

**TRANSMITTAL OF MEETING HANDOUT MATERIALS FOR  
IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN**

*This form is to be filled out (typed or hand-printed) by the person who announced the meeting (i.e., the person who issued the meeting notice). The completed form, and the attached copy of meeting handout materials, will be sent to the Document Control Desk on the same day of the meeting; under no circumstances will this be done later than the working day after the meeting.  
**Do not include proprietary materials.***

DATE OF MEETING

01/10/2000

The attached document(s), which was/were handed out in this meeting, is/are to be placed in the public domain as soon as possible. The minutes of the meeting will be issued in the near future. Following are administrative details regarding this meeting:

Docket Number(s)	N/A
Plant/Facility Name	N/A
TAC Number(s) (if available)	N/A
Reference Meeting Notice	Meeting with NEI TS Task Force
Purpose of Meeting (copy from meeting notice)	To discuss proposed Standard Technical Specification changes and status/comments on Revision 2 of STS.

NAME OF PERSON WHO ISSUED MEETING NOTICE

William D. Beckner

TITLE

Chief

OFFICE

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

DIVISION

Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs

BRANCH


Technical Specifications Branch (RTSB)

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Docket File/Central File  
PUBLIC

ML003671554 meeting notice in Adams

# Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process -DRAFT-



**From:** James Lazevnick  
**To:** Robert Dennig, William Beckner  
**Date:** Tue, Dec 21, 1999 9:26 AM  
**Subject:** TSTF 283 Rev 2 Comments

I reviewed TSTF 283 Rev 2 and found that significant improvements were made from Rev 1. The proposed change to allow performance of electrical surveillances at power is now restricted to allowing this only for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g. post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated operability concerns). The previous revision allowed this for purposes of maintaining or reestablishing OPERABILITY. This would have allowed essentially unrestricted testing at power following a utility performed assessment. From a risk perspective, the key difference between the two versions is that the risk of performing these tests at power may be offset by the avoided risk of shutdown and startup, when they are only allowed for the purpose of reestablishing operability.

The second improvement made in Rev 2 is that the surveillances are divided into a group that allows the full surveillance to be performed at power to reestablish operability, and another group that allows only a portion of the surveillance to be performed. The previous version allowed either case on all the surveillances. There are some surveillances where it is simply not appropriate to perform the entire surveillance at power. Two such surveillances are SR 3.8.1.12 and SR 3.8.1.17. It is not appropriate to perform the portions of these surveillances that call for energization of the emergency loads from the offsite power system, while the plant is operating. The remaining portions of the surveillances, however, might be capable of being performed at power if the utility assessment determines that plant safety is maintained or enhanced. The inserts designated for these surveillances should therefore be changed to Insert 2 and Bases Insert 2. Insert 2 and Bases Insert 2 are the inserts used when only a portion of the surveillance is allowed.

I also revised the Bases inserts for Rev 2 to provided more details on the type of things that need to be considered in the required assessment and to more clearly differentiate between a full surveillance and a partial surveillance. These are attached.

If the foregoing changes are made we would find the TSTF acceptable.

**CC:** Dale Thatcher, Edward Tomlinson, Jose Calvo

**From:** James Lazevnick  
**To:** Robert Dennig, William Beckner  
**Date:** Tue, Jan 4, 2000 10:32 AM  
**Subject:** TSTF 283 Rev 2, Revised Bases Inserts 1 and 2

In a 12/21/99 e-mail I provided revised bases inserts 1 and 2 for the subject TSTF. Attached are are further revisions to those inserts I would like to be used in place of those I originally provided. I've indicated the changes in italics.

**CC:** Dale Thatcher, Edward Tomlinson, Jose Calvo

TSTF 283 Rev 2  
Revised Bases Insert 2

This restriction of normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g. post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together *or operated independently* for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to demonstrate the plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

TSTF 283 Rev 2  
Revised Bases Insert 1

This restriction of normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g. post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together *or operated independently* for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to demonstrate the plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.