material property. This means that the uncertainties in RT<sub>NDT0</sub> can be treated as being epistemic. For similar reasons, the parameter ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub> can also be considered as a material property, and its uncertainties can be treated as being epistemic in nature.

Note that the comparison of correlation results for ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub> with experimental data will lead to a sampling distribution for error in the correlation (due to the effect of factors not included in the correlation). This sampling distribution can be used to develop the epistemic distribution for ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub>, but it should not be taken to mean that ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub> at a given point (the location of the flaw) is itself aleatory.

Also note that the correlation for ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub> requires values of copper content, nickel content, and fluence, all of which are uncertain. Estimation of the uncertainties in ΔRT<sub>NDT</sub> due solely to modeling needs to be done recognizing these uncertainties. Bayesian methods have been developed to address this problem.

- Reactor vessel temperature: Deterministic

In the current PFM approach, the spatial distribution of temperature inside the reactor vessel is computed deterministically based on the temperature-time curves provided by the T/H analysis. (Presumably, the heat transfer coefficients and material thermal properties, e.g., thermal diffusivities, are assumed to be constant.) Uncertainties in the T/H input will lead to uncertainties in the vessel temperature, but there are no other sources of uncertainty considered.

Unless the effect of uncertainties in the heat transfer coefficients and the material thermal properties are believed to be important, there is no need to perform any additional sampling.

- Reactor vessel stress: Deterministic

In the current PFM approach, the spatial distribution of stress inside the reactor vessel is also computed deterministically (based on a number of factors, including the time-dependent temperature profile, the vessel geometry, and the weld residual stresses.) Unless there are any significant uncertainties in these calculations, there is no need to perform any additional sampling.

- $K_I$ : Deterministic

This variable is currently computed deterministically as a function of other variables. Unless it is postulated that the computation process itself introduces additional uncertainties, there is no need to perform any additional sampling.

- $K_{Ic}$  scatter: Aleatory and Epistemic

In the current PFM approach, the scatter in  $K_{Ic}$  is sampled once per time step for each flaw. (The sampling distribution is based on a comparison of  $K_{Ic}$  predictions with experimental data.) Based on when the sampling is done ( $K_{Ic}$  is a function of local temperature, which is a function of the thermal hydraulic transient), it appears that the uncertainties in  $K_{Ic}$  are being treated as being aleatory in nature.

At first glance, it appears that  $K_{Ic}$ , which is computed as a function of  $T - RT_{NDT}$ , is a temperature-dependent material property and should therefore be deterministic (at a given point). However, consider the crack initiation model which uses  $K_{Ic}$ . This model predicts crack initiation whenever  $K_I$ , which is a computed function of a number of factors (e.g., crack geometry and applied stress), exceeds  $K_{Ic}$ . Applying this model to experimental results, it would not be surprising for the model would be correct for some trials and incorrect for others. (The graph showing variability in  $K_{Ic}$  for fixed values of  $T - RT_{NDT}$  may be an indication of this aleatory uncertainty. Note that models, by definition, are simplified representations of the real world, and generally don't address all factors that can potentially affect the results.) Thus, although the uncertainties in  $K_{Ic}$  are epistemic, there are aleatory uncertainties in the results of the model which uses  $K_{Ic}$ .

Note that in a mathematically analogous problem involving aging-related failures of piping, Apostolakis (1999) argues that model uncertainty should be treated as being epistemic in a PRA. It is currently planned that a small task group reinvestigate the treatment of the scatter in  $K_{Ic}$ . The task group will need to determine if the current PFM distribution for  $K_{Ic}$  appropriately addresses the model uncertainty and how epistemic uncertainties in the model should be addressed.

- Weld residual stresses: Epistemic

In the current PFM analysis, these are treated as being deterministic. (They affect the finite element stress calculations, and therefore cannot be easily incorporated into the current computational scheme used by FAVOR to address uncertainties.)

Since weld residual stresses are essentially determined at the time of vessel manufacture, the uncertainties in these stresses are epistemic in nature. Given the difficulty of addressing these uncertainties within FAVOR, a scheme for doing this outside of FAVOR is outlined later in this section.

- Cladding thickness: Epistemic

In the current PFM analysis, this is treated as being deterministic. (It affects the finite element stress calculations, and therefore cannot be easily incorporated into the current computational scheme used by FAVOR to address uncertainties.)

Since the vessel dimensions (including the cladding thickness) are essentially determined at the time of vessel manufacture, the uncertainties in this thickness (for a given subregion) are epistemic in nature. Given the difficulty of addressing these uncertainties within FAVOR, a scheme for doing this outside of FAVOR is outlined later in this section.

- Stress-free temperature: Epistemic

In the current PFM analysis, this is treated as being a deterministic parameter. Presuming that, for a given reactor vessel, there is a temperature at which the stress between the cladding and the vessel base material is zero, it appears that this treatment is reasonable. The uncertainties in the parameter are, therefore, epistemic.

- Flaw size distributions: Epistemic

In the current PFM analysis, uncertainties in the flaw size distribution (e.g., regarding its shape and parameter values) are not treated. Since, as noted earlier, the uncertainties in the flaw characteristics are epistemic in nature, the uncertainties in the distribution of characteristics is also epistemic. From a computational point of view, the proposed treatment of flaw characteristics accounts for uncertainties in the flaw size distribution; no additional treatment is needed.

- Flaw density: Epistemic

Following the discussion of other flaw characteristics, the flaw density is determined at the time of vessel manufacture and the uncertainties in this density are epistemic.

- T/H pressure-temperature curve: Aleatory and Epistemic

In the current PFM analysis, T/H uncertainties are used directly in the computation of the  $\phi_i$ ; this procedure treats the T/H uncertainties as being aleatory.

The proposed treatment of T/H uncertainties has been discussed earlier in this paper. It recognizes that there is an aleatory component (quantified by the frequency of the parent PRA scenarios and the fraction of this frequency associated with the bundle of T/H scenarios modeled through the use of a single representative T/H scenario) and an epistemic component (quantified by distributions for the T/H scenario frequencies and the conditional T/H model output).

Table 2 summarizes the results of the preceding discussions on the categorization of uncertain PFM variables and parameters. In general, the conceptual treatment of uncertainties in the variables and parameters used by the current PFM approach appears to be consistent with the principles described in the first part of this paper (although a PRA-based description would describe the process somewhat differently<sup>11</sup>). The impact of changes in categorization are discussed in the following section.

### *Implications for FAVOR*

Table 2 shows that, from the standpoint of PFM uncertainty analysis, four classes of variables/parameters have been identified.

1. Variables/parameters which do not need to be explicitly included in sampling schemes used to perform the uncertainty analysis. These are generally deterministic functions of other uncertain variables/parameters. Uncertainties in these will be automatically dealt with as part of the uncertainty analysis process.
2. Variables/parameters which have both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. The epistemic uncertainties can be addressed within FAVOR.
3. Variables/parameters which have epistemic uncertainties. The epistemic uncertainties can be addressed within FAVOR.
4. Variables/parameters which have epistemic uncertainties. The epistemic uncertainties cannot be addressed within FAVOR (at least without considerable restructuring of the code).

The discussion in the previous section and Table 2 show that the current PFM categorization of variables and parameters is generally reasonable. Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that the computational approach used by FAVOR appropriately distinguishes between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. Thus, the following points, which address recommended changes in the PFM uncertainty analysis, do not appear to require significant changes in the FAVOR code.

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<sup>11</sup>For example, as noted earlier in this paper, the term "stochastic" is typically used in the PRA literature to refer to random or aleatory issues. My understanding is that the process of "stochastically generating vessels" actually addresses epistemic uncertainties. I recommend that future descriptions of the PFM analysis use the terminology of this white paper.

Table 2 - Recommendations for Categorization of Uncertain Variables and Parameters in PFM

<u>Variable/Parameter</u>	<u>Recommended Uncertainty Category<sup>a</sup></u>
copper content	epistemic
nickel content	epistemic
neutron fluence	epistemic
flaw size	epistemic
flaw location	epistemic
RT <sub>NDT</sub> margin	epistemic
reactor vessel temperature	deterministic <sup>b</sup>
reactor vessel stress	deterministic <sup>b</sup>
K <sub>I</sub>	deterministic <sup>b</sup>
K <sub>Ic</sub> scatter	aleatory and <u>epistemic</u>
weld residual stresses	<u>epistemic</u>
cladding thickness	<u>epistemic</u>
stress-free temperature	<u>epistemic</u>
flaw size distributions	<u>epistemic<sup>c</sup></u>
flaw density	<u>epistemic</u>
T/H pressure-temperature curve	aleatory and <u>epistemic</u>

<sup>a</sup>Underline indicates a change from the current PFM approach.

<sup>b</sup>Variable is a deterministic function of other, uncertain variables; no additional treatment of uncertainty is required.

<sup>c</sup>Uncertainties in flaw size distribution should be addressed as part of the uncertainty analysis for flaw size.

- Category 2 Variables and Parameters: K<sub>Ic</sub> scatter and T/H temperature/pressure

In general, the parameters of aleatory distributions are uncertain. If these uncertainties are significant (methods for quantifying these uncertainties were discussed in the first section of this paper), they need to be addressed in the sampling process. This can be done in a very straightforward manner within the FAVOR code.

Assume, for example, that the distribution of K<sub>Ic</sub> is lognormal with uncertain parameters  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ . At the time FAVOR is sampling the reactor vessel parameters (e.g., copper content, which have epistemic uncertainties), it should also sample a value for  $\mu$  and a value for  $\sigma$ . Then, when FAVOR is actually sampling for K<sub>Ic</sub>, it should use the sampled values of  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  in defining the lognormal distribution for K<sub>Ic</sub>.

- Category 4 Variables and Parameters: weld residual stresses, cladding thickness, and stress-free temperature

Although the epistemic uncertainties in these variables and parameters are fundamentally of the same nature as the epistemic uncertainties in other variables and parameters, it appears for computational efficiency reasons that they should be addressed outside of the FAVOR code. It appears that this can be done relatively simply using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) techniques; LHS is used to define sets of inputs (with appropriate probability weights) that are then provided to FAVOR.

#### **Summary Points - Integrated PTS Analysis**

- The proposed approach for integrating PRA, T/H, and PFM analyses described in this paper (see Figure 7) is nearly identical to that discussed at the April 30, 1999 and June 9, 1999 NRC meetings on PFM/PRA integration. Two minor differences are: 1) the proposed approach requires the aggregation of results on a PRA scenario basis, rather than on an overall basis; and 2) the approach requires that PRA scenario frequencies be explicitly allocated to the constituent T/H scenarios in a manner consistent with the PRA model.
- Although it doesn't use the same terminology, the uncertainty analysis framework employed by the current PFM approach correctly distinguishes between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties.
- The current PFM categorization of uncertain PFM variables and parameters (in terms of whether the uncertainties are epistemic, aleatory, or both) appears to be generally reasonable. A few changes in categorization are recommended (see Table 2). Some of these changes can be addressed within the current FAVOR code; others will need to be addressed outside of the code.
- The quantification of aleatory uncertainties in  $K_{ic}$  and of the epistemic uncertainties in this distribution needs to be looked at further.
- The current quantification of uncertainties for many of the PFM variables and parameters can be updated using relatively simple tools.

## Recommended for Further Reading

Apostolakis, G., "Probability and risk assessment: the subjectivistic viewpoint and some suggestions," *Nuclear Safety*, 9, 305-315(1978). [*Provides a seminal discussion on the interpretation of probability appropriate to PRA.*]

Apostolakis, G., "The concept of probability in safety assessments of technological systems," *Science*, 250, 1359-1364(1990). [*An update of the Nuclear Safety paper.*]

Apostolakis, G., "A commentary on model uncertainty," in *Model Uncertainty: Its Characterization and Quantification*, A. Mosleh, N. Siu, C. Smidts, and C. Lui, eds., Center for Reliability Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1995, pp. 13-22. [*Provides first reference to the terminology "aleatory" and "epistemic" uncertainties in a PRA context.*]

Apostolakis, G., "The distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is important: an example from the inclusion of aging effects into PSA," *Proceedings of Probabilistic Safety Assessment International Topical Meeting (PSA '99)*, Washington, DC, 1999. [*Provides a detailed discussion of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the context of a PSA aging analysis. The analysis includes a phenomenological model for piping failure, and is mathematically similar to the PTS problem addressed in this paper.*]

Iman, R.L., and M.J. Shortencarier, "A FORTRAN Program and User's Guide for the Generation of Latin Hypercube and Random Samples for Use with Computer Models," NUREG/CR-3624, 1984. [*Provides a brief introduction to Latin Hypercube Sampling as well as the program.*]

Kaplan, S. and B.J. Garrick, "On the quantitative definition of risk," *Risk Analysis*, 1, 11-37(1981). [*Provides a pioneering discussion of the purpose of risk assessment and the need to address uncertainties.*]

Parry, G.W. and P.W. Winter, "Characterization and evaluation of uncertainty in probabilistic risk analysis," *Nuclear Safety*, 22, 28-42(1981). [*An early discussion of various sources of uncertainty relevant to PRA, including model uncertainty.*]

Helton, J.C. and Burmaster, D.E., Guest Editors, "Treatment of Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty," Special Issue of *Reliability Engineering and System Safety*, 54(1996). [*Includes contributions from a number of authors on the topic.*]

Siu, N. and D.L. Kelly, "Bayesian Probability and Statistics in PRA," *Reliability Engineering and System Safety*, 62, 89-116, 1998. [*Provides a tutorial level discussion on Bayesian estimation.*]

Siu, N., D. Karydas, and J. Temple, "Bayesian Assessment of Modeling Uncertainty: Application to Fire Risk Assessment," *Analysis and Management of Uncertainty: Theory and Application*, B.M. Ayyub, M.M. Gupta, and L.N. Kanal, eds., North-Holland, 1992, pp. 351-361. [*Provides a Bayesian methodology for quantifying model uncertainty when model input parameters are also uncertain.*]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," Regulatory Guide 1.174, July 1998. March 25, 1999. [*Discusses how uncertainties are to be treated in one particular risk-informed approach to regulatory decision making.*]

Winkler, R.L., "Model uncertainty: probabilities for models?", in *Model Uncertainty: Its Characterization and Quantification*, A. Mosleh, N. Siu, C. Smidts, and C. Lui, eds., Center for Reliability Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1995, pp. 109-118. [*Discusses a Bayesian approach for addressing model uncertainty.*]

## Appendix A - Probability Definitions and Concepts

### Probability

Probability is a subjective (internal) measure of likelihood.<sup>1</sup> Thus,  $P\{A\}$  is the quantity that measures the assessor's degree of certainty (or uncertainty) as to the truth of proposition A.<sup>2</sup>  $P\{A|B\}$ , the conditional probability of A, given B, measures the assessor's belief that proposition A is true, given (assuming) that proposition B is true. Some important observations are as follows:

1. Although there is no "true" or "correct" probability for a given proposition, useful probabilistic assessments are not arbitrary; they must adhere with the rules established by the calculus of probabilities. It turns out that this requirement forces convergence of subjective and frequentist probabilities when there is a large amount of data.
2. For a probability to be meaningful, the proposition must be carefully defined. Lack of clarity can lead to misunderstandings and misuses of probabilistic analysis results.
3. All probabilities are conditional; they are all based on the assessor's current state of knowledge concerning the proposition in question. As that state of knowledge changes, the (conditional) probability of the proposition changes as well.
4. The definition of probability does not distinguish between "aleatory" and "epistemic" uncertainties. Uncertainties of both types contribute to the overall probability. However, they contribute in different manners, as illustrated by an example at the end of this appendix.

### Probability Distributions

Let  $X$  be a continuous variable (e.g., the copper content at a specific point in the reactor vessel) whose precise value is unknown. Some generic propositions of interest are:

$$\{X \leq x\}$$

$$\{X > x\}$$

$$\{x \leq X < x + \Delta x\}$$

where  $x$  is a given value. The probabilities of these propositions being true clearly can change as functions of  $x$ . Because of their usefulness, these functions have been given specific names:

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<sup>1</sup>Although there are other definitions of probability, e.g., the "frequentist" definition which takes the probability to be the limiting ratio of successes to trials in an infinite series of repeatable, identical experiments, the subjectivist definition is appropriate for use in PRA, as it is an integral part of current theories on decision making under uncertainty.

<sup>2</sup>A proposition is a statement that is either true or false.

Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF):  $F(x) \equiv P\{X \leq x\}$

Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF):  $\bar{F}(x) \equiv P\{X > x\}$

Probability Density Function (pdf):  $f(x) \equiv \lim_{\Delta x \rightarrow 0} \frac{P\{x \leq X < x + \Delta x\}}{\Delta x}$

Some useful relationships following from these definitions and the axioms of probability are given in Table A.1.

It is important to observe that all of the above distribution functions are probabilities which quantify the assessor's subjective beliefs as to whether the true value of  $X$  lies in a specified range. Thus, for example (see Figure A.1), a highly peaked pdf indicates that the assessor is, correctly or incorrectly, very confident in his knowledge about  $X$ ; a more shallow pdf indicates a lower level of confidence.




Figure A.1 - Probability Density Functions (pdfs) and Confidence

It should also be noted that neither the definitions of distributions nor the relationships in Table A.1 are dependent on the particular form of the distribution. This means that, in principle, probability distributions do not have to members of any particular parametric family, e.g., normal (Gaussian), lognormal, gamma, Weibull, or exponential. However, for mathematical and computational convenience, it is often useful to approximate the assessor's distribution using a particular parametric form. Specific forms and their characteristics (e.g., mean value, variance, key percentiles) can be found in numerous handbooks and textbooks.

The above discussion focuses on a single uncertain variable. Similar propositions and associated distribution functions can be developed for multiple uncertain variables, albeit with more complexity. In dealing with multiple variables, care needs to be taken that dependencies between the variables are accounted for because, in general,

$$P\{a \leq X < b, c \leq Y < d\} \neq P\{a \leq X < b\} \cdot P\{c \leq Y < d\}$$

Table A.1 - Some Useful Relationships Between Distribution Functions

$$\bar{F}(x) = 1 - F(x)$$

$$F(x) = \int_{-\infty}^x f(x') dx'$$

$$P\{a \leq X < b\} = F(b) - F(a) = \int_a^b f(x') dx'$$

$$f(x) = \frac{dF(x)}{dx}$$

---

### On The Meaning of Probability Distributions: Examples

In probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and other probabilistic analyses, probability distributions are routinely used to represent the uncertainties in key variables and parameters. However, the meaning of each distribution, which is directly related to the specific proposition addressed by the distribution, is not always clearly specified. This can lead to misunderstandings or even misuses of the distributions and, therefore, of the analysis results.

#### Example 1: Reactor Vessel Copper Content

Define the variable C as the copper content (in weight percent) at the location of a specific flaw in a particular subregion of the vessel.<sup>3</sup> From an engineering analysis perspective, it is reasonable to assume that there is a fixed, "true value" of C, whether or not there are problems with our current ability to reliably measure C. The proposition of interest, therefore, is that the true value of C lies in a specific range of values, e.g., (c,c+Δc).

For the sake of this simple example, assume that, following some data analysis (see Appendix C for example calculations), the assessor determines that his state of knowledge regarding C is adequately represented by a lognormal distribution function with a mean value of 0.20 and a standard deviation of 0.05. The pdf is shown in Figure A.2.

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<sup>3</sup>C is clearly a function of position; its explicit dependence on (r,θ,z) is not shown for notational convenience.




Figure A.2 - Copper Content Probability Density Function (Example)

Using the properties of the lognormal distribution function, it can be shown that some of the key percentiles of this distribution are as follows.

$$C_{05} = 0.129, \text{ i.e., } P\{C \leq 0.129\} = 0.05$$

$$C_{50} = 0.194, \text{ i.e., } P\{C \leq 0.194\} = 0.50$$

$$C_{95} = 0.291, \text{ i.e., } P\{C \leq 0.291\} = 0.95$$

It can be seen that the assessor is very confident (with 95% probability) that the true (but unknown) value of  $C$  is less than 0.291. It also can be seen, using the third relationship in Table A.1, that the assessor is very confident (with 90% probability) that the true value of  $C$  lies between 0.129 and 0.291.

Note that the uncertainties modeled by this distribution of  $C$  are purely epistemic and should be treated as such. If the uncertainties are treated in an analysis as being aleatory,<sup>4</sup> this would imply that  $C$  could vary randomly over time (e.g., from pressurized thermal shock event to event), which contradicts the basic modeling assumption that there is a fixed, true value of  $C$ .

#### Example 2: On Measurement Errors and Epistemic Uncertainties

Consider a situation where the copper content of a particular sample is measured in a series of tests. It can be expected that random variations in the measurement process will lead to random variability, i.e., aleatory uncertainty, in the measurement outcomes, and that this variability can be represented by a distribution. Does this mean that the copper content is an aleatory variable?

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<sup>4</sup>Appendix B provides additional discussion on the treatment of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties in a probabilistic analysis.

The answer depends on what is meant by "the copper content," i.e., what is the underlying proposition.

If the proposition is that the value of the next measurement of copper content falls in some range, e.g.,  $(c, c+\Delta c)$ , the uncertainty in the truth of this proposition is indeed aleatory. (This follows directly from the description of the situation.) The observed distribution provides a good indication of what the next measurement might be, as long as key factors (e.g., the test procedure, the sample itself) are not changed.

On the other hand, if the proposition is that the copper content at some specified  $(r, \theta, z)$  in a given reactor vessel falls in some range, then the model of the previous example still holds: the uncertainties in this copper content are epistemic. The distribution of measured values for the sample is evidence which affect the assessor's distribution for  $C(r, \theta, z)$ , but it is not the assessor's distribution. Even if, as a practical matter, the assessor decides to make his distribution for  $C(r, \theta, z)$  numerically identical to the distribution of measured values, his distribution must be treated in subsequent analyses as being epistemic (rather than aleatory), or else the analysis will be inconsistent.

## Appendix B - Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainties

### Is It Important To Make The Distinction?

In order to make most effective use of the results of any analysis, it is important that the user understand the fundamental modeling assumptions underlying the analysis. In particular, in the case of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), it is important to understand how the analysis deals with uncertainties that arise because of issues not explicitly modeled and those that arise because of imperfect knowledge concerning the issues that are explicitly modeled. This understanding will affect how the user perceives and uses the analysis results in subsequent decision making activities.

Consider a situation where a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) could be subjected to a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) event. Assume the PTS event arrival is governed by a Poisson process and has characteristic frequency  $\lambda$ . We are uncertain as to whether the RPV will fail because of a PTS event; the associated conditional probability of failure, given a PTS event, is  $\phi$ . Depending on the interpretation of  $\phi$ , the analysis user could have very different pictures of the situation.

Two extreme interpretations are as follows (see Figures B.1 and B.2).

1. The uncertainty quantified by  $\phi$  arises only because of issues not explicitly modeled (e.g., causal factors underlying differences in the timing of component actuations and failures, which, in turn, lead to different thermal hydraulic subscenarios) and is entirely aleatory. Under this treatment, if we hypothesize a very large number of PTS events, we would expect to see RPV failure for a fraction  $\phi$  of these events.
2. The uncertainty quantified by  $\phi$  arises only because of imperfect knowledge regarding modeled processes (e.g., sparsity and relevance of data for the copper content at a specific point in the RPV) and is entirely epistemic. Under this treatment, the RPV will either fail or it won't, regardless of the number of challenges. Thus, for  $N$  hypothesized PTS events, one of two hypotheses will be true: i) there will be  $N$  RPV failures, or ii) there will be  $N$  RPV successes. The likelihood that the first hypothesis is true is  $\phi$ ; the likelihood that the second hypothesis is true is  $1 - \phi$ .

Under the first interpretation, the expected number of PTS-induced RPV failures in a fixed time interval  $T$  is given by:

$$E[\# \text{ RPV failures in } (0, T) | \text{interpretation 1}] = \lambda\phi T$$

The probability of  $N$  such events is given by:

$$P\{N \text{ RPV failures in } (0, T) | \text{intepretation 1}\} = \frac{(\lambda\phi T)^N}{N!} e^{-\lambda\phi T}$$

Under the second interpretation, the expected number of events and the probability of  $N$  such events are given by:

PTS Challenge	RV Good?	Scenario Frequency	RV State
-----	-----	$\lambda(1-\phi)$	Good
	-----	$\lambda\phi$	Failed

Figure B.1 - Risk Model for Aleatory Interpretation of RPV Conditional Failure Probability

**Probability =  $1 - \phi$**

PTS Challenge	RV Good?	Scenario Frequency	RV State
-----	-----	$\lambda$	Good
-----	-----	0	Failed

**Probability =  $\phi$**

PTS Challenge	RV Good?	Scenario Frequency	RV State
-----	-----	0	Good
-----	-----	$\lambda$	Failed

Figure B.2 - Risk Model for Epistemic Interpretation of RPV Conditional Failure Probability

$$E[\# \text{ RPV failures in } (0, T) | \text{interpretation 2}] = \lambda\phi T$$

$$P\{N \text{ RPV failures in } (0, T) | \text{intepretation 2}\} = \phi \cdot \frac{(\lambda T)^N}{N!} e^{-\lambda T}$$

It can be seen that if the user only cares about the expected number of events in a fixed time interval  $T$ , both interpretations will lead to the same value:  $\lambda\phi T$ . However, if the user has a non-linear consequence function for PTS-induced RPV failure (e.g., if one event is barely tolerable but two events spell utter doom), the differences in interpretation can make a difference.

Reinforcing the points raised above, Apostolakis (1999) points out that the distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties can make a difference at the detailed technical analysis level. In particular, he questions the concept of a failure rate for components when the failure mechanisms are essentially deterministic (albeit, with uncertain governing parameters). The problem involves the passive failure of an aging pipe under steady-state load conditions, and corresponds mathematically to the situation shown in Figure B.2.

In general, it might be expected that there are aleatory and epistemic contributions to the RPV conditional failure probability. Operational issues in dealing with such situations are discussed in the following section.

### Treating Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainties

For situations where there are aleatory and epistemic contributions to uncertainty, these contributions need to be separated for the reasons discussed above. In our example of the PTS-induced RPV failure, this separation is shown in Figure B.3. The aleatory contribution ( $\phi'$ ) is dealt with in the event tree (i.e., as a "conditional split fraction"). The epistemic uncertainty in  $\phi'$  is treated when epistemic uncertainties are propagated through the event tree model. Neglecting the epistemic uncertainties in  $\lambda$  for simplicity, the expected number of failures and the probability of  $N$  events are given by:

$$E[\# \text{ RPV failures in } (0, T)] = \lambda T \cdot \int_0^1 \phi' \pi(\phi') d\phi' = \lambda T \cdot E[\phi']$$

$$P\{N \text{ RPV failures in } (0, T)\} = \int_0^1 \frac{(\lambda\phi'T)^N}{N!} e^{-\lambda\phi'T} \pi(\phi') d\phi'$$

where  $\pi(\phi')$  is the epistemic pdf for  $\phi'$ . Note that  $\phi$ , the overall conditional probability of PTS-induced RPV failure given a PTS event, is given by:

$$\phi = \int_0^1 \phi' \pi(\phi') d\phi' = E[\phi']$$




Figure B.3 - Risk Model for General Interpretation of RPV Conditional Failure Probability

#### A Computational Note

In situations where Monte Carlo sampling is used to address both aleatory uncertainties and epistemic uncertainties, it is still important to treat these two contributions separately. In the example of the PTS-induced RPV failure probability, an appropriate approach is illustrated in Figure B.4. Here, an inner sampling loop is used to estimate  $\phi'$ , which is conditioned on a number of deterministic (but unknown) parameters, represented by the vector  $\underline{\omega}$ . (Recall that  $\phi'$  quantifies the aleatory uncertainties in RPV failure.) The epistemic uncertainties in the deterministic parameters, represented by the joint distribution  $\pi(\underline{\omega})$  are addressed via an outer sampling loop. (This is the so-called "propagation of uncertainties" phase of the PRA.) Failure to properly perform this sampling (e.g., by addressing epistemic uncertainties in the inner loop) will lead to confusion in the interpretation of results.




Figure B.4 - Schematic of Sampling Scheme for Addressing Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainties

## Appendix C - Example Application of Bayes' Theorem for A Lognormal Variable

### Problem

Consider a situation where  $C$ , a random variable, is believed to be lognormally distributed. In other words, the likelihood that  $C$  takes on a value in any specified range, e.g.,  $(c, c+\Delta c)$ , is governed by a probability density function (pdf) of the form

$$f(c|\mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\ln c - \mu}{\sigma}\right)^2\right]$$

where  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  are parameters of the distribution. Note that the mean value and variance of  $C$  can be determined from  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ , if they are known:

$$E[C] = e^{\mu + 0.5\sigma^2}$$

$$\text{Var}[C] = (E[C])^2 (e^{\sigma^2} - 1)$$

In general,  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  are not known and must be estimated based on available data.

Assume that there are  $N$  data points for  $C$ :  $\{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_N\}$ . If  $N$  is large,  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  can be estimated using a number of different methods (e.g., the method of maximum likelihood, Bayes' Theorem). If  $N$  is small, Bayes' Theorem provides an appropriate tool. In the case of this example, Bayes' Theorem states that the joint distribution for  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  is given by:

$$\pi_1(\mu, \sigma | c_1, \dots, c_N) = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{\ln c_i - \mu}{\sigma}\right]^2\right\} \pi_0(\mu, \sigma)}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \prod_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{\ln c_i - \mu}{\sigma}\right]^2\right\} \pi_0(\mu, \sigma) d\sigma d\mu}$$

where  $\pi_0(\mu, \sigma)$  is the joint probability distribution for  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  prior to the collection of the data set  $\{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_N\}$ . The predictive pdf for  $C$ , i.e., the pdf to be used for predictive purposes, is the average lognormal distribution function, where the posterior distribution for  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  is used as the weighting function.

$$f(c|c_1, \dots, c_N) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} f(c|\mu, \sigma) \pi_1(\mu, \sigma | c_1, \dots, c_N) d\sigma d\mu$$

## Example Application

Consider the following data set:

Table C.1 - Sample Data Set

i	$C_i$ (dimensionless)
1	0.20
2	0.13
3	0.44
4	0.18
5	0.19

Sample Mean                      0.228

Sample Variance                      0.0118

Using a non-informative prior distribution (in this case, a distribution proportional to  $1/\sigma$ )<sup>1</sup>, Bayes' Theorem and the predictive distribution for C can be readily evaluated using commercial spreadsheet or equation solving software. An example solution using Mathcad 6.0 is attached. The mean, variance, 5<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the predictive distribution are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} E[C] &= 0.23 \\ \text{Var}[C] &= 0.018 \\ C_{05} &= 0.076 \\ C_{50} &= 0.21 \\ C_{95} &= 0.57 \end{aligned}$$

### Computation Notes

1. The Mathcad worksheet has been written for clarity of presentation and not computational efficiency. For example, the integration symbols used in the worksheet invoke the Mathcad-supplied automatic integrator. For the problem of interest, pre-computing the posterior distribution at a specified set of points and using a single-pass trapezoidal integration scheme will lead to results of comparable accuracy with significantly less computation time.

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<sup>1</sup>See for example G.E.P. Box and G.C. Tiao, *Bayesian Inference in Statistical Analysis*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1973.

2. The maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) for  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  can be found using the sample moments shown in Table C.1 and the relationships between  $E[C]$ ,  $\text{Var}[C]$ ,  $\mu$ , and  $\sigma$  specified earlier. Figure C.1 compares the pdf based on these estimates with the pdf developed using Bayes' Theorem. It can be seen that the MLE-based pdf is narrower; this is because the MLE-based pdf does not account for the uncertainties in  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  due to the limited sample size.




Figure C.1 - Comparison of Bayesian and MLE pdfs

## Example Application of Bayes' Theorem for A Lognormal Variable Mathcad 6.0 Worksheet, Last Revised September 3, 1999

### Data

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 0.20 \\ 0.13 \\ 0.44 \\ 0.18 \\ 0.19 \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{array}{ll} N = \text{length}(C) & \text{mean}(C) = 0.228 \\ i = 0..N - 1 & \text{var}(C) = 0.0118 \end{array}$$

(Mathcad uses "0" as the first index of a vector/matrix)

### Functions

$$\pi_0(\mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \quad \text{(Prior distribution)}$$

$$L(c, \mu, \sigma) = \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \cdot \pi \cdot c \cdot \sigma}} \right) \cdot \exp \left[ -0.5 \cdot \left( \frac{\ln(c) - \mu}{\sigma} \right)^2 \right] \quad \text{(Likelihood function - 1 data point)}$$

$$LN(c, \mu, \sigma) = \prod_{i=0}^{N-1} L(c_i, \mu, \sigma) \quad \text{(Likelihood function - N data points)}$$

### Initial Plot (Unnormalized Posterior Distribution)

$$m = 25 \quad j = 0..m \quad k = 0..m \quad \text{(Linear grid for } \mu \text{ and } \sigma)$$

$$\mu_{\min} := -2.5 \quad \mu_{\max} := -.5 \quad \sigma_{\min} := .01 \quad \sigma_{\max} := 1.5$$

$$\mu_j = \mu_{\min} + \frac{j}{m} \cdot (\mu_{\max} - \mu_{\min}) \quad \sigma_k = \sigma_{\min} + \frac{k}{m} \cdot (\sigma_{\max} - \sigma_{\min})$$

$$\pi_{1u_{j,k}} = LN(C, \mu_j, \sigma_k) \cdot \pi_0(\mu_j, \sigma_k) \quad \text{(Unnormalized posterior distribution)}$$

(A plot of the unnormalized posterior is useful for defining appropriate integration bounds.)


### Bayes' Theorem Integration Constant

$$k := \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} LN(C, \mu, \sigma) \cdot \pi_0(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma$$

$$k = 85.986$$

### Normalized Posterior Distribution Function

$$\pi_1(\mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{k} \cdot LN(C, \mu, \sigma) \cdot \pi_0(\mu, \sigma)$$



$\pi_{1u}$

### Posterior Distribution Moments

(The moments of  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  are not needed to develop the predictive distribution but they can be useful. Note that the calculations would be more efficient if a precalculated posterior and a single-pass numerical integration scheme were used; the Mathcad automatic integrator is used for clarity of presentation.)

$$E\mu = \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} \mu \cdot \pi_1(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma$$

$$E\mu^2 = \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} \mu^2 \cdot \pi_1(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma \quad \text{Var}\mu := E\mu^2 - E\mu^2$$

$$E\sigma = \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} \sigma \cdot \pi_1(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma$$

$$E\sigma^2 = \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} \sigma^2 \cdot \pi_1(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma \quad \text{Var}\sigma := E\sigma^2 - E\sigma^2$$

$$E\mu\sigma = \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} (\mu \cdot \sigma) \cdot \pi_1(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma \quad \text{Cov}\mu\sigma := E\mu\sigma - E\mu \cdot E\sigma$$

$$\text{Corr}\mu\sigma = \frac{\text{Cov}\mu\sigma}{\sqrt{\text{Var}\mu \cdot \text{Var}\sigma}}$$

$$E\mu = -1.568$$

(Mean value of  $\mu$ )

$$\text{Var}\mu = 0.063$$

(Variance of  $\mu$ )

$$E\sigma = 0.541$$

(Mean value of  $\sigma$ )

$$\text{Var}\sigma = 0.047$$

(Variance of  $\sigma$ )

$$\text{Cov}\mu\sigma = 7.618 \cdot 10^{-4}$$

(Covariance of  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ )

$$\text{Corr}\mu\sigma = 0.014$$

(Correlation coefficient:  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ )

### Predictive Distribution for C


$$n_{\text{point}} := 30 \quad ii := 0..n_{\text{point}} - 1$$

$$CP_{\min} := 0.01 \quad CP_{\max} := 0.80$$

(The pdf is calculated at specified points on a grid. A logarithmic grid is used here.)

$$CP_{ii} = CP_{\min} \cdot \left( \frac{CP_{\max}}{CP_{\min}} \right)^{\frac{ii}{n_{\text{point}} - 1}}$$

$$f_{CP_{ii}} := \int_{\sigma_{\min}}^{\sigma_{\max}} \int_{\mu_{\min}}^{\mu_{\max}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \cdot \pi \cdot \sigma \cdot CP_{ii}}} \cdot \exp \left[ -0.5 \cdot \left( \frac{\ln(CP_{ii}) - \mu}{\sigma} \right)^2 \right] \cdot \pi_1(\mu, \sigma) \, d\mu \, d\sigma$$



(Plot of predictive pdf)

**Cumulative Distribution and Moments**

(Trapezoidal integration is used for ease and efficiency; CDF and moments can also be found using built-in integration functions.)

$$jj := 1 .. npoint - 1$$

$$FCP_0 = 0$$

$$FCP_{jj} = FCP_{jj-1} + 0.5 \cdot (fCP_{jj} + fCP_{jj-1}) \cdot (CP_{jj} - CP_{jj-1})$$

$$ECP = \sum_{jj=1}^{npoint-1} 0.5 \cdot (CP_{jj} \cdot fCP_{jj} + CP_{jj-1} \cdot fCP_{jj-1}) \cdot (CP_{jj} - CP_{jj-1})$$

$$ECP2 = \sum_{jj=1}^{npoint-1} 0.5 \cdot [(CP_{jj})^2 \cdot fCP_{jj} + (CP_{jj-1})^2 \cdot fCP_{jj-1}] \cdot (CP_{jj} - CP_{jj-1})$$

$$VarCP := ECP2 - ECP^2$$

$$C0 = \min(CP)$$

(Use linear interpolation to find percentiles of C)

Given

$$linterp(CP, FCP, C0) = 0.05$$

$$C05 = \text{Find}(C0)$$

Given

$$linterp(CP, FCP, C0) = 0.50$$

$$C50 = \text{Find}(C0)$$

Given

$$linterp(CP, FCP, C0) = 0.95$$

$$C95 = \text{Find}(C0)$$

$$ECP = 0.229$$

(Mean value of C)

$$VarCP = 0.0177$$

(Variance of C)

$$C05 = 0.076$$

(5th percentile of C)

$$C50 = 0.209$$

(50th percentile of C)

$$C95 = 0.571$$

(95th percentile of C)

**Output Results To File case1.prn**

$$M_{ii} := (CP_{ii} \quad fCP_{ii} \quad FCP_{ii})$$

$$\text{WRITEPRN}(\text{case1}) := M$$