Event Notification Report for January 19, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE STUCK IN UNSHIELDED POSITION

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On January 11, 2024, the licensee's service company reported to the Department that when the licensee's radiation safety officer was verifying a lock-out on an Ohmart SHLM-BR-2 fixed gauge, containing a 1,000 millicurie cesium-137 source, he found that the source had separated from the insertion rod and therefore could not be returned to the fully shielded position. The gauge operates by rod insertion of the source into a housing that is inside the reactor unit. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to get the gauge repaired. There have been no exposures as a result of this event, and none are expected due to the location of the gauge. The intended work on the unit has been postponed until the gauge is repaired and the source can be returned to the fully shielded position. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: 10079
Texas NMED # TX240002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email.

"On Thursday, January 11, 2024, the Agency received written notification from the radiation safety officer (RSO) at a nuclear pharmacy of an elevated dosimetry badge report for a worker in Romeoville, IL. The whole body dose reported would exceed the occupational limits in 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.210. The information provided indicates the worker received 162,926 mrem during the week of December 11, 2023, which exceeds the annual limit of 5,000 mrem. This is a reportable incident under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1230, and will be reported to NRC and NMED. While an investigation is underway to determine the cause of this overexposure, after speaking with the RSO, it is likely the result of a spill/splash event. If this spill resulted in an occupational exposure in excess of the limits, it is also reportable under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(b) and will be reported to the NRC today. In the next week, Agency inspectors will perform a reactionary inspection to inspect the adequacy of the licensee's investigation, compliance with the Agency's regulations, and determine the root cause."

NMED Item Number: IL240002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST FIXED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) via email:

"The MDH was notified on 1/12/2024, by PPL Group LLC, a representative for ERP Iron Ore, LLC Plant 2, of a missing/lost fixed gauge from the licensee's location listed above. PPL Group LLC contracted a waste broker to dispose of the registered generally licensed devices located at the plant. The completed inventory indicates that one device is missing. The missing device is a Berthold model LB74400-CR, serial number 0240/12 containing a 50 mCi Cs-137 source (assay date of 3/20/2014).

"MDH will do an inspection next week and will continue to keep the NRC informed of the status of our investigation."



THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CARBON-14 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following information was provided by the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On January 12, 2024, the Department received notification from the licensee that 568 millicuries of C-14 was found to be missing on December 14, 2023. The licensee stated that the radioactive material was last seen sometime in July of 2023 during their last manufacturing run. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event."

Arizona Incident: 24-001

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

NON-POWER REACTOR - ADMINISTRATIVE TECH SPEC VIOLATION

The following is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee via email and phone call:

On January 17th, at 1616 MST, the Reactor Supervisor violated Technical Specification (TS) 6.1.12.a. During an NRC exam, a trainee was operating the reactor under the supervision of the reactor supervisor. The doorbell rang, and the supervisor requested that the reactor be scrammed and the console power be turned off, which was accomplished. The supervisor then stepped out of the reactor room, but the key remained in the console, thus the reactor was unsecured. TS 6.1.12.a requires one reactor operator or reactor supervisor to be in the room when the reactor is not secured.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL DEGRADED DUE TO SERVICE WATER LEAKAGE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On January 18, 2024, at 0030 PST, diesel generator 2 (DG2) was shut down following a monthly surveillance run. Subsequently, a leak was discovered in the DG2 building. Service water pump '1B' was secured at 0117, effectively stopping the leak. The leak was determined to be service water coming from a diesel generator mixed air cooling coil. Service water system 'B' and DG2 were subsequently declared inoperable at 0135. After discussion with engineering, it was identified that the amount of service water leakage from the cooling coil was assumed to be greater than the leakage allowed by the calculation to assure adequate water in the ultimate heat sink to meet the required mission time of 30 days.

"At 1204, it was determined that entry into Technical Specification 3.7.1 condition D was warranted since the assumed leakage from the cooling coil could exceed the calculated allowed value. At 1238, the control power fuses for service water pump '1B' were removed. DG2 and service water system 'B' were declared unavailable, and the technical specification condition for the inoperable ultimate heat sink was exited. With the control power fuses removed, the pump is kept from auto starting, effectively preventing the leak and ensuring the safety function of the ultimate heat sink is maintained while the cooling coil is repaired or replaced.

"Due to the leakage assumed greater than the calculated allowable value this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.

"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public."

The NRC Resident has been notified.