

Turkey Point 4

2Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to provide adequate instructions when working on the reactor protection system results in reactor trip

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee started corrective maintenance on the Unit 4 reactor protection system with an inadequate procedure. As a result, a reactor trip occurred when a reactor trip circuit was not placed on bypass as an initial condition needed to safely complete the work. During the event investigation, the licensee determined that neither the work order, nor the pre-job review identified the need to place the affected train of the reactor protection system on the bypass breaker.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it affects the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of an event that upsets plant stability by resulting in a reactor trip. The finding was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) per SDP Phase 1 determination because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control H.3(b) because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work and plant conditions that may affect work activities, resulting in a reactor trip. (1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Evaluation Of Damaged Rod Control Extension Results In High Risk Evolution And Risk Condition Yellow

A Self-revealing Finding was identified when the licensee did not manage maintenance activities adequately to identify and repair a damaged rod control drive component on Unit 3 prior to setting the reactor vessel closure head on the reactor vessel flange. As a result, the subsequently filled reactor coolant system had to be drained again to 2 feet below the reactor vessel flange (a high risk activity) placing the unit in the licensee's risk condition Yellow for repairs. The licensee documented this in condition report (CR) 2009-10284.

The finding was more than minor because it affected the Human Performance attribute of Initiating Events cornerstone and the licensee's risk assessment failed to anticipate that the maintenance activity could result in another plant draining evolution with its inherent risk of an initiating event of loss of inventory or shutdown cooling. With appropriate mitigating equipment available, the finding screened to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding affected the cross cutting area of Human Performance, Work Practices, Supervisory & Management Oversight (H.4(c)) because the licensee did not appropriately provide oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. (1R20)

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Maintenance causes smoke and fumes to enter the control room causing fire alarms.

A Self-Revealing finding of very low safety significance was identified after smoke and welding fumes from maintenance entered the control room through the ventilation system causing smoke alarms. When identified, the licensee stopped the maintenance and entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR 2008-17166.

The Initiating Events cornerstone was affected when smoke alarms occurred requiring the operators to initiate actions to protect themselves and the plant. The event screened as Green when mitigating systems remained unaffected and would have functioned, if needed. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, Work Practices, (H.4.b) when personnel did not follow procedures in developing the work package for metalizing operations outside of the control room. (1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2008003](#) (pdf)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to properly perform a procedure results in damage to an RHR pump

A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications 6.8.1.a, Procedures, was identified when operators did not properly align the RHR system from shutdown cooling mode to injection mode. As a result, the 4A RHR pump was left running with no suction source causing a failure of the pump mechanical seal and minor flooding in the Unit 4, A RHR pump room. The pump was not available for either injection or shutdown cooling operations until the seal was replaced. The issue was documented in the corrective action program as AR 1644427 and a root cause investigation was initiated.

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Scaffold blocked access to fire areas used in a control room evacuation event

The inspectors identified a Non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance when scaffolding was placed as a barricade against personnel access to doors to fire zones 108B and 104. The barricade impeded access to the 3B and 3A DC Equipment rooms through doors that are used in the event of a control room evacuation event and may have delayed or prevented operator actions to mitigate a potential fire. When identified to the licensee, the scaffolding was promptly removed and the problem was documented in AR 594112.

Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, the inspectors assigned a moderate degradation rating to the deficiency because of the likely inability of the plant operators being able to implement the procedural actions within the licensee stipulated time, and the issue was more than minor.

A regional Senior Reactor Analyst evaluated the performance deficiency under the Phase 3 protocol of the Significance Determination Process. Based upon the results of that evaluation, the performance deficiency was characterized as of very low safety significance (Green) for both units. The evaluation was performed via hand calculation using elements of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, NUREG-6850 as amended by Frequently Asked Questions under the National Fire Protection Association 0805 pilot program. A simplified Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) failure probability based upon Westinghouse high temperature seals was used. Key human failure probabilities were estimated using standard techniques. Conditional core damage probabilities, due to a spurious Safety Injection, were derived from the licensee's most current model results. Major assumptions and dominant accident sequence for Units 3 and 4 were discussed and included in analysis section of 1R05 in the inspection report.

The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Control (H.3.a) when the scaffold-barricade was constructed without a planned contingency or compensatory measure to assure that the fire mitigation activity could be accomplished within design time constraints. (1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure To Maintain Lighting Impedes Compensatory Measure For Failed Fire Detection.

The inspectors identified a Green finding for failure to correct failed lighting in a Unit 4 electrical penetration room that prevented the hourly rover from adequately compensating for fire detection that was out of service. The inspectors determined that maintaining lighting in areas of degraded fire protection features is not a specific NRC requirement. The licensee documented this in CR 2009-17533.

The finding was more than minor because it affected the External Event attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and failure to correct a problem that impacted the ability of fire watch personnel to adequately compensate for out of service fire detection equipment could reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant fire event. The inspectors evaluated this finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination. The finding was screened as Green because the assigned fire degradation rating was low. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, Appropriate & Timely Corrective Actions (P.1(d)) because the licensee did not document and correct a problem that was previously identified. (1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Recurring Problems with Alternate Shutdown Communication Equipment

The inspectors identified a finding when the licensee did not identify and correct an adverse trend of recurring problems with the alternate shutdown communications system. When identified, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective actions program and initiated a review of reliability issues with the communications equipment.

The finding is more than minor because it affects the availability and reliability of the communications system used by plant operators to mitigate certain fire scenarios. The issue was of very low safety significance because an alternate communications system (radios) was available, if needed. The cause was related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution because the adverse trend of problems with alternate shutdown communications had not been identified nor corrected by the licensee commensurate with its safety significance. (IMC 305, P.1 (d)) (4OA2)

Inspection Report# : [2007004](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A May 21, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

PI&R

The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The threshold for initiating condition reports (CRs) was appropriately low, as evidenced by the types of problems identified and the number of CRs entered annually into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Employees were encouraged by management to initiate CRs. However, the team identified deficiency's associated with preventative maintenance (PM) scheduling in that a number of PMs were inadvertently scheduled past their due dates when the licensee began using the PM scheduling tool LCP.net. In addition, the team identified several examples of minor equipment issues that had not been identified by the licensee and entered into the CAP. When identified, the licensee entered these issues into the CAP. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.

The team determined that, overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work and plant operations.

Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns. Inspection Report# : [2010006](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : October 14, 2011