


Browns Ferry 1

4Q/2013 Performance Indicators

The solid trend line represents the current reporting period.

Licensee's General Comments: none

Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs




Thresholds: White > 3.0 Yellow > 6.0 Red > 25.0

Notes

Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Unplanned scrams	0	0	0	0	1.0	0	0	0
Critical hours	2183.0	2184.0	2208.0	1182.3	1954.2	2184.0	2208.0	2209.0
Indicator value	0.9	0	0	0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8

Licensee Comments: none

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs




Thresholds: White > 6.0

Notes

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Unplanned power changes	0	1.0	0	0	1.0	0	1.0	0
Critical hours	2183.0	2184.0	2208.0	1182.3	1954.2	2184.0	2208.0	2209.0
Indicator value	2.6	3.2	1.6	0.9	1.9	0.9	1.9	1.6

Licensee Comments: none

Unplanned Scrams with Complications




Thresholds: White > 1.0

Notes

Unplanned Scrams with Complications	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Scrams with complications	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indicator value	1.0	0.0						

Licensee Comments: none

Safety System Functional Failures (BWR)



Thresholds: White > 6.0

Notes

Safety System Functional Failures (BWR)	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Safety System Functional Failures	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Indicator value	5	4	2	2	1	0	0	1

Licensee Comments:

4Q/13: LER 50-259/2013-007-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable Due to an Inadvertent Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System

4Q/12: The following LERs were once considered Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFWA 805 Transition and counted as a single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, LER 259/2012-004-00, LER 259/2012-007-00, and LER 259/2012-007-01. Based on discussions with the NRC and new guidance in NUREG 1022 these LERs are no longer considered to be SSFFs. Based on this new guidance, the SSFF reported in April 2012 are removed for BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3. Changes to data were made on January 14, 2013, by BFN Licensing.

3Q/12: A Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) was presented at the October 17, 2012, Reactor Oversight Process Task Force Meeting related to the application of NUREG 1022 guidance for counting additional failures as a single Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF). This FAQ could impact current or previously submitted data. NUREG 1022 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFWA 805. The following LERs were once considered SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFWA 805 Transition and counted as a single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, LER 259/2012-004-00, LER 259/2012-007-00, and LER 259/2012-007-01. Based on discussions with the NRC and new guidance in NUREG 1022 these LERs are no longer considered to be SSFFs.

3Q/12: A Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) was presented at the October 17, 2012, Reactor Oversight Process Task Force Meeting related to the application of NEI 99-02 guidance for counting additional failures as a single Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF). This FAQ could impact current or previously submitted data. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are SSFFs identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition. The following LERs are SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in 2nd Quarter 2012: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported 2nd Quarter of 2012.

3Q/12: NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition. The following LERs are SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in 2nd Quarter 2012: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported 2nd Quarter of 2012.


2Q/12: LER 259/2012-006-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Turbine Failed to Trip Using the Manual Trip Pushbutton. The following LERs are Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are SSFFs identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in the 3rd Quarter of 2012. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported in the 2nd Quarter 2012.

2Q/12: LER 259/2012-006-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Turbine Failed to Trip Using the Manual Trip Pushbutton. The following LERs were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition and are due to the same condition. In accordance with NEI 99-02 section 2.2, the following LERs count as single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00 - Unanalyzed Conditions Discovered During NFPA 805 Transition Review, LER 259/2012-002-00 - Fault Propagation During A Postulated Appendix R Event Could Result In An Inability To Close Motor Operated Valves, LER 259/2012-003-00 - Reactor Protection System Circuit Could Potentially Remain Energized During An Appendix R Fire, and LER 259/2012-004-00 - Fire Damage to Cables in Fire Areas Could Cause a Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump to Spuriously Start.

2Q/12: LER 259/2012-006-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Turbine Failed to Trip Using the Manual Trip Pushbutton. The following LERs were once considered Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, LER 259/2012-004-00, LER 259/2012-007-00, and LER 259/2012-007-01. Based on discussions with the NRC and new guidance in NUREG 1022 these LERs are no longer considered to be SSFFs.

1Q/12: LER 259/2011-008-01, High Vibrations on High Pressure Coolant Injection Booster Pump Thrust Bearings

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
UAI (Δ CDF)	-2.06E-08	-3.16E-08	-3.66E-08	-3.47E-08	-2.17E-08	-1.60E-08	1.93E-08	4.61E-08
URI (Δ CDF)	7.87E-07	8.15E-07	8.45E-07	1.96E-06	2.09E-06	1.97E-06	2.03E-06	3.32E-06
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Indicator value	7.70E-07	7.80E-07	8.10E-07	1.90E-06	2.10E-06	2.00E-06	2.00E-06	3.40E-06

Licensee Comments:

4Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from the highest worth single failure (1.23E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07. There was one additional failure during the 4th Quarter 2013. On 11/23/2013, EDG A was removed from service to repair a fuel fitting which failed during a run.

3Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run (1.21E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

2Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run (1.18E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

1Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run (1.16E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07. MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013. On December 22, 2012, the Emergency AC Power system experienced a failure that was incorrectly categorized as a load/run failure

instead of a run failure. The failure mode was corrected resulting in the performance indicator color changing from green to white in the 4th Quarter of 2012. This issue is being tracked by PERs 704392 and 669462.

4Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ($1.09\text{E}-06$) has been replaced by a value of $5.00\text{E}-07$.


4Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ($1.09\text{E}-06$) has been replaced by a value of $5.00\text{E}-07$.

3Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ($1.07\text{E}-06$) has been replaced by a value of $5.00\text{E}-07$. The A Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outage scheduled to be performed in the third quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468).

2Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ($1.05\text{E}-06$) has been replaced by a value of $5.00\text{E}-07$. The D Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages scheduled to be performed in the second quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468).

1Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ($1.03\text{E}-06$) has been replaced by a value of $5.00\text{E}-07$. Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468). The B and C Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages scheduled to be performed in the first quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468). Revised Emergency Diesel Generator run hours to exclude the run hours associated with (1) the first hour of run time after breaker closure and (2) unloaded run hours (FAQ 480). Revised Emergency Diesel Generator supercomponent boundary to include fuel oil transfer pumps/valves (FAQ 484).

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
UAI (ΔCDF)	3.92E-07	4.76E-07	4.45E-07	4.72E-07	6.75E-07	6.47E-07	4.89E-07	4.89E-07
URI (ΔCDF)	5.52E-07	7.26E-07	5.50E-07	5.50E-07	9.35E-07	9.35E-07	9.35E-07	9.35E-07
PLE	NO							
Indicator value	9.40E-07	1.20E-06	1.00E-06	1.00E-06	1.60E-06	1.60E-06	1.40E-06	1.40E-06

Licensee Comments:

4Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Turbine Driven Pump Demand Failure (5.48E-07) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

3Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Turbine Driven Pump Demand Failure (5.48E-07) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

2Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Turbine Driven Pump Demand Failure (5.48E-07) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

1Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Turbine Driven Pump Demand Failure (5.49E-07) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07. MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013. High Pressure Injection System indicator color changed from green to white. The High Pressure Injection System indicator was white in the 2nd Quarter of 2012. No new failures have occurred since that time.


3Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

2Q/12: The unit 1 HPCI system changed from green to white this quarter. There are 4 failures currently counted against HPCI (reports #527, #678, #701, #819) and excessive unavailability due to steam admission valve leakage. Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

2Q/12: The unit 1 HPCI system changed from green to white this quarter. There are 4 failures currently counted against HPCI (reports #527, #678, #701, #819) and excessive unavailability due to steam admission valve leakage.

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468). 4/12 Revised unplanned unavailability in May 2011 to count from point of discovery. This is a reduction in unplanned unavailability of about 17 hours.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
UAI (Δ CDF)	1.35E-08	1.36E-08	4.41E-08	4.85E-08	1.12E-07	1.37E-07	1.28E-07	1.19E-07
URI (Δ CDF)	-3.45E-08	-3.50E-08	-3.54E-08	-3.58E-08	-1.62E-07	-1.63E-07	-1.64E-07	-1.64E-07
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Indicator value	-2.10E-08	-2.10E-08	8.70E-09	1.30E-08	-5.00E-08	-2.60E-08	-3.60E-08	-4.50E-08

Licensee Comments:

3Q/13: Added previously uncounted RCIC injection demands. Added demand data for Unit 1 in April 2011. BFNs interpretation of what RCIC demands need to be counted changed for RCIC. This did not impact the MSPI color of RCIC.


1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

1Q/13: MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

1Q/12: Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes


Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
UAI (ΔCDF)	1.04E-09	5.91E-09	1.33E-08	1.66E-08	9.47E-08	1.01E-07	8.76E-08	9.02E-08
URI (ΔCDF)	-2.80E-08	-2.83E-08	-2.85E-08	-2.86E-08	-1.16E-07	-1.17E-07	-1.17E-07	-1.99E-07
PLE	NO							
Indicator value	-2.70E-08	-2.20E-08	-1.50E-08	-1.20E-08	-2.20E-08	-1.60E-08	-2.90E-08	-1.10E-07

Licensee Comments:

1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
UAI (ΔCDF)	2.18E-07	1.60E-07	1.65E-07	1.75E-07	1.41E-07	1.58E-07	2.78E-07	2.85E-07
URI (ΔCDF)	-6.66E-08	-4.51E-08	-4.51E-08	-4.51E-08	-2.46E-08	-2.46E-08	-2.46E-08	-2.46E-08
PLE	NO							
Indicator value	1.50E-07	1.10E-07	1.20E-07	1.30E-07	1.20E-07	1.30E-07	2.50E-07	2.60E-07

Licensee Comments:


1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

3Q/12: 2nd Quarter 2012 Data were updated. On April 4, 2012, B2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump failed to start when given a start signal. No indicator color was impacted by this event.

2Q/12: 2nd Quarter 2012 Data were updated. On April 4, 2012, B2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump failed to start when given a start signal. No indicator color was impacted by this event.

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).

Reactor Coolant System Activity



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0


Notes

Reactor Coolant System Activity	1/12	2/12	3/12	4/12	5/12	6/12	7/12	8/12	9/12	10/12	11/12	12/12
Maximum activity	0.000161	0.000174	0.000172	0.000100	0.000177	0.000185	0.000192	0.000143	0.000202	0.000210	N/A	0.000079
Technical specification limit	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Indicator value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0

Reactor Coolant System Activity	1/13	2/13	3/13	4/13	5/13	6/13	7/13	8/13	9/13	10/13	11/13	12/13
Maximum activity	0.000110	0.000084	0.000150	0.000082	0.000081	0.000081	0.000123	0.000163	0.000069	0.000174	0.000184	0.000182
Technical specification limit	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Indicator value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Licensee Comments: none

Reactor Coolant System Leakage



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0


Notes

Reactor Coolant System Leakage	1/12	2/12	3/12	4/12	5/12	6/12	7/12	8/12	9/12	10/12	11/12	12/12
Maximum leakage	2.230	2.940	2.060	2.290	2.390	2.210	2.130	2.960	2.190	2.200	N/A	1.970
Technical specification limit	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Indicator value	7.4	9.8	6.9	7.6	8.0	7.4	7.1	9.9	7.3	7.3	N/A	6.6
Reactor Coolant System Leakage	1/13	2/13	3/13	4/13	5/13	6/13	7/13	8/13	9/13	10/13	11/13	12/13
Maximum leakage	2.010	1.960	1.950	1.970	1.960	2.120	2.030	2.100	2.100	2.090	2.100	2.070
Technical specification limit	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Indicator value	6.7	6.5	6.5	6.6	6.5	7.1	6.8	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.9

Licensee Comments:

6/13: The Maximum RCS Identified Leakage (gpm) was updated to reflect the correct leakage. This condition was identified in PER 694496. This affected July 2012 to December 2012. There was no color change.

Drill/Exercise Performance




Thresholds: White < 90.0% Yellow < 70.0%

Notes

Drill/Exercise Performance	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Successful opportunities	13.0	6.0	34.0	14.0	24.0	26.0	41.0	70.0
Total opportunities	13.0	6.0	34.0	14.0	24.0	26.0	42.0	70.0
Indicator value	98.7%	98.7%	98.6%	98.9%	99.2%	99.3%	99.3%	99.6%

Licensee Comments: none

ERO Drill Participation




Thresholds: White < 80.0% Yellow < 60.0%

Notes

ERO Drill Participation	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Participating Key personnel	74.0	73.0	77.0	73.0	76.0	76.0	79.0	81.0
Total Key personnel	74.0	73.0	77.0	73.0	76.0	77.0	80.0	82.0
Indicator value	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	98.7%	98.8%	98.8%

Licensee Comments: none

Alert & Notification System




Thresholds: White < 94.0% Yellow < 90.0%

Notes

Alert & Notification System	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
Successful siren-tests	800	799	799	899	900	800	932	622
Total sirens-tests	800	800	800	900	900	800	932	624
Indicator value	99.8%	99.8%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%

Licensee Comments: none

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness




Thresholds: White > 2.0 Yellow > 5.0

Notes

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
High radiation area occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very high radiation area occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unintended exposure occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indicator value	0							

Licensee Comments: none

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent



Thresholds: White > 1.0 Yellow > 3.0

Notes

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12	4Q/12	1Q/13	2Q/13	3Q/13	4Q/13
RETS/ODCM occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indicator value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Licensee Comments: none

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page.

 [Action Matrix Summary](#) | [Inspection Findings Summary](#) | [PI Summary](#) | [Reactor Oversight Process](#)

Last Modified: January 22, 2014