

Harris 1

1Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Nov 07, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Sprinkler System in Cable Spreading Room A Does Not Meet Licensee's Fire Protection Program Requirements

The team identified a non-cited violation of Shearon Harris Unit 1 operating license condition 2.F, for the licensee's failure to install the sprinkler system in Cable Spreading Room A (CSRA) in accordance with the approved fire protection program (FPP). Specifically, the installed system would not have been able to deliver the sprinkler system design density of 0.3 gallons per minute/square foot in CSRA, as stated in the FPP in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.2.3. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and established a continuous fire watch in CSRA as a compensatory measure in accordance with the Shearon Harris FPP.

Inspection Report# : [2008008](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Categorize Maintenance Rule Functional Failures

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) for the licensee's failure to categorize two failures of the condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation monitor (REM-3534) as maintenance rule functional failures and accordingly, failed to monitor the component as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1). The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report 283579.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems which responds to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition, Example 7.b provided in Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, states that violations of Paragraph 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2), failure to demonstrate effective control of performance or condition and not putting the affected Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) in (a)(1), are not minor because they necessarily involve degraded SSC performance or condition. The inspectors determined this finding is of very low safety significance because the REM-3534 is not a risk-significant component and a back-up means of detecting a primary to secondary leak, the steam generator blowdown radiation monitor, was functional during the time periods when REM-3534 was not functional. The finding occurred because of the two missed failures in 2005. All of the failures of REM-3534 since 2005 have been properly counted. Therefore, the cause of this finding was not associated with a cross-cutting area because it is not reflective of current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2008003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  May 29, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Incorrect test acceptance criteria for Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump discharge check valves 1SW-9 and 10 during test procedure OST-1214/1215.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for incorrect test acceptance criteria for Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump discharge check valves 1SW-9 and 10 during test procedure OST-1214/1215, ESW System Operability Train A/B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4-5-6-Defueled. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as condition report NCR 277362. The procedure was immediately placed on hold and planned corrective actions included revision of the ESW pump test procedures to directly observe absence of reverse rotation of the ESW pumps to verify adequate performance of the ESW pump discharge check valves.

This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern since the test procedure could have allowed an inoperable check valve to satisfactorily pass surveillance testing. Specifically, test criteria established would not ensure that the safety objective of preventing pump reverse rotation was achieved. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not result in the ESW pumps being inoperable.

Inspection Report# : [2008006](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  May 29, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to translate critical design attributes into drawings and the as-built condition of the plant.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to translate critical design attributes into drawings and the as-built condition of the plant. As a result, the fuel and air supplies to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) were susceptible to risk from impingement due to potential structural failures of a wall for two external events, tornado and seismic.

This finding is more than minor because it impacts the mitigating systems' cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency, although sufficient to exceed the critical deflection limits and result in cracking, was analyzed to not result in catastrophic collapse. This issue is documented in the corrective action program as NCRs 276674, 277720, and 279326.

Inspection Report# : [2008006](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Maintain Control Over the Station's Very High Radiation Areas

A self-revealing Green NCV was identified for the failure to maintain control of access to the station's very high radiation areas (VHRA), as required by 10 CFR 20.1602. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to maintain sufficient controls of access to VHRAs from the fall of 2006 through January 2008, contrary to 10 CFR

20.1602 and station procedural requirements. Licensee corrective actions included the retrieval and disposition of the security guard master keys, and developing more specific procedural guidance for key control and issuance at the station.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety

Significance:  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to monitor effluent releases from SFP filter backwash

The inspectors identified a non-cited (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1302 (a) for failure to make adequate surveys of radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas. The licensee altered the configuration of the vent stack effluent radiation monitors without determining the impact the change would make on the capability of the monitors to detect and measure radioactive materials in the effluent stream from the main plant vent stack and thus demonstrate compliance with the dose limits for individual members of the public as defined in 10 CFR 20.1301. This condition existed from approximately July 2000 to approximately September 2008. The change resulted in the licensee failing to monitor and attribute potential doses to the public from particulate material originating in the SFP filter backwash system, which resulted in underestimating the dose to a member of the public by up to 40%. The licensee provided a reasonable basis for the determination that in a bounding case neither the limits in 10 CFR 20.1301, 10 CFR 50 Appendix I nor 40 CFR 190 were exceeded. Licensee corrective actions included collection of in-plant samples to bound releases until the monitors are restored to the as designed configuration.

The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the Program/Process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and potentially affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. By removing the isokinetic sampling skids from service, the licensee could not be assured that the samples were representative of the effluents being released, and therefore the magnitude of the releases was unknown.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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