Event Notification Report for March 06, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED SOURCE LEAK TEST

The following is a summary of information received from the Georgia Radioactive Material Program (the Department) via email:

On January 6, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee, that on January 3, 2024, a nuclear medicine technologist was performing routine leak testing of sealed sources in preparation of returning the sources to the manufacturer. The leak test indicated one of the sealed sources (Co-57, 21.12 microcuries as of 2/1/2023, manufacturer: Eckert and Ziegler, model: PHI-0124, serial number: V6-599) had more than 0.005 microcuries of removable Co-57 contamination. The sealed source was secured, the radiation safety officer (RSO) was notified, and decontamination protocol was followed.

Post-decontamination surveys and wipe tests of the staff and department indicated that there was no detectable contamination in the department or on staff members. The sealed source and the waste generated during the decontamination process were placed in leakproof containers and marked as containing Co-57. All items are currently stored in the nuclear medicine hot lab. Disposal with a waste disposal company has been arranged.

Georgia NMED event number: 76

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was provided by the North Dakota Department of Health (the Department) via email:

"On February 28, 2024, EMCOR Facilities Services, Inc. reported that nine (9) single-face tritium exit signs belonging to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints were removed and improperly disposed of by an electrical subcontractor (Feininger Electric Works). The make, model, and serial numbers of these tritium exit signs are unknown.

"North American Signs was contracted by EMCOR Facilities Services, Inc. on November 02, 2023 to complete the scope of work on behalf of the Church. In turn, North American Signs subcontracted the work to be completed by Feininger Electric Works.

"North American Signs informed EMCOR Facilities Services, Inc. on February 6, 2024, that a Feininger Electric Works technician mistakenly discarded 9 tritium exit signs before they could be catalogued, packed, and shipped out for proper disposal. The signs were presumably collected from a general waste receptacle and could not be recovered.

"The Department is attempting to gather more specific information from the entities involved. Typically, each of these signs initially contain tritium in amounts greater than one (1) curie. As such, we are reporting this event under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i)."

NMED Event Number: ND240001

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0132 EST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a main feedwater isolation signal which resulted in steam generator lo-level reactor trip. The reactor trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed using the auxiliary feedwater and steam dump systems. Unit 1 is not affected.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The expected actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"All control rods are fully inserted. The cause of the main feedwater isolation is being investigated."

ACCIDENT MITIGATION - LOSS OF UPS COOLING

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"*** 8 Hour Notification was due at 1520 CST *** Follow up discussion of conditions after recovery determined that a report is required. This report restores reporting compliance.

"On March 5, 2024, at 0720 CST, the X-02 118V uninterruptible power supply air conditioning (UPS A/C) unit tripped with the associated emergency fan coil units (EFCUs) shut down for planned maintenance in the area. The X-01 UPS A/C unit was declared inoperable upon discovery due to a scheduled outage of support systems (Unit 1 station service water) via the safety function determination process. This placed the site in technical specification 3.7.20 condition A, B, and C to restore the UPS A/C system within one hour. The EFCUs were restarted at 0729 which satisfied condition B and C, and X-01 UPS A/C unit was aligned to Unit 2 cooling water at 0801, exiting condition A. The condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function lasted for approximately nine minutes. Area temperatures had no notable change based on field observations during the condition.

"The UPS HVAC system provides temperature control for the safety related UPS and distribution rooms during all normal and accident conditions. The UPS HVAC system consists of (a) a dedicated UPS room EFCU in each safety-related UPS and distribution room, and (b) two electrically independent and redundant A/C trains either of which can support all four safety related UPS and distribution rooms; each train consists of an air conditioning unit, ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.