United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

2019 Reactor Actions

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Clinton Power Station (EA-18-104)

On April 1, 2019, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Exelon Generation Company (Exelon) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V at Clinton Power Station, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. Contrary to the requirements of numerous quality related procedures, Exelon failed to properly restore an emergency diesel generator (EDG) during shutdown conditions and subsequently began maintenance on the other emergency diesel generator. The resulting plant condition was that no emergency diesel generator was immediately available to provide on-site back-up electrical power for a period more than 3 days. Additionally, the unavailability of the EDG resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," which requires at least one EDG to be operable in Mode 5, and at least one EDG shall be restored immediately when it is determined that none is operable.

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (EA-18-155)

On March 25, 2019, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (CP) in the amount of $116,000 to Southern California Edison Company for two violations of NRC requirements related to an August 3, 2018 fuel-loading incident at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.  The first violation was Severity Level (SL) II violation involving the failure to ensure important to safety equipment was available to provide redundant drop protection features for a spent fuel canister during downloading operations.  Specifically, the licensee inadvertently disabled the redundant important to safety downloading slings while lowering canister 29 into the storage vault.  During the approximately 45 minute time frame, the canister rested on a shield ring unsupported by the redundant downloading slings at approximately 18 feet above the fully seated position.  This failure to maintain redundant drop protection placed canister 29 in an unanalyzed condition because the postulated drop of a loaded spent fuel canister is not analyzed in the final safety analysis report.

In addition, a SL III violation involving the failure to make a timely notification to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center for the August 3, 2018, disabling of important to safety equipment.  Specifically, the licensee failed to notify the NRC after an event that occurred on August 3, 2018, in which the licensee inadvertently disabled the redundant important to safety downloading slings while lowering spent fuel canister 29 into the storage vault, which resulted in the canister resting on a shield ring unsupported by the redundant downloading slings at approximately 18 feet above the fully seated position for approximately 45 minutes.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.) EA-18-032

On January 29, 2019, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC, licensee) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution mediation session held on September 21, 2018. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between SNC and the NRC based on evidence gathered during an investigation in which the NRC had identified an apparent violation involving the licensee’s failure to store Safeguards (SGI) in accordance with regulatory requirements. The violation involved a, now-former, nuclear security officer (NSO) who was employed at the Farley Nuclear Plant, who deliberately failed to store SGI in a locked security storage container while unattended, failed to maintain an inventory of SGI located inside a security storage container, and failed to document the retrieval of SGI when in use. Additionally, the licensee failed to maintain an inventory and document the retrieval of SGI from the security storage container when the NSO reproduced an SGI document, placed the SGI in a binder, and removed it for use from the security storage container. Because licensees are responsible for the actions of their employees and contractors, the NRC concluded that the NSO’s actions placed SNC in violation of NRC requirements and licensee’s procedures. In response to the incident, SNC agreed to complete additional corrective actions and enhancements, as fully discussed in the CO. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed not to pursue any further enforcement action (including issuance of a civil penalty) relating to the notice of apparent violation.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, April 15, 2019