United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

2016 Reactor Actions

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Diablo Canyon Power Plant (Pacific Gas and Electric Company) EA-16-168

On December 28, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee), for a violation involving the licensee's failure to develop adequate instructions for the installation of external limit switches on safety-related motor-operated valves as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a "Procedures," at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.  Specifically, Procedure MP E-53.10R, "Augmented Stem Lubrication for Limitorque Operated Valves," Revision 4, used to perform maintenance on safety-related equipment, failed to provide instructions to establish and check the travel of external switches installed on motor-operated valves are within vendor established criteria.  Consequently, the limit switch for valve RHR-2-8700B was installed, such that, it was operated repeatedly beyond overtravel tolerances resulting in its failure on May 16, 2016.  Additionally, the licensee also violated Technical Specification 3.5.2 because train B of the emergency core cooling system was determined to be inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 14 days.

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Northern States Power Company) EA-16-175

On December 12, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Northern States Power Company (the licensee) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," involving Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's failure to correct oil leakage from the safety-related High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, a condition adverse to quality, in accordance with written documents appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, between March 14, 2006 and March 21, 2016, the licensees initiated a number of work orders and subsequently closed them without any further work performed to correct the conditions adverse to quality, which resulted in gradual degradation and loss of HPCI system safety function.

Browns Ferry (Tennessee Valley Authority ) EA-16-064

On November 28, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $140,000 to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to conduct compensatory fire watches as required by TVA corporate procedures and 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection." Specifically, on multiple occasions in May 2015, hourly fire watches required as compensatory measures for fire protection equipment that was out of service in the Unit 3 Diesel Building and Unit 3 4kV Shutdown Board Room were not performed.

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.) EA 16-136

On October 19, 2016, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of Violation to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information." This violation involved the licensee's failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects. The issue was the result of the mismanagement of information by Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) personnel which resulted in losing track of the type of configuration that had been implemented to deal with intergranular stress corrosion cracking in 1988. The NRC used this inaccurate information to approve HNP's proposed alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code and deferral of nondestructive examinations required by ASME Code.

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Florida Power & Light ) EA-16-099

On October 10, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Florida Power & Light for a Severity Level III violation involving Turkey Point Nuclear Plant's failure to maintain complete and accurate records as required by 10 CFR 50.9(a). Specifically, on multiple occasions between November 2014 and April 2015, Fire Watch Shift Supervisors initialed and signed hourly fire watch logs indicating that hourly fire watches had been completed, with all required areas checked, when on multiple occasions some areas had not been checked or hourly fire watches had not been performed at all.

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.) EA 16-163

On October 3, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) confirming SNC's commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (HNP) to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. SNC had originally planned to submit its application on October 4, 2016. However, SNC requested more time to complete development of its Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment model and to allow appropriate coordination and implementation of design modifications at HNP. The NRC reviewed SNC's request and its justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of April 4, 2018.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) EA 16-128

On September 20, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding identified during an inspection of the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna). This White finding, an issue of low to moderate safety significance, will require additional U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections. The finding involves an inadvertent change Exelon made that introduced an error to the Ginna Emergency Plan. Specifically, Exelon implemented a revision to the emergency action level (EAL) table for the fission product barrier matrix that was incorrect with respect to the EAL threshold associated with a potential loss of containment barrier. This could have resulted in an untimely declaration of a General Emergency or a failure to declare a Site Area Emergency during an actual event. A Notice of Violation is included based on Exelon’s failure to meet 10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(2), which requires that a holder of a license under this part shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in Appendix E to this part; and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.) EA-16-022

On September 1, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session. The agreement resolves the apparent failure of a licensed operator who deliberately failed to comply with a condition of his license, and failed to provide Davis-Besse with information, that was complete and accurate in all material respects, for the submittal of required updates on the operator's medical condition. Davis-Besse agreed to a number of corrective actions, including: (1) a management discussion with each licensed operator in regard to this event, (2) revisions to operator requalification training materials to incorporate facts and lessons learned from this event, (3) management communications regarding expectations and requirements for complete and accurate medical reporting to operations personnel subject to those requirements, (4) training to address the provisions of 10 CFR 50.9, (5) revisions to existing fleet procedures governing licensed operator medical reports, (6) a presentation at the Nuclear Medical Resources Professionals User Group on the facts of this case, and (7) submission of an article to a widespread trade publication based on the facts and lessons learned from this event. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and will consider this Order as an escalated enforcement action for a period of one year from its effective date.

Exelon Nuclear (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station) EA-16-057

On July 6, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Exelon Nuclear for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," and Technical Specifications 3.7.C.2, for failing to appropriately prescribe an activity affecting quality, in documented instructions, associated with maintenance of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, since 2002, Exelon did not having appropriate work instructions to replace the EDG cooling flexible hose every 12 years as specified by Exelon’s procedure and vendor information. As a result, a flexible coupling hose remained in service for approximately 22 years and was subject to thermal degradation and aging that eventually lead to the failure of EDG No. 1 during a surveillance test on January 4. 2016. In addition, based on analysis of hose failure and review of past operability, the NRC determined that EDG No. 1 was inoperable for a period greater than its technical specification allowed outage time of seven days.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades Nuclear Plant) EA-15-039

On May 16, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session. The commitments were made by Palisades as part of a settlement agreement between Palisades and the NRC regarding apparent violations of NRC requirements. The agreement resolves the apparent violations identified during an investigation into a Palisades leaking Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT). Palisades agreed to a number of corrective actions, including, but not limited to: (1) ensuring site personnel understand lessons learned from this matter, (2) sharing lessons learned from this matter with other reactor licensees, (3) reviewing the applicable procedures in light of the lessons learned from events associated with leakage of the SIRWT and revise these procedures as appropriate, and (4) modification to its current program of public outreach at Palisades. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC has agreed to refrain from issuing a proposed imposition of a civil penalty and a Notice of Violation.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) EA-15-247

On April 11, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a Severity Level III Problem involving two related violations of NRC requirements. The first violation involved the failure to conduct compensatory fire watches as required by Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's corporate procedures and 10 CFR 50.48. Specifically, on multiple occasions between June 1, 2012, and June 26, 2014, fire watch personnel failed to examine the areas involved in the hourly fire watch postings for evidence of fire or conditions that may lead to a fire. The second violation involved the failure to maintain complete and accurate records as required by 10 CFR 50.9(a). Specifically, on multiple occasions during the same time frame, log sheets for hourly fire watches were falsified when an individual initialed that fire watches were completed when in fact, these fire watches had not been performed.

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3) EA-15-100

On April 6, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution mediation session held on February 19, 2016. The commitments were made by Entergy as part of a settlement agreement between Entergy and the NRC regarding the deliberate violations of 10 CFR 50.9, “Complete and accuracy of information,” 10 CFR 50.48, “Fire protection,” and 10 CFR 73.56(f)(3), “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants,” requirements. The violations involved seven individuals at Waterford who deliberately failed to conduct compensatory hourly fire watch inspections and falsified their fire watch tour logs, a licensee supervisor who deliberately failed to identify and take corrective actions when provided with information of suspected wrongdoing by fire watch individuals, and a licensee manager who deliberately provided incomplete and inaccurate information to an access authorization reviewing official regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of a contract fire watch individual. Entergy agreed to a number corrective actions including, but not limited to: (1) conducting an Entergy Nuclear Fleet common causes evaluation, and, if general industry insights are identified, sharing them at an industry forum, (2) revising or issuing fleet-wide procedures to enhance Entergy’s management and oversight of supplemental workers, (3) provide the common requirements for fire watch programs, and (4) provide a process to address requests for the reinstatement of unescorted access authorization (UAA) for workers whose UAA has been temporarily suspended. In consideration of the commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed to not issue a civil penalty nor a Notice of Violation.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (Wolf Creek Generating Station) EA-15-170

On January 27, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation for violations of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information," and 10 CFR 55.25, "Incapacitation because of disability or illness." Specifically, from June 30, 2006 to July 9, 2015, the licensee failed to report a permanent disability of an NRC licensed operator. Additionally, on January 10, 2010, the licensee submitted an NRC licensed operator application that certified the medical fitness of the applicant without a necessary restricting license condition. Based, in part, on the inaccurate information, the NRC issued the applicant a renewed operator license without the required restricting license condition on February 25, 2010. These two violations represent a Severity Level III problem.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, September 05, 2017