

# Wolf Creek 1

## 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

---

### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Jan 03, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance causes reactor trip.**

The inspectors documented a failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005, "Component Manipulation Control." Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005, requires shift manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components. While restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010. This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant response.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

---

### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Oct 11, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate Alternative Shutdown Procedure**

The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393. This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.

Inspection Report# : [2002008\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Sep 25, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes**

The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This noncited violation closes three unresolved items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06. This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Jul 10, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system**

The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system. Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

---

## **Barrier Integrity**

---

## **Emergency Preparedness**

---

## Occupational Radiation Safety

---

## Public Radiation Safety

---

## Physical Protection

---

## Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A May 17, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

### Identification and Resolution of Problems

The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : May 30, 2003