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Event Notification Report for October 06, 2020

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/5/2020 - 10/6/2020

** EVENT NUMBERS **

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor	Event Number: 54738
Facility: Millstone Region: 1 State: CT Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: Alison Davenport HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia	Notification Date: 06/05/2020 Notification Time: 10:39 [ET] Event Date: 06/05/2020 Event Time: 03:20 [EDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation	Person (Organization): MATT YOUNG (R1DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

Startup

Event Text

EN Revision Imported Date : 10/6/2020

EN Revision Text: CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR FAILURE

"On June 5, 2020, at 0320 [EDT] a loss of control room envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable due to failure of door 204-36-007. The door was repaired at 0322 [EDT], restoring the CRE to operable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local authorities were notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 07/09/2020 AT 1443 EDT FROM GERALD A. BAKER TO OSSY FONT * * *

"The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on June 5, 2020, NRC Event Number EN54738.

"NRC Event Report number EN54738 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position.

"The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation determined that even with the control room boundary door unable to be fully closed due to the latching mechanism being stuck in, the extended position, control room air in-leakage would not have been sufficient to prevent the control room emergency ventilation system from performing its safety function.

"Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN54738 is being retracted.

"The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL GAGNON TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1444 EDT ON 10/01/2020 * * *

"The purpose of this call is to provide an update to the retraction for a report made on June 5, 2020, NRC Event Number EN54738. The retraction being updated was made on 7/9/2020 at 1443 hours.

"NRC Event Report number EN54738 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (the Control Room Envelope).

"A subsequent engineering evaluation of the conditions that existed at the time, determined that the inability of the control room boundary door to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position did not have an adverse impact upon the ability of the CRE to perform its safety function. The CRE remained operable throughout this event, and the ventilation system would have performed its safety function.
Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN54738 is being retracted.

"The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R1DO (Lally).

Agreement State	Event Number: 54911
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: Pixelle Specialty Solutions LLC Region: 1 City: Spring Grove State: PA County: License #: PA-1631 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: Joshua Myers HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited	Notification Date: 09/25/2020 Notification Time: 12:20 [ET] Event Date: 08/24/2020 Event Time: 00:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/25/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Section: Agreement State	Person (Organization): DONNA JANDA (R1DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following was received from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection via email:

"On August 24, 2020, the licensee identified a failure of the shutter assembly and indicator on one of its Valmet Multi-Filler Module, Serial Number 0022 containing 20 mCi of lron-55. The shutter had failed closed. The gauge was immediately removed from service. The manufacturer was contacted, and the broken shutter mechanism was removed and replaced on August 26, 2020. The shutter mechanism was then tested and confirmed as operating properly. No exposures were resulted from this event."

Event Report ID No.: PA200018

Agreement State	Event Number: 54912
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: Eurofins TestAmerica Region: 3 City: North Canton State: OH County: License #: GL Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: Michael Snee HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited	Notification Date: 09/25/2020 Notification Time: 13:59 [ET] Event Date: 09/16/2020 Event Time: 00:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/25/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Section: Agreement State	Person (Organization): JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE

The following is a summary of the email received from the State of Ohio:

The licensee discovered that one of their Electron Capture Detectors (Model: G2397A; S/N: U23974; Source: Ni-63 0.015 Ci) was leaking during a routine leak test. The source has been transferred for disposal.

Item Number: OH200008

Agreement State	Event Number: 54915
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL Licensee: Cardinal Health 414 Sarasota Region: 1 City: Sarasota State: FL County: License #: 3453-1 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: Reno J Fabii HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia	Notification Date: 09/26/2020 Notification Time: 11:13 [ET] Event Date: 09/26/2020 Event Time: 00:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/26/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Section: Agreement State	Person (Organization): DONNA JANDA (R1DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - VEHICLE CARRYING RADIO-PHARMACEUTICALS INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT

The following was received from the state of Florida via email:

"A transport vehicle carrying radio-pharmaceuticals was rear-ended at the intersection of County road 39 and State road 62 in Parrish Florida. Duette Fire rescue is on scene with a representative from the pharmaceutical company. The shipping papers indicate 227 mCi of Tc-99m but the driver had already made several stops and may have additional radioactive waste materials not on manifest. Cardinal Health Sarasota has taken custody of all packages."

Florida Incident Number: FL20-110.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 54931
Facility: Browns Ferry Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [] [] [3] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: Casey Cartwright HQ OPS Officer: Howie Crouch	Notification Date: 10/05/2020 Notification Time: 13:51 [ET] Event Date: 08/06/2020 Event Time: 01:28 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation	Person (Organization): MARK MILLER (R2DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

100

Power Operation

100

Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of an emergency service water system component that does not normally run and which provides an ultimate heat sink.

"On August 6, 2020, at approximately 0128 CDT, the A3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump received an auto-start signal while performing Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) on the 3C Core Spray pump. Normally, the involved EECW pump would be started prior to testing to prevent an auto-start; however, in this case the pump was not running prior to the test. When the 3C Core Spray pump breaker was closed while in the test position, an unanticipated actuation of the A3 EECW pump occurred. Work was stopped and the workers reported to the Control Room to evaluate the condition. Based on a review of this event, individuals involved were coached on understanding system response prior to performing work.

"The A3 EECW pump responded in accordance with the plant design. No other plant equipment was affected during this event. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Reference corrective action document CR 1628479. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 54932
Facility: Browns Ferry Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: Casey Cartwright HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited	Notification Date: 10/05/2020 Notification Time: 14:25 [ET] Event Date: 08/06/2020 Event Time: 17:49 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/05/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation	Person (Organization): MARK MILLER (R2DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

100

Power Operation

100

Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On August 6, 2020, at approximately 1749 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2 experienced a loss of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus 2A. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolated in response to this event. The PCIS isolations caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains A, B, and C, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem A. Unit 2 declared RCS leakage detection instrumentation inoperable and entered TS LCO 3.4.5 condition A, B, and D with required action D.1 to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately. Unit 2 entered TS LCO 3.0.3 with required actions to be in Mode 2 within 10 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Upon investigation, it was discovered that an age-related overheating condition resulted in the failure of the 2A RPS Motor Generator (MG) set, causing the feeder beaker from the 2A 480v Remote Motor-Operated Valve distribution board to trip. On August 6, 2020, at approximately 1808 CDT, Operations personnel commenced restoration of Unit 2 to normal after transferring 2A RPS to its alternate power supply. The 2A RPS MG Set drive motor was replaced on August 24, 2020.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel (RV) Low Water Level or Drywell High Pressure. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 3 actuations are RV Low Water Level or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are RV Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 8 actuations are Reactor Vessel (RV) Low Water Level or Drywell High Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"All affected safety systems responded as expected. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1628707. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021