Event Notification Report for February 27, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

The following was received from the the Virginia Office of Radiological Health, Radioactive Materials Program via email:

"At approximately 1743 EST, on 2/16/2024, the Virginia Office of Radiological Health was notified of an incident involving a portable nuclear gauge. At approximately 1600 EST, a Troxler gauge; Model 3430, containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, was struck by a dump truck on a building construction site located in Chester, VA. The authorized user notified the radiation safety officer (RSO) who arrived on site and then he notified the Virginia Emergency Management's Operations Center at approximately 1630 EST.

"Per the RSO, the gauge was sitting on soil with the source in the retracted, shielded position when it was run over by a dump truck. The source remained in the shielded position, but the handle was bent slightly. He did not attempt to turn it on or extend the rod for any reason. He obtained survey readings of 2.5 mR/h at 12 inches and 0.1 mR/h at 3 feet from the gauge. The gauge was placed in its transportation box, secured in the back of a pickup truck, and transported back to the licensee's office for secure storage. The gauge will be sent to the manufacturer for assessment.

"The Radioactive Materials Program will follow up with an investigation."

Virginia Report Number: VA240002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCES

The following information was provided by the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) via fax:

"The Radiation Safety Officer for NRD, LLC (NYS Radioactive Materials License number: C1429) contacted the NYSDOH on February 20, 2024, regarding a shipment of 10,000 Americium-241 foils (approximately 0.77microCi per foil) that were shipped and lost via common carrier. The model is A-001. The destination for this shipment was El Paso, Texas.

"On January 22, 2024, NRD, LLC shipped 11 boxes, each box containing 10,000 units of Americium-241. The shipment was picked up by a common carrier through Buffalo, New York, to El Paso, Texas. The client confirmed that only 10 of the 11 shipped boxes were delivered. The Tracking ID (774896057866) indicated that the missing package in question was unaccounted for in/after the Buffalo, New York location. In reviewing the other 10 shipments, stops were made in Buffalo, New York, Binghamton, New York, Fort Worth, Texas and eventually to El Paso, Texas.

"NRD, LLC requested that the common carrier investigate the location of this lost shipment (Case Number C-138364453 Reference-46194) and the common carrier confirmed that they were unable to locate this shipment on February 13, 2024. To date, this shipment is still missing. NYSDOH is actively monitoring this incident and has assigned Incident number 1475 to track this event. NYSDOH has contacted Texas for awareness, as this event involves their client. NRD, LLC will be contacting their client intermittently and monitoring their returned shipments if this package is delivered or returned to sender. In accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 (d), NRD, LLC, will be reporting any substantive information to the loss of these devices within 30 days of their awareness. Additional information will be reported to NMED once available."

NYSDOH EVENT REPORT ID NUMBER: NY-24-02


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via phone call and email from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department):

"On February 20, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a Troxler 3440 moisture/density gauge was damaged at a temporary job site. The gauge contains a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source and an 8 millicurie cesium -137 source. The gauge operator was setting the gauge up for use when they noticed that a large number of construction equipment was moving into the area. The operator decided to move their truck out of the way and while they were doing so the gauge was struck by a piece of equipment. The RSO stated the gauge case was damaged, but the sources were not damaged. The cesium source was still in the fully shielded position when the event occurred. The RSO stated the gauge was transported back to their facility and a leak test was conducted on the sources. The RSO stated they have contacted a service company and as soon as they get the leak test results back, they will dispose of the gauge. No individual received any significant exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: 10089
Texas NMED Number: TX240007

EN Revision Imported Date: 2/26/2024

EN Revision Text: INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a Licensee Event Report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

"At approximately 2333 EST on January 1, 2024, an invalid actuation of group 6 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (i.e., containment atmospheric control/monitoring (CAC/CAM) and post-accident sampling system (PASS) isolation valves) occurred. Reactor building ventilation isolated and standby gas treatment started per design. No manipulations associated with the isolation or reset logic were ongoing at the time.

"Troubleshooting determined that the group 6 isolation signal resulted from spurious relay contact actuation in the main stack radiation high-high isolation logic due to relay contact oxidation. The main stack radiation monitor is a shared component that sends isolation signals to Unit 1 and Unit 2. There were no Unit 1 actuations. Only the relay contacts associated with Unit 2 actuated. The relay has been replaced.

"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions. It was not an intentional manual initiation and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.

"During this event the PCIVs functioned successfully, and the actuations were complete. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."

The NRC Resident Inspector had been notified.

EN Revision Imported Date: 2/26/2024

EN Revision Text: INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a Licensee Event Report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

"At approximately 0815 EST on December 28, 2023, an invalid actuation of the four emergency diesel generators (EDGs) occurred. It was determined that this condition was likely caused by spurious operation of the undervoltage relay for the startup auxiliary transformer feeder breaker to the `1D' balance of plant bus which was being fed by the unit auxiliary transformer at the time, per the normal lineup. This non-safety related EDG actuation logic was disabled, and additional investigation is planned during the upcoming refueling outage.

"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.

"During this event, the four EDGs functioned successfully, and the actuations were complete. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power and, therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses.

"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."

The NRC Resident Inspector had been notified.

PART 21 - AIR START VALVE (BENT BOTTOM STEM)

The following is a summary of the information provided by Fairbanks Morse Engine via email:

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) was conducting a planned replacement of emergency diesel generator air start solenoid valves when it discovered that the bottom stem appeared to be bent and observed air leakage. PINGP returned five valves to Fairbanks Morse, and they returned them to the manufacturer, ASCO. ASCO reassembled one valve and confirmed there was air leakage through the valve. The leakage path was from the air supply port to the exhaust port when the valve was in the de-energized normally open state. ASCO functionally tested the remaining four valves and found a second valve that also leaked.

ASCO and Fairbanks Morse have implemented corrective actions to address this issue. Fairbanks Morse will notify PINGP and Limerick Generating Station.

Affected plants with potentially defected parts: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant and Limerick Generating Station.

Point of Contact:
Martin Kurr
Quality Assurance Manager
Fairbanks Morse
608-364-8247
Martin.Kurr@fmdefense.com

Fairbanks Morse Notification Report Number: 23-01

PART 21 - MINI-GEN SIGNAL GENERATOR DEFECT

The following is a summary of the information provided by Fairbanks Morse Engine via email:

Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 2 had a failure of a mini-gen signal generator on the opposed piston emergency diesel generator. Bench testing after removal from the engine showed an erratic signal, and this was confirmed by Fairbanks Morse. Fairbanks Morse destructive analysis revealed wear of the dynamic surface on the stator bushing inside diameter. The cause of the worn stator bushing is most likely due to inadequate lubrication on the dynamic surfaces, outside diameter of the shaft and inside diameter of the stator bushing. Possible causes of inadequate lubrication could be failure to apply enough lubrication to the dynamic surfaces during the manufacturing process or deterioration/evaporation over time.

Fairbanks Morse has implemented corrective actions to address this issue, and they are estimated to be completed by May 23, 2024.

Affected plants with potentially defected parts: Arkansas Nuclear One, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Generating Station, Limerick Generating Station, and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.

Point of Contact:
Martin Kurr
Quality Assurance Manager
Fairbanks Morse
608-364-8247
Martin.Kurr@fmdefense.com

Fairbanks Morse Notification Report Number: 23-02