


## Browns Ferry 2

### 3Q/2012 Performance Indicators

Licensee's General Comments: none

#### Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs




Thresholds: White > 3.0 Yellow > 6.0 Red > 25.0

#### Notes

Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Unplanned scrams	0	0	1.0	0	0	0	0	0
Critical hours	2209.0	1344.0	1438.2	2208.0	2209.0	2183.0	2184.0	2208.0
Indicator value	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Licensee Comments: none

### Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs




Thresholds: White > 6.0

#### Notes

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Unplanned power changes	0	0	1.0	1.0	0	0	0	0
Critical hours	2209.0	1344.0	1438.2	2208.0	2209.0	2183.0	2184.0	2208.0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0</b>

Licensee Comments: none

### Unplanned Scrams with Complications




Thresholds: White > 1.0

#### Notes

Unplanned Scrams with Complications	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Scrams with complications	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>0.0</b>							

Licensee Comments: none

### Safety System Functional Failures (BWR)



Thresholds: White > 6.0

#### Notes

Safety System Functional Failures (BWR)	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Safety System Functional Failures	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>

#### Licensee Comments:

3Q/12: LER 260/2012-002-00, High Pressure Injection System Rendered Inoperable Due to an Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Valve. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition. The following LERs are SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in 2nd Quarter 2012: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported 2nd Quarter of 2012.

3Q/12: LER 260/2012-002-00, High Pressure Injection System Rendered Inoperable Due to an Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Valve. A Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) was presented at the October 17, 2012, Reactor Oversight Process Task Force Meeting related to the application of NEI 99-02 guidance for counting additional failures as a single Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF). This FAQ could impact current or previously submitted data. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are SSFFs identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition. The following LERs are SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in 2nd Quarter 2012: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-

00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported 2nd Quarter of 2012.

2Q/12: The following LERs are Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are SSFFs identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in the 3rd Quarter of 2012. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported in the 2nd Quarter 2012.


2Q/12: The following LERs were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition and are due to the same condition. In accordance with NEI 99-02 section 2.2, the following LERs count as single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00 - Unanalyzed Conditions Discovered During NFPA 805 Transition Review, LER 259/2012-002-00 - Fault Propagation During A Postulated Appendix R Event Could Result In An Inability To Close Motor Operated Valves, LER 259/2012-003-00 - Reactor Protection System Circuit Could Potentially Remain Energized During An Appendix R Fire, and LER 259/2012-004-00 - Fire Damage to Cables in Fire Areas Could Cause a Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump to Spuriously Start.

4Q/11: LER 260/2011-001-00, Core Spray Relay Found in Incorrect Position

2Q/11: LER 259/2011-002-00, Loss of Safety Function (SDC) Resulting from Loss of Power from C EDG Due to Oil Leak

4Q/10: LER 259/2010-001-00 (Units 1, 2, 3) - Unit 1, 2, and 3 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instruction Procedures Contain Incorrect Operator Manual Actions

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
UAI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	8.10E-08	6.79E-08	7.45E-08	1.00E-07	7.85E-08	-9.28E-10	-2.25E-08	-3.20E-08
URI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	-1.74E-07	-2.59E-07	5.84E-07	6.84E-07	6.84E-07	7.86E-07	8.14E-07	8.43E-07
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Indicator value	-9.30E-08	-1.90E-07	6.60E-07	7.80E-07	7.60E-07	7.80E-07	7.90E-07	8.10E-07

#### Licensee Comments:

3Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ( $1.06E-06$ ) has been replaced by a value of  $5.00E-07$ . The A Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outage scheduled to be performed in the third quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468).

2Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ( $1.04E-06$ ) has been replaced by a value of  $5.00E-07$ . The D Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages scheduled to be performed in the second quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468).

1Q/12: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ( $1.02E-06$ ) has been replaced by a value of  $5.00E-07$ . Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline

Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468). The B and C Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages scheduled to be performed in the first quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468). Revised Emergency Diesel Generator run hours to exclude the run hours associated with (1) the first hour of run time after breaker closure and (2) unloaded run hours (FAQ 480). Revised Emergency Diesel Generator supercomponent boundary to include fuel oil transfer pumps/valves (FAQ 484).

4Q/11: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ( $7.17E-07$ ) has been replaced by a value of  $5.00E-07$ . Problem Evaluation Report 439980 documented that D DG Failure was incorrectly classified as a Start Failure in EPIX Report 624 associated with Heat Exchanger Fouling. Based on the Past Operability performed on D DG, it was determined that the failure of the DG would have been a load-run failure. This failure classification does not result in a significant impact to MSPI calculations.

3Q/11: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011. The MSPI Risk Cap is also invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ( $7.17E-07$ ) has been replaced by a value of  $5.00E-07$ .

3Q/11: Risk Cap Invoked. Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011. The MSPI Risk Cap is also invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run ( $7.17E-07$ ) has been replaced by a value of  $5.00E-07$ . Problem Evaluation Report 439980 documented that D DG Failure was incorrectly classified as a Start Failure in EPIX Report 624 associated with Heat Exchanger Fouling. Based on the Past Operability performed on D DG, it was determined that the failure of the DG would have been a load-run failure. This failure classification does not result in a significant impact to MSPI calculations.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011. Problem Evaluation Report 439980 documented that D DG Failure was incorrectly classified as a Start Failure in EPIX Report 624 associated with Heat Exchanger Fouling. Based on the Past Operability performed on D DG, it was determined that the failure of the DG would have been a load-run failure. This failure classification does not result in a significant impact to MSPI calculations.


1Q/11: Problem Evaluation Report 439980 documented that D DG Failure was incorrectly classified as a Start Failure in EPIX Report 624 associated with Heat Exchanger Fouling. Based on the Past Operability performed on D DG, it was determined that the failure of the DG would have been a load-run failure. This failure classification does not result in a significant impact to MSPI calculations.

4Q/10: Changed PRA Parameter(s). In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010.

4Q/10: In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010. Problem Evaluation Report 439980 documented that D DG Failure was incorrectly classified as a Start Failure in EPIX Report 624 associated with Heat Exchanger Fouling. Based on the Past Operability performed on D DG, it was determined that the failure of the DG would have been a load-run failure. This failure classification does not result

in a significant impact to MSPI calculations.

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
UAI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	5.43E-07	3.51E-07	1.27E-07	1.07E-07	2.09E-07	5.46E-08	6.13E-08	7.15E-08
URI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	-1.25E-07	-1.25E-07	-1.26E-07	-1.04E-07	-1.04E-07	-7.21E-08	-7.23E-08	-7.04E-08
PLE	NO							
Indicator value	4.20E-07	2.30E-07	1.70E-09	3.30E-09	1.10E-07	-1.80E-08	-1.10E-08	1.20E-09

#### Licensee Comments:

3Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. Changes were also made to account for Unplanned Unavailability hours for High Pressure Injection System for the month of June 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

2Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. Changes were also made to account for Unplanned Unavailability hours for High Pressure Injection System for the month of June 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

1Q/12: Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468). Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).


4Q/11: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

3Q/11: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011.

4Q/10: Changed PRA Parameter(s). In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010.

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
UAI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	1.24E-07	1.29E-07	1.34E-07	1.53E-07	1.59E-07	1.54E-07	1.46E-07	-1.85E-09
URI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	1.06E-07	1.05E-07	1.04E-07	7.52E-08	7.45E-08	7.09E-08	7.02E-08	-3.46E-08
PLE	NO							
Indicator value	2.30E-07	2.30E-07	2.40E-07	2.30E-07	2.30E-07	2.20E-07	2.20E-07	-3.60E-08

#### Licensee Comments:

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).


3Q/11: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011.

4Q/10: Changed PRA Parameter(s). In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model

effective October 2010.

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
UAI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	1.87E-09	2.68E-09	2.69E-09	6.08E-09	5.55E-09	8.00E-09	7.36E-09	5.64E-09
URI ( $\Delta$ CDF)	3.96E-09	2.67E-09	4.06E-09	2.45E-09	2.50E-09	1.77E-09	3.68E-09	4.39E-09
PLE	NO							
Indicator value	5.80E-09	5.40E-09	6.70E-09	8.50E-09	8.00E-09	9.80E-09	1.10E-08	1.00E-08

#### Licensee Comments:


1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).

3Q/11: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011.

4Q/10: Changed PRA Parameter(s). In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010.

### Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

#### Notes

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
UAI (ΔCDF)	3.52E-10	4.12E-10	3.87E-10	6.27E-08	7.36E-08	6.85E-08	4.99E-08	5.20E-08
URI (ΔCDF)	1.69E-08	1.69E-08	9.67E-09	-3.78E-08	-3.78E-08	-4.97E-08	-3.37E-08	-3.37E-08
PLE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Indicator value	1.70E-08	1.70E-08	1.00E-08	2.50E-08	3.60E-08	1.90E-08	1.60E-08	1.80E-08

Licensee Comments:

3Q/12: 2nd Quarter 2012 Data were updated. On April 4, 2012, B2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump failed to start when given a start signal. No indicator color was impacted by this event.

2Q/12: 2nd Quarter 2012 Data were updated. On April 4, 2012, B2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump failed to start when given a start signal. No indicator color was impacted by this event.

1Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised PRA parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 006 to reflect CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4. CAFTA PRA Model Revision 4 was performed in accordance with NEI 99-02 to evaluate the impacts of adjusting the Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability in conjunction with the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outages (FAQ 468).

3Q/11: Changed PRA Parameter(s). Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011.

3Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 Rev 005 to reflect BFN CAFTA PRA Model Rev 3 which was approved in June 2011. MSPI PRA Parameters based on this model are effective as of Third Quarter 2011. Problem Evaluation Report 468993 documents changes to RHRSW pump demand failures to run failures on failure reports 573, 584, and 692.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011.

2Q/11: Revised MSPI Basis Document and MSPI PRA Parameters based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-0003 rev 003 to correct PRA Model errors associated with the modeling of EECW (Cooling Water System 2) North Header Unavailability and not modeling a failure of a normally operating EECW pump to restart following loss of offsite power. These changes are effective as of Second Quarter 2011. Problem Evaluation Report 468993 documents changes to RHRSW pump demand failures to run failures on failure reports 573, 584, and 692.


1Q/11: Problem Evaluation Report 468993 documents changes to RHRSW pump demand failures to run failures on failure reports 573, 584, and 692.

4Q/10: In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010. In January 2011, an error was identified in BFN PRA model rev 2. This error affects the FVUAP terms for the north and south EECW headers. Service Request 311078 has been initiated to address this error.

4Q/10: In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010. In January 2011, an error was identified in BFN PRA model rev 2. This error affects the FVUAP terms for the north and south EECW headers. Service Request 311078 has been initiated to address this error. Problem Evaluation Report 468993 documents changes to RHRSW pump demand failures to run failures on failure reports 573, 584, and 692.

4Q/10: Changed PRA Parameter(s). In September 2010, Revision 2 of the Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model became the model of record. All MSPI Parameters have been updated to reflect Revision 2 of the PRA model effective October 2010.

### Reactor Coolant System Activity



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0

#### Notes


Reactor Coolant System Activity	10/10	11/10	12/10	1/11	2/11	3/11	4/11	5/11	6/11	7/11	8/11	9/11
Maximum activity	0.000091	0.000116	0.000082	0.000084	0.000104	N/A	0.000072	0.000041	0.000064	0.000039	0.000033	0.000057
Technical specification limit	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Indicator value	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0

Reactor Coolant System Activity	10/11	11/11	12/11	1/12	2/12	3/12	4/12	5/12	6/12	7/12	8/12	9/12
Maximum activity	0.000061	0.000058	0.000060	0.000039	0.000060	0.000058	0.000038	0.000056	0.000063	0.000060	0.000067	0.000063
Technical specification limit	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Indicator value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Licensee Comments: none

### Reactor Coolant System Leakage




Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0

#### Notes

Reactor Coolant System Leakage	10/10	11/10	12/10	1/11	2/11	3/11	4/11	5/11	6/11	7/11	8/11	9/11
Maximum leakage	2.560	2.790	2.850	3.000	3.020	N/A	1.680	1.450	1.610	1.490	1.850	1.920
Technical specification limit	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Indicator value	8.5	9.3	9.5	10.0	10.1	N/A	5.6	4.8	5.4	5.0	6.2	6.4
Reactor Coolant System Leakage	10/11	11/11	12/11	1/12	2/12	3/12	4/12	5/12	6/12	7/12	8/12	9/12
Maximum leakage	2.060	1.450	1.430	1.610	1.450	1.450	1.480	1.430	1.450	1.880	1.720	1.860
Technical specification limit	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Indicator value	6.9	4.8	4.8	5.4	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.8	6.3	5.7	6.2

Licensee Comments: none

### Drill/Exercise Performance




Thresholds: White < 90.0% Yellow < 70.0%

#### Notes

Drill/Exercise Performance	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Successful opportunities	39.0	25.0	24.0	37.0	111.0	13.0	6.0	34.0
Total opportunities	40.0	26.0	24.0	38.0	112.0	13.0	6.0	34.0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>98.5%</b>	<b>98.1%</b>	<b>98.3%</b>	<b>98.1%</b>	<b>98.4%</b>	<b>98.7%</b>	<b>98.7%</b>	<b>98.6%</b>

Licensee Comments: none

### ERO Drill Participation




Thresholds: White < 80.0% Yellow < 60.0%

#### Notes

ERO Drill Participation	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Participating Key personnel	74.0	76.0	77.0	72.0	80.0	74.0	73.0	77.0
Total Key personnel	74.0	77.0	79.0	75.0	80.0	74.0	73.0	77.0
Indicator value	100.0%	98.7%	97.5%	96.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Licensee Comments: none

### Alert & Notification System



Thresholds: White < 94.0% Yellow < 90.0%


#### Notes

Alert & Notification System	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
Successful siren-tests	699	700	599	896	799	800	799	799
Total sirens-tests	700	700	600	900	800	800	800	800
Indicator value	99.6%	99.7%	99.9%	99.8%	99.8%	99.8%	99.8%	99.9%

Licensee Comments:

2Q/11: Siren Test canceled for May 9, 2011 due to severe weather in the area.

### Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness




Thresholds: White > 2.0 Yellow > 5.0

#### Notes

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
High radiation area occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very high radiation area occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unintended exposure occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Indicator value</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Licensee Comments: none

### RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent



Thresholds: White > 1.0 Yellow > 3.0

#### Notes

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent	4Q/10	1Q/11	2Q/11	3Q/11	4Q/11	1Q/12	2Q/12	3Q/12
RETS/ODCM occurrences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indicator value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Licensee Comments: none

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page.

 [Action Matrix Summary](#) | [Inspection Findings Summary](#) | [PI Summary](#) | [Reactor Oversight Process](#)

*Last Modified: November 30, 2012*