

## McGuire 2

# 1Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings

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## Initiating Events

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## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2014

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials and Ignition Sources in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program**

•Green: An NRC-identified Green NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4, “Fire Protection Program (FPP),” was identified for the licensee’s failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 exterior doghouses in accordance with the FPP requirements of Nuclear System Directive (NSD)-313, “Control of Transient Fire Loads.” Specifically, temporary electric portable heaters were energized for several days without implementing required hourly fire watches, locating the energized heaters greater than prescribed separation distances from safety-related equipment, and preventing other transient combustible materials from being located near the heaters. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and took corrective actions to de-energize the heaters, distance the heaters away from safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables, and remove unnecessary transient combustibles from the area.

The failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency (PD) . The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, a fire could have affected nearby safety-related feedwater isolation valve electrical cables which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions (H.4). (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2014005](#) (*pdf*)

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## Barrier Integrity

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

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